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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
IN THE INTEREST OF: J.L., JR., A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: J.D.L., SR., NATURAL :
FATHER :
:
:
: No. 1405 MDA 2018
Appeal from the Order Entered July 25, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County Criminal Division at
No(s): 41-Adopt-2018,
CP-28-DP-0000061-2016
IN RE: ADOPTION OF: J.L., III, A : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
MINOR : PENNSYLVANIA
:
:
APPEAL OF: J.L., II, NATURAL :
FATHER :
:
:
: No. 1406 MDA 2018
Appeal from the Decree Entered July 25, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Franklin County Orphans’ Court at
No(s): 41-Adopt-2018
BEFORE: SHOGAN, J., OLSON, J., and MUSMANNO, J.
MEMORANDUM BY SHOGAN, J.: FILED JANUARY 24, 2019
J.L., II (“Father”), appeals from the July 25, 2018 order of the Court of
Common Pleas of Franklin County changing the placement goal regarding his
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son, J.L., III (“Child”),1 born in August of 2009, to adoption. In addition,
Father appeals the July 25, 2018 decree involuntarily terminating his parental
rights to Child.2 After careful review, we affirm.
We summarize the relevant factual and procedural history, as follows.
On August 16, 2016, at the request of Father’s paramour, who had custody of
Child3 because Father was incarcerated for drug-related crimes, Child was
placed in the custody of the Franklin County Children and Youth Services (“the
Agency” or “CYS”). Orphans’ Court Opinion, 9/13/18, at 2–3. At the time,
Father’s paramour complained that Child had behavioral problems that she
could not control. Id. at 2; N.T., 7/24/18, at 29–30. The juvenile court
adjudicated Child dependent on August 25, 2016, and established his
permanency goal as reunification. Orphans’ Court Opinion, 9/13/18, at 3.
Approximately two months later, on October 28, 2016, Father was
released from prison and permanency review hearings occurred at regular
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1 We note that Child is referred to as J.L., Jr., at Docket Number CP-28-DP-
0000061-2016, and as J.L., III, at Docket Number 41-Adopt-2018.
2 By separate decree on July 25, 2018, the orphans’ court involuntarily
terminated the parental rights of A.P. (“Mother”). Mother did not file a notice
of appeal.
3 The record reveals that, at the time of Child’s placement, Mother’s
whereabouts were unknown to the Agency. N.T., 7/24/18, at 30–31. The
Agency subsequently learned that Mother resided in the State of Maryland,
and that Child had not seen Mother since May of 2014, when he was four years
old. Id. at 32. Child began residing with Father in 2011, until Father’s
incarceration in May of 2016. Orphans’ Court Opinion, 9/13/18, at 2; N.T.,
7/24/18, at 16.
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intervals. N.T., 7/24/18, at 48–49. Father was required to satisfy the
following Family Service Plan (“FSP”) objectives: participate in a drug and
alcohol evaluation and comply with all recommendations; participate in a
parental fitness evaluation and comply with all recommendations; refrain from
future criminal activity and comply with all terms of his probation; maintain
consistent visitation and contact with Child; and maintain stable housing and
employment. Orphans’ Court Opinion, 9/13/18, at 3. In August of 2017,
based upon new drug-related charges, Father was re-incarcerated, where he
remained at the time of the subject proceedings. N.T., 7/24/18, at 51.
There is testimonial evidence that Child suffered physical abuse prior to
his placement with CYS. Child alleged that two adults, who are not identified
in the record, had been physically abusive toward him. N.T., 7/24/18, at 89.
In his initial foster placement, Child displayed severe behavioral problems. In
January of 2017, following inpatient hospital treatment and a diagnostic
evaluation, Child was placed in a residential treatment facility. Id. at 57–58.
Child’s behavioral problems, including outbursts that apparently necessitated
the use of restraints, continued while he was in the residential treatment
facility. Id. at 58–59. Child’s treatment team opined that his behaviors were
caused by his lack of “family connections” and “not having anybody visiting
him or calling him.” Id. at 59. Following successful visits with potential foster
parents who were willing to provide permanency, Child was discharged on
June 18, 2018, and placed with the foster parents. Id. at 58.
