IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
AN’DESHIA SATCHELL, §
§
Defendant Below, § No. 396, 2018
Appellant, §
§ Court Below—Superior Court
v. § of the State of Delaware
§
STATE OF DELAWARE, § Cr. ID No. 1711001757
§ 1711001790
Plaintiff Below, §
Appellee. §
Submitted: November 21, 2018
Decided: December 20, 2018
Before VALIHURA, SEITZ, and TRAYNOR, Justices.
ORDER
After consideration of the brief and motion to withdraw filed by the
appellant’s counsel under Supreme Court Rule 26(c), the State’s response, and the
Superior Court record, it appears to the Court that:
(1) In January 2018, the appellant, An’Deshia Satchell, was indicted on
charges of Robbery Second Degree, Robbery First Degree, Assault Second Degree,
Aggravated Menacing, and two counts of Possession of a Deadly Weapon During
Commission of a Felony. The charges arose from two separate incidents that
occurred on November 1, 2017. On May 23, 2018, Satchell pleaded guilty to
Robbery First Degree and Robbery Second Degree. In exchange for Satchell’s guilty
plea, the State entered a nolle prossequi on the other charges.
(2) On July 13, 2018, following a presentence investigation, the Superior
Court sentenced Satchell as a habitual offender for Robbery Second Degree,
imposing a sentence of fifteen years at Level 5 incarceration, with credit for 257
days previously served. For the charge of Robbery First Degree, the Superior Court
sentenced Satchell to fifteen years at Level 5 incarceration, with decreasing levels
of supervision beginning after serving five years at Level 5. This is Satchell’s direct
appeal.
(3) Satchell’s counsel has filed a brief and a motion to withdraw under
Supreme Court Rule 26(c). Satchell’s counsel asserts that, based upon a complete
and careful review of the record, there are no arguably appealable issues. Counsel
states that he informed Satchell of the provisions of Rule 26(c) and provided her
with a copy of the motion to withdraw and the accompanying brief. Counsel also
informed Satchell of her right to supplement counsel’s presentation. Satchell
responded with a written submission raising an issue concerning her sentencing as a
habitual offender. The State has responded to the Rule 26(c) brief and argues that
the Superior Court’s judgment should be affirmed.
(4) When reviewing a motion to withdraw and an accompanying brief
under Rule 26(c), this Court must be satisfied that the appellant’s counsel has made
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a conscientious examination of the record and the law for arguable claims. 1 This
Court must also conduct its own review of the record and determine “whether the
appeal is indeed so frivolous that it may be decided without an adversary
presentation.”2
(5) In her written submission, Satchell challenges her sentencing as a
habitual offender. She claims that her plea agreement does not reflect that she would
be sentenced as a habitual offender.
(6) The record makes clear that Satchell was aware that she faced a
potential maximum sentence of life imprisonment as a habitual offender. The plea
agreement that Satchell signed indicates that Satchell’s potential sentence for
Robbery Second Degree was “5 yrs to life,” as “HO § 4214(a).” Even if Satchell
may not have known from reading the plea agreement form alone that “HO §
4214(a)” referred to habitual offender status under 11 Del. C. § 4214(a), the plea
agreement made clear that she faced a potential maximum sentence of life
imprisonment. And Satchell acknowledges on appeal that she was aware of the issue
“through conversations.” The truth-in-sentencing form that Satchell signed similarly
indicates that Satchell’s maximum potential penalty was life imprisonment.
1
Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 486 U.S. 429,
442 (1988); Anders v. California, 386 U.S.738, 744 (1967).
2
Penson, 488 U.S. at 81.
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(7) The transcript of the plea proceeding confirms that Satchell’s counsel
stated that he had explained to Satchell that the State would be seeking sentencing
as a habitual offender; recited her prior convictions and that he had reviewed those
convictions with Satchell; stated that she was eligible for habitual offender
sentencing; and stated that she would be subject to a sentence of “five to life.” The
Superior Court asked Satchell if she understood that, “because of what is your likely
status,” she “face[d] a sentence up to life in jail,” to which Satchell responded,
“Yes.”
(8) During Satchell’s sentencing hearing, Satchell’s counsel conceded that
Satchell was a habitual offender and remarked that she could receive a life sentence.
The Superior Court asked Satchell’s counsel whether he had any objections to the
State’s habitual offender motion. Her counsel stated that he did not, noting that the
prior convictions appeared to satisfy the statutory requirements for habitual offender
status.
(9) Finally, even if Satchell had disputed her habitual offender status when
she entered into the plea agreement—which she did not—the Superior Court would
not have erred by sentencing her as a habitual offender. Satchell’s prior convictions
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clearly satisfy the statutory requirements for habitual offender status under §
4214(a).3
(10) The Court has reviewed the record carefully and concludes that
Satchell’s appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably appealable
issue. We also are satisfied that counsel made a conscientious effort to examine the
record and the law and properly determined that Satchell could not raise a
meritorious claim on appeal.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior
Court is AFFIRMED. The motion to withdraw is moot.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Gary F. Traynor
Justice
3
See, e.g., Lewis v. State, 2015 WL 4606521 (Del. July 30, 2015) (affirming sentencing as habitual
offender where the defendant disputed habitual offender status on plea agreement form but did not
oppose the later-filed habitual offender motion and did not show on appeal that his prior
convictions did not support his designation as a habitual offender); Alley v. State, 2015 WL
4511348 (Del. July 24, 2015) (affirming sentencing as habitual offender where defense counsel
stated at the guilty plea hearing that the defendant intended to challenge the State’s motion to seek
habitual offender sentencing, defense counsel stated at the sentencing hearing that there was no
good faith basis to oppose the habitual offender motion, and the defendant had the required number
of prior felony convictions to be declared a habitual offender).
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