[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FILED
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
________________________ ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
JULY 19, 2005
No. 05-10668 THOMAS K. KAHN
Non-Argument Calendar CLERK
________________________
D. C. Docket No. 04-00417-CV-FTM-29-DNF
MICHAEL S. GOGOLA,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
JAMES ZINGALE,
Defendant-Appellee,
FLORIDA DEPARTMENT OF REVENUE, et al.,
Defendants.
________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
_________________________
(July 19, 2005)
Before ANDERSON, BIRCH and CARNES, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Michael S. Gogola, proceeding pro se, appeals the district court’s dismissal
of his civil rights action for lack of jurisdiction. Because Gogola’s claims
regarding Florida’s alimony laws were “inextricably intertwined” with the state
court’s final judgment of dissolution of his marriage, and he had a reasonable
opportunity to raise his claims in state court, his instant action was barred by the
Rooker-Feldman 1 doctrine. Accordingly, the district court lacked jurisdiction to
review Gogola’s claims. We AFFIRM.
I. BACKGROUND
In an amended verified complaint, Gogola filed an action against James
Zingale, the Chairman and Executive Director of the Florida Department of
Revenue, and the Florida Department of Revenue (collectively “the defendants”),
and maintained that Florida’s “Dissolution of Marriage” alimony provisions (“the
alimony provisions”), including Fla. Stat. § 61.08, were unconstitutional under the
United States Constitution because they violated (1) his rights to privacy and equal
protection under the Fourteenth Amendment, and (2) the Thirteenth Amendment’s
1
The Rooker-Feldman doctrine is based on the following two cases: District of
Columbia v. Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 103 S. Ct. 1303 (1983), and Rooker v.
Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 44 S. Ct. 149 (1923).
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prohibition against involuntary servitude.2 He also asserted that the alimony
provisions (1) were unconstitutional under the Florida Constitution because they
violated his right to privacy, right to equal protection, and inalienable basic rights,
and (2) violated Florida Supreme Court precedent and public policy.
In support of his complaint, Gogola indicated the following: (1) in 1969, he
married Sandra S. Gogola (“Sandra”); (2) in 1999, the 20th Judicial Circuit in Lee
County, Florida, entered a final judgment of dissolution of marriage, in which the
court ordered him to pay alimony to Sandra until he or Sandra dies, or Sandra
remarries; (3) he has tried to comply with the court’s alimony order, but
occasionally has failed to make payments, and several contempt orders have been
entered against him; (4) although he has not previously raised his federal claims in
any court, he has raised some of his state claims in state court, but the court denied
him relief; and (5) the Second District Court of Appeals dismissed his appeal
without analysis or opinion. Gogola requested a declaratory judgment that the
alimony provisions violated the United States Constitution, the Florida
Constitution, Florida Supreme Court precedent, and Florida public policy.
2
The complaint also included (1) the U.S. District Court, Middle District of Florida, and
(2) Patricia C. Fawcett, U.S. District Court Chief Judge, as defendants. Gogola later voluntarily
dismissed these parties.
3
Gogola attached, inter alia, documents relating to the 20th Judicial Circuit’s
final judgment of dissolution of marriage. These documents indicate that, after the
20th Judicial Circuit ordered Gogola to pay alimony to Sandra, Gogola filed a
motion, requesting, inter alia, a declaratory judgment that the alimony provisions
(1) were unconstitutional under the Florida Constitution, and (2) violated the Due
Process Clause of the United States Constitution. The 20th Judicial Court entered
an order denying Gogola relief, and the Second District Court of Appeal dismissed
Gogola’s appeal on the ground that the order was nonappealable.
The defendants filed a motion to dismiss the amended verified complaint.
The defendants argued, inter alia, that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred the
district court from reviewing Gogola’s claims because (1) Gogola was a party to
the state court dissolution proceedings, (2) the final judgment of dissolution of
marriage was a final judgment on the merits, (3) Gogola had a reasonable
opportunity to raise his federal claims during the dissolution proceedings and did
raise some of his claims therein, and (4) Gogola’s federal claims were inextricably
intertwined with the state court’s judgment. Gogola responded that the defendants’
motion to dismiss should be denied and argued, inter alia, that (1) because he was
raising a general constitutional challenge to the alimony provisions, the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine was inapplicable, (2) since he was not asking the court to issue a
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divorce, alimony, or custody decree, the court should not abstain from reviewing
his claims, and (3) the court had supplemental jurisdiction over his state claims.
