IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 17-1460
Filed January 9, 2019
STATE OF IOWA,
Plaintiff-Appellee,
vs.
MICHELLE M. SWENSON,
Defendant-Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Story County, James B. Malloy,
District Associate Judge.
Michelle Swenson appeals a district court verdict and sentence for
possession of methamphetamine, second offense. AFFIRMED.
Mark C. Smith, State Appellate Defender, and Vidhya K. Reddy, Assistant
Appellate Defender, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Louis S. Sloven, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee.
Heard by Vogel, P.J., and Vaitheswaran and McDonald, JJ.
2
VAITHESWARAN, Judge.
Michelle Swenson appeals a district court verdict and sentence for
possession of methamphetamine, second offense. She argues the court should
have granted her motion to suppress evidence seized in a warrantless search of
her purse.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
An Ames police officer saw a vehicle he recognized pull into the parking lot
of a convenience store. After running the license plate number, he suspected the
driver was an individual he had encountered in the past who was not authorized to
drive. He drove into the parking lot, approached the vehicle, recognized the driver,
and told him he was “not supposed to be driving.” He instructed the driver to step
out of the vehicle. After noticing a pocket knife, the officer patted him down and
discovered a methamphetamine pipe in his pocket. The driver was arrested.
Michelle Swenson was a passenger in the vehicle. The officer advised her
to step out so that he could search the vehicle. Swenson did so but left her purse
on the passenger seat. The officer searched the purse and found drug
paraphernalia and a “small baggy containing methamphetamine.”
The State charged Swenson with possession of methamphetamine, second
offense. See Iowa Code § 124.401(5) (2017). Swenson moved to suppress the
evidence gained in the search of her purse, arguing in part that the officer lacked
probable cause to conduct the search. Following an evidentiary hearing, the
district court denied the motion. The court reasoned that “[t]he search of
defendant’s purse was valid under the automobile exception to the warrant
requirement.” Swenson appealed.
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II. Suppression Ruling
The Iowa Supreme Court recently articulated the parameters of the
automobile exception:
The Supreme Court has recognized a “specifically established
and well-delineated” exception to the warrant requirement for
searches of automobiles and their contents. “[T]his exception is
applicable when probable cause and exigent circumstances exist at
the time the car is stopped by police.” The inherent mobility of motor
vehicles satisfies the exigent-circumstances requirement.
The automobile exception rests on twin rationales: (1) the
inherent mobility of the vehicle, and (2) the lower expectation of
privacy in vehicles compared to homes and other structures.
State v. Storm, 898 N.W.2d 140, 145 (Iowa 2017) (internal citations omitted). The
court stated, “We have continued to follow the federal automobile exception for
decades” and “[w]e are not persuaded to chart a different course today.” Id. at
148.
Swenson acknowledges our highest court’s reaffirmation of the automobile
exception but argues the probable cause predicate was not satisfied. First, she
asserts “there was no probable cause to search the vehicle” because the pipe
found in the driver’s pocket could have been “used for the ingestion of legal
substances in addition to illegal substances” and there was “no information
supporting the conclusion that the pipe was used to smoke methamphetamine
rather than a legal substance.” Second, Swenson argues “[E]ven if there was
probable cause to search the vehicle based on conduct of the driver, the search of
[her] purse as a container within that vehicle was not authorized” because “[t]here
was no probable cause to conclude that [she] was involved in any criminal activity.”
On our de novo review, we disagree with both contentions.
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The officer testified to his training and knowledge of “different paraphernalia
associated with drug use.” He identified the item found in the driver’s pocket as a
“meth pipe.” Based on his training and experience, he agreed the pipe was “used
for the ingestion of methamphetamine.” The officer’s observations established
probable cause to search the vehicle. See State v. Predka, 555 N.W.2d 202, 207
(Iowa 1996) (finding probable cause to search the vehicle based in part on the
officer’s observation of a screen used with a marijuana pipe); cf. State v. See, No.
16-0470, 2017 WL 1400822, at *3 (Iowa Ct. App. Apr. 19, 2017) (finding an
absence of probable cause to search a vehicle where a used marijuana pipe was
found in a passenger’s coat pocket).
We turn to the officer’s search of Swenson’s purse. Probable cause to
search the vehicle vested the officer with probable cause to search containers
within the vehicle. See State v. Eubanks, 355 N.W.2d 57, 60 (Iowa 1984) (“Once
the patrolman lawfully stopped the car and had probable cause to search it for
contraband, in this case marijuana, he could lawfully open and examine all
containers within the vehicle from the time probable cause appeared.”); cf. State
v. Brown, 905 N.W.2d 846, 847 (Iowa 2018) (concluding officers executing a
search warrant on a home could not search a purse belonging to a visitor).
We affirm the district court’s denial of Swenson’s suppression motion and
her “verdict and sentence” for possession of methamphetamine, second offense.1
AFFIRMED.
1
In her brief, Swenson raised an alternative claim of ineffective assistance of counsel.
Having reached her suppression argument on the merits, we find it unnecessary to
address the issue.