UNPUBLISHED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FOURTH CIRCUIT
No. 18-4322
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA,
Plaintiff - Appellee,
v.
SHEMIKA ALFRIDA PARSON WILLIAMS, a/k/a Shemika Alfrida Parson,
Defendant - Appellant.
Appeal from the United States District Court for the District of South Carolina, at
Anderson. Timothy M. Cain, District Judge. (8:17-cr-00211-TMC-1)
Submitted: December 17, 2018 Decided: December 20, 2018
Before DUNCAN and QUATTLEBAUM, Circuit Judges, and SHEDD, Senior Circuit
Judge.
Affirmed and remanded by unpublished per curiam opinion.
Lora Blanchard, Assistant Federal Public Defender, OFFICE OF THE FEDERAL
PUBLIC DEFENDER, Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellant. Daniel Josev Brewer,
Assistant United States Attorney, OFFICE OF THE UNITED STATES ATTORNEY,
Greenville, South Carolina, for Appellee.
Unpublished opinions are not binding precedent in this circuit.
PER CURIAM:
Shemika Parson Williams pleaded guilty to conspiring to possess with intent to
distribute and to distribute 50 grams or more of methamphetamine and 500 grams or
more of a mixture containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine, in violation
21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), 846 (2012), and knowingly carrying and using a
firearm in furtherance of a drug trafficking crime, in violation of 18 U.S.C.
§ 924(c)(1)(A) (2012). The district court sentenced Williams to a total of 180 months of
imprisonment—the statutory mandatory minimum of 120 months on the drug charge, and
the statutory mandatory consecutive 60 month term on the firearm count—and 5 years of
supervised release. On appeal, counsel has filed a brief pursuant to Anders v. California,
386 U.S. 738 (1967), questioning whether the length of Williams’ sentence is
substantively reasonable. Williams has also filed a pro se supplemental brief raising two
issues. We affirm the conviction and sentence and remand to correct a clerical error in
the judgment. *
Williams’ counsel questions whether the district court’s sentence of 180 months’
imprisonment and five years’ supervised release was substantively reasonable. Under
Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38 (2007), we review sentences under a deferential abuse-
of-discretion standard. Id. at 41. “A statutorily required sentence . . . is per se
*
Williams pleaded guilty to conspiracy, yet the judgment does not reference
§ 846, the applicable conspiracy statute. We therefore remand the case so that the district
court may amend the judgment to reflect that Williams pleaded guilty to violating
21 U.S.C. §§ 841(a)(1), (b)(1)(A), 846. See Fed. R. Crim. P. 36 (correcting clerical
error).
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reasonable.” United States v. Farrior, 535 F.3d 210, 224 (4th Cir. 2008), abrogated on
other grounds by Rodriguez v. United States, 135 S. Ct. 1609 (2015). Because the district
court imposed the statutory minimum sentence, we conclude that Williams cannot
establish that her sentence of imprisonment is substantively unreasonable.
In her pro se supplemental brief, Williams first challenges her conviction under §
924(c)(1)(A), asserting that it is invalid following the Supreme Court’s holding in
Sessions v. Dimaya, 138 S. Ct. 1204 (2018), which held that the residual clause of
18 U.S.C. § 16(b) (2012) is unconstitutionally vague. Id. at 1215-16. Williams’
conviction does not implicate the Dimaya ruling because Williams was not convicted
under § 924(c)’s crime of violence clause. See Id. at 1210 (defining question addressed).
Instead, Williams was convicted under § 924(c)’s drug trafficking clause. Therefore, the
district court did not err in finding Williams guilty of violating § 924(c).
Williams’ next claims that her sentence violates Alleyne v. United States, 570 U.S.
99 (2013), because the district court improperly found facts that increased her sentence,
in violation of the Sixth Amendment. Williams argues that the district court erred in
finding her responsible for the entire quantity of methamphetamine and the firearm found
in the vehicle she was driving during her traffic stop. However, Alleyne distinguishes
those factual findings that raise the minimum or maximum sentence a defendant faces
from those that inform the district court’s choice of sentence within the minimum and
maximum ranges. Id. at 111-17. “[F]actfinding used to guide judicial discretion in
selecting a punishment within limits fixed by law” does not violate the Sixth
Amendment. Id. at 113 n.2 (internal quotation marks omitted).
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Here, Williams pleaded guilty to conspiring to possess with intent to distribute 50
grams or more of methamphetamine and 500 grams or more of a mixture or substance
containing a detectable amount of methamphetamine, for which the statutory minimum
penalty is 10 years’ imprisonment, see 21 U.S.C. §§ 841(b)(1)(A)(viii), 846, and also to
possessing or using a firearm in connection with a drug trafficking crime, for which the
statutory minimum penalty is 5 years’ imprisonment consecutive to the drug sentence,
see 18 U.S.C. § 924(c)(1)(A)(i). Therefore, the district court correctly determined that
Williams was subject to an aggregate mandatory minimum sentence of 15 years’
imprisonment. At the sentencing hearing, the district court concluded that Williams was
responsible for 2.51 kilograms of “Ice” methamphetamine, which established a base
offense level of 36 under the Sentencing Guidelines. U.S. Sentencing Guidelines Manual
§ 2D1.1(c)(2) (2016). This finding did not raise the minimum or maximum sentence
faced by Williams, but merely informed the district court’s decision within the range
established by statute. Therefore, the district court’s factual findings did not violate
Alleyne or the Sixth Amendment.
In accordance with Anders, we have reviewed the entire record in this case and
have found no meritorious issues for appeal. We therefore affirm Williams’ conviction
and sentence, but remand for correction of the judgment, see supra n.*. This court
requires that counsel inform Williams, in writing, of the right to petition the Supreme
Court of the United States for further review. If Williams requests that a petition be filed,
but counsel believes that such a petition would be frivolous, then counsel may move in
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this court for leave to withdraw from representation. Counsel’s motion must state that a
copy thereof was served on Williams.
We dispense with oral argument because the facts and legal contentions are
adequately presented in the materials before this court and argument would not aid the
decisional process.
AFFIRMED AND REMANDED
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