The district court granted the defendant’s motion to dismiss. The district
court found that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine barred it from reviewing Gogola’s
claims that the alimony provisions were unconstitutional or a violation of federal
law because (1) these claims were inextricably intertwined with the state court’s
dissolution judgment, since Gogola was, in essence, seeking to reverse the portion
of the order that required him to pay alimony, and (2) Gogola had a reasonable
opportunity to raise his claims during the dissolution proceedings. Citing Doe v.
Pryor, 344 F.3d 1282 (11th Cir. 2003), the court also found that Gogola lacked
standing to raise a general challenge to the constitutionality of the alimony
provisions. Gogola filed a motion to reconsider and argued that the court failed
liberally to construe his pleadings and that the court’s reliance on Doe was
misplaced since his case was distinguishable from Doe. The district court found
that Gogola failed to demonstrate good cause to justify the remedy of
reconsideration and denied Gogola’s motion.3
3
On appeal, Gogola has failed to raise any arguments relating to how the district court erred
by denying his motion for reconsideration. Issues not argued on appeal are deemed waived, and a
passing reference in an appellate brief is insufficient to raise an issue. Greenbriar, Ltd. v. City of
Alabaster, 881 F.2d 1570, 1573 n.6 (11th Cir. 1989). Accordingly, Gogola has waived his appeal
of the district court’s denial of his motion for reconsideration. See id.
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II. DISCUSSION
On appeal, Gogola argues that the district court erred by finding that it
lacked jurisdiction under the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Specifically, Gogola
asserts that: (1) his action was a constitutional civil rights action not based on
family law; (2) he was not seeking to overturn a state court judgment; (3) he did
not have a reasonable opportunity to raise his federal claims in state court; and (4)
judicial economy mitigates against abstention.
We review de novo a dismissal for lack of subject matter jurisdiction.
Williams v. Best Buy Co., 269 F.3d 1316, 1318 (11th Cir. 2001). “The
Rooker-Feldman doctrine places limits on the subject-matter jurisdiction of federal
district courts and courts of appeal over certain matters related to previous state
court litigation.” Goodman v. Sipos, 259 F.3d 1327, 1332 (11th Cir. 2001).
Under this doctrine, “federal courts, other than the . . . Supreme Court, have no
authority to review the final judgments of state courts,” which “extends not only to
constitutional claims presented or adjudicated by a state court, but also to claims
that are ‘inextricably intertwined’ with a state court judgment.” Id. (citation and
quotations omitted). “A federal claim is inextricably intertwined with a state court
judgment if the federal claim succeeds only to the extent that the state court
wrongly decided the issues before it.” Id. (citation and quotations omitted).
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Nevertheless, “even if a claim is ‘inextricably intertwined’ with the state court’s
judgment, the doctrine does not apply if the plaintiff had no ‘reasonable
opportunity to raise his federal claim in state proceedings.’” Id. (citation and
quotations omitted).
The district court did not err by granting the defendant’s motion to dismiss
because Gogola’s suit was barred by the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Although
Gogola asserts that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine did not bar his federal action
because he was not trying to overturn the state court’s final judgment of dissolution
of marriage, the Rooker-Feldman doctrine also prevents a party from raising claims
that are “inextricably intertwined” with a state court judgment. See Goodman, 259
F.3d at 1332. Gogola’s claims were “inextricably intertwined” with the state
court’s judgment because Gogola, by challenging the constitutionality of the
alimony statute, in essence, was attempting to reverse the state court’s order
regarding the payment of alimony. Additionally, Gogola had a reasonable
opportunity to raise his federal claims in state court and, in fact, did file a motion
requesting a declaratory judgment that the alimony provisions violated the Due
Process Clause of the United States Constitution, which the state court denied. See
id.
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III. CONCLUSION
The district court correctly found that this action is barred by application of
the Rooker-Feldman doctrine. Accordingly, we AFFIRM.
8