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On July 12, 2018, CYS requested that the court change Child’s
placement goal to adoption, and it filed a petition for the involuntary
termination of Father’s parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1),
(2), (5), (8), and (b). On July 24, 2018, the court held a combined goal-
change and involuntary-termination hearing during which the Agency
presented the testimony of caseworker, Hannah Crean. N.T., 7/24/18, at 27–
92. Father testified via telephone from prison. Father stated that he
anticipated being released from prison to a drug-program facility in
approximately one month, where he would then reside for an unspecified time.
Id. at 5.
During the hearing, Child, then nearly nine years old, was represented
by Kristen Hamilton, Esquire, who served as his guardian ad litem (“GAL”) in
the dependency matter. The trial court appointed the same attorney to
represent Child’s legal interests in the involuntary termination matter.4
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4 Pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2313(a), a child who is the subject of a contested
involuntary termination proceeding has a statutory right to counsel, who
discerns and advocates for his legal interests, which our Supreme Court has
defined as the child’s preferred outcome. See In re T.S., 192 A.3d 1080 (Pa.
2018) (citing In re Adoption of L.B.M., 161 A.3d 172 (Pa. 2017)). The T.S.
Court held, “[D]uring contested termination-of-parental-rights proceedings,
where there is no conflict between a child’s legal and best interests, an
attorney-guardian ad litem representing the child’s best interests can also
represent the child’s legal interests.” T.S., 192 A.3d at 1092.
Because the right to counsel belongs to the child, who is unable to address
a deprivation of his right to counsel on his own behalf, we must address this
issue sua sponte. See In re Adoption of T.M.L.M., 184 A.3d 585, 588 (Pa.
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By permanency review order entered on July 25, 2018, the court
changed Child’s placement goal to adoption. By decree the same date, the
orphans’ court involuntarily terminated Father’s parental rights. On
August 22, 2018, Father timely filed notices of appeal and concise statements
of errors complained of on appeal pursuant to Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)(2)(i) and (b),
which this Court consolidated sua sponte. The orphans’ court filed its Rule
1925(a) opinion on September 13, 2018.
On appeal, Father presents the following issue for our review:
[Whether] [t]he trial court abused its discretion in
terminating the parental rights [of Father] and changing the goal
of adoption of [Father] where, although incarcerated, [Father] had
sent letters to his son, thus not evidencing a settled purpose of
relinquishing his parental claims to the child; and he testified that
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Super. 2018) (“This Court must raise the failure to appoint statutorily-required
counsel for children sua sponte, as children are unable to raise the issue on
their own behalf due to their minority.”) (citing In re K.J.H., 180 A.3d 411,
414 (Pa. Super. 2017)).
Instantly, prior to the subject proceedings, Attorney Hamilton, then Child’s
GAL, filed in the orphans’ court an Affidavit of Non-Conflict declaring that no
conflict would exist if the court appointed her as Child’s legal counsel in the
contested involuntary termination proceeding. By order dated July 12, 2018,
the court appointed Ms. Hamilton as Child’s counsel.
Upon review, we conclude that Attorney Hamilton’s representation of Child
satisfied the requirements of 23 Pa.C.S. § 2313(a) insofar as the testimonial
evidence indicates that Child’s legal and best interests were not in conflict.
See N.T., 7/24/18, at 84 (Child asked the Agency caseworker if his foster
parents “can be his mom and dad.”). At the conclusion of the testimonial
evidence, Attorney Hamilton argued in favor of the involuntary termination of
Father’s parental rights stating, “I think [Child] deserves to be heard now, and
he is making his wishes known that he would like to attempt permanency with
this [foster] family.” Id. at 148.
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he would soon be released from incarceration, and only then
would he have the opportunity to remedy the conditions that led
to placement of the child and to fulfill the requirements set by the
Agency for reunification[?]
Father’s Brief at 5 (emphasis in original).
