In Re the Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of: B.M., R.M., and K.M., Jr. (Minor Children) and T.M. (Mother) and K.M., Sr. (Father) v. The Indiana Department of Child Services (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D), FILED
this Memorandum Decision shall not be Jan 11 2019, 8:58 am
regarded as precedent or cited before any CLERK
court except for the purpose of establishing Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
the defense of res judicata, collateral and Tax Court

estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANTS ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Erin L. Berger Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Evansville, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Katherine A. Cornelius
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In Re the Termination of the January 11, 2019
Parent-Child Relationship of: Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-JT-1503
B.M., R.M., and K.M., Jr.
(Minor Children) Appeal from the Vanderburgh
Superior Court
and
The Honorable Brett J. Niemeier,
T.M. (Mother) and K.M., Sr. Judge
(Father), The Honorable Reneé A.
Appellant-Respondent, Ferguson, Magistrate
Trial Court Cause No.
v. 82D04-1709-JT-1637
82D04-1709-JT-1638
The Indiana Department of 82D04-1709-JT-1639
Child Services,
Appellee-Petitioner.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-1503| January 11, 2019 Page 1 of 24
 Tavitas, Judge.

Case Summary
[1] T.M. (“Mother”) and K.M., Sr. (“Father”) appeal the trial court’s termination

of their parental rights to B.M., R.M., and K.M., Jr. (the “Children”). We

affirm.

Issue
[2] Mother and Father raise one issue, which we restate as whether the evidence is

sufficient to support the termination of their parental rights.

Facts
[3] In December 2014, the Vanderburgh County Office of the Department of Child

Services (“DCS”) was notified after Mother was hospitalized for threatening to

commit suicide and kill her child, K.M., Jr. At the time, Mother was not

receiving mental health treatment for her anxiety and depression. Mother

tested positive for amphetamine use, and Adderall medication that was

prescribed for K.M., Jr.’s attention-deficit hyperactivity disorder was missing. 1

[4] DCS removed eight-year-old K.M., Jr. 2 from Mother’s and Father’s care on

December 6, 2014, “due to the lack of a caregiver to provide appropriate

1
On drug screens, Adderall can register as a positive result for amphetamine.
2
K.M., Jr. was eleven years old at the time of the evidentiary hearing on DCS’ petition to terminate
Mother’s and Father’s parental rights.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-1503| January 11, 2019 Page 2 of 24
 supervision.” App. Vol. II p. 39. On December 9, 2014, the trial court

conducted a detention hearing. The trial court deemed K.M., Jr.’s removal to

be necessary; determined that detention was in K.M., Jr.’s best interest; and

placed K.M., Jr. with a relative. That same day, DCS filed a petition alleging

that K.M., Jr. was a child in need of services (“CHINS”).

[5] At a hearing on December 16, 2014, Mother admitted to the allegations and

Father stated that he had no objection to a CHINS determination. The trial

court adjudicated K.M., Jr. as a CHINS. At a dispositional hearing on January

20, 2015, the trial court granted DCS’ petition for parental participation as to

Mother and ordered Mother to: (1) submit to random drug screens; (2)

complete substance abuse evaluation and follow any treatment

recommendations; (3) remain drug and alcohol free; (4) obtain a mental health

assessment and evaluation to address her mental health needs and follow all

treatment recommendations; (5) attend supervised or monitored visitation; (6)

complete nurturing classes; (7) participate in case management services; and (8)

comply with her parent aide. The trial court ordered Father to maintain contact

with DCS.

[6] B.M. was born on August 7, 2015 3 and tested positive at birth for

methamphetamine. DCS removed B.M. from Mother’s and Father’s care the

following day. “At the time of [B.M.’s] birth, the parents had not been

3
B.M. was two years old at the time of the evidentiary hearing on DCS’ petition to terminate parental rights.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-1503| January 11, 2019 Page 3 of 24
 compliant” with the trial court’s orders regarding K.M., Jr. Mother used

methamphetamine during her pregnancy with B.M. and was noncompliant as

to mental health services and visitation. Id. at 40. Father was enrolled in a

work release program and, therefore, was unable to supervise and parent K.M.,

Jr. and B.M.

