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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN RE: A.P.-S., A MINOR : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
APPEAL OF: T.P.-S., MOTHER :
:
:
:
:
: No. 897 WDA 2018
Appeal from the Order May 18, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Allegheny County Orphans' Court at
No(s): CP-02-AP-0000189-2017
BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., DUBOW, J., and STEVENS*, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY DUBOW, J.: FILED DECEMBER 31, 2018
T.P.-S. (“Mother”) appeals from the May 18, 2018 Order involuntarily
terminating her parental rights to her minor daughter A.P.-S., (“Child”), born
in November 2012.1 Because the record supports the decision of the orphans’
court, we affirm.
SUMMARY OF FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
Child was born in November 2012; at the time of her birth, Mother was
fourteen years old and herself a dependent child in foster care. N.T., 5/17/18,
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1 A petition seeking to involuntarily terminate the parental rights of S.D.D.,
Child’s putative father, was also filed. On May 17, 2018, the Allegheny County
Office of Children, Youth, and Families (“CYF”) withdrew its petition following
S.D.D.’s death in January 2018. Mot. to Withdraw, 5/14/18, at ¶¶ 1-6; Order,
5/17/18, at 1. On May 18, 2018, the parental rights of any unknown father
were also terminated. No putative father has filed an appeal from that order.
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* Former Justice specially assigned to the Superior Court.
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at 10.2 When Child was approximately one year old, Mother fled with her.
Id. at 10. After authorities recovered Child, CYF obtained an emergency
custody Order. Id.
Child was adjudicated dependent on October 23, 2013, and placed in a
foster home while Mother was placed in a youth emergency shelter. Id. at
10-11. Mother’s goals were to obtain mental health and domestic violence
counseling, attend parenting classes, complete drug and alcohol counseling,
continue visitation with Child, and work towards obtaining a General
Equivalency Diploma (“GED”). Id. at 11, 18.
Mother did not complete most of her goals. Id. at 17, 22-25, 31-41,
89-95, 209-11. Since Child’s adjudication, Mother and Child have cycled
through twelve placements, some together and some apart. Id. at 35-48, 56.
Additionally, Mother’s two other children,3 who are not the subjects of this
appeal, are in the primary care of their father and paternal grandmother. Id.
at 148-49, 208.
On November 8, 2017, CYF filed petitions to terminate involuntarily the
parental rights of Mother and change Child’s permanency goal to adoption. In
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2Mother had been removed from her home as an infant, returned to the care
of her mother, and removed again at the age of five. Id. at 21. Mother was
subsequently adopted, but after she reported sexual abuse at the hands of
her adoptive sibling, Mother returned to the custody of the Allegheny County
Office of Children, Youth and Families (“CYF”) at age twelve. Id. at 20-21,
54.
3 Mother’s other children are a son, born in June 2016, and a daughter, born
in January 2018. Id. at 73-76, 87.
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addition to the guardian ad litem who had represented Child throughout the
dependency proceedings, the court appointed legal counsel to represent Child
at the termination hearing. The orphans’ court held a hearing on the petition
on May 17, 2018. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court terminated
Mother’s rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), (5), (8), and (b).
Mother timely filed a notice of appeal from the termination decree on
June 15, 2018, along with a concise statement of errors complained of on
appeal. The orphans’ court filed an opinion pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a) on
July 17, 2018.
ISSUES ON APPEAL
Mother raises the following claims for our review:
I. Whether the trial court committed fatal error and/or abused its
discretion in finding that the Office of Children, Youth, and
Families met their burden of proof and proved by clear and
convincing evidence that the parental rights of [Mother] should be
terminated pursuant to 23 [Pa.C.S. §] 2511(a)(1), (a)(2), (a)(5),
and (a)(8)?
II. Whether the trial court erred and/or committed a fatal error
and/or abused its discretion by finding that the Office of Children,
Youth and Families met their burden of proof and proved by clear
and convincing evidence that terminating the parental rights of
[Mother] best meets the needs and welfare of [Child] pursuant to
23 [Pa.C.S. § 2511(b)]?
III. Whether the trial court committed fatal error and/or abused
its discretion in allowing hearsay testimony in the form of written
documents of persons who were not present at the hearing to
terminate the parental rights of [Mother]?
