IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF DELAWARE
BROCK T. DAVIS, §
§
Defendant Below, § No. 409, 2018
Appellant, §
§ Court Below—Superior Court
v. § of the State of Delaware
§
STATE OF DELAWARE, § Cr. ID No. 1709008546
§
Plaintiff Below, §
Appellee. §
Submitted: December 27, 2018
Decided: January 3, 2019
Before STRINE, Chief Justice; VALIHURA and TRAYNOR, Justices.
ORDER
After consideration of the no-merit brief and motion to withdraw filed by the
appellant’s counsel under Supreme Court Rule 26(c), the State’s response, and the
Superior Court record, it appears to the Court that:
(1) In December 2017, the appellant, Brock Davis, was indicted on charges
of Assault Second Degree and Strangulation in connection with a domestic
altercation that occurred in September 2017. On July 11, 2018, Davis pleaded guilty
to the assault charge. In exchange for Davis’s guilty plea, the State entered a nolle
prossequi on the strangulation charge.
(2) The Superior Court sentenced Davis to eight years Level 5
incarceration, suspended for one year at Level 3 probation, consistent with the
sentencing recommendation made in connection with the guilty plea. This is Davis’s
direct appeal.
(3) Davis’s counsel has filed a brief and a motion to withdraw under
Supreme Court Rule 26(c). Davis’s counsel asserts that, based upon a complete and
careful review of the record, there are no arguably appealable issues. In his
statement filed under Rule 26(c), counsel indicates that he informed Davis of the
provisions of Rule 26(c) and provided him with a copy of the motion to withdraw
and the accompanying brief. Counsel also informed Davis of his right to supplement
counsel’s presentation. Davis responded with points he wanted to present for the
Court’s consideration, which counsel included in the Rule 26(c) brief. The State has
responded to the Rule 26(c) brief and argues that the Superior Court’s judgment
should be affirmed.
(4) When reviewing a motion to withdraw and an accompanying brief
under Rule 26(c), this Court must be satisfied that the appellant’s counsel has made
a conscientious examination of the record and the law for arguable claims. 1 This
Court must also conduct its own review of the record and determine “whether the
1
Penson v. Ohio, 488 U.S. 75, 83 (1988); McCoy v. Court of Appeals of Wisconsin, 486 U.S. 429,
442 (1988); Anders v. California, 386 U.S.738, 744 (1967).
2
appeal is indeed so frivolous that it may be decided without an adversary
presentation.”2
(5) Davis argues that his due process rights were violated. Specifically, he
asserts that the victim testified falsely at a Protection from Abuse (“PFA”) hearing
in Family Court on June 29, 2018, at which Davis also testified, after which the
Family Court granted the victim a lifetime PFA order. Davis argues that the
circumstances of the PFA hearing placed him under duress on the date of his guilty
plea on July 11, 2018. Davis further contends that he was not mentally healthy
enough to enter a guilty plea.
(6) To the extent that Davis is arguing that the victim’s purportedly false
testimony at the PFA hearing supports the conclusion that there was insufficient
evidence to convict him of Assault Second Degree, his argument does not set forth
an arguably appealable issue. During the plea colloquy in this matter, Davis
acknowledged to the Superior Court judge that he understood that, by pleading
guilty, he was giving up his right to a trial, including the rights “to be presumed
innocent until the State can prove each and every part of the charges against you,”
“to a speedy and public jury trial,” to “hear and question the witnesses against you,”
to “present evidence in your own defense,” and to “testify or not testify at that trial,
2
Penson, 488 U.S. at 81.
3
as you see fit.” Davis waived his constitutional right to a trial and thus the
opportunity to challenge the victim’s testimony.3
(7) Davis’s argument that he was not “mentally healthy” enough to plead
guilty also does not present an arguably appealable issue. The test for determining
a defendant’s competence to plead guilty is “whether the defendant had a sufficient
present ability to consult with his lawyer with a reasonable degree of rational
understanding and a rational as well as factual understanding of the proceedings
against him.”4 There is nothing in the record of this case to suggest that Davis was
unable to consult with his counsel with a reasonable degree of rational understanding
or was unable to understand the proceedings against him. To the contrary, the
transcript of the guilty plea hearing indicates that Davis engaged in meaningful
communications with his counsel and understood the guilty plea proceedings in
which he actively participated. The fact that Davis spent a short period in a mental
hospital in May 2018 does not constitute clear and convincing evidence that Davis
3
See Smith v. State, 1996 WL 21050 (Del. Jan. 5, 1996) (“By pleading guilty, Smith waived his
constitutional right to a trial and thus the opportunity to present evidence in his own behalf.
Furthermore, in the absence of clear and convincing evidence to the contrary, Smith is bound by
his signed statement on the guilty plea form. Smith indicated on the guilty plea form and during
the plea colloquy that he knew he was waiving his constitutional right to present evidence in his
behalf.” (citations omitted)).
4
Ellingsworth v. State, 2002 WL 31477130 (Del. Nov. 4, 2002).
4
had a mental health issue that rendered his guilty plea unknowing or involuntary. 5
Davis’s counsel informed the Superior Court in the truth-in-sentencing form and on
the record during the guilty plea hearing that Davis had spent time in a mental
hospital because of a “mental breakdown leading into the original trial date of this
case.”6 But counsel stated that he had spoken with Davis for more than an hour on
the day before the guilty plea hearing, and that counsel believed Davis understood
the roles of his counsel, the prosecutor, and the Court in the matter and was
competent to proceed.
(8) To the extent Davis’s argument that he pleaded guilty under duress
differs from the arguments the Court has addressed above, the Court concludes that
it also fails to present an arguably appealable issue. In his truth-in-sentencing form
and during the plea colloquy, Davis represented to the Superior Court that he freely
and voluntarily decided to plead guilty and that no one had threatened or forced him
5
See Miller v. State, 2014 WL 7010949 (Del. Dec. 9, 2014) (“Absent clear and convincing
evidence to the contrary, Miller is bound by his representations to the judge during the guilty plea
colloquy. There is no clear and convincing evidence that Miller’s mental health rendered his guilty
plea unknowing or involuntary. A knowing and voluntary guilty plea waives any defenses Miller
might have had.” (citation omitted)).
6
It also appears from the transcript of the sentencing hearing, which immediately followed the
Court’s acceptance of Davis’s guilty plea, that a psycho-forensic report indicated that Davis
suffered from depression and anxiety and that Davis had failed to show up for a previously
scheduled guilty plea hearing because of his forty-eight-hour admission to a psychiatric hospital
as a result of an “emotional and mental breakdown.”
5
to plead guilty. The Superior Court’s finding that Davis’s guilty plea was knowing,
voluntary, and intelligent was clearly supported by competent evidence.7
(9) The Court has reviewed the record carefully and concluded that Davis’s
appeal is wholly without merit and devoid of any arguably appealable issue. We
also are satisfied that counsel made a conscientious effort to examine the record and
the law and properly determined that Davis could not raise a meritorious claim on
appeal.
NOW, THEREFORE, IT IS ORDERED that the judgment of the Superior
Court is AFFIRMED. The motion to withdraw is moot.
BY THE COURT:
/s/ Karen L. Valihura
Justice
7
Boughner v. State, 1995 WL 466465 (Del. Aug. 2, 1995).
6