[7] On August 11, 2015, DCS filed a petition alleging that B.M. was a CHINS.

Mother admitted B.M. was a CHINS on August 11, 2015, and Father agreed

that B.M. was a CHINS on October 29, 2015. B.M. was adjudicated as a

CHINS. The trial court subsequently ordered Mother and Father “to comply

with specific services and to fulfill specific obligations as to [B.M.].” Id.

[8] On March 17, 2016, DCS removed the Children due to Mother’s and Father’s

drug use. The Children were placed in foster care.

[9] R.M. was born on September 16, 2016, 4 and DCS removed R.M. from

Mother’s and Father’s care at the hospital, “[d]ue to ongoing concerns for

stability, illegal and impairing substance use by the parents, criminal activity by

the parents, and mother’s ongoing failure to address mental health issues.” Id.

at 41. On September 20, 2016, DCS filed a petition alleging that R.M. was a

CHINS. The trial court adjudicated R.M. as a CHINS on December 13, 2016.

4
R.M. was one year old at the time of the evidentiary hearing on DCS’ petition to terminate parental rights.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-1503| January 11, 2019 Page 4 of 24
[10] After Mother’s and Father’s numerous arrests, relapses, and sustained non-

compliance with the trial court’s orders, DCS filed petitions to terminate

Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to K.M., Jr. and B.M. in September and

October 2016. The trial court granted Mother and Father additional time to

comply with the trial court’s orders. Subsequently, in November 2016 and

December 2016, respectively, Mother and Father tested positive for narcotics.

[11] On September 7, 2017, DCS filed petitions to terminate Mother’s and Father’s

parental rights to the Children. The trial court conducted an evidentiary

hearing on January 9 and February 26, 2018. In an order dated May 15, 2018,

the trial court entered findings of fact and conclusions of law and terminated

Mother’s and Father’s parental rights to the Children. The order provided in

part:

1. [Each] [c]hild has been removed from his parents for more
than six (6) months pursuant to the terms of the dispositional
decree or the child has been removed from his parents’ care for at
least fifteen of the past twenty-two months, and

2. There is a reasonable probability that:

a. The conditions which resulted in [the] Child[ren]’s
removal and continued placement outside the home will
not be remedied;

b. That continuation of the parent-child relationship poses
a threat to [the] Child[ren]’s wellbeing.

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 3. Termination of parental rights is in [the] Child[ren]’s best
interests.

4. There is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment of [the]
Child[ren], that being adoption.

Id. at 51. Mother and Father now appeal.

Analysis
[12] Mother and Father challenge the termination of their parental relationship with

the Children. The Fourteenth Amendment to the United States Constitution

protects the traditional right of parents to establish a home and raise their

children. In re K.T.K. v. Indiana Dept. of Child Services, Dearborn County Office,

989 N.E.2d 1225, 1230 (Ind. 2013). “[A] parent’s interest in the upbringing of

[his or her] child is ‘perhaps the oldest of the fundamental liberty interests

recognized by th[e] [c]ourt[s].’” Id. (quoting Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S. 57, 65,

120 S. Ct. 2054 (2000)). We recognize, of course, that parental interests are not

absolute and must be subordinated to the child’s interests when determining the

proper disposition of a petition to terminate parental rights. Id. Thus,

“‘[p]arental rights may be terminated when the parents are unable or unwilling

to meet their parental responsibilities by failing to provide for the child’s

immediate and long-term needs.’” Id. (quoting In re D.D., 804 N.E.2d 258, 265

(Ind. Ct. App. 2004), trans. denied).