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Mother’s Brief at 1 (unnecessary capitalization and suggested responses
omitted).4
LEGAL ANALYSIS
We review cases involving the termination of parental rights according
to the following standards.
The standard of review in termination of parental rights cases
requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and
credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported
by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate
courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law
or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse
of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest
unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial
court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because
the record would support a different result. We have previously
emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand
observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (internal citations and quotations
omitted).
Termination requires a bifurcated analysis:
Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence
that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for
termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court
determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his
or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of
the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the
needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests
of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis
concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between
parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child
of permanently severing any such bond.
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4 We have reordered Mother’s questions for ease of analysis.
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In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted). As CYF
argues that it proved by clear and convincing evidence that grounds for
termination existed under 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(2), we focus our analysis on
subsection (a)(2) and (b).
The relevant subsections of 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511 provide:
(a) General rule.--The rights of a parent in regard to a child
may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the
following grounds:
***
(2) The repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect
or refusal of the parent has caused the child to be without
essential parental care, control or subsistence necessary for
his physical or mental well-being and the conditions and
causes of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or
will not be remedied by the parent.
***
(b) Other considerations.--The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511.
Termination Pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2)
We first address whether the orphans’ court abused its discretion by
terminating Mother’s parental rights pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2).
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To satisfy the requirements of Section 2511(a)(2), the moving party
must prove “(1) repeated and continued incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal;
(2) that such incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal caused the child to be
without essential parental care, control or subsistence; and (3) that the causes
of the incapacity, abuse, neglect or refusal cannot or will not be remedied.”
See In Interest of Lilley, 719 A.2d 327, 330 (Pa. Super. 1998). The
grounds for termination are not limited to affirmative misconduct, but concern
parental incapacity that cannot be remedied. In re Z.P., 994 A.2d 1108,
1117 (Pa. Super. 2010). Parents are required to make diligent efforts toward
the reasonably prompt assumption of full parental duties. Id. Further,
“evidence concerning a parent’s ability to care for another child is irrelevant
and inadmissible in a proceeding to terminate parental rights with regard to
the child at issue.” In re A.L.D., 797 A.2d 326, 338 (citations omitted).
Here, the court based its decree on Mother’s inconsistency, over the
course of the five years Child has been in care, in working towards the
development of parenting skills and in obtaining mental health counseling.
Trial Court Opinion, 7/17/18, at 13. The court found that mental health
counseling would be crucial to Mother’s ability to successfully parent Child.
Id. The court noted that although Mother had taken some steps towards
improving her parenting skills with her other two children, who were not in
her primary custody, the improvement was “too little too late.” Id. at 14.
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In response, Mother argues that the record does not mention the specific
reason Child came into care.5 Mother’s Brief at 9. Mother acknowledges that
the court provided her with goals for reunification, but argues that testimony
showed that she had made a significant change in her attitude and
commitment to her children, including Child. Id. Mother points to the
testimony of the paternal grandmother of her son, who stated she has no
issues leaving her grandson with Mother and has no concerns about Mother’s
parenting ability. Id.
Following a thorough review of the record in this matter, we conclude
that the orphans’ court did not abuse its discretion in granting the petition
pursuant to Section 2511(a)(2). During the termination hearing, CYF
presented the testimony of caseworker Kelly Nelson, who testified that the
trial court had ordered Mother to complete a series of reunification goals. N.T.,
5/17/18, at 22. These goals included obtaining mental health and domestic
violence counseling, attending parenting classes, completing drug and alcohol
counseling, continuing visitation with Child, and obtaining a GED. Id. at 11,
18.
Mother did not comply with the goal for continued visitation with Child.
Josh Rowe, placement coordinator and foster care worker, Emily Cronquist,
visitation coach, and Chelsea Jacobs, permanency specialist, for Project STAR
(“Steps to Achieving Resilience”), testified regarding Mother’s visitations with
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5 Mother does not further elaborate on this argument.
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Child. Id. at 170-196. In March 2017, Mother attended eleven of sixteen
supervised visits. Id. at 190-91. Mother paid more attention to her son,
causing Child to engage in negative, attention-seeking behaviors. Id. at 192.
