J-S69008-18
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: S.L.D., A MINOR IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
PENNSYLVANIA
APPEAL OF: S.L.D., A MINOR
No. 787 MDA 2018
Appeal from the Dispositional Order Entered April 9, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of York County
Juvenile Division at No(s):
CP-67-JV-0000165-2018
CP-67-JV-0000233-2018
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and MURRAY, J.
MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED: JANUARY 4, 2019
Appellant, S.L.D. (a minor), appeals from the dispositional order entered
on April 9, 2018, following his adjudication of delinquency for the offenses of
robbery and criminal conspiracy to commit theft. Appellant solely challenges
the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain his convictions. After careful review,
we affirm.
Appellant was arrested and charged with the above-stated offenses, as
well as harassment, in the case docketed at CP-67-JV-0000165-2018.1 At an
adjudicatory hearing on March 26, 2018, the Commonwealth presented
evidence that Appellant and a cohort robbed Sean Meekins at gunpoint,
stealing Meekins’ phone. At the conclusion of the hearing, the court found
Appellant guilty of robbery and conspiracy to commit theft, but not guilty of
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1 Appellant was also charged with (and ultimately found guilty of) possession
of marijuana in the case docketed at CP-67-JV-0000233-2018. However,
Appellant did not file a notice of appeal from the dispositional order entered
in that case, and his present claims pertain only to the dispositional order case
CP-67-JV-0000165-2018.
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harassment. At the dispositional hearing held on April 9, 2018, Appellant was
adjudicated delinquent and ordered to be placed in a residential treatment
facility. Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal, and he also timely complied
with the trial court’s order to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) concise statement of
errors complained of on appeal. Herein, Appellant presents one issue for our
review:
Whether [Appellant’s] adjudication and disposition for robbery and
conspiracy should be reversed where the evidence was insufficient
to identify him as one of the robbers because the victim gave only
a weak and tentative identification that was motivated by
[Appellant’s] appearance in a photograph and was not
meaningfully corroborated.
Appellant’s Brief at 4.
Preliminarily, we note that, “[t]he Juvenile Act grants broad discretion
to juvenile courts, and we will not disturb the lower court’s disposition absent
a manifest abuse of discretion.” In Interest of N.C., 171 A.3d 275, 280 (Pa.
Super. 2017) (citing In re C.A.G., 89 A.3d 704, 709 (Pa. Super. 2014), and
In the Interest of J.D., 798 A.2d 210, 213 (Pa. Super. 2002)). Further,
[i]n reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support the
adjudication below, we recognize that the Due Process Clause of
the United States Constitution requires proof beyond a reasonable
doubt at the adjudication stage when a juvenile is charged with
an act which would constitute a crime if committed by an adult.
Additionally, we recognize that in reviewing the sufficiency of the
evidence to support the adjudication of delinquency, just as in
reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to sustain a conviction,
though we review the entire record, we must view the evidence in
the light most favorable to the Commonwealth.
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In re A.D., 771 A.2d 45, 48 (Pa. Super. 2001) (internal citations and
quotation marks omitted) (quoting In re Johnson, 284 A.2d 780, 781 (Pa.
1971)).
In the present case, Appellant contends that the evidence was
insufficient to prove that he was one of the two individuals that robbed
Meekins. Before addressing the specifics of Appellant’s arguments, we
summarize - in the light most favorable to the Commonwealth - the evidence
presented at his adjudicatory hearing. There, Meekins was the first witness
called by the Commonwealth. He testified that on January 18, 2018, he was
walking to his car when he “noticed somebody walking up from [his] right.”
N.T. Hearing, 3/26/18, at 5, 6. Meekins explained that as the person got
closer, he “realized that [he] had a gun.” Id. at 6. Meekins also “felt
somebody else behind [him].” Id. at 7. The person in front of Meekins
pointed the gun - which Meekins described as “a black pistol” - at Meekins’
waist and asked Meekins “what [he] got [sic].” Id. Meekins gave the man
his wallet, which the man “looked through … to see if there was anything in
there … he could use[,]” after which the man “tossed [the wallet] back to
[Meekins].” Id. at 8. The man then asked Meekins for his phone, which was
an Apple iPhone 7. Id. Meekins gave the man his phone and the passcode
for the phone. Id.
Meekins testified that as the robbery was transpiring, he could tell that
the man behind him “was holding a gun to [his] back.” Id. at 9. When asked
how he knew this, Meekins replied: “I looked behind me. I took a glance. I
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saw a gun, looked up, and then turned back around and handed [the man in
front] my phone.” Id. Meekins testified that the man behind him was African-
American, “significantly taller than the guy in the front[,]” and he was wearing
ripped jeans and a black hooded sweatshirt with the hood up. Id. at 9, 10.
Meekins explained that the man behind him was standing very close, and he
had the gun touching Meekins’ back. Id.
After taking Meekins’ phone, the two men “ran off….” Id. Meekins then
borrowed a phone from a friend and called the police, as well as his father,
who told Meekins he would deactivate the stolen phone. Id. at 11, 20.
Meekins testified that his father deactivated the phone “within an hour” after
the robbery. Id.