[13] When reviewing the termination of parental rights, we do not reweigh the

evidence or judge witness credibility. In re. I.A., 934 N.E.2d 1127, 1132 (Ind.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-1503| January 11, 2019 Page 6 of 24
 Ct. App. 2010). We consider only the evidence and reasonable inferences that

are most favorable to the judgment. Id. We must also give “due regard” to the

trial court’s unique opportunity to judge the credibility of the witnesses. Id.

(quoting Ind. Trial Rule 52(A)).

[14] Pursuant to Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-8(c), “The trial court shall enter

findings of fact that support the entry of the conclusions required by subsections

(a) and (b).” 5 Here, the trial court did enter findings of fact and conclusions of

law in granting DCS’s petition to terminate Mother’s and Father’s parental

rights. When reviewing findings of fact and conclusions of law entered in a

case involving a termination of parental rights, we apply a two-tiered standard

of review. First, we determine whether the evidence supports the findings, and

second, we determine whether the findings support the judgment. Id. We will

set aside the trial court’s judgment only if it is clearly erroneous. Id. A

judgment is clearly erroneous if the findings do not support the trial court’s

conclusions or the conclusions do not support the judgment. Id.

5
Indiana Code Sections 31-35-2-8(a) and (b), governing termination of a parent-child relationship involving a
delinquent child or CHINS, provide as follows:

(a) Except as provided in section 4.5(d) of this chapter, if the court finds that the
allegations in a petition described in section 4 of this chapter are true, the court shall
terminate the parent-child relationship.

(b) If the court does not find that the allegations in the petition are true, the court shall
dismiss the petition.

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[15] Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-8(a) provides that “if the court finds that the

allegations in a petition described in [Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4] are true,

the court shall terminate the parent-child relationship.” Indiana Code Section

31-35-2-4(b)(2) provides that a petition to terminate a parent-child relationship

involving a child in need of services must allege, in part:

(B) that one (1) of the following is true:

(i) There is a reasonable probability that the
conditions that resulted in the child’s removal
or the reasons for placement outside the
home of the parents will not be remedied.

(ii) There is a reasonable probability that the
continuation of the parent-child relationship
poses a threat to the well-being of the child.

(iii) The child has, on two (2) separate occasions,
been adjudicated a child in need of services;

(C) that termination is in the best interests of the child;
and

(D) that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and
treatment of the child.

DCS must establish these allegations by clear and convincing evidence. In re

V.A., 51 N.E.3d 1140, 1144 (Ind. 2016).

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 I. Probability that Removal Conditions Will Not be Remedied

[16] First, Mother and Father argue that DCS failed to establish, by clear and

convincing evidence, that the conditions that led to the removal of the Children

will not be remedied. 6 In order to prove this element, DCS must establish (1)

what conditions led to DCS placing and retaining the children in foster care;

and (2) whether there is a reasonable probability that those conditions will not

be remedied. I.A., 934 N.E.2d at 1134. When analyzing this issue, courts may

consider not only the basis for the initial removal of the children, but also

reasons for the continued placement of the children outside the home thereafter.

In re A.I., 825 N.E.2d 798, 806 (Ind. Ct. App. 2005), trans. denied.

[17] Courts must judge a parent’s fitness to care for his or her child at the time of the

termination hearing, taking into consideration evidence of changed

circumstances. A.D.S. v. Indiana Dep’t of Child Servs., 987 N.E.2d 1150, 1157

(Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied. The parent’s habitual patterns of conduct

should be evaluated to determine the probability of future neglect or deprivation

of the child. Id. Factors to consider include a parent’s prior criminal history,

drug and alcohol abuse, history of neglect, failure to provide support, and lack

6
Because Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-4(b)(2)(B) is written in the disjunctive, DCS needed to prove only
one of the requirements of subsection (B). We conclude there is sufficient evidence of a reasonable
probability that the conditions resulting in the Children’s removal from Mother’s and Father’s care would not
be remedied, and we need not address whether there is sufficient evidence that continuation of the parent-
child relationship posed a threat to the Children. See A.D.S. v. Ind. Dep’t of Child Services, 987 N.E.2d 1150,
1158 n.6 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), trans. denied.

