MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Jan 31 2019, 6:58 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Stanley L. Campbell Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Fort Wayne Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Caryn N. Szyper
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Nyelah M. Hayes, January 31, 2019
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-CR-1799
v. Appeal from the
Allen Superior Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable
Appellee-Plaintiff. Wendy W. Davis, Judge
The Honorable
Samuel R. Keirns, Magistrate
Trial Court Cause No.
02D04-1704-F6-395
Kirsch, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1799 | January 31, 2019 Page 1 of 8
[1] Nyelah M. Hayes (“Hayes”) appeals the trial court’s revocation of her
probation, contending that there was insufficient evidence to support the
revocation.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] In June 2017, Hayes pleaded guilty pursuant to a plea agreement to resisting
law enforcement as a Level 6 felony. The trial court sentenced Hayes to two
years suspended to probation. Hayes’s probation officer, Ashley Feller
(“Feller”), informed Hayes about the terms of her probation, and Hayes
acknowledged that she had read and understood the terms. Appellant’s App. Vol.
II at 21. As a condition of probation, Hayes was required to “behave well and
report for supervision as instructed.” Id. Additionally, she was required to
complete counseling and treatment through the Bowen Center. Tr. at 21-22;1
Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 21.
[4] In March 2018, the State filed a Verified Petition for Revocation of Probation,
alleging that Hayes had committed new criminal offenses.2 The trial court held
a fact-finding hearing on June 29, 2018 which established the following: In
December 2017, Hayes was placed at the Harmony House, a temporary
1
The transcript and its table of contents are each labeled as volume 1. Because we cite only to the transcript,
for ease of reference, we refer to it as “Tr.”
2
In April 2018, the State filed an Amended Verified Petition for Revocation, alleging essentially the same
violation. Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 15-16.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1799 | January 31, 2019 Page 2 of 8
emergency housing facility managed by the Bowen Center.3 Deon Dittmar
(“Dittmar”), the Bowen Center support housing manager, testified that, while
at Harmony House, Hayes had “[l]ots of difficulties due to mental health
issues.” Tr. at 14. Dittmar highlighted two incidents from March 22, 2018.
First, Dittmar received a call from Harmony House resident Jennifer
Lauderdale (“Lauderdale”) requesting to be moved to another location because
she was concerned about Hayes’s behavior. Dittmar testified that the police
were called, but no action was taken. Instead, police instructed Harmony
House employees to separate Hayes and Lauderdale and to call if there was
another incident. Id. at 15. The second and more significant incident occurred
later that night when Dittmar received a call from Officer Daniel Rosenberg
(“Officer Rosenberg”) of the Warsaw Police Department, informing him that
the police were at Harmony House, arresting Hayes for battery. Id. at 15-16.
[5] Lauderdale testified that she had been sitting in the Harmony House living
room, watching television, when Hayes approached and punched Lauderdale
repeatedly in the head. Id. at 8-9. During the attack, Lauderdale tried to call
911, but Hayes “yanked” the cell phone from her hand. Id. at 9. Lauderdale
eventually recovered her phone from Hayes and contacted the police. Id. at 9-
10. First responders transported Lauderdale to the hospital, where she was
3
Hayes took herself to St. Joe Hospital in a psychotic state and was, thereafter, committed to the in-patient
unit of the Bowen Center. Tr. at 21. The Bowen Center support housing manager, Deon Dittmar, testified
at Hayes’s probation revocation fact-finding hearing that Bowen “didn’t have a place and [Hayes] was
homeless at the time. Harmony House is a temporary emergency shelter for clients of ours. So we staffed it,
and they thought that would be an appropriate place for [Hayes].” Id. at 14.
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diagnosed with a sprained shoulder, a deep cut across her right arm, and a
headache. Id. at 10-12. Because the commission of these acts was a violation
of house rules, Hayes’s placement at the Harmony House was terminated
immediately. Id. at 16-17. That same evening, Officer Rosenberg filed an
affidavit setting forth his belief that there was probable cause to believe that
Hayes had committed the charged offenses. Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 22-27.
[6] Hayes was arrested and charged in Kosciusko County with Class B
misdemeanor battery and Class C misdemeanor interference with the reporting
of a crime. Shortly thereafter, Feller filed a petition for probation revocation,
alleging that by committing the new criminal offenses Hayes had failed to
“maintain good behavior” as required by the terms and conditions of her
supervised probation. Id. at 22. During the probation revocation hearing,
witnesses testified about the incidents of that evening, and the State introduced
the charging information and Officer Rosenberg’s probable cause affidavit.
[7] At the close of the fact-finding hearing, the trial court found “by a
preponderance of the evidence [that] the defendant violated terms and
conditions of probation as contained in the petition.” Tr. at 32. After revoking
Hayes’s probation, the trial court ordered Hayes committed to the Indiana
Department of Correction for a period of two years with one hundred eighty-
one days “jail credit.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 28. Hayes now appeals.
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Discussion and Decision
[8] “‘Probation is a matter of grace left to trial court discretion, not a right to which
a criminal defendant is entitled.’” Cain v. State, 30 N.E.3d 728, 731 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2015) (quoting Prewitt v. State, 878 N.E.2d 184, 188 (Ind. 2007)), trans.
denied. “Courts in probation revocation hearings ‘may consider any relevant
evidence bearing some substantial indicia of reliability.’” Id. (quoting Cox v.
State, 706 N.E.2d 547, 551 (Ind. 1999)). “It is within the discretion of the trial
court to determine the conditions of a defendant’s probation and to revoke
probation if the conditions are violated.” Id. Our court has said that “all
probation requires ‘strict compliance’” because once the trial court extends this
grace and sets its terms and conditions, the probationer is expected to comply
with them strictly.” Id. at 731-32 (quoting Woods v. State, 892 N.E.2d 637, 641
(Ind. 2008)). “If the probationer fails to do so, then a violation has occurred.”
Id. We review a sanction imposed following revocation of probation for an
abuse of discretion. Heaton v. State, 984 N.E.2d 614, 616 (Ind. 2013). “‘An
abuse of discretion occurs where the decision is clearly against the logic and
effect of the facts and circumstances.’” Hutchison v. State, 82 N.E.3d 305, 310
(Ind. Ct. App. 2017) (quoting Prewitt, 878 N.E.2d at 188).
[9] Probation revocation is a two-step process. First, the trial court must make a
factual determination that a violation of a condition of probation occurred.
Heaton, 984 N.E.2d at 616. Second, if a violation is found, then the trial court
must determine the appropriate sanctions for the violation. Id. Hayes does not
appeal the sanction imposed; instead, she claims “that the uncorroborated
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testimony of Lauderdale is insufficient to sustain the [trial c]ourt’s
determination that she violated the terms and conditions of her probation.”
Appellant’s Br. at 10. We disagree.
[10] “When reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence to support a probation
revocation, we consider only the evidence most favorable to the judgment
without reweighing the evidence or judging witnesses’ credibility. Figures v.
State, 920 N.E.2d 267, 272 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010) (citing Woods, 892 N.E.2d at
639). “A probation revocation hearing is civil in nature, and the State’s burden
is to prove the alleged violations by a preponderance of the evidence.” Id.
“One violation of a condition of probation is enough to support a probation
revocation.” Pierce v. State, 44 N.E.3d 752, 755 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015). “If the
trial court’s finding of a violation is supported by substantial evidence of
probative value, then we will affirm the revocation of probation.” Id. When
the alleged probation violation is the commission of a new crime, conviction of
the new crime is not required. Id. The State only needs to establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that the person has committed the crime.
Heaton, 984 N.E.2d at 618.
[11] Here, Hayes was on probation in March 2018. A condition of her probation
was that she “behave well.” Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 21. The State alleged that
Hayes committed battery against Lauderdale by intentionally touching her “in a
rude, insolent or angry manner, resulting in bodily injury,” and that she
intentionally interfered with Lauderdale’s ability to call 911. Id. at 17, 18.
During the fact-finding hearing, Dittmar testified that Lauderdale called him on
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1799 | January 31, 2019 Page 6 of 8
the morning of March 22, 2018, saying that she was concerned about Hayes’s
behavior and wanted to be separated from her. Police were called, and the two
were separated. Later that day, the police called Dittmar to say they were
arresting Hayes for the battery of Lauderdale. Lauderdale testified that Hayes
approached her and without provocation, hit her repeatedly. Tr. at 9.
Lauderdale also testified that Hayes took her cell phone during the attack so
that she could not call 911. Id.
[12] When Lauderdale was able to retrieve the phone, she called the police. First
responders took Lauderdale to the hospital, where she was found to have a
sprained shoulder, a deep cut across her right arm, and other injuries. The State
also introduced into evidence Officer Rosenberg’s probable cause affidavit.
State’s Ex. 2. Lauderdale’s testimony and Officer Rosenberg’s statements in the
probable cause affidavit established that Hayes committed the charged offenses
and violated the condition of her probation that she behave well. Heaton, 984
N.E.2d at 618.
[13] Hayes’s contention that Lauderdale’s uncorroborated testimony is insufficient
to sustain the trial court’s finding that she violated her probation ignores the
standard of review on appeal and Indiana Supreme Court precedent. It is well-
settled that a conviction or probation violation “can be sustained on only the
uncorroborated testimony of a single witness, even when that witness is the
victim.” Bailey v. State, 979 N.E.2d 133, 135 (Ind. 2012). We conclude that the
State presented sufficient evidence of probative value to establish by a
preponderance of the evidence that Hayes violated the terms of her probation
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by committing a new crime. Accordingly, we affirm the trial court’s revocation
of Hayes’s probation.
[14] Affirmed.
Riley, J., and Robb, J., concur.
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