2018 IL App (3d) 160408
Opinion filed November 9, 2018
Modified upon denial of rehearing December 12, 2018
_____________________________________________________________________________
IN THE
APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS
THIRD DISTRICT
2018
THE PEOPLE OF THE STATE OF ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
ILLINOIS, ) of the 10th Judicial Circuit,
) Peoria County, Illinois,
Plaintiff-Appellee, )
) Appeal No. 3-16-0408
v. ) Circuit No. 06-CF-359
)
JOE LEE STEWART, ) Honorable
) John P. Vespa,
Defendant-Appellant. ) Judge, Presiding.
_____________________________________________________________________________
JUSTICE O’BRIEN delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justice Lytton concurred in the judgment and opinion.
Justice Schmidt dissented, with opinion.
_____________________________________________________________________________
OPINION
¶1 Defendant, Joe Lee Stewart, appeals the trial court’s order granting the State’s motion to
dismiss his section 2-1401 petition. Specifically, defendant argues that the court erred in
considering the petition as a successive postconviction petition without informing defendant. We
vacate the court’s order dismissing defendant’s petition and remand the matter with directions
that the court admonish defendant regarding its recharacterization of the petition.
¶ 2 FACTS
¶3 Defendant was convicted of first degree murder (720 ILCS 5/9-1(a)(1) (West 2004)) for
causing the death of Leon Riley. The court sentenced defendant to 30 years’ imprisonment plus a
firearm enhancement of 25 years’ imprisonment. Defendant was represented by Assistant Public
Defender Mark Rose throughout the pretrial proceedings, the trial, and sentencing. On appeal,
we awarded defendant additional presentence custody credit but otherwise affirmed defendant’s
conviction and sentence. People v. Stewart, No. 3-06-0874 (2008) (unpublished summary order
under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23(c)).
¶4 On September 8, 2008, defendant filed a pro se postconviction petition alleging,
inter alia, that defendant’s trial counsel labored under a conflict of interest. Specifically, the
petition alleged: “Trial counsel was ineffective for failing to make the petitioner aware of his
connection to the victim and the vi[c]tim’s family, by not presenting petitioner with a[n]
intelligent waiver prepared by counsel to inform the petitioner of his rights under such
circumstances.” The trial court summarily dismissed the petition. On appeal, we affirmed the
summary dismissal. People v. Stewart, 405 Ill. App. 3d 1216 (2010) (table) (unpublished order
under Illinois Supreme Court Rule 23). We reasoned that defendant “failed to attach any
affidavits, records, or other evidence to support his allegations of conflict of interest.” Id., slip
order at 6. We also reasoned that defendant failed to allege sufficient facts to “make clear the
nature of the conflict of interest he allege[d].” Id.
¶5 On July 9, 2015, defendant filed a pro se pleading titled “Motion in Nature of Writ of
Error Coram Nobis,” which is the subject of the instant appeal. The pleading indicated that
defendant was seeking relief under section 2-1401 of the Code of Civil Procedure (Code) (735
ILCS 5/2-1401 (West 2014)). In the motion, defendant argued that Rose had previously
represented Riley and failed to disclose this conflict to defendant. Defendant attached to his
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motion a document titled “Case Summary Case No. 02-CF-00053-1.” This document indicated
that Leon D. Riley had been convicted of aggravated robbery in 2002. The document listed the
“Lead Attorneys” as “A. Purham” and “M. Rose.” Defendant alleged that he had relied on family
members to supply him with the case summary and that he “exercised due diligence in securing
this information/evidence as directed by the appellate court.”
¶6 The court held a status hearing on defendant’s pro se pleading. The court asked defendant
if he was making a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Defendant said yes. The court
asked defendant if he had brought that claim before the court in prior proceedings. Defendant
said that his previous appeal was denied because he did not have documentation to support the
claim. The court asked the State if it had filed a response to defendant’s pleading. The assistant
state’s attorney replied: “No, sir. I’m not sure that it is even proper character in his post
conviction petition. If the Court wants to characterize as that, I guess I would ask we set it for
motions to be filed.” The assistant state’s attorney stated that the pleading was “not obviously on
its face a post-conviction petition.” The court noted that the State might not have been served
with the pleading and gave the State 30 days to respond.