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 of adequate housing and employment. Id. Courts also may consider services

offered to the parent by DCS and the parent’s responses to those services. Id.

DCS is not required to prove a parent has no possibility of changing; it need

only establish a reasonable probability that no change will occur. Id.

[18] The trial court found:

7. * * * * * Both [Mother and Father] have had significant
incarceration during the pending CHINS matters, resulting
in inability to attend visitation at times, inability to provide
supervision and care to the children, and inability to
maintain suitable housing.

*****

9. The parents were given additional time to demonstrate that
they could achieve reunification. Although the parents began
to make some improvements following the filing of
termination of parental rights and were participating in
visitation, mother again tested positive for narcotic substances
without a prescription in November of 2016 and father tested
positive for narcotic substances without a prescription in
December of 2016.

10. In early 2017, the parents began to display increased non-
compliance with programs and orders of the court. Between
March and May 2017, mother missed approximately 18 drug
screens and father was again in Community Corrections,
where he was unable to assume care and placement of the
children.

*****

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 12. The Father has not shown an ability to provide stability and
care for the children throughout the CHINS matter. . . .

13. Father stopped participating in random drug screens in
September of 2017 and has not demonstrated an ability to
abide by Court orders, and more importantly, has not
demonstrated sobriety. This is critical given his long history
of substance use and his own report that he could [not] keep
his children in his care due to his substance use.

14. The children’s father had not visited with the children since
September of 2017 as of the start of trial. . . .

l5. Father has been arrested approximately seven times during
the pending CHINS matters. Father was convicted of fraud
for stealing a prescription pad from a medical provider.
Father has been sentenced to work release due to probation
violations, including a revocation based on a relapse on
opiates. Father’s petitions to revoke indicate that father has
difficulty following orders of the court.

16. Of extreme concern to the court is that the parents were
involved in a domestic altercation in October of 2017. . . .

17. ln November of 2017, the parents participated in a court
facilitation meeting geared toward giving the parents a final
opportunity to avoid their parental rights being terminated.
At that meeting, father stated that he could not provide care
for the children on his own, that he would not participate in
the services ordered by the court, and that he wanted to give
custody to the mother. Father left the meeting and did not
stay to its conclusion. . . .

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 18. Father now reports that he has been attending drug screens
and seeking substance abuse treatment. Father failed to notify
FCM [family case manager] that he was undertaking these
efforts and did not notify the court facilitator. Additionally,
evidence from a representative of the Father’s treatment
provider indicated that screens collected by them were for the
sole purpose of monitoring compliance with Suboxone
treatment and were not random; furthermore, father is no
longer receiving treatment at their facility as of the time of
trial.

19. The court has given consideration to father’s current
treatment but notes that father has attended substance abuse
treatment previously, including inpatient treatment at
Stepping Stone, and continued to use illegal and impairing
substances after completing treatment.

*****

22. Father reported on the last day of trial that he wants to be,
and is ready to be, a dad now. The Court believes that Father
has had three years to make the children a priority and has
failed to do so. Father’s pattern of behavior speaks more
loudly than his words and the children should not have to
wait any longer to determine if father is going to someday be
able to be a consistent parent to them.

23. Based on the evidence before the court, the court finds that father is
not likely to remedy the reasons that each child has remained out of
his care. Father has not maintained a bond with the children
in that father failed to take advantage of the opportunity to
participate in visits with the children. Father does not know
any information about current conditions or medical care,
and has not made efforts to gain knowledge about the
children. . . .

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 *****

25. Likewise, Mother has no[t] shown an ability to care for the
children in a safe and stable manner during the underlying
CHINS matters.

