Oswald v. Hamer

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Supreme Court Date: 2019.02.04
11:24:10 -06'00'

Oswald v. Hamer, 2018 IL 122203

Caption in Supreme CONSTANCE OSWALD, Appellant, v. BRIAN HAMER, Director
Court: of Revenue, et al., Appellees.

Docket No. 122203

Filed September 20, 2018

Decision Under Appeal from the Appellate Court for the First District; heard in that
Review court on appeal from the Circuit Court of Cook County, the Hon.
Robert Lopez-Cepero, Judge, presiding.

Judgment Affirmed.

Counsel on Edward T. Joyce and Kenneth Flaxman, of Law Offices of Edward T.
Appeal Joyce & Associates, P.C., and Joan M. Mannix, both of Chicago, for
appellant.

Lisa Madigan, Attorney General, of Springfield (David L. Franklin,
Solicitor General, and Carl J. Elitz, Assistant Attorney General, of
Chicago, of counsel), for appellees.

Mark D. Deaton, of Illinois Health and Hospital Association, of
Naperville, and Steven F. Pflaum, Tonya G. Newman, and Collette A.
Brown, of Neal, Gerber & Eisenberg LLP, of Chicago, for
intervenor-appellee.
 Frederic M. Grosser, of Champaign, for amici curiae Cunningham
Township et al.

Julia Rietz, State’s Attorney, of Urbana (Joel D. Fletcher, Assistant
State’s Attorney, of counsel), for amici curiae Champaign County
Treasurer et al.

John M. Izzo and Eugene C. Edwards, of Hauser Izzo, LLC, of
Flossmoor, for amici curiae Illinois Association of School Boards
et al.

Justices JUSTICE NEVILLE delivered the judgment of the court, with
opinion.
Chief Justice Karmeier and Justices Thomas, Kilbride, Garman,
Burke, and Theis concurred in the judgment and opinion.

OPINION

¶1 Section 15-86 of the Property Tax Code (35 ILCS 200/15-86 (West 2012)) provides for a
charitable property tax exemption specifically to eligible not-for-profit hospitals and their
hospital affiliates (hereinafter hospitals). Plaintiff, Constance Oswald, filed an action in the
circuit court of Cook County seeking a judgment declaring that section 15-86 of the Property
Tax Code, on its face, violates section 6 of article IX of the Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const.
1970, art IX, § 6). The circuit court granted summary judgment in favor of defendants Brian
Hamer, Director of Revenue, 1 the Department of Revenue, and the Illinois Hospital
Association. The appellate court affirmed. 2016 IL App (1st) 152691.
¶2 This court allowed plaintiff’s petition for leave to appeal (Ill. S. Ct. R. 315 (eff. Mar. 15,
2016)). For the following reasons, we affirm the judgment of the appellate court.

¶3 I. BACKGROUND
¶4 Section 15-86(c) of the Property Tax Code provides that a hospital applicant “shall be
issued” a charitable property tax exemption if the value of certain qualifying services or
activities provided by the hospital in a given year equals or exceeds the hospital’s estimated
property tax liability for the same year. 35 ILCS 200/15-86(c) (West 2012). In her single-count
complaint, plaintiff alleged that section 15-86(c) commands that the hospital applicant receive
the charitable property tax exemption if the statutory criteria are satisfied. Plaintiff contended

1
Brian Hamer is no longer the director of the Illinois Department of Revenue. Thus, the current
director, Constance Beard, has been substituted as a party by operation of law. See 735 ILCS
5/2-1008(d) (West 2012).