¶7 The court then appointed an assistant public defender to represent defendant. The
assistant public defender asked the court what type of case it was. The court replied: “Well,
okay, I will call it for purposes of answering your question, post conviction, post conviction
case.” The court told the assistant public defender to inform the court if he reviewed the case and
determined that it was not a postconviction case. The assistant public defender stated that he
believed defendant’s pleading was a section 2-1401 petition and that defendant was not entitled
to court-appointed counsel. The court replied:
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“The problem is he didn’t label this like he should have. It is no big deal. I don’t
care, but that has got us where you just can’t go to the one pleading and see a
label on there and know one way or the other whether to appoint the Public
Defender, and I would rather not take his word for it.”
The court gave the assistant public defender 30 minutes to review the pleading. After the recess,
the court indicated that the case would be continued. The record does not show any further
discussion between the court and the assistant public defender, nor does it show that the trial
court admonished defendant that it intended to recharacterize the petition.
¶8 On May 13, 2016, the State filed a “Motion to Dismiss Defendant’s Petition for Relief
from Judgment,” which characterized defendant’s pleading as a section 2-1401 petition. The
motion to dismiss argued that defendant’s petition was untimely under section 2-1401(c) of the
Code (id. § 2-1401(c)) because it was filed more than two years after the entry of judgment. The
motion also argued that defendant’s petition improperly attempted to relitigate an issue that he
previously raised in other collateral proceedings and that defendant’s petition was insufficient on
its face because trial counsel’s alleged prior representation of the murder victim was not a per se
conflict of interest.
¶9 On June 10, 2016, a hearing was held on the State’s motion to dismiss. Defendant
appeared pro se at the hearing. The record does not indicate that the public defender had
withdrawn as counsel. At the hearing, the court and the State referred to defendant’s pleading as
a petition for relief from judgment. Defendant asked to file a pro se response to the State’s
motion to dismiss. The State did not object, and the court indicated that it would consider
defendant’s written response.
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¶ 10 In the written response, defendant argued that trial counsel’s prior representation of Riley
created a per se conflict of interest. Defendant stated that this was a violation of his sixth
amendment right to effective assistance of counsel and requested that the court recharacterize his
section 2-1401 petition as a successive postconviction petition. Defendant attached a notarized
affidavit stating that he was never informed of his trial counsel’s prior representation of Riley or
given the chance to waive his right to conflict-free counsel. Defendant also attached a “Motion
for Leave to File Successive Post-Conviction Petition Pursuant to 725 ILCS 5/122-1(f).” In this
motion, defendant alleged that there was cause for his failure to bring the claim in his previous
postconviction petition because he was waiting on family members to obtain the case summary
documenting trial counsel’s prior representation of Riley. Defendant also alleged that prejudice
resulted from his failure to bring the claim earlier because “the claim infected [his] judgment of
conviction.”
¶ 11 The court entered a written order granting the State’s motion to dismiss. The court
referred to defendant’s pro se pleading as a postconviction petition throughout the written order.
The court reasoned that defendant’s petition was untimely, his claim was barred by the doctrine
of res judicata, and the petition “fail[ed] to ‘clearly set forth the respects in which petitioner’s
constitutional rights were violated.’ ” The order stated that it was a final judgment pursuant to
section 122-2.1(a)(2) of the Post-Conviction Hearing Act (Act) (725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2) (West
2014)).
¶ 12 ANALYSIS
¶ 13 Defendant argues that the court erred in dismissing his section 2-1401 petition by
“(1) considering the petition as a successive post-conviction petition without informing
[defendant]; (2) appointing counsel and then having [defendant] proceed pro se; and
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(3) requiring [defendant] to show prejudice from the per se conflict.” We find that this matter
must be remanded because the court failed to properly admonish defendant before
recharacterizing defendant’s pro se pleading as a postconviction petition.
¶ 14 “[W]here a pro se pleading alleges a deprivation of rights cognizable in a postconviction
proceeding, a trial court may treat the pleading as a postconviction petition, even where the
pleading is labeled differently.” People v. Shellstrom, 216 Ill. 2d 45, 53 (2005). However, before
recharacterizing a pleading as a postconviction petition, the trial court must give the defendant
several admonitions (Shellstrom admonitions). Id. at 57. Specifically, before recharacterizing a
pro se pleading as a successive postconviction petition, the trial court must:
“(1) notify the pro se litigant that the court intends to recharacterize the pleading,
(2) warn the litigant that this recharacterization means that the petition will be
subject to the restrictions on successive postconviction petitions, and (3) provide
the litigant an opportunity to withdraw the pleading or to amend it so that it
contains all the factors and arguments appropriate to a successive postconviction
petition that the litigant believes he or she has.” People v. Pearson, 216 Ill. 2d 58,
68 (2005).