26. Mother self-reports that she has been arrested approximately
five to six times during the pending CHINS matter. Mother
has had multiple petitions to revoke probation, including for
relapse on opiates. Mother’s petitions to revoke indicate that
she has difficulty following orders of the court.

27. Mother stopped participating in random drug screens in
October of 2017. . . .

28. Mother has been residing in the home of her step-father.
DCS and CASA went to the home in fall of 2017 for a
scheduled visit in an effort to determine if it might be
appropriate for reunification. The home was found to be in
disarray, with prescription bottles in plain view and a bong
associated with drug use out in plain sight. . . .

29. At the facilitation meeting in November of 2017, mother
admitted that she was only taking half of the depression
medication that she was prescribed. Mother reported that she
was willing to obtain the mental health treatment that had
been ordered throughout the CHINS matter but had not been
doing so. . . .

30. Mother claimed on the last day of trial that she would be
starting mental health treatment the Wednesday after trial.

31. [ ] Mother has had three years to make the children a priority
and has failed to do so. Mother is aware that she resides with

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 a person who uses illegal substances and who is likely to have
illegal substances in her home. Mother has not been
compliant with drug screens to demonstrate sobriety, which is
a key factor considering her history of use. Most importantly,
Mother still had not initiated mental health treatment as of
the final day of trial. Mother continues to struggle with
mental health conditions, which are the very thing that lead to
the Department’s intervention in 2014. Based on these facts, the
Court finds that Mother is unlikely to remedy the reasons that the
children were removed from Mother and the reasons that the children
have remained out of her care.

*****

33. As with father, Mother’s pattern of behavior speaks more
loudly than her words and the children should not have to
wait any longer to determine if mother is going to someday be
able to be a consistent parent to them.

App. Vol. II pp. at 42-47 (emphasis added).

[19] The reasons for the Children’s removal and continued placement outside

Mother’s and Father’s care included Mother’s mental health and Mother’s and

Father’s substance abuse and instability. None of these conditions has been

remedied, and there is a reasonable probability that these conditions will not be

remedied in the future.

[20] First, Mother’s mental health issues have not been resolved. DCS family case

manager (“FCM”) Crystal Hobgood testified that, after Mother threatened to

commit suicide, Mother was ordered to get a mental health evaluation and to

follow any resulting recommendations; Mother “never did complete [the

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 mental health evaluation].” Tr. Vol. II p. 67. Hobgood testified that, when

pressed by DCS, “[Mother] would just basically say that she could handle it and

that she was gonna take care of it on her own.” Id. at 81-82. The record

establishes that Mother finally submitted to the mental health evaluation “two

and a half, three weeks” before the evidentiary hearing. Id. at 77. Mother

testified that she would “start counseling on [the] Wednesday” following the

evidentiary hearing on DCS’ petition to terminate parental rights. Id. at 178.

[21] Next, Mother’s and Father’s substance abuse issues also remain unresolved.

For much of the three-year pendency of the CHINS matters, neither Mother

nor Father achieved demonstrable, sustained sobriety. FCM Salome Lamarche

testified that, as to drug screens, Father “was pretty much non-compliant the

whole time”; and Mother “did comply the first few months” before becoming

“less complian[t].” Id. at 91. FCM Kassidy McGee testified that Mother’s and

Father’s compliance with random drug screens was “sporadic,” and neither

achieved sobriety on McGee’s watch. Id. at 100. McGee also testified that

Mother and Father were suspended from intensive outpatient treatment “for

non-compliance.” Id. at 103.