Meekins testified that he received a new phone within 48 hours after the
robbery. About a week and a half later, he was looking at his iCloud account
when he noticed “a picture in there of two people” that Meekins had not
taken.2 Id. at 12, 15. Meekins testified that “the shorter” person in the
photograph was “the person that was in front of [Meekins] when [he] got
robbed, and the taller person in [the] picture look[ed] familiar, like he was the
person in back of [Meekins].” Id. at 13. Meekins identified Appellant in court
as the taller man in the photograph. Id. at 13-14. Meekins also identified
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2According to Apple Inc.’s website, iCloud is a program that is built into every
Apple device and automatically stores data from the device, including
photographs. See iCloud, https://www.apple.com/icloud/.
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Appellant in court as the man who was standing behind him during the
robbery. Id. at 14, 15. Specifically, Meekins testified:
[The Commonwealth:] The person [Appellant] that you see in the
courtroom today, have you ever seen him before?
[Meekins:] Yes, sir.
[The Commonwealth:] When did you see him?
[Meekins:] When I was robbed.
[The Commonwealth:] And which person was that?
[Meekins:] The person behind me.
…
[The Commonwealth:] Who was the guy who was standing behind
you with the gun in your back robbing you?
[Meekins:] I don’t know.
[The Commonwealth:] Do you see that person in the courtroom?
[Meekins:] Yes, sir.
Id. at 14-15.
The Commonwealth also called Officer Daniel Craven to the stand.
Officer Craven testified that during the investigation of the robbery, Meekins
showed him the photograph that Meekins had discovered on his iCloud
account. Id. at 20. Meekins told Officer Craven that the two men in the
photograph were the robbers. Id. Officer Craven testified that he identified
the shorter man in the photograph as Kareem Williams and the taller individual
as Appellant. Id. at 21. Officer Cravens also confirmed that there was “about
a one-hour window [when the] phone still had access to the iCloud” during
which the photograph must have been taken. Id. at 22. However, there was
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“no identifying information embedded within the digital photo[,]” such as “a
time or date stamp.” Id. at 21, 22.
On appeal, Appellant maintains that this evidence was inadequate to
prove his identity as one of the men who robbed Meekins. According to
Appellant, “Meekins’ identification was tentative and had more to do with the
photo than [Meekins’] actual recollection of the robbery itself.” Appellant’s
Brief at 15. Appellant also argues that, “there was little in the way of
corroboration to shore up Meekins’ shaky identification testimony.” Id. at 14.
Appellant points out that while Officer Craven testified that the photograph of
Appellant found on Meekins’ iCloud account must have been taken within an
hour of the robbery, Officer Craven “was not qualified as an expert in this
field” and no time or date stamp associated with the photograph was found.
Id. Appellant also stresses that “none of the other evidence traditionally
associated with a robbery was present[,]” as neither the phone nor the guns
used in the robbery were “ever recovered or otherwise associated with
[Appellant].” Id. In sum, Appellant insists that “the evidence was insufficient
to prove [he] was one of the people who robbed Meekins” because “[t]he
identification testimony was weak and tentative, and there was insufficient
corroboration to establish proof beyond a reasonable doubt.” Id. at 16.
Appellant’s argument is unconvincing. Initially, we disagree with
Appellant that Meekins’ identification was ‘weak and tentative.’ To the
contrary, Meekins unequivocally identified Appellant in-court as the man who
was standing behind him during the robbery. See N.T. Hearing at 14, 14-15.
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Meekins also provided an out-of-court identification of Appellant to Officer
Craven based on the photograph of Appellant in Meekins’ iCloud account. That
photograph demonstrated that Appellant and Kareem Williams were together,
and in possession of Meekins’ stolen phone, during the hour after the robbery.
This evidence was sufficient to prove that Appellant was one of the two
individuals who robbed Meekins.
While Appellant contends that the court should not have credited
Meekins’ in-court identification because it was premised on Meekins’ observing
Appellant in the photograph, rather than on his actual recollection of the
robbery, this argument attacks the weight of the evidence, not its sufficiency.
See Commonwealth v. Lewis, 911 A.2d 558, 566 (Pa. Super. 2006)
(concluding that a claim that witnesses are not credible is an argument
challenging the weight of the evidence); Commonwealth v. Orr, 38 A.3d
868, 874 (Pa. Super. 2011) (“Given additional evidentiary circumstances, any
indefiniteness and uncertainty in the identification testimony goes to its
weight.”) (citations and quotation marks omitted). The same is true for
Appellant’s argument that the court should have disregarded Officer Craven’s
unobjected-to testimony that the photograph was taken within one hour of
the robbery, as the officer was not admitted as an expert witness. An
appellate court will not review a sufficiency claim where the argument in
support thereof goes to the weight, not the sufficiency, of the evidence. See
Commonwealth v. Sherwood, 982 A.2d 483, 492 (Pa. 2009) (citing
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Commonwealth v. Small, 741 A.2d 666, 672 (Pa. 1999); Commonwealth
v. Mack, 850 A.2d 690, 693 (Pa. Super. 2004)).3
Dispositional order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 01/04/2019
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3 Moreover, Appellant did not preserve any weight-of-the-evidence claim in
his Rule 1925(b) statement, thus waiving it for our review. See Pa.R.A.P.
1925(b)(4)(vii) (“Issues not included in the Statement and/or not raised in
accordance with the provisions of this paragraph (b)(4) are waived.”).
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