IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 18-1881
Filed January 23, 2019
IN THE INTEREST OF J.M., B.M., and L.M.,
Minor Children,
K.N., Mother,
Appellant,
J.M., Father,
Appellant.
________________________________________________________________
Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Story County, Stephen A. Owen,
District Associate Judge.
A mother and father separately appeal the termination of parental rights.
AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.
Daniela Matasovic of Matasovic Law Firm, Ames, for appellant mother.
Patrick C. Peters of Payer, Hunziker, Rhodes & Peters, LLP, Ames, for
appellant father.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Anagha Dixit, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Shannon M. Leighty of Public Defender’s Office, Nevada, guardian ad litem
for minor children.
Considered by Vaitheswaran, P.J., and Potterfield and Doyle, JJ.
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DOYLE, Judge.
J.M. is the father and K.N. is the mother of L.M., B.M., and J.M., born in
2013, 2014, and 2017, respectively. Following a trial, the juvenile court terminated
the parents’ parental rights, and each parent now appeals the court’s order. Upon
our de novo review of the record, we affirm.
I. Standard of Review and Statutory Framework.
Parental rights may be terminated under Iowa Code chapter 232 (2018) if
the following three conditions are true: (1) a “ground for termination under section
232.116(1) has been established” by clear and convincing evidence, (2) “the best-
interest framework as laid out in section 232.116(2) supports the termination of
parental rights,” and (3) none of the “exceptions in section 232.116(3) apply to
preclude termination of parental rights.” In re A.S., 906 N.W.2d 467, 472-73 (Iowa
2018). Our review is de novo, which means we give the juvenile court’s findings
of fact weight, especially the court’s credibility assessments, but we are not bound
by those findings. See id. at 472. “For evidence to be ‘clear and convincing,’ it is
merely necessary that there be no serious or substantial doubt about the
correctness of the conclusion drawn from it.” Raim v. Stancel, 339 N.W.2d 621,
624 (Iowa Ct. App. 1983); see also In re M.W., 876 N.W.2d 212, 219 (Iowa 2016).
Our fundamental concern is the children’s best interests. See In re K.N., 625
N.W.2d 731, 733 (Iowa 2001).
II. Background Facts and Proceedings.
The parents and children came to the attention of the Iowa
Department of Human Services (DHS) in February 2017 when the
mother visited the hospital and tested positive for methamphetamine
(meth). The State also alleged that both parents cared for the two
older children while under the influence of meth. Shortly thereafter,
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the mother gave birth to the youngest of the three children and both
she and the child tested positive for meth. The mother also tested
positive for amphetamines and opiates. In March, the parents
stipulated to removal and the children were adjudicated children in
need of assistance (CINA).
In re J.M., No. 17-2073, 2018 WL 1182544, at *1 (Iowa Ct. App. Mar. 7, 2018).
Services were offered to the family, and the parents were given multiple
opportunities to put their children first and obtain and maintain sobriety. See id. at
*1-6. Nevertheless, the parents’ progress was minimal until the juvenile court
directed the State to file petitions for termination of each parents’ parental rights.
See id. Following the November 2017 termination-of-parental-rights hearing, the
court entered its order the following month denying the termination petitions. See
id. Although the court found the State proved one of the grounds for termination,
the court concluded the children’s best interests were served by granting the
parents six additional months to work toward reunification, stating:
[B]oth the mother and father have now experienced the
longest period of sobriety known to this court. The mother has been
sober for approximately two months. The father has been sober for
just over four months and has been provided mental health therapy
and medication. Both parents have sought the assistance of
supportive relatives to assist them in continuing sobriety. Both
parents have reasonable and credible plans for their future. [The
father] acknowledges the codependent relationship between himself
and [the mother], and further acknowledges the need for individual
and family counseling in order to prove and sustain a healthy
marriage.
....
The CINA proceedings are less than one year old and in fact
only began about nine months ago in late February 2017. A
dispositional order entered a mere six months prior to the hearing on
the termination of parental rights. As shown by her date of birth on
the petition, the mother is only 23 years of age. Her drug problems
commenced when she was but 14 years of age. The father is 29
years of age as shown by his date of birth on the petitions and his
drug problems commenced approximate seven years ago when he
was 22 years of age. The parents have drug abuse problems that
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are years in the making. It is unreasonable to think that those
problems would be completely addressed within six months.
Consequently it is unreasonable to conclude that their parental rights
should be terminated in the absence of an appropriate opportunity to
meet the case plan goals in a reasonable amount of time under the
circumstances. The children deserve permanency but also deserve
an opportunity to have a life with their parents. In the children’s best
interest to continue the permanency order for an additional period of
six months in order to provide the parents an opportunity to reunify
with their children to attaining sobriety and stability.
See also id.
The children’s guardian ad litem appealed the court’s order, arguing the
State’s termination-of-parental-rights petitions should have been granted for
several reasons, including that termination of the parents’ parental rights was in
the children’s best interest. See id. at *6. A panel of this court affirmed the juvenile
court’s ruling on the best-interests issue. See id. Procedendo issued in March
2018.