[22] Further, Mother and Father’s substance abuse resulted in multiple arrests and

periods of incarceration. Mother and Father were each arrested at least five

times during the pendency of the CHINS matters. On one occasion, Mother

was arrested for presenting a diluted urine sample during drug testing. FCM

Hobgood testified as follows:

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 [Mother] was testin’ positive for Lortabs and opiates with her
probation officer. She tested positive several times. She actually
[was] with the parent aide a few times and the parent aide had to
take [B.M.] back to [Father] because [Mother] was arrested.
That happened several times. The last time she was arrested the
probation officer said that they thought that she was gonna have
a long sentence. So at that time my supervisor and I had met
with [Father] at his place and discussed some services that we
could put in the home to help him so that he could work . . . . So
we were tryin’ to establish some services to help him, such as
daycare, etcetera, so that he can maintain his job. That day . . .
he had agreed to the services but later that afternoon he had
called and asked me to remove his children.

Id. at 63-64. Hobgood testified that, despite DCS’ offer of support services,

Father called within an hour to say that “he didn’t think that he can handle all

the children and that he knew that he would use Lortabs and that he wanted us

– even though he said that it was very difficult on him . . . he felt that it was

better for the children to be removed.” Id. at 65.

[23] Specifically, as to Father’s own substance abuse, FCM Hobgood testified that,

despite “opportunities to make up,” Father “did not follow through” and

“didn’t complete the last phase of substance abuse treatment.” Id. at 92.

Hobgood testified that, on one occasion, after Father tested positive for opiates

and Oxycontin, DCS agreed to pay for him to enroll in the Stepping Stone

program. Hobgood testified that “when a bed [be]came available[,] . . . . Father

refused and said he didn’t wanna do that treatment.” Id. at 66. During the

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 CHINS pendency, Father tested positive for oxycodone, hydrocodone,

hydromorphone, benzodiazepine, and morphine. 7

[24] Although Father testified, at the evidentiary hearing, that he completed

substance abuse treatment at SelfRefind 8 and submitted to drug screens, Father

failed to provide documentation to DCS of his enrollment, progress, or test

results. Moreover, the testimony of both Father and Bailee Edmond, who

conducted Father’s drug screens, established that Father’s drug testing at

SelfRefind was scheduled, predictably, every Tuesday. As FCM McGee

testified, persons who present only sporadically for drug screens “c[an] still be

active users” and “c[an] screen one week and . . . miss four weeks [while] using

[drugs] those four weeks.” Id. at 102.

[25] Additionally, Mother’s and Father’s instability has not been resolved. FCM

Hobgood testified that Mother and Father were referred to the intensive Home

Builders program “to help them keep the kids in the home, [and to] help them

with identifying treatment programs, jobs”; however, services were terminated

after forty-five days because Mother and Father did not meet consistently with

Home Builders staff and “wouldn’t comply[.]” Id. at 62. Hobgood testified

that, after a forty-five-day enrollment in services, Mother and Father “weren’t

7
Lamarche testified that Father had a prescription for “[o]ne of them.” Tr. Vol. II p. 92.
8
SelfRefind is an outpatient mental health and substance abuse support program.

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 able to accomplish the goals,” and DCS “ended up removin[g] the children due

to [Mother’s and Father’s] positive drug screens.” Id. at 63.

[26] Another issue of concern for DCS was Mother’s and Father’s housing

instability and their inability to maintain consistent living conditions fit for the

Children. Despite DCS’ rent assistance, Mother and Father were evicted from

their residence “a couple of times” during the pendency of the CHINS matters.

Id. at 139. Hobgood testified that Mother was in and out of jail 9 and that,

during one of Mother’s incarcerations, Father had the opportunity to keep the

children in his home and to keep them from going into foster care. Hobgood

testified that, after initially agreeing to the plan, Father opted out, and DCS

removed the Children. Due to a domestic abuse incident in September 2017,

during the pendency, Mother and Father separated. Mother moved in with her

stepfather, who self-reported his regular marijuana use and, in whose home

FCM McGee observed a bong and prescription medication bottles in plain

view.