We review Father’s issue regarding the involuntary-termination decree5
according to the following standard:
The standard of review in termination of parental rights
cases requires appellate courts to accept the findings of fact and
credibility determinations of the trial court if they are supported
by the record. If the factual findings are supported, appellate
courts review to determine if the trial court made an error of law
or abused its discretion. A decision may be reversed for an abuse
of discretion only upon demonstration of manifest
unreasonableness, partiality, prejudice, bias, or ill-will. The trial
court’s decision, however, should not be reversed merely because
the record would support a different result. We have previously
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5 In his Pa.R.A.P. 1925 statement, Father indicated that he is appealing both
the termination of his parental rights and the trial court’s decision to change
Child’s permanency goal to adoption. In the body of his brief, however, Father
has abandoned any argument relating to the goal-change determination.
Father does not pursue a claim that the orphans’ court erred in changing
Child’s goal to adoption and fails to provide argument or citation to any
relevant legal authority regarding the goal-change order. See Banfield v.
Cortes, 110 A.3d 155, 168 (Pa. 2015) (“Where an appellate brief fails to
provide any discussion of a claim with citation to relevant authority or fails to
develop the issue in any other meaningful fashion capable of review, that claim
is waived. It is not the obligation of an appellate court to formulate [an]
appellant’s arguments for him.” Wirth v. Commonwealth, 95 A.3d 822, 837
(Pa. 2014)); In re M.Z.T.M.W., 163 A.3d 462, 465 (Pa. Super. 2017) (“It is
well-settled that this Court will not review a claim unless it is developed in the
argument section of an appellant’s brief.”); In re W.H., 25 A.3d 330, 339 n.3
(Pa. Super. 2011) (stating that issues are waived if appellate brief fails to
provide meaningful discussion with citation to relevant authority); see also
Pa.R.A.P. 2119(b). Moreover, even if not waived, we would affirm the trial
court’s decision to change the goal based upon the thorough Pa.R.A.P. 1925(a)
opinion. Orphans’ Court Opinion, 9/13/18, at 14–16.
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emphasized our deference to trial courts that often have first-hand
observations of the parties spanning multiple hearings.
In re T.S.M., 71 A.3d 251, 267 (Pa. 2013) (citations and quotation marks
omitted).
Termination of parental rights is governed by Section 2511 of the
Adoption Act, which requires a bifurcated analysis.
Initially, the focus is on the conduct of the parent. The party
seeking termination must prove by clear and convincing evidence
that the parent’s conduct satisfies the statutory grounds for
termination delineated in Section 2511(a). Only if the court
determines that the parent’s conduct warrants termination of his
or her parental rights does the court engage in the second part of
the analysis pursuant to Section 2511(b): determination of the
needs and welfare of the child under the standard of best interests
of the child. One major aspect of the needs and welfare analysis
concerns the nature and status of the emotional bond between
parent and child, with close attention paid to the effect on the child
of permanently severing any such bond.
In re L.M., 923 A.2d 505, 511 (Pa. Super. 2007) (citations omitted).
Instantly, we conclude that the certified record supports the decree
pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1) and (b), which provide as follows:
(a) General Rule.—The rights of a parent in regard to a child
may be terminated after a petition filed on any of the following
grounds:
(1) The parent by conduct continuing for a period of
at least six months immediately preceding the filing of
the petition either has evidenced a settled purpose of
relinquishing parental claim to a child or has refused
or failed to perform parental duties.
* * *
(b) Other considerations.―The court in terminating the rights
of a parent shall give primary consideration to the developmental,
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physical and emotional needs and welfare of the child. The rights
of a parent shall not be terminated solely on the basis of
environmental factors such as inadequate housing, furnishings,
income, clothing and medical care if found to be beyond the
control of the parent. With respect to any petition filed pursuant
to subsection (a)(1), (6) or (8), the court shall not consider any
efforts by the parent to remedy the conditions described therein
which are first initiated subsequent to the giving of notice of the
filing of the petition.
23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1), (b). This Court may affirm the trial court’s decision
regarding the termination of parental rights with regard to any one subsection
of Section 2511(a), as well as Section 2511(b).6 In re B.L.W., 843 A.2d 380,
384 (Pa. Super. 2004) (en banc).