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 that section 15-86 was facially unconstitutional because the statute mandates the issuance of
the charitable property tax exemption without consideration of the constitutional requirement
that the subject property be “used exclusively for *** charitable purposes” (Ill. Const. 1970,
art. IX, § 6). Plaintiff sought, inter alia, a judgment declaring that section 15-86 was
“unconstitutional on its face” and an order enjoining defendants from granting any section
15-86 exemptions and requiring defendants to collect property tax from those hospitals that
already had been granted such exemptions.
¶5 The complaint named as defendants the Department of Revenue and its director. The
circuit court granted the Illinois Hospital Association’s petition for leave to intervene as a
defendant. Plaintiff and defendants filed cross-motions for summary judgment contesting
solely the facial constitutionality of section 15-86. The circuit court denied plaintiff’s motion
for summary judgment and granted summary judgment in favor of defendants. The court found
that section 15-86 does not dispense with the Illinois Constitution’s requirements for charitable
property tax exemption but, rather, the Department of Revenue must still evaluate a hospital
applicant’s claim for a section 15-86 exemption under constitutional requirements and
precedent. Also, the court found that plaintiff failed to show that section 15-86 was inherently
flawed in all circumstances. Accordingly, the circuit court concluded that the statute was not
facially unconstitutional.
¶6 The appellate court affirmed. 2016 IL App (1st) 152691. The court rejected plaintiff’s
argument that the legislature intended the word “shall” in section 15-86(c) to be mandatory. Id.
¶ 22. Rather, the court held that the word “shall” is merely directory. Id. ¶ 26. The court
observed that its construction of section 15-86(c) followed case law that construed charitable
property tax exemption statutes alongside the exclusive use requirements of section 6 of article
IX of the Illinois Constitution. Id. ¶¶ 27-36. Alternatively, the appellate court upheld the circuit
court’s conclusion that section 15-86 was facially constitutional because plaintiff failed to
sustain her burden of demonstrating that there was no set of circumstances under which the
statute would be valid. Id. ¶ 47.
¶7 Plaintiff appeals to this court. The Champaign County Treasurer et al., Cunningham
Township et al., and the Illinois Association of School Boards et al. were each granted leave to
submit an amicus curiae brief in support of plaintiff. Ill. S. Ct. R. 345 (eff. Sept. 20, 2010).

¶8 II. ANALYSIS
¶9 The ultimate question presented for our review is whether section 15-86 of the Property
Tax Code, on its face, violates section 6 of article IX of the Illinois Constitution. This matter
comes before us in the context of cross-motions for summary judgment. Summary judgment is
appropriate “if the pleadings, depositions, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits,
if any, show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party is
entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” 735 ILCS 5/2-1005(c) (West 2012). When parties
file cross-motions for summary judgment, they mutually agree that there are no genuine issues
of material fact and that the case may be resolved as a matter of law. Jones v. Municipal
Employees’ Annuity & Benefit Fund, 2016 IL 119618, ¶ 26; Irwin Industrial Tool Co. v.
Department of Revenue, 238 Ill. 2d 332, 339-40 (2010); Founders Insurance Co. v. Munoz,
237 Ill. 2d 424, 432 (2010). The issues in this case involve statutory construction. Statutory
construction presents questions of law that are appropriate for summary judgment. Hooker v.

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 Retirement Board of the Firemen’s Annuity & Benefit Fund, 2013 IL 114811, ¶ 15. Issues
involving statutory construction and summary judgment rulings are reviewed de novo. Id.
Also, the constitutionality of a statute is a question of law reviewed de novo. Irwin Industrial
Tool, 238 Ill. 2d at 340; In re Parentage of John M., 212 Ill. 2d 253, 265 (2004).
¶ 10 In construing section 15-86, we are guided by familiar principles. When presented with an
issue of statutory construction, a court’s primary objective is to ascertain and give effect to the
intent of the legislature. Murphy-Hylton v. Lieberman Management Services, Inc., 2016 IL
120394, ¶ 25. All other rules of statutory construction are subordinate to this cardinal principle.
Chicago Teachers Union, Local No. 1 v. Board of Education of the City of Chicago, 2012 IL
112566, ¶ 15. The most reliable indicator of legislative intent is the language of the statute,
which must be given its plain and ordinary meaning. The statute is viewed as a whole,
construing words and phrases in context to other relevant statutory provisions and not in
isolation. Murphy-Hylton, 2016 IL 120394, ¶ 25; J&J Ventures Gaming, LLC v. Wild, Inc.,
2016 IL 119870, ¶ 25. Each word, clause, and sentence of a statute must be given a reasonable
meaning, if possible, and should not be rendered superfluous. Murphy-Hylton, 2016 IL
120394, ¶ 25; Williams v. Staples, 208 Ill. 2d 480, 487 (2004). Additionally, the court may
consider the reason for the law, the problems sought to be remedied, the purposes to be
achieved, and the consequences of construing the statute one way or another. Murphy-Hylton,
2016 IL 120394, ¶ 25; J&J Ventures Gaming, 2016 IL 119870, ¶ 25. To understand the
purpose and effect of section 15-86, we consider its constitutional and statutory foundations.

