[Cite as In re M.W., 2019-Ohio-140.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
SECOND APPELLATE DISTRICT
MONTGOMERY COUNTY
IN RE: M.W. :
:
: Appellate Case Nos. 28046 & 28065
:
: Trial Court Case No. 2015-1370
:
: (Juvenile Appeal from
: Common Pleas Court)
:
:
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OPINION
Rendered on the 18th day of January, 2019.
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MATHIAS H. HECK, JR., by SARAH E. HUTNIK, Atty. Reg. No. 0095900, Assistant
Prosecuting Attorney, Montgomery County Prosecutor’s Office, Appellate Division,
Montgomery County Courts Building, 301 West Third Street, Dayton, Ohio 45422
Attorney for Appellee Montgomery County Children Services
SARA M. BARRY, Atty. Reg. No. 0090909, 1139 Holly Avenue, Dayton, Ohio 45410
Attorney for Appellant-Mother
ROBERT BRENNER, Atty. Reg. No. 0067714, P.O. Box 340214, Beavercreek, Ohio
45434
Attorney for Appellant-Father
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DONOVAN, J.
{¶ 1} This matter is before the Court on Father’s June 22, 2018 Notice of Appeal
and Mother’s July 12, 2018 Notice of Appeal. Father and Mother appeal from the June
12, 2018 judgment of the juvenile court that overruled Father’s and Mother’s objections
to a magistrate’s decision and granted permanent custody of their child, M.W., to the
Montgomery County Department of Job and Family Services - Children Services Division
(“MCCS”). The juvenile court concluded that the State had presented clear and
convincing evidence that permanent custody was in the best interest of the child. We
hereby affirm the judgment of the juvenile court.
{¶ 2} MCCS filed a dependency complaint on March 10, 2015, alleging in part that
Mother had substance abuse issues and that the agency became involved with the family
after receiving a sexual abuse referral that M.W. was victimized by a non-related minor
male. Although the sexual abuse referral was not substantiated, in the course of the
investigation, Mother was arrested for solicitation and possessing criminal tools. The
complaint stated that, after Mother was released from jail, in the course of an
unannounced home visit by MCCS in February 2015, Mother admitted to relapsing on
heroin, reported that she was being evicted from her housing, and reported that she had
no one to care for her child while she sought substance abuse treatment. M.W. was
placed in the interim temporary custody of MCCS.
{¶ 3} After an adjudicatory and dispositional hearing on May 6, 2015, M.W. was
found to be dependent in a “Magistrate’s Decision and Judge’s Order of Adjudication and
Disposition of Temporary Custody” issued on May 28, 2015. The Court found that that
a case plan had been developed, that neither parent had remedied the concerns that
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resulted in the child’s removal, and that “mother and father need to address housing
issues along with substance abuse, mental health, and domestic violence. Neither
parent is in a position to care for the child. Mother and Father are in agreement with
temporary custody to [MCCS.]”
{¶ 4} On January 25, 2016, MCCS filed a motion for an extension of temporary
custody. After a hearing on March 2, 2016, the extension was granted. The order
provided that “neither parent has remedied the concerns that resulted in the child’s
removal from the home. The mother continues to struggle with her addiction and does
not have stable housing. The father needs to address the recommendations of his
recent assessments.” According to the order, the parents agreed with the extension of
temporary custody to MCCS.
{¶ 5} On July 19, 2016, MCCS filed a motion for permanent custody of M.W. On
February 7, 2017, Father filed a “Petition for Legal Custody.” On February 19, 2017, the
trial court denied MCCS’s motion for permanent custody.
{¶ 6} On April 19, 2017, MCCS filed a second motion for permanent custody of
M.W. A hearing was held on August 2, 2017. On August 4, 2017, the trial court granted
permanent custody to MCCS. The magistrate found that Mother had “made very minimal
progress addressing case plan concerns,” whereas Father’s progress was “much more
substantial.” With respect to Father, the magistrate’s decision stated in relevant part as
follows:
● Father has made significant progress addressing many of his case
plan goals. He has completed a batterer’s assessment with no
recommendations for treatment. He also completed a parenting program.
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Moreover, he completed a substance abuse assessment with no
recommendations although father admits to marijuana use at least two to
three times per week. Father is involved in mental health services at the
Wellness Card and is prescribed psychotropic medications. Father’s
psychiatrist did recommend that father engage in counseling but father has
not been consistent with this service during 2017. Father did not attend
counseling for about 3-4 months in 2017 because he did not feel that the
therapist was listening to him. He did address this concern with the
therapist and reengaged with counseling around May 2017.