With respect to Section 2511(a)(1), “the moving party must produce
clear and convincing evidence of conduct, sustained for at least the six months
prior to the filing of the termination petition, which reveals a settled intent to
relinquish parental claim to a child or a refusal or failure to perform parental
duties.” In re Z.S.W., 946 A.2d 726, 730 (Pa. Super. 2008) (citation
omitted).
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6 Based on this disposition, to the extent Father argues that the trial court
abused its discretion in terminating his parental rights pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S.
§ 2511(a)(2), (5), and (8), we need not review those sections. Nevertheless,
we observe that termination pursuant to Section 2511(a)(5) and (8) was not
proper with respect to Child because he was not removed from Father’s care.
See In re C.S., 761 A.2d 1197 (Pa. Super. 2000) (en banc) (stating that
Section 2511(a)(5) and (8) did not provide a basis for terminating the father’s
parental rights when he was incarcerated at the time of the child’s removal
from the mother’s care).
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It is well established that Section 2511 does not require that the parent
demonstrate both a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child
and refusal or failure to perform parental duties. In re Adoption of Charles
E.D.M., 708 A.2d 88, 91 (Pa. 1998). Rather, parental rights may be
terminated pursuant to Section 2511(a)(1) “if the parent either demonstrates
a settled purpose of relinquishing parental claim to a child or fails to perform
parental duties.” Id. (emphasis in original).
Our Supreme Court has explained that parental duty “is best understood
in relation to the needs of a child.” In re Burns, 379 A.2d 535, 540 (Pa.
1977).
A child needs love, protection, guidance, and support. These
needs, physical and emotional, cannot be met by a merely passive
interest in the development of the child. Thus, this Court has held
that the parental obligation is a positive duty which requires
affirmative performance. This affirmative duty encompasses
more than a financial obligation; it requires continuing interest in
the child and a genuine effort to maintain communication and
association with the child. Because a child needs more than a
benefactor, parental duty requires that a parent exert himself to
take and maintain a place of importance in the child’s life.
Id. (citations omitted).
With respect to the performance of parental duties of incarcerated
parents, our Supreme Court has explained as follows:
[A] parent’s absence and/or failure to support due to incarceration
is not conclusive on the issue of abandonment. Nevertheless, we
are not willing to completely toll a parent’s responsibilities during
his or her incarceration. Rather, we must inquire whether the
parent has utilized those resources at his or her command while
in prison in continuing a close relationship with the child. Where
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the parent does not exercise reasonable firmness in declining to
yield to obstacles, his other rights may be forfeited.
In re Adoption of S.P., 47 A.3d 817, 828 (Pa. 2012) (quoting In re
Adoption of McCray, 331 A.2d 652, 655 (Pa. 1975) (footnotes and internal
quotation marks omitted)).
We have stated:
Once the evidence establishes a failure to perform parental duties
or a settled purpose of relinquishing parental rights, we have
explained that the court must engage in three lines of inquiry: (1)
the parent’s explanation for his or her conduct; (2) the post-
abandonment contact between parent and child; and (3)
consideration of the effect of termination of parental rights on the
child pursuant to Section 2511(b).
Z.S.W., 946 A.2d at 730 (quoting Adoption of Charles E.D.M., 708 A.2d at
92).
Regarding the performance of his parental duties, Father asserts on
appeal that he was not given sufficient time to complete his FSP objectives.
Father’s Brief at 16. He requests the opportunity to complete the required
objectives upon his release from prison, which he testified would be in
approximately one month. Id. In addition, Father contends that while
incarcerated, he sent notes to Child. Id. at 11. Therefore, he maintains that
he did not evidence a settled purpose of relinquishing his parental rights. Id.
We conclude that Father’s assertions are without merit.
The trial court found as follows, in relevant part:
Between Father’s release from prison in October of 2016 and his
re-imprisonment in August of 2017, Father was tasked with
concrete objectives which, upon completion, would reunite him
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with [Child]. However, while Father made initial progress toward
these goals by participating in both the drug and alcohol
evaluation and the parental fitness evaluation, Father did not
complete the recommendations prescribed by either evaluation.