See also Shellstrom, 216 Ill. 2d at 57.
¶ 15 In the instant case, it is clear that the court recharacterized defendant’s pro se pleading as
a successive postconviction petition at some point during the proceedings. 1 At the initial status
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We disagree with the State’s position that the court recharacterized defendant’s pleading as an
initial postconviction petition rather than a successive postconviction petition. Because defendant had
previously filed an initial postconviction petition, the standards for successive postconviction petitions
necessarily applied in the event that the court recharacterized the pro se pleading as a postconviction
petition. We acknowledge that the court cited section 122-2.1(a)(2) of the Act (725 ILCS 5/122-2.1(a)(2)
(West 2014)) in its written order, which concerns first-stage summary dismissals. However, we believe
that the court’s reference to section 122-2.1(a)(2) of the Act merely indicated that the court applied the
incorrect standard after recharacterizing the pro se pleading as a postconviction petition.
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hearing, the court asked defendant if he was making a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel,
which is a constitutional claim that is cognizable in a postconviction proceeding. Defendant said
yes. The court then appointed counsel to represent defendant. Appointed counsel asked what
type of case it was, and the court replied, “I will call it for purposes of answering your question,
post conviction, post conviction case.” When appointed counsel expressed doubt as to whether
defendant’s pro se pleading was actually a successive postconviction petition, the court indicated
that defendant did not label the pleading correctly. The court told appointed counsel that he could
review the case and advise the court if he did not believe it was a postconviction case, but the
record does not indicate that counsel ever did this. Significantly, the court referred to defendant’s
pleading as a postconviction petition in its written order granting the State’s motion to dismiss.
¶ 16 Because the court recharacterized defendant’s pro se pleading as a successive
postconviction petition, the court erred in failing to (1) admonish defendant that it was
recharacterizing the pleading as a successive postconviction, (2) admonish defendant that the
petition would be subject to the strictures of the Act, and (3) give defendant an opportunity to
withdraw or amend his pleading. See Pearson, 216 Ill. 2d at 68. Accordingly, we find that the
matter must be remanded for new proceedings. Because we have found that remand is required
based on the court’s failure to give the Shellstrom admonitions, we need not reach defendant’s
alternative arguments on appeal.
¶ 17 We reject the State’s argument that the court did not err in failing to give defendant the
above admonitions because defendant requested that the court recharacterize his pro se pleading
as a successive postconviction petition in his response to the State’s motion to dismiss. The State
cites People v. Bland, 2011 IL App (4th) 100624, for the proposition that a court need not
provide Shellstrom admonitions where the court does not sua sponte recharacterize a defendant’s
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pleading. In Bland, the defendant filed a pro se pleading that cited both section 2-1401 of the
Code and section 122-1 of the Act. Id. ¶ 2. The trial court asked the defendant at a hearing
whether he wished to proceed under the Act or section 2-1401, and the defendant replied that he
wished for his pleading to be treated as a postconviction petition. Id. ¶¶ 8-9. The Bland court
held that Shellstrom admonitions were unnecessary under these circumstances. Id. ¶ 24.
¶ 18 In the instant case, unlike in Bland, defendant did not cite both the Act and section 2
1401 of the Code in his initial pro se pleading. Moreover, unlike in Bland, the record does not
clearly show at which point the court recharacterized the petition. Here, the court did not state
explicitly in its order granting the State’s motion to dismiss that it was recharacterizing
defendant’s pro se pleading as a successive postconviction petition because defendant had
requested that the court do so. Also, the court showed some intent to recharacterize the pro se
pleading as a successive postconviction petition at the initial hearing on defendant’s pro se
pleading, which occurred before defendant requested that the court recharacterize his pleading.
During that hearing, the trial court appeared to believe defendant’s pleading was in the nature of
a successive postconviction petition, and it gave the appointed public defender thirty minutes to
review the case and inform the court if he determined it was not a postconviction case. However,
there is no indication the public defender weighed in on the nature of the petition as requested by
the trial court. Thus, it is unclear whether the court recharacterized the pro se pleading after
defendant filed his motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition or earlier in the
proceedings.