● When the child was removed in 2015, the father was residing in a
studio apartment at the Veteran’s Administration which was not suitable for
the child. Father did obtain a Section 8 voucher and secured an apartment
on Bruce Avenue in Dayton, Ohio around May 2015. In early 2017, father
failed to renew his lease on Bruce Avenue and became homeless. Since
early 2017, father has been residing with friends and family members. He
is currently residing with his cousin and his cousin’s wife on Northwoods
Ave[.] in a 2 bedroom apartment. The current caseworker and GAL have
spoken to father many times about the housing issue and father has
indicated that he is attempting to secure a voucher through Section 8 for
larger housing that could accommodate this child and this child’s 2 half-
sisters who are also in foster care. The Agency did provide father with a
letter to assist him with housing and the father has spoken to Greater
Dayton Premiere Housing about a voucher. Father has also identified a
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potential landlord who may be willing to rent to father. However, as of the
date of this hearing, father does not have independent housing and his
current living situation is not suitable for the child.
● In conclusion, the Court finds that neither parent has addressed
their case plan concerns and demonstrated an ability to care for the child.
{¶ 7} On August 9, 2017, Father filed general objections to the magistrate’s
decision, and on August 10, 2017, MCCS filed a reply. On January 22, 2018, Father
filed supplemental objections to the magistrate’s decision, asserting that “[p]ermanency
for the child could be achieved by placing him with his father” and that “the Magistrate
abused her discretion by awarding permanent custody to MCCS as the decision was not
supported by the evidence and testimony presented.”
{¶ 8} On January 31, 2018, with leave of Court, Mother filed supplemental
objections to the magistrate’s decision. She asserted that “the Findings of Fact, filed
along with the Magistrate’s Decision, [were] incorrect.” She incorporated by reference
Father’s memorandum in support of his objections.1 On March 9, 2018, MCCS replied
to these objections.
{¶ 9} In its judgment and ruling on the parties’ objections, the juvenile court found
that M.W. had been “in the temporary custody of a children service agency for more than
12 months in a 22 month period,” as set forth in R.C.2151.414(B)(1)(d). The court also
concluded that “the State presented clear and convincing evidence that permanent
custody [was] in the best interest of the child.” The juvenile court determined in relevant
1
Mother’s argument in her objections, as on appeal, seems to be limited to her belief that
Father should have been awarded custody, not MCCS; she does not assert that she
should have been awarded custody of the child herself.
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part as follows:
* * * Father has completed various case plan objectives. However,
Father lacked independent, adequate housing throughout a portion of the
case. Father provided MCCS with no less than 4 different residences
where he was residing throughout the pendency of this matter. At the time
of the August [2nd] hearing, more than 2 years after the case plan was
developed, Father was still in the process of trying to acquire adequate
housing and had not yet done so. Additionally, although Father completed
a substance abuse assessment, the Court is unconvinced of its
effectiveness. Father stated that he did not abuse any substances during
the assessment and thus, received no recommendations for treatment.
However, Father testified to his active and frequent marijuana use during
the August [2], 2017 hearing. Father’s admission coupled with his
steadfast refusal to submit to drug screening throughout the case history
suggests that the substance abuse concerns have not been remedied.
While Father has made progress on his case plan, other districts
have held that custody determinations go beyond the successful completion
of a case plan. * * * The Court finds housing and substance abuse issues
to be unresolved issues for Father, rendering him incapable of adequately
caring for the child.
{¶ 10} Mother and Father each appealed from the juvenile court’s judgment.
They were initially represented by the same appointed counsel on appeal and filed
identical briefs. Appointed counsel filed the briefs pursuant to Anders v. California, 386
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U.S. 738, 87 S.Ct. 1396, 18 L.Ed. 493 (1967), asserting that he could “find no non-
frivolous argument that the trial court abused its discretion in granting the State’s motion
for permanent custody,” and that the appeals were “wholly frivolous.” MCCS filed a
response in each appeal asserting that, since Father filed a brief pursuant to Anders,
“there are no arguments to which [it] can respond.” (MCCS did not reference Mother’s
Anders brief.) This court informed Father and Mother that counsel had filed Anders
briefs on their behalf and granted them 60 days to file pro se briefs. Mother subsequently
filed a brief with the assistance of a different attorney, and Father filed a pro se brief.
{¶ 11} As a potential assignment of error, appointed counsel asserts as follows:
THE FINDING THAT PERMANENT CUSTODY TO MCCS IS IN
THE BEST INTERESTS OF THE CHILD IS AGAINST THE MANIFEST
WEIGHT OF THE EVIDENCE.
{¶ 12} However, according to counsel, the “record supports the trial court’s findings
that ‘housing and substance abuse [are] unresolved issues for Father, rendering him
incapable of adequately caring for the child’ and those findings are not against the
manifest weight of the evidence.”