Father was also directed to refrain from criminal activity and
comply with his probation; instead, Father violated his probation
and returned to prison.
Trial Court Opinion, 9/13/18, at 12–13. The testimonial evidence supports
the orphans’ court’s findings.
At the time of the instant proceedings, Child had been in placement for
twenty-three months. N.T., 7/24/18, at 6, 11. Father was released from
prison for approximately ten months during Child’s first year of placement,
from late October of 2016, until August of 2017, when he was re-incarcerated
on new drug-related charges. Id. at 15, 20, 49, 51. The CYS caseworker,
Ms. Crean, testified that on November 9, 2016, Father took part in a drug and
alcohol evaluation, which resulted in a recommendation for him to undertake
intensive outpatient treatment. Id. at 49. Although Father attended an initial
intake appointment with an outpatient drug and alcohol treatment provider,
Father never attended any additional appointments. Id. at 49-50.
Likewise, Father underwent a parental fitness evaluation, which resulted
in recommendations for him to participate in a bonding assessment regarding
Child; to understand and to be fully involved in Child’s mental health
treatment; to obtain and maintain financial stability; and to participate in
individual outpatient therapy. N.T., 7/24/18, at 50. Father did not pursue
any of these recommendations except for being involved for an unspecified
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period in Child’s mental health treatment. Specifically, Father participated in
biweekly family therapy sessions by telephone with Child. Id. at 51–52.
However, Ms. Crean testified on direct examination as follows:
Q. Was [Father] engaged in the [therapy] process [with Child]?
A. The therapist did struggle to initially get [Father] on the phone
most times and then keep him engaged on the phone due to the
fact that his son didn’t really want to talk on the phone much so
[Father] . . . was pretty disinterested most times.
Id. at 52. Importantly, Father testified that he has had no contact with Child’s
therapist since August of 2017. Id. at 20–21.
With respect to visitation, Ms. Crean testified that the Agency
transported Father to visit Child in the residential treatment facility an
unspecified number of times. N.T., 7/24/18, at 55. She testified that the
Agency stopped transporting Father on March 9, 2017, because Father was
“swearing at the caseworkers due to the fact that there were two [people] to
transport him. [Father] thought that was disrespectful and then [Father] just
refus[ed] to . . . sit in the car where he was supposed to and made some
derogatory comments racially towards the caseworker.” Id. at 55.
Finally, Father did not maintain financial and housing stability during the
months that he was released from prison. Ms. Crean testified that in March
of 2017, Father informed the Agency that he was no longer employed. N.T.,
7/24/18, at 51. Moreover, in April of 2017, Father told CYS that he was going
to be evicted from his current residence and planned to stay with friends and
family until he obtained new employment and new housing. Id.
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Thereafter, Father did not comply with his FSP objectives to abide by
the terms of his probation and refrain from criminal activity. Specifically, he
was arrested and incarcerated in August of 2017, for testing positive for
cocaine and fentanyl. N.T., 7/24/18, at 51. On cross-examination by the
Agency’s counsel, Father testified:
Q. Do you have any concerns about your ability to completely
abstain from using drugs or alcohol and staying out of jail?
A. No, ma’am. I mean, I have excuses but last year was like a
really rough patch for me, you know what I’m saying. I lost a lot
as far as my son getting put in there. . . . I was just going through
a real rough time and I didn’t use as I did before but I . . . slipped
up and wound up using and I paid for it. . . .
Id. at 12.
Father acknowledged that when he was not incarcerated, he was
hindered from visiting Child in the residential treatment facility. N.T.,
7/24/18, at 8. He explained, “[I]t was a rough time for me, like, emotionally.
I did my best.” Id. Father testified that the residential treatment facility “was
way out of my way. I was staying in Chambersburg. . . . I didn’t really have
no [sic] support system over there whatsoever. . . .” Id. Nevertheless, Father
testified that he was attempting to complete his FSP objectives when he was
re-arrested. Id. at 6-7.