¶ 11 A. Article IX of the Illinois Constitution
¶ 12 The constitutional backdrop of charitable property tax exemption legislation in Illinois is
well established. Generally, the Illinois Constitution does not grant power to the legislature but
rather restricts the legislature’s power to act. The State’s inherent power to tax is vested in the
General Assembly. The legislature’s power to tax is plenary and is restricted only by the
federal and state constitutions. Article IX of the 1970 Illinois Constitution (Ill. Const. 1970, art.
IX) generally subjects all real property to taxation. Eden Retirement Center, Inc. v. Department
of Revenue, 213 Ill. 2d 273, 285 (2004) (and cases cited therein). “Under Illinois law, taxation
is the rule. Tax exemption is the exception.” Provena Covenant Medical Center v. Department
of Revenue, 236 Ill. 2d 368, 388 (2010).
¶ 13 However, section 6 of article IX limits the power of the legislature in the area of property
tax exemption in pertinent part as follows:
“The General Assembly by law may exempt from taxation only the property of the
State, units of local government and school districts and property used exclusively for
agricultural and horticultural societies, and for school, religious, cemetery and
charitable purposes.” Ill. Const. 1970, art. IX, § 6.
Section 6 of article IX is not self-executing but authorizes the General Assembly to enact
legislation providing for an exemption. It is permissible, not mandatory, for the legislature to
exercise that authority. Provena, 236 Ill. 2d at 389; North Shore Post No. 21 of the American
Legion v. Korzen, 38 Ill. 2d 231, 233 (1967).2

2
Because section 6 of article IX of the 1970 Illinois Constitution merely rephrases its predecessor
provision in the 1870 Illinois Constitution, “ ‘cases interpreting the permissive legislative exemptions

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¶ 14 Section 6 of article IX divides property that the legislature may exempt from taxation into
two categories: (1) property owned by “the State, units of local government and school
districts” and (2) property used exclusively for the purposes defined in the second clause of the
section. Ill. Const. 1970, art. IX, § 6. By designating the categories of property that the
legislature may exempt from taxation, section 6 of article IX limits the legislature’s authority
to exempt. Eden, 213 Ill. 2d at 286; MacMurray College v. Wright, 38 Ill. 2d 272, 276 (1967).
Where the legislature does choose to provide for an exemption, it must remain within
constitutional limitations. “No other subjects of property tax exemption are permitted. The
legislature cannot add to or broaden the exemptions specified in section 6.” Provena, 236 Ill.
2d at 389; accord Eden, 213 Ill. 2d at 286; Chicago Bar Ass’n v. Department of Revenue, 163
Ill. 2d 290, 297 (1994).
¶ 15 One category of property that the legislature may exempt from taxation is property used for
charitable purposes. “Charitable use is a constitutional requirement. An applicant for a
charitable-use property tax exemption must ‘comply unequivocally with the constitutional
requirement of exclusive charitable use.’ [Citation.]” (Emphasis in original.) Eden, 213 Ill. 2d
at 287. In Methodist Old Peoples Home, this court defined “charity” as “ ‘a gift to be applied
*** for the benefit of an indefinite number of persons, persuading them to an educational or
religious conviction, for their general welfare—or in some way reducing the burdens of
government.’ ” Provena, 236 Ill. 2d at 390-91 (quoting Methodist Old Peoples Home v.
Korzen, 39 Ill. 2d 149, 156-57 (1968)).
¶ 16 Additionally, the term “exclusively used” “means the primary purpose for which property
is used and not any secondary or incidental purpose.” Methodist Old Peoples Home, 39 Ill. 2d
at 157.
¶ 17 This court has repeatedly acknowledged the difficulty of framing a universally applicable
definition of an exclusive charitable use. People ex rel. Nordlund v. Association of the
Winnebago Home for the Aged, 40 Ill. 2d 91, 100 (1968); Methodist Old Peoples Home, 39 Ill.
2d at 156. However, the above-stated “principles constitute the frame of reference to which we
must apply plaintiff’s use of its property to arrive at a determination of whether or not such use
is in fact exclusively for charitable purposes.” Methodist Old Peoples Home, 39 Ill. 2d at 157.
¶ 18 “While the General Assembly has no authority to grant exemptions beyond those
authorized by section 6, it ‘may place restrictions, limitations, and conditions on [property tax]
exemptions as may be proper by general law.’ ” Provena, 236 Ill. 2d at 390 (quoting North
Shore Post No. 21, 38 Ill. 2d at 233). The party claiming an exemption carries the burden of
proving clearly that the use of the subject property is within both the constitutional
authorization and the terms of the statute under which the claim of exemption is made. Eden,
213 Ill. 2d at 288-89 (and cases cited therein); Rogers Park Post No. 108 v. Brenza, 8 Ill. 2d
286, 290 (1956).