{¶ 13} Mother asserts the following assignment of error in her brief:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT CLEAR AND
CONVINCING EVIDENCE SUPPORTED PERMANENT CUSTODY TO
MCCS DUE TO LACK OF EVIDENCE OF ADOPTABILITY AS REQUIRED
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BY R.C. 2151.413(E).2
{¶ 14} Mother argues that MCCS failed to comply with a “statutory requirement”
that it file an adoption plan and show that M.W. was adoptable. She asserts that MCCS
therefore failed to prove an award of permanent custody was in M.W.’s best interest and
that custody should have been awarded to Father. Father’s pro se brief raises an
identical assignment of error, and his argument is duplicative of Mother’s, concluding that
“MCCS’s failure to confirm adoption plans for the child [was] dispositive.”
{¶ 15} In its brief, the State responds as follows:
Specifically, Mother argues that MCCS[’s] failure to complete the
statutory requirement of filing an adoption plan along with the motion for
permanent custody is dispositive and MCCS did not show by clear and
convincing evidence that permanent custody was in the child’s best interest.
In support of her argument, Mother details several cases pertaining to the
requirements of R.C. 2151.413(E). However, every case Mother cites has
been reversed by the Ohio Supreme Court in In re T.R. et al, 120 Ohio St.3d
136, 2008-Ohio-5219, 896 N.E.2d 1003. Therefore, any reliance on the
rationale in those cases is misplaced and erroneous. Under current law,
the “court is not required to factor adoption possibilities into its analysis.”
Id. at ¶ 16. As there is no requirement to file an adoption plan along with
the motion for permanent custody, MCCS presented clear and convincing
2
“Any agency that files a motion for permanent custody under this section shall include
in the case plan of the child who is the subject of the motion, a specific plan of the agency’s
actions to seek an adoptive family for the child and to prepare the child for adoption.”
R.C. 2151.413(E).
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evidence that permanent custody was in the child’s best interest.
{¶ 16} In her Reply Brief, Mother concedes that “part of her argument was,
indeed, based on case law that was reversed by the Ohio Supreme Court, and
respectfully apologizes for any reliance on the position that requirement of the filing of the
case-plan for adoption was required at the permanent custody hearing.” In a footnote
counsel for Mother noted that she “has certainly learned a lesson as to the validity of the
authority check of certain case law programs.” Mother argued that, more importantly,
she sought “to emphasize that the lack of a permanent placement for the child through
adoption, as opposed to a secure placement with his biological parent, must be
considered in determining his best interest under a R.C. 2151.414 analysis.” According
to Mother, “Father was present and ready to take care of [M.W.] on a permanent basis,
but the trial court chose to leave the child in an unstable situation – contrary [to the] best
interests of the child. The trial court erred and acted against the manifest weight of the
evidence.”
{¶ 17} We have thoroughly reviewed the entire record as required by Anders v.
California, and we conclude that the evidence establishes that the grant of permanent
custody to MCCS was not against the manifest weight of the evidence and was in M.W.’s
best interest.
{¶ 18} As this Court has previously noted:
In a proceeding for the termination of parental rights, all of the court’s
findings must be supported by clear and convincing evidence. R.C.
2151.414(E); In re J.R., Montgomery App. No. 21749, 2007-Ohio-186, at
¶ 9. An order terminating parental rights will not be overturned as being
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against the manifest weight of the evidence if the record contains
competent, credible evidence upon which the trial court could have formed
a firm belief that the statutory elements for a termination of parental rights
have been established. In re Forest S. (1995), 102 Ohio App.3d 338, 344-
345. The credibility of the witnesses, and the weight to be given to their
testimony, are matters for the trial court, as the finder or fact, to resolve.
State v. DeHass (1967), 10 Ohio St.2d 230, 231.
In re S.G., 2d Dist. Greene No. 2009-CA-46, 2010-Ohio-2641, ¶ 12.
{¶ 19} It is undisputed that M.W. was in MCCS’s custody for more than 12
consecutive months. Therefore, R.C. 2151.414(B)(1) permits the court to grant
permanent custody to MCCS if the court determines, at a hearing held pursuant to R.C.
2151.414(A), by clear and convincing evidence, that it is the best interest of the child to
grant permanent custody of the child to the agency that filed the motion for permanent
custody. Id. at ¶ 13. Further, “ ‘[w]here children have been in agency custody for the
required time, the agency does not have to establish that the child cannot be placed with
a parent within a reasonable time or should not be placed with a parent. The only
consideration is the child’s best interests.’ In re A.U., Montgomery App. Nos. 20583,
20585, 2004-Ohio-6219, at ¶ 26.” Id.