Ms. Crean further testified that during his current incarceration, Father
had written regularly to Child. N.T., 7/24/18, at 53. However, Ms. Crean
testified, “[T]he letters are severely edited due to the content of the letters,
including explicit lyrics of songs, sexual lyrics and such.” Id. She explained
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that Father was told by Child’s treatment team, the Agency, and the trial court
that the content of his letters was inappropriate, and after a substantial period,
Father’s letters to Child improved. Id. at 53–54. Moreover, Father testified
that he has not spoken to Child on the telephone for approximately one year.
Id. at 24.
Father acknowledged on cross-examination by Child’s attorney that he
is aware that Child has significant delays in his cognitive and developmental
abilities. N.T., 7/24/18, at 21. With respect to Child’s behavioral issues,
Father testified regarding his responsibility for them, as follows:
[By CYS counsel:] You are aware, correct me if I’m wrong, about
the severity of [Child’s] behavior, including threatening, being
aggressive towards others, harming himself, harming other
adults, harming other children, his aggression, you’re aware of all
that?
[Father:] Yes, ma’am.
Q. And you’re aware, also, that permanency reviews, it was
discussed that perhaps some of the aggression was the fact that
there was no consistency from specifically you?
A. Yeah, yeah. When I had him, I did the best I could do.
Unfortunately, . . . I had to move and then I moved to another
place. I took my son camping with me, I came back and it was
broken into, you know what I’m saying. I was going to stay there
so I was trying to find another place and we was, you know,
staying house to house. And unfortunately, I don’t have the
support system I would like to have from my family but I do the
best I can do.
Id. at 21–22.
Based on the totality of the record evidence, we discern no abuse of
discretion by the trial court in concluding that, for a period far in excess of the
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six-month statutory minimum, Father failed to perform his parental duties to
Child. Accordingly, we affirm the decree pursuant to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(a)(1).
With respect to 23 Pa.C.S. § 2511(b), this Court has stated that
“[i]ntangibles such as love, comfort, security, and stability are involved in the
inquiry into the needs and welfare of the child.” In re C.M.S., 884 A.2d 1284,
1287 (Pa. Super. 2005) (citation omitted). Further, the trial court “must also
discern the nature and status of the parent-child bond, with utmost attention
to the effect on the child of permanently severing that bond.” Id. (citation
omitted). However, “[i]n cases where there is no evidence of any bond
between the parent and child, it is reasonable to infer that no bond exists.
The extent of any bond analysis, therefore, necessarily depends on the
circumstances of the particular case.” In re K.Z.S., 946 A.2d 753, 762-763
(Pa. Super. 2008) (citation omitted).
Turning to Section 2511(b), although Father does not present a
challenge to this section, we consider it based on the requisite bifurcated
analysis in involuntary termination matters. See In re C.L.G., 956 A.2d 999,
1009 (Pa. Super. 2008) (en banc). We have explained:
While a parent’s emotional bond with his or her child is a major
aspect of the subsection 2511(b) best-interest analysis, it is
nonetheless only one of many factors to be considered by the
court when determining what is in the best interest of the child.
In re K.K.R.S., 958 A.2d 529, 533-536 (Pa. Super. 2008). The
mere existence of an emotional bond does not preclude the
termination of parental rights. See In re T.D., 949 A.2d 910 (Pa.
Super. 2008) (trial court’s decision to terminate parents’ parental
rights was affirmed where court balanced strong emotional bond
against parents’ inability to serve needs of child). Rather, the
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orphans’ court must examine the status of the bond to determine
whether its termination “would destroy an existing, necessary and
beneficial relationship.” In re Adoption of T.B.B., 835 A.2d 387,
397 (Pa. Super. 2003). As we explained in In re A.S., 11 A.3d
473, 483 (Pa. Super. 2010),
[I]n addition to a bond examination, the trial court can
equally emphasize the safety needs of the child, and should
also consider the intangibles, such as the love, comfort,
security, and stability the child might have with the foster
parent. Additionally, this Court stated that the trial court
should consider the importance of continuity of
relationships and whether any existing parent-child bond
can be severed without detrimental effects on the child.
In re N.A.M., 33 A.3d 95, 103 (Pa. Super. 2011).