[27] FCM McGee testified that DCS pursued termination of Father’s parental rights

“due to [his] unwillingness to participate in services”; and because Father

“admitted he can’t care for all three kiddos.” Id. at 112. McGee testified

9
Hobgood testified that, from March through August 2016, Mother was “[o]ff and on” in jail, and “fairly
most of April to August[, Mother] was in jail.” Tr. Vol. II p. 76.

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 further that DCS sought termination of Mother’s parental rights because

Mother “didn’t fully comply, which . . . would’ve meant doing all of her drug

screens, not missing visits, and doing mental health services. And there was no

compliance.” Id. at 109. McGee testified that her stance as to Mother would

not change, even if Mother completed substance abuse treatment, 10 because

“[i]t’s been three years and there has been no stability so there’s nothing that

would make me think that it’s gonna change now, especially in a short amount

of time.” Id. at 112.

[28] The record reveals that Mother and Father occasionally made progress during

the pendency of the CHINS matters. Unfortunately, three years later, Mother

and Father simply failed to demonstrate that they could provide a safe, secure,

and stable environment for the Children. We acknowledge the hurdles inherent

in overcoming drug addiction; however, we cannot overlook Mother’s and

Father’s patterns of abusing drugs, complacency, pursuing substance abuse

treatment, relapsing, and going to jail. See A.D.S., 987 N.E.2d at 1157 (holding

that the parent’s habitual patterns of conduct should be evaluated to determine

the probability of future neglect or deprivation of the child); see id. (holding that

DCS is not required to prove a parent has no possibility of changing; DCS need

only establish a reasonable probability that no change will occur). As the trial

court stated, “the children should not have to wait any longer to determine if

10
Mother did complete substance abuse treatment.

Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-JT-1503| January 11, 2019 Page 19 of 24
 [Mother or Father are] going to someday be able to be consistent parent[s] to

them.” App. Vol. II p. 47.

[29] Based on the foregoing, we find that DCS presented sufficient evidence to

establish, by clear and convincing evidence, that a reasonable probability exists

that the conditions resulting in the Children’s removal or the reasons for

placement outside Mother’s and Father’s care will not be remedied. The trial

court’s finding in this regard is not clearly erroneous.

II. Best Interests of the Children

[30] Next, Mother and Father assert that DCS failed to prove that termination of

their parental rights is in the Children’s best interests. In determining what is in

the best interests of a child, the trial court is required to look at the totality of

the evidence. D.D., 804 N.E.2d at 267. In doing so, the trial court must

subordinate the interests of the parents to those of the child involved. Id.

[31] Termination of a parent-child relationship is proper where the child’s emotional

and physical development is threatened. K.T.K., 989 N.E.2d at 1235. A trial

court need not wait until a child is irreversibly harmed such that his or her

physical, mental, and social development is permanently impaired before

terminating the parent-child relationship. Id. Additionally, a child’s need for

permanency is a “central consideration” in determining the best interests of a

child. Id.

[32] A parent’s historical inability to provide a suitable, stable home environment

along with the parent’s current inability to do so supports a finding that

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 termination is in the best interest of the child. In re A.P., 981 N.E.2d 75, 82

(Ind. Ct. App. 2012). Testimony of the service providers and evidence that the

conditions resulting in removal will not be remedied are sufficient to show, by

clear and convincing evidence, that termination is in the child’s best interests.

In re A.S., 17 N.E.3d 994, 1005 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014), trans. denied.

[33] The trial court found:

1. Each child is in need of a stable, sober caregiver who can
advocate for the child and give the child a permanent home. The
Court does not believe, based on either parent’s pattern of
ongoing behavior, that either of them are [sic] able to serve those
roles for the child.

2. The CASA and DCS family case managers involved the
parents in numerous Child and Family Team meetings in an
effort to help the parents remain on the path to reunification.
Despite these efforts and the services provided, the parents have
not shown a commitment to reunification. As the CASA
volunteer noted, these children deserve better. Children need
stability, consistency, they need to feel wanted and loved, to have
a roof over their head, and food on table. They need boundaries
to feel secure. These are the exact types of things that the parents
have not been able to provide and which lead the Court to find
that termination of parental rights is in the best interests of the
children.