Following a July 2018 permanency hearing, the juvenile court entered its
order again directing the State to file termination-of-parental-rights petitions with
respect to each parent. The court learned the parents had squandered the
additional time it had granted:
The parents had nearly 16 months to attempt to reunify the children
and have not done so. The father has shown some progress by
visiting with the children and in obtaining employment but continues
to do drugs and has no say for stable home for the children as his
mother and her boyfriend both have substance abuse histories and
issues as well. The mother continues to engage in drugs; she faces
two felony charges for drug-related crimes, and she offers no support
for the children and admits that she is all but a stranger to them.
The court further observed:
Both of these parents had extremely difficult childhoods and began
engaging in the use of drugs at an early age. They both suffer from
emotional difficulties as a result of the abuse they have endured in
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their lives. Nevertheless, neither of them has taken any steps to
engage in mental health services. They continue to turn to drugs to
escape the pain of tragedy engulfing their lives. That tragedy need
not, and should not, engulf the children.
A termination-of-parental-rights hearing was subsequently held in October
2018. The parents testified, which “was emotional but not to such a degree that
they did not acknowledge the truths of the matters put to them.” Thereafter, the
juvenile court entered its order terminating each parents’ parental rights.
The parents now appeal, separately.
III. Discussion.
Both parents challenge the grounds1 for termination found by the juvenile
court, as well as the court’s determinations that termination of their parental rights
is in the children’s best interests and that subsection 232.116(3) does not apply.
For the following reasons, we disagree.
A. Grounds for Termination.
The juvenile court found the State proved several statutory grounds for
termination. When that occurs, “we may affirm . . . on any ground we find
supported by the record.” In re A.B., 815 N.W.2d 764, 774 (Iowa 2012). We focus
our analysis on paragraphs (f) as to the two older children and (h) as to the younger
child.2
1
We note the mother did not challenge one of the grounds for termination found by the
juvenile court: 232.116(1)(f) as to the two oldest children and (h) as to the youngest child.
We could simply affirm the termination based on that unchallenged ground as urged by
the State. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.903(2)(g)(3). Nevertheless, we elect to proceed to the
merits of termination of the mother’s parental rights.
2
Iowa Code section 232.116(1) paragraphs (f) and (h) are substantially similar but contain
different time requirements based on the ages of the children. Compare Iowa Code
§ 232.116(1)(f) (applying to children four years of age or older who have been removed
from the home for twelve of the last eighteen months or twelve consecutive months), with
id. § 232.116(1)(h) (applying to children three years of age or younger who have been
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Paragraphs (f) and (h) require the State prove, among other things, the child
could not be returned to the parent’s care “at the present time.” See Iowa Code
§ 232.116(1)(f)(4), (h)(4); see also A.S., 906 N.W.2d at 473 (discussing paragraph
(h)). “At the present time” means at the time of the termination-of-parental-rights
hearing. See In re A.M., 843 N.W.2d 100, 111 (Iowa 2014). Upon our de novo
review of the record, we find clear and convincing evidence the children could not
be returned to either parent’s care at the time of the termination-of-parental-rights
hearing. We agree whole-heartedly with the juvenile court’s following assessment:
The children cannot be returned to either parent today. The
mother lives in Georgia and the [home studies] have denied
placement of the children with her in Georgia. She admits to ongoing
drug use just weeks ago. She is again moving with her extended
family to a location in Georgia several hours away from their current
residence. She is facing serious felony and misdemeanor drug
charges in Georgia. She last visited her children in September 2017
and has made no effort to reunify with them. Like the mother, the
father is homeless. He has no income. He is on parole and was
recently arrested for assaultive conduct on or about October 4, 2018.
He last used methamphetamine 21 days ago and admits to using
methamphetamine monthly. Neither parent has addressed
substance abuse issues to the extent that they have [not] been sober
for any substantial period of time nor has any parent appropriately
addressed recommendations to engage in mental health services.
The parents have been offered . . . services targeted to address the
issues leading to the children’s removal and had parents engaged
in the services to any substantial or reasonable degree, it is likely
they would have been able to reunify with the children. The parents
have refused the services or have failed to respond to them.
The parents were given extra time for reunification, and they could not maintain
their sobriety. It is clear the children could not be placed in either parent’s care at
removed from the home for six of the last twelve months or six consecutive months). The
father does not dispute the sufficiency of the evidence establishing the first three elements
of paragraphs (f) and (h); as noted above, the mother did not challenge the grounds at all.
Therefore, we need only examine whether there is clear and convincing evidence the
children could not be returned to the parents’ care.
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the time of the termination-of-parental-rights hearing. Accordingly, we affirm the
juvenile court’s determination that the State proved grounds for termination under
section 232.116(1) paragraphs (f) and (h).