Furthermore, our Supreme Court has stated that “[c]ommon sense
dictates that courts considering termination must also consider whether the
children are in a pre-adoptive home and whether they have a bond with their
foster parents.” T.S.M., 71 A.3d at 268. The T.S.M. Court directed, in
weighing the bond considerations pursuant to Section 2511(b), “courts must
keep the ticking clock of childhood ever in mind.” Id. at 269. Moreover, the
High Court observed, “Children are young for a scant number of years, and
we have an obligation to see to their healthy development quickly. When
courts fail . . . the result, all too often, is catastrophically maladjusted
children.” Id.
Instantly, the orphans’ court found as follows with respect to Child’s best
interests:
Due to various issues, including but not limited to serial
periods of incarceration, [F]ather has been unable to meet his
son’s needs. Most critical to [Child’s] well-being are the issues
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addressed by the . . . []residential treatment facility placement]—
[Child’s] need for family connections. In fact, [Child] was released
from the [residential treatment facility] to foster care to have this
significant mental health issue addressed. Based on past
behaviors and demonstrated lack of commitment to the stability
critical to [Child’s] positive development, this [c]ourt has no faith
that [F]ather will be in a position to meet his son’s needs in the
future. Family connections are essential for [Child]. The foster
family is presently providing these connections and has stated
their willingness to continue to do so long[-]term. His needs are
now being well met.
Decree, 7/25/18, at 6, ¶ 7(ll) (emphasis in original). The testimonial evidence
supports the orphans’ court’s findings.
Ms. Crean testified that Child is diagnosed with disruptive dysregulation,
mood disorder, and attention deficit hyperactive disorder. N.T., 7/24/18, at
53. He receives family-based therapy in his foster home as well as psychiatric
treatment. Id. at 91. Child has an Individualized Education Plan, and
Ms. Crean testified that although nearly age nine at the time of the involuntary
termination proceeding, Child is at a kindergarten or remedial first grade
educational level. Id. at 90. Significantly, Ms. Crean testified as follows on
direct examination:
[By CYS:] Is there anything in particular that [Child’s] treatment
team has repeatedly expressed that [Child] needs to help him
cope and deal with the issues that he’s suffered throughout his
life?
[By Ms. Crean:] Yes. Family connections is the biggest one. They
continue to reiterate to [Father] as well as us that [Child] just
needs those connections to be able to be successful in his
treatment.
Q. And has [Father] appeared to understand the importance of
this for [Child]?
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A. He has not.
Q. And why do you say he hasn’t?
A. He . . . has not continued to maintain that contact with his
son, to be a resource for his son or [to] provide other family
resources for his son.
Id. at 54.
Ms. Crean testified that although a bond initially existed between Child
and Father, that bond has weakened over the past six to eight months. N.T.,
7/24/18, at 83–84. She explained that Child “is very angry that Father doesn’t
keep him safe. That’s something that he continues to reiterate and wants a
mom and a dad that will want him and keep him safe.” Id. at 84. Ms. Crean
testified that Child “seems very clearly bonded to” his foster parents. Id. at
63. She testified, “If he’s struggling with something, he goes to them for help.
They’re there to comfort him when he needs it.” Id. In fact, Ms. Crean stated
that Child has asked her whether his foster parents “can be his mom and dad.”
Id.
The record evidence clearly demonstrates that Child suffers from the
lack of family stability and permanency in his life. Prior to his discharge from
the residential treatment facility, Child participated in overnights with the
foster parents, during which he displayed “no behaviors whatsoever. He was
just very happy to have a family to visit with,” according to Ms. Crean. N.T.,
7/24/18, at 59. She testified, in part, that Child currently “is showing some
of the breakdowns and discussing some of his trauma with [foster parents,]
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so they are seeing some of the outbursts but as well as the really good stuff.”
Id. at 62. The foster parents continue to be willing to provide permanency
for him. Id. Because the testimonial evidence supports the orphans’ court’s
decision that Child’s developmental, physical, and emotional needs and
welfare necessitate the involuntary termination of Father’s parental rights, we
affirm the decree pursuant to Section 2511(b).
Goal change order affirmed. Decree terminating parental rights
affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 01/24/2019
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