{¶ 20} Finally, this Court noted:
In determining what is in the best interests of the child, the trial court
must consider all relevant factors, including, but not limited to, the following:
(1) the interaction and interrelationship of the child with the child's parents,
siblings, relatives, foster caregivers, and out-of-home providers, and any
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other person who may significantly affect the child; (2) the wishes of the
child, as expressed directly by the child or through the child's guardian ad
litem; (3) the custodial history of the child, including whether the child has
been in the temporary custody of public or private children services
agencies for twelve or more months; and (4) the child's need for a legally
secure permanent placement and whether that type of placement can be
achieved without a grant of permanent custody. R.C. 2151.414(D).
Id. at ¶ 14.
{¶ 21} It is undisputed that one of Father’s case plan objectives was to obtain and
maintain appropriate housing. At the August 2, 2017 hearing, Father testified that he
resided on Northwood Drive, with his cousin and his cousin’s wife, in a two bedroom
apartment. He stated that he moved from his own two-bedroom apartment when the lease
was up so that he could find housing to accommodate M.W., as well as Father’s two
daughters who were also in MCCS’s custody. On cross-examination by counsel for
MCCS, Father stated that the Northwood Drive address was “just temporary.” On cross-
examination by counsel for M.W., Father testified that he had a “landlord * * * that’s very
compassionate, and for some reason she wants to do this for [M.W.], I suppose. She
has a two-bedroom house,” and “she wants me - - us to have it.” According to Father,
he is “like caught up in the middle, like you can’t get custody without a two-bedroom.
And I can’t get a two-bedroom without custody.” Father provided an address on “Klee
Street” to the court, but he acknowledged that “couldn’t set it up” for a caseworker to visit
the residence. We conclude, as the juvenile court found, that at the time of the August
2, 2017 hearing, Father had failed to obtain stable, appropriate housing for M.W.
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{¶ 22} Father further testified that he smoked marijuana “once every three days,
once a week. Because I don’t have much money.” Cheryl Keyton, a caseworker at
MCCS who was assigned to Father’s case in April 2015, testified that random urine
screening was also one of Father’s case plan objectives, and that Father refused to
submit to a court ordered drug screen in May 2015. She testified that she “did ask him
when he was at the Agency in August of 2015, to do a drug screen, and he refused to do
that at that point.” She stated that in December 2015, Father “wanted to schedule a time
and date to do that drug screen. But we don’t usually do random drug screens that way,
so we did not schedule anything at that point.” Karen Wright, another MCCS case worker
involved in Father’s case, testified that Father refused to complete a drug screen in June
2016. According to Wright, Father “stated that he didn’t feel like the Agency was working
with him, and that we were - - that he had done everything that we had asked him to do,
and that he was not going to comply with the drug screen or meet with me anymore.”
{¶ 23} Given that Father did not obtain and maintain appropriate housing, and by
his own admission, he continued to use marijuana, we agree with counsel for Father that
the record supported the trial court’s findings that housing and substance abuse were
unresolved issues for Father, “rendering him incapable of adequately caring for the child,”
and those findings were not against the manifest weight of the evidence.
{¶ 24} Regarding Mother’s assertion in her brief (which she subsequently
acknowledged lacks merit) and Father’s assertion in his pro se brief that MCCS’s “failure
to confirm adoption plans for the child [was] dispositive,” the Supreme Court of Ohio has
held:
While it certainly may be helpful for a court to know the agency’s
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adoption plans, the court is not required to factor adoption possibilities into
its analysis, and the agency will be bound to seek adoption for the child if
permanent custody is granted regardless of whether the plans are filed
before the motion is considered. Thus, interpreting R.C. 2151.413(E) to
allow children-services agencies to update case plans to include adoption
plans after permanent custody is granted does not lead to an illogical or
absurd result, which we must avoid in construing statutes. * * *.
In re. T.R., 120 Ohio St.3d 136, 2008-Ohio-5219, 896 N.E.2d 1003, ¶ 16.
{¶ 25} Finally, the decision of the juvenile court reflects that the court carefully
considered the best interest factors in R.C. 2151.414(D)(1) and correctly concluded that
the grant of permanent custody to MCCS was in M.W.’s best interest.
{¶ 26} Based upon the foregoing, Mother’s and Father’s assignments of error are
overruled.
{¶ 27} The judgment of the trial court is affirmed.
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HALL, J. and TUCKER, J., concur.
Copies sent to:
Mathias H. Heck, Jr.
Sarah E. Hutnik
Sara M. Barry
Robert Brenner
Alan Gabel
Byron Shaw
Mark Wood
Hon. Helen Wallace
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