B. Best Interests and Section 232.116(3) Exceptions.
The parents’ remaining arguments are related; we therefore address them
together. Both parents maintain termination of parental rights is not in the
children’s best interests. Each parent also asserts his or her bond with the children
should overcome the need for termination of parental rights. Upon our de novo
review of the record, we disagree.
“Time is a critical element” in proceedings concerning parental rights. In re
C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 495 (Iowa 2000). When a child is removed from his or her
parents’ care, the parents have a limited time frame, based upon their child’s age,
to demonstrate the child can be safely returned to the parents’ care. See A.S.,
906 N.W.2d at 474; see also Iowa Code §§ 232.102(6)(b), 232.116(1)(f)(3), (h)(3).
For children aged three and under, the legislature has determined that time frame
is six months. See Iowa Code § 232.116(1)(h)(3); A.S., 906 N.W.2d at 473-74.
For children aged four and older, that time frame is twelve months. See Iowa Code
§ 232.116(1)(f)(3).
Iowa law requires the DHS to “make every reasonable effort to return the
child to the child’s home as quickly as possible consistent with the best interests
of the child.” Id. § 232.102(9); see also C.B., 611 N.W.2d at 493. “Visitation
between a parent and child is an important ingredient to the goal of reunification,”
In re M.B., 553 N.W.2d 343, 345 (Iowa Ct. App. 1996), and the reasonable-efforts
requirement “includes visitation designed to facilitate reunification while providing
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adequate protection for the child.” C.B., 611 N.W.2d at 493. “However, the nature
and extent of visitation is always controlled by the best interests of the child.” M.B.,
553 N.W.2d at 345.
After the statutory time period for termination has passed, termination is
viewed with a sense of urgency. See C.B., 611 N.W.2d at 495. Before the court
can grant a parent additional time to work toward reunification, there must be an
assurance that the need for removal will no longer exist at the end of that time
period. See Iowa Code § 232.104(2)(b) (requiring the court, in granting additional
time, to “enumerate the specific factors, conditions, or expected behavioral
changes which comprise the basis for the determination that the need for removal
of the child from the child’s home will no longer exist at the end of the additional
six-month period”). Children are not equipped with pause buttons, and a child
cannot be deprived “of permanency after the State has proved a ground for
termination under section 232.116(1) by hoping someday a parent will learn to be
a parent and be able to provide a stable home for the child.” A.S., 906 N.W.2d at
474 (cleaned up). Ultimately, in determining whether termination of parental rights
is in a child’s best interests, we “give primary consideration to the child’s safety, to
the best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and growth of the child,
and to the physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the child.” Iowa
Code § 232.116(2).
The juvenile court found
that it would be in the best interests of the children to terminate the
parent-child relationship. The children’s safety is best ensured by
termination of parental rights to free the children from continued
neglect, homelessness, desertion and the dangers of being cared for
by drug addicted parents. In order to further the long-term nurturing
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and growth of the children, the best placement is with the pre-
adoptive foster families to whom the children have become bonded
and who have provided the children with safety, love, and nurturing.
The physical, mental, and emotional condition and needs of the
children can be best met by termination freeing the children for
adoption so that they may achieve permanency and safe and stable
home is free from drug abuse, criminal activity, neglect, desertion
and mental health instability.
Likewise, the court found “the alternatives to termination per 232.116(3), do not
apply,” pointing out the “father offered no evidence that either foster parent or any
other relative or other suitable person would accept guardianship of the children.”
We concur with the juvenile court’s determinations.
Here, we believe the parents love their children and may share a bond.
Nevertheless, the parents were given more than one year to demonstrate their
ability to care for their children and remain sober. We understand achieving and
maintaining sobriety is not easy, but when children are at issue, they and their
needs come first. The juvenile court aptly summarized:
The facts of this case as applied to the law may make the
parents appear to be monsters. They are not. Outwardly they
appear as average young adults, when the reality is they are
traumatized people ravaged by severe addiction to
methamphetamine and the many resultant traumas that they have
laid bare in the proceedings before this court. They have candidly
described their traumatic experiences and have admitted their
addictions may end their lives. The court has no words of wisdom or
comfort especially as this order is likely to be viewed by them as but
one more of the many traumas they have suffered. The parents have
described the trauma they have endured emotionally but with candor
and dignity. The court can only end with a note of respect to the
parents for the dignity and candor they have offered to these
proceedings.
The children have thrived in foster care and are adoptable. Considering the
children’s safety; the best placement for furthering the long-term nurturing and
growth of the children; and the physical, mental, and emotional condition and
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needs of the children, we agree with the juvenile court that termination of the
parents’ parental rights is in the children’s best interests, and no exceptions to
termination set forth in section 232.116(3) apply to further delay permanency.
IV. Conclusion.
Because we find clear and convincing evidence the grounds for termination
of the parents’ parental rights were established under section 232.116(1)
paragraphs (f) and (h), termination of the parents’ parental rights is in the children’s
best interests, and exceptions to termination do not apply here, we affirm the
juvenile court’s order terminating the parents’ parental rights.
AFFIRMED ON BOTH APPEALS.