In May 2017, Mother began coached visits with two-hour visits two times per
week. Id. at 171. She attended forty-one of seventy-eight offered visits,
with sporadic attendance. Id. at 172-73. Her attendance dropped off
following her most recent pregnancy, and she was eventually removed from
the program in March 2018 after missing three visits in thirty days several
times. Id. at 174-79. In March 2018, Mother was offered un-coached,
supervised visits, but attended only one of twenty offered visits. Id. at 181-
82.
Mother did not obtain her GED. Id. at 18, 21-22. Mother did obtain a
job with a home healthcare agency, but has not had any assignments since
the birth of her youngest child. Id. at 159-60, 167. Mother did complete drug
and alcohol counseling. Id. at 17.
Although Mother completed a parenting program orientation and three
classes in October 2013, following her carousel of placements over the next
three years, she never completed parenting classes. Id. at 22-32, 209-11.
During that time, Mother failed to show appropriate parenting skills by failing
to provide appropriate sleeping accommodations for the children or to bathe
and feed the children regularly or appropriately. Id. at 40. Mother presented
testimony from S.W., the paternal grandmother of her two younger children,
that Mother has her own residence which she keeps reasonably clean, has
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toys for the children, bathes them, and does not yell at them. Id. at 74-76.
However, Mother does not have primary custody of either of her younger
children. Id. at 47, 58, 104. Further, as noted above, Mother’s attempt to
parent another child does not demonstrate that she is capable of providing
safety, security and stability for the Child, especially in light of Mother’s
unwillingness to even visit the Child regularly.
Mother had an initial assessment for mental health services in June of
2015, but did not attend further appointments. She attended some counseling
while at a shelter in 2013, but provided no evidence of the completion of goals.
Id. at 41-45. She only completed some anger management sessions but
overall failed to complete her mental health goals. Id. at 43. Although
referred to domestic violence services, Mother did not believe she needed to
work on those issues because she was not in a relationship at the time. Id.
at 221-22. Dr. Patricia Pepe, a psychologist who performed an interactional
evaluation of Child, foster parents, and Mother, testified regarding her
concerns about Mother’s mental health. Id. at 85-106. Mother has a deflated
sense of self for which she overcompensates with narcissism that causes her
to reject treatment, and has a paranoid personality disorder which causes her
to mistrust others and reject counseling. Id. at 88-90. Additionally, Mother
suffers from post-traumatic stress disorder. Id. at 106. Without further
counseling, Mother is likely to repeat the unhealthy relationship patterns of
victimization that have troubled her throughout her life. Id.
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Accordingly, the record confirms that Mother is incapable of parenting
Child and that she cannot or will not remedy her parental incapacity. Mother
did not complete her parenting goals. Specifically, she was inconsistent with
visitation, did not complete parenting classes, was not compliant with mental
health counseling, and indeed, did not believe that she required mental health
counseling. By the time of the hearing, Child had been in foster care since
March 2017, and had been in various placements since 2013, and was in need
of permanence and stability. It is clear that Mother will not be able to provide
for these needs at any point in the future, and accordingly, the record supports
the court’s findings and conclusions with respect to Section 2511(a)(2).
Termination Pursuant to Section 2511(b)
With respect to Section 2511(b), we consider whether Child’s
developmental, physical, and emotional needs and welfare will be best served
by the termination. Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121. “In this context, the court must
take into account whether a bond exists between child and parent, and
whether termination would destroy an existing, necessary and beneficial
relationship.” Id. The court is not required to use expert testimony, and
social workers and caseworkers may offer evaluations as well. Id. Ultimately,
the concern is the needs and welfare of a child. Id. Where there is no
evidence of a bond between the parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that
no bond exists. In re: K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 763 (Pa. Super. 2008).
We have noted
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[b]efore granting a petition to terminate parental rights, it is
imperative that a trial court carefully consider the intangible
dimension of the needs and welfare of a child—the love, comfort,
security, and closeness—entailed in a parent-child relationship, as
well as the tangible dimension. Continuity of relationships is also
important to a child, for whom severance of close parental ties is
usually extremely painful. The trial court, in considering what
situation would best serve the child[ren]’s needs and welfare,
must examine the status of the natural parental bond to consider
whether terminating the natural parents’ rights would destroy
something in existence that is necessary and beneficial.
Z.P., 994 A.2d at 1121 (quoting In re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197, 1202 (Pa. Super.
2000)).
Here, there was evidence of a relationship between Mother and Child.
