FILED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION
NOV 30 2018
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
YESSICA TICAS-GUILLEN, No. 16-72981
Petitioner, Agency No. A202-002-399
v.
MEMORANDUM*
MATTHEW G. WHITAKER, Acting
Attorney General,
Respondent.
On Petition for Review of an Order of the
Board of Immigration Appeals
Argued and Submitted November 16, 2018
San Francisco, California
Before: SCHROEDER and WATFORD, Circuit Judges, and KORMAN,** District
Judge.
After being sexually assaulted in her home country of El Salvador, petitioner
Yessica Ticas-Guillen fled to the United States, where she applied for asylum,
withholding of removal, and protection under the Convention Against Torture
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The Honorable Edward R. Korman, United States District Judge for
the Eastern District of New York, sitting by designation.
(“CAT”). An Immigration Judge (“IJ”) denied her applications. The Board of
Immigration Appeals affirmed, upholding the rejection of Ticas-Guillen’s asylum
and withholding claims on the IJ’s stated ground that her proposed social group –
“women in El Salvador” – was “just too broad.”
Both parties now agree that we must remand for the Board to consider
whether this proposed social group is cognizable in light of our precedent. The IJ’s
ground for denial – that the proposed social group was “just too broad” to satisfy
the “particularity” requirement – cannot stand. Under our law, gender and
nationality can form a particular social group. See Perdomo v. Holder, 611 F.3d
662, 669 (9th Cir. 2010) (reversing Board’s finding that “all women in Guatemala”
is an overly broad and internally diverse group; warning that the “size and breadth
of a group alone does not preclude [it] from qualifying as [a particular] social
group”); see also Mohammed v. Gonzales, 400 F.3d 785, 797 (9th Cir. 2005)
(“[T]he recognition that girls or women of a particular clan or nationality[,] or even
in some circumstances females in general[,] may constitute a social group is simply
a logical application of our law.”) (internal parentheses omitted).
Former Attorney General Sessions’s recent opinion clarifies what is required
to be considered a “particular social group.” See Matter of A-B-, 27 I. & N. Dec.
316 (June 11, 2018). The opinion explains that this is a “recurring question in
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asylum law” for which the “standard has evolved,” and emphasizes that “[w]hen
confronted with asylum cases based on purported membership in a particular social
group, the Board . . . must analyze the requirements as set forth in this opinion,
which restates and where appropriate, elaborates upon, th[ose] requirements.” Id.
at 318-19.
We therefore grant the petition as to Ticas-Guillen’s withholding and asylum
claims and, consistent with the government’s position, remand to the Board to
further analyze (1) whether Ticas-Guillen’s proposed social group is cognizable;
and (2) whether her social group was “a reason” for her persecution. See Barajas-
Romero v. Lynch, 846 F.3d 351, 359-60 (9th Cir. 2017) (clarifying applicants need
only prove that their protected status was “a reason,” not “one central reason,” for
their persecution); see also Perdomo, 611 F.3d at 669 (remanding for similar
reasons); Gonzalez-Solares v. Whitaker, No.16-72740, 2018 WL 5876986, at *2
(9th Cir. Nov. 8, 2018) (same); Silvestre-Mendoza v. Sessions, 729 F. App’x 597,
598-99 (9th Cir. 2018) (same).
We deny relief as to the CAT claim. Although Ticas-Guillen argues that
the Salvadorian government has been generally ineffective in preventing sexual
assaults against women, we have pointed out that the government “does not
acquiesce in the torture of its citizens merely because it is aware of torture but
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powerless to stop it.” Garcia-Milian v. Holder, 755 F.3d 1026, 1034 (9th Cir.
2014) (quoting Mouawad v. Gonzales, 485 F.3d 405, 413 (8th Cir. 2007)).
PETITION FOR REVIEW GRANTED in part; DENIED in part;
REMANDED.
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