App. Vol. II p. 48.

[34] At the evidentiary hearing, FCM McGee testified that termination of Mother’s

and Father’s parental rights is in the Children’s best interests “[s]o the[ ]

[Children] have a safe and stable home to grow up in.” Tr. Vol. II p. 108.

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 McGee testified that K.M., Jr. and B.M. have special medical or mental health

needs and that the Children all need a caregiver “that can show stability and

sobriety.” Id. at 109.

[35] FCM Katharine Thien testified that she recommended termination of Mother’s

and Father’s parental rights because, three years after being court ordered to do

so, Mother had yet to complete vital mental health treatment; and Father failed

to satisfactorily complete substance abuse treatment. CASA Michael Huther

testified that Mother and Father “lack the stability necessary to maintain a

household for the kids”; and that Huther could not recommend reunification

“[b]ecause of the non-compliance with the expectations that the DCS has

required of [Mother and Father].” Id. at 139.

[36] The totality of the evidence supports the trial court’s determination that DCS

proved, by clear and convincing evidence, that termination is in the Children’s

best interests. Accordingly, the trial court’s finding on this issue is not clearly

erroneous.

III. Satisfactory Plan

[37] Lastly, Mother and Father allege that DCS failed to prove, by clear and

convincing evidence, that there is a satisfactory plan for the care and treatment

of the Children. “DCS must provide sufficient evidence there is a satisfactory

plan for the care and treatment of the child.” In re J.C., 994 N.E.2d 278, 290

(Ind. Ct. App. 2013) (citing Ind. Code § 31-35-2-4(b)(1)(D)), reh’g denied. The

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 plan need not be detailed, provided that it offers a general sense of the direction

in which the child will go, upon termination of the parent-child relationship. Id.

[38] The trial court found:

3. DCS did consider the possibility of relative care for the
children in hopes that a less restrictive option could be found for
the child, and relative placement was used early on in the case.
The child’s maternal grandmother subsequently tested positive
for substances, resulting in removal from her care prior to the
trial home visit with the parents in November of 2015. Other
appropriate relatives have not been found.

4. The court acknowledges that while the youngest child is in pre-
adoptive placement, the current foster homes for the oldest two
are only foster homes and are not likely to adopt the children.
However, the Special Needs Adoption Program matches children
to adoptive families and the children will be eligible for
consideration by potential families if parental rights are
terminated. Both the Court Appointed Special Advocate
(CASA) and the family case manager believe that the children
are adoptable. The court agrees that adoption for the children is
best sought now rather than the children being at a more
advanced age were parents to be given more time to try to
complete services.

5. DCS and the CASA volunteer recommend adoption as the
plan of care which is in the children’s best interest. The Court
finds that adoption is in each child’s best interests based on the
behavior of the parents, and that adoption is a satisfactory plan.

App. Vol. II p. 48.

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[39] DCS is only required to offer a general sense of the plan for the Children after

termination of Mother’s and Father’s parental rights. Here, FCM McGee and

CASA Huther testified that adoption is the most appropriate plan of care for the

Children and that each child is “adoptable.” Id.; see Lang v. Starke Cnty. Office of

Family and Children, 861 N.E.2d 366, 375 (Ind. Ct. App. 2007) (holding that

adoption is a satisfactory plan), trans. denied. We find that DCS proved, by

clear and convincing evidence, that it has a satisfactory plan for the care and

treatment of the Children; accordingly, the trial court’s finding on this issue is

not clearly erroneous.

Conclusion
[40] The evidence is sufficient to support the termination of Mother’s and Father’s

parental rights to the Children. We affirm.

[41] Affirmed.

[42] Baker, J., and May, J., concur.

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