During interactions with Mother, Child was happy, smiling, and physically
affectionate; Mother was positive and appropriate with her. Id. at 97-98.
Child stated that if she could not see “mommy,” she would be sad. Id.
However, the court also considered Child’s need for stability and
permanency, and evidence of her strong bond with her foster parents.
Specifically, Child was relaxed with her foster parents and referred to them as
mommy and daddy, and showed appropriate affection towards them. Id. at
105. There were multiple bonding behaviors suggestive of a positive
attachment. Id. Additionally, foster parents were meeting Child’s needs.
Child had previously had behavioral problems which included physical
aggression and sexualized behaviors. Id. at 100-103. Currently, Child
receives psychotherapy and does not exhibit those behaviors any longer, nor
does she suffer nightmares. Id.
Dr. Pepe noted that
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[Foster parents have] really provided her with an enriched
environment and a structured, consistent, stable environment,
which is – I can’t stress the importan[ce] of that, because she has
moved so many times at such a young age that she’s at such
tremendous risk for ongoing psychological problems that, you
know, it’s very positive that she’s stabilizing and developing age-
appropriate behaviors . . .
[I]f [Child] were to move again, she would be at such high risk of
reactive attachment disorder and for multiple psychological
problems, because we wouldn’t know that she would be stabilized
with her mother . . . So it’s time this child has to have stability.
Id. at 105-107. Additionally, Dr. Pepe opined that the Child’s bond with
Mother was not sufficiently meaningful to Child that the severance of the bond
would be detrimental to the Child:
I think that [Child] would be sad and I think she would miss her
mother, but I don’t think it would have an enormous impact on
her current functioning.
You know, she’s very much separate from her mother and she’s
become adjusted to that. I mean, she’s said she’s sad. She
misses her mother. I mean, she missed her mother because there
wasn’t consistency. But, you know, when you weigh it, which is
– you know, it’s always a balancing act.
I certainly believe that it’s much more in her psychological
interests to have a permanent and stable residence where her
needs are being addressed and where she’s succeeding . . .
I think it would be beneficial for the child to be able to be placed
permanently through adoption . . . I believe [Child] very much
needs permanency . . . and I do believe adoption would be in her
best interests.
Id. at 124-26.
As required by Section 2511(b), the court weighed the importance of
the relationship between Mother and Child against Child’s need for
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permanency and stability, and concluded that termination would best serve
Child’s needs and welfare. The court noted with concern that Mother had not
completed parenting classes, and had not attended any mental health
counseling. Accordingly, the court concluded that Child’s need for
permanency and stability outweighed the importance of the relationship that
Child had with Mother, and that foster parents, a pre-adoptive resource, were
a positive stabilizing force in Child’s life.
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the orphans’ court did not
abuse its discretion by terminating Mother’s parental rights involuntarily.
Evidentiary Issues
Finally, Mother contends that the trial court erred in “allowing hearsay
testimony in the form of written documents and statements of persons who
were not present at the hearing.” Mother’s Brief at 11.
Appellate briefs must conform to the Pennsylvania Rules of Appellate
Procedure. Pa.R.A.P. 2101. “Where an appellate brief fails to provide any
discussion of a claim with citation to relevant authority or fails to develop the
issue in any other meaningful fashion capable of review, that claim is
waived.” Umbelina v. Adams, 34 A.3d 151, 161 (Pa. Super. 2011) (citation
omitted). “This Court will not act as counsel and will
not develop arguments on behalf of an appellant.” Commonwealth v.
Kane, 10 A.3d 327, 331 (Pa. Super. 2010) (citation omitted).
In her brief, Mother cites to six pages in the record where she claims
she objected to the admission of inadmissible hearsay. Id. at 11. The first
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three objections occurred during the testimony of the caseworker
investigating Mother’s living situation; the second three objections occurred
during the testimony of Dr. Patricia Pepe, testifying as an expert witness.
N.T., 5/17/18, at 28-30; 101-103. Mother does not further elaborate on any
hearsay exceptions that might apply to those instances, provide further
citation to authority beyond a general recitation of the definition of hearsay
itself, or discuss specifically the ways in which the cited testimony constituted
inadmissible hearsay. Id. at 11-12. Because of these significant defects we
are unable to conduct a meaningful review of Mother’s claims; accordingly,
she has waived this claim.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 12/31/2018
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