NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS JAN 17 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
GODSON ERUCHALU, Nos. 17-15878
17-15881
Plaintiff-Appellant,
D.C. No. 2:12-cv-01264-RFB-VCF
v.
U.S. BANK; et al., MEMORANDUM*
Defendants-Appellees.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the District of Nevada
Richard F. Boulware II, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted January 15, 2019**
Before: TROTT, TALLMAN, and CALLAHAN, Circuit Judges.
In these consolidated appeals, Godson Eruchalu appeals pro se from the
district court’s order granting defendant First Option Mortgage’s amended motion
for attorney’s fees and costs under 28 U.S.C. §§ 1920 and 1927. We have
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review for an abuse of discretion. Wages
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
v. IRS, 915 F.2d 1230, 1235 (9th Cir. 1990). We affirm.
The district court did not abuse its discretion by awarding § 1927 sanctions
because the record supports the district court’s findings that Eruchalu twice refiled
previously dismissed claims, ignored discovery orders, initiated similar
proceedings in state court and bankruptcy court, and filed meritless motions and
appeals over the course of the proceedings. See 28 U.S.C. § 1927 (authorizing an
award of attorney’s fees reasonably incurred because of conduct that “multiplies
the proceedings . . . unreasonably and vexatiously”); Wages, 915 F.2d at 1235-36
(sanctions under § 1927 require a showing of bad faith and may be imposed upon a
pro se plaintiff).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by awarding attorney’s fees in
the amount of $189,908.65 because the record supports the district court’s
calculation under the lodestar method. See Camacho v. Bridgeport Fin., Inc., 523
F.3d 973, 977-78 (9th Cir. 2008) (discussing proper application of the lodestar
method and the district court’s “great deal of discretion” to determine the
reasonableness of the fee (citation and internal quotation marks omitted)).
The district court did not abuse its discretion by awarding costs under 28
U.S.C. § 1920. See 28 U.S.C. § 1920 (setting forth categories of taxable costs); In
2 17-15878
re Online DVD-Rental Antitrust Litig., 779 F.3d 914, 924-25 (9th Cir. 2015)
(setting forth standard of review).
We do not consider matters not specifically and distinctly raised and argued
in the opening brief, or arguments and allegations raised for the first time on
appeal. See Padgett v. Wright, 587 F.3d 983, 985 n.2 (9th Cir. 2009).
Eruchalu’s request for “extra” pages, set forth in his reply brief, is granted.
The reply brief has been filed. To the extent Eruchalu requests leave to file a
supplemental reply brief, the request is denied.
Eruchalu’s request to strike the answering briefs, set forth in his reply brief,
is denied.
AFFIRMED.
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