¶ 19 While the dissent correctly notes that defendant filed a pro se motion for leave to file a
successive postconviction petition along with his response to the State’s motion to dismiss, it is
unclear whether the trial court actually considered this motion. The court did not expressly deny
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defendant’s motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition. Instead, the court
granted the State’s motion to dismiss, which characterized defendant’s initial pleading as a
section 2-1401 petition. The written order granting the State’s motion to dismiss did not mention
defendant’s motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition or the cause and
prejudice standard. The written order cited section 122-2.1(a)(2) of the Act (725 ILCS 5/122
2.1(a)(2) (West 2014)), which concerns first-stage summary dismissals rather than leave to file
successive petitions. The court’s reference to section 122-2.1(a)(2) rather than the cause and
prejudice standard indicates that the court did not recharacterize the pleading in response to
defendant’s motion for leave to file a successive postconviction petition.
¶ 20 In light of all of the confusion as to the nature of the pleadings, we cannot conclude that
the trial court recharacterized the pleadings at defendant’s request, which would have alleviated
the need for the Shellstrom admonitions. Giving the admonitions would have the additional
benefit of clarifying for all parties involved that the court was proceeding under the Act rather
than under section 2-1401 of the Code.
¶ 21 CONCLUSION
¶ 22 For the foregoing reasons, we vacate the judgment of the trial court. We remand the
matter to the trial court with directions to (1) admonish defendant that the court intends to
recharacterize the pleading as a successive postconviction petition, (2) warn defendant that this
recharacterization means that the petition will be subject to the restrictions on successive
postconviction petitions, and (3) provide defendant an opportunity to withdraw or amend the
pleading “so that it contains all the factors and arguments appropriate to a successive
postconviction petition that [defendant] believes he *** has.” Pearson, 216 Ill. 2d at 68.
¶ 23 Vacated and remanded with directions.
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¶ 24 JUSTICE SCHMIDT, dissenting:
¶ 25 Defendant cannot ask the court to treat his pleading as a successive postconviction
petition and then complain on appeal that the court granted his request. People v. Carter, 208 Ill.
2d 309, 319 (2003); see People v. Henderson, 2017 IL App (3d) 150550, ¶ 36; People v.
Threatte, 2017 IL App (2d) 160161, ¶ 18; People v. Henderson, 45 Ill. App. 3d 798, 802 (1977).
¶ 26 Because this does not involve a court, sua sponte, characterizing a pleading as a
successive postconviction petition, Pearson and Shellstrom are inapplicable. Unlike the
defendant in Pearson, it is clear that defendant knew what he was doing when he asked that his
pleading be filed as a successive postconviction petition. He alleged, or attempted to allege, both
cause and prejudice.
¶ 27 I also believe that the majority’s attempts to distinguish Bland clearly fail. See supra
¶¶ 17-18. While the majority is not bound to follow Bland, Bland is well-reasoned and supports
the State’s position that, under the facts of this case, no additional admonitions to defendant were
necessary.
¶ 28 Defendant’s successive postconviction petition failed to establish “cause.” The gravamen
of defendant’s argument is that his former defense attorney, Mark Rose, had previously acted as
defense counsel for defendant’s victim, Riley, in a 2002 criminal matter. In his motion for leave
to file a successive postconviction petition, the defendant pled that the cause for not filing this
motion until eight years after his trial was that he was waiting for his family to obtain the case
summary documenting trial counsel’s prior representation of Riley. As the majority points out
(supra ¶ 4), defendant unsuccessfully attempted to raise this same issue in his September 8,
2008, postconviction petition. The trial court correctly found the issue res judicata. Defendant
provides no reason why he could not obtain necessary documentation before filing his original
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postconviction petition. “I was waiting for my family” is no just cause for delay. If defendant
could obtain the records in 2015, he could have done so in 2008.
¶ 29 Again, the defendant here filed a motion for leave to file a successive postconviction
petition, asked that his claim be treated as a successive postconviction petition, and then the
majority holds that the trial court recharacterized defendant’s section 2-1401 petition as a
successive postconviction petition sua sponte, without giving admonitions to defendant. This
case is nothing like either Shellstrom or Pearson. I would affirm.
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