NONPRECEDENTIAL DISPOSITION
To be cited only in accordance with Fed. R. App. P. 32.1
United States Court of Appeals
For the Seventh Circuit
Chicago, Illinois 60604
Submitted December 20, 2018
Decided December 20, 2018
Before
JOEL M. FLAUM, Circuit Judge
ILANA DIAMOND ROVNER, Circuit Judge
MICHAEL Y. SCUDDER, Circuit Judge
No. 18‐1913
UNITED STATES OF AMERICA, Appeal from the United States District
Plaintiff‐Appellee, Court for the Central District of Illinois.
v. No. 13‐30043‐001
CHAY ANTHONY, Sue E. Myerscough,
Defendant‐Appellant. Judge.
O R D E R
Chay Anthony pleaded guilty to manufacturing methamphetamine, 21 U.S.C.
§ 841(a)(1). Only two months after Anthony was released from prison, he possessed and
used methamphetamine and violated conditions of his sober‐living program. Anthony
admitted to a probation officer and to the district court at his revocation hearing that he
violated the terms of his supervised release. Based on Anthony’s Grade B violation and
criminal history category of VI, the judge calculated the term of imprisonment under
the Chapter 7 policy statements to be 21 to 27 months, see USSG § 7B1.4. As for
supervised release, the judge said that Anthony could be sentenced to up to a life’s
term, see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3), (h); 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C). The judge sentenced him to
27 months’ imprisonment and 6 years’ supervised release. Anthony filed a notice of
appeal, but his lawyer moves to withdraw, arguing that the appeal is frivolous.
No. 18‐1913 Page 2
See Anders v. California, 386 U.S. 738 (1967). We agree with his attorney, grant the
motion, and dismiss the appeal.
A defendant facing revocation of supervised release does not have a
constitutional right to counsel unless he has a serious claim that he has not violated his
conditions of release or a substantial argument against revocation that would be hard to
develop without counsel. See Gagnon v. Scarpelli, 411 U.S. 778, 790–91 (1973);
United States v. Eskridge, 445 F.3d 930, 932–33 (7th Cir. 2006). Because Anthony admitted
that he violated his conditions of release and does not offer a complex mitigating
argument, we are not obligated to apply the Anders safeguards in ruling on counsel’s
motion to withdraw. See United States v. Wheeler, 814 F.3d 856, 857 (7th Cir. 2016).
As a matter of practice, however, we apply the Anders standard here. See United
States v. Brown, 823 F.3d 392, 394 (7th Cir. 2016). Counsel’s brief explains the nature of
the case and addresses the potential issues that an appeal of this kind might be expected
to involve. Because counsel’s analysis appears thorough and Anthony has not
responded to counsel’s motion, see CIR. R. 51(b), we limit our review to the subjects
counsel discusses. See United States v. Bey, 748 F.3d 774, 776 (7th Cir. 2014); United States
v. Wagner, 103 F.3d 551, 553 (7th Cir. 1996).
Counsel first considers whether Anthony could argue that the district court
abused its discretion in revoking his supervised release. See United States v. Musso,
643 F.3d 566, 570 (7th Cir. 2011). Anthony admitted to his probation officer and to the
court that he possessed and used methamphetamine, which violated his terms of
supervised release. Counsel correctly finds no basis to argue that Anthony’s admissions
were unknowing or involuntary. The judge engaged in a lengthy colloquy, explaining
the nature of the allegations and the consequences of admitting their truth, including
the rights that Anthony was giving up, see FED. R. CRIM. P. 32.1(b), and the judge
ensured that no one had induced him to admit the violations. Once the judge found that
Anthony possessed methamphetamine, revocation was mandatory, see 18 U.S.C.
§ 3583(g)(1). Challenging the revocation, therefore, would be frivolous.
Next, counsel appropriately concludes that a procedural challenge to Anthony’s
sentence would be frivolous. A district court would commit procedural error by
incorrectly calculating the guidelines range or by treating the guidelines as mandatory.
See Gall v. United States, 552 U.S. 38, 51 (2007). But here, we could not find that the judge
erred in classifying Anthony’s methamphetamine possession as a Grade B violation
because his prior drug conviction “exposed him to a maximum of two years in prison.”
United States v. Trotter, 270 F.3d 1150, 1156 (7th Cir. 2001); 21 U.S.C. § 844(a); USSG
No. 18‐1913 Page 3
§ 7B1.1(a)(2). Nor would we find that the judge erred in determining that Anthony’s
criminal history category was VI, that the correct policy‐statement range was 21 to 27
months’ imprisonment, see USSG § 7B1.4, or that Anthony could be sentenced up to a
life term of supervised release, see 18 U.S.C. § 3583(e)(3), (h), 21 U.S.C. § 841(b)(1)(C).
We would also find frivolous an argument that the judge thought she could not deviate
from the guidelines, because she acknowledged at the hearing that the policy‐statement
range was advisory.
Finally, counsel explores a challenge to Anthony’s sentence as substantively
unreasonable. We would presume that a sentence within the policy‐statement range is
reasonable, United States v. Jones, 774 F.3d 399, 404 (7th Cir. 2014), and we agree with
counsel that the record presents no basis to disturb that presumption. First, the judge
explained that the sentence was justified based on factors in 18 U.S.C. § 3553(a),
including Anthony’s repeated failures to stay off drugs. This led the judge to conclude
that incarceration would help deter him from possessing and using drugs in the future.
Second, the judge clarified why she thought that Anthony would be better served in
prison rather than at another drug‐treatment facility. She acknowledged that Anthony
had been a drug addict since his teenage years, that he turned to drugs when grieving,
and that he came from a hard background. But based on Anthony’s repeated failures to
change, she was skeptical that he was serious about addressing his addiction. Given the
judge’s consideration of the relevant factors, including Anthony’s mitigating
arguments, we agree with counsel that it would be frivolous to challenge the
substantive reasonableness of the sentence.
We GRANT counsel’s motion to withdraw and DISMISS the appeal.