¶ 19 B. Section 15-65 Charitable Use Exemption
¶ 20 In conformity with section 6 of article IX, the General Assembly chose to create a
charitable-use property tax exemption but with the additional restriction that the property be

under the Constitution of 1870 are equally relevant to the limits of exemption now constitutionally
permitted.’ ” Eden, 213 Ill. 2d at 286 (quoting Small v. Pangle, 60 Ill. 2d 510, 514 (1975)).

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 owned by a statutorily designated organization. Section 15-65 of the Property Tax Code
requires not only that the property be “actually and exclusively used for charitable or
beneficent purposes, and not leased or otherwise used with a view to profit,” but also that the
property be owned by “[i]nstitutions of public charity,” “[b]eneficent and charitable
organizations,” “[o]ld people’s homes,” not-for-profit health maintenance organizations, free
public libraries, or historical societies. 35 ILCS 200/15-65 (2012); see Provena, 236 Ill. 2d at
390. Accordingly, section 15-65 requires two things to qualify for a charitable use property tax
exemption: charitable use and ownership by a charitable organization. Chicago Patrolmen’s
Ass’n v. Department of Revenue, 171 Ill. 2d 263, 270 (1996); Rogers Park Post No. 108, 8 Ill.
2d at 291.
¶ 21 Prior to the enactment of section 15-86 of the Property Tax Code, private hospitals could
apply for property tax exemption as charitable organizations. See, e.g., People ex rel. County
Collector v. Hopedale Medical Foundation, 46 Ill. 2d 450, 453-54 (1970); People ex rel.
Cannon v. Southern Illinois Hospital Corp., 404 Ill. 66, 69-70 (1949) (both collecting cases).
¶ 22 In Provena, this court, with two justices recusing, unanimously concluded that Provena
failed to satisfy the requirements for the charitable use property tax exemption. The plurality
opinion reached this conclusion by recounting that the underlying purpose of charitable
property tax exemption is the benefit that private charity confers upon the public and,
consequently, to some extent, a relief of the State’s burden to care for and advance the interests
of its residents. Provena, 236 Ill. 2d at 394-95 (and cases cited therein). The plurality reasoned:
“Conditioning charitable status on whether an activity helps relieve the burdens on
government is appropriate. After all, each tax dollar lost to a charitable exemption is
one less dollar affected governmental bodies will have to meet their obligations
directly. If a charitable institution wishes to avail itself of funds which would otherwise
flow into a public treasury, it is only fitting that the institution provide some
compensatory benefit in exchange. While Illinois law has never required that there be a
direct, dollar-for-dollar correlation between the value of the tax exemption and the
value of the goods or services provided by the charity, it is a sine qua non of charitable
status that those seeking a charitable exemption be able to demonstrate that their
activities will help alleviate some financial burden incurred by the affected taxing
bodies in performing their governmental functions.” Id. at 395.
After reviewing the record, the plurality determined that “both the number of uninsured
patients receiving free or discounted care and the dollar value of the care they received” were
de minimis. Id. at 397.
¶ 23 However, two members of this court concurred in part and dissented in part. Id. at 411
(Burke, J., concurring in part and dissenting in part, joined by Freeman, J.). The partial dissent
concluded that Provena did not qualify for the charitable exemption based on the actual
ownership of the property. Id. at 411-12. The partial dissent disagreed with the plurality’s
determination that Provena’s charity care was de minimis: “I disagree with this rationale. By
imposing a quantum of care requirement and monetary threshold, the plurality is injecting
itself into matters best left to the legislature.” Id. at 412. “I do not believe that this court can,
under the plain language of section 15-65, impose a quantum of care or monetary requirement,
nor should it invent legislative intent in this regard.” Id. at 415. Having discussed the

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 constitutional and statutory backdrop, we now turn to section 15-86 of the Property Tax Code.

¶ 24 C. Section 15-86 Hospital Charitable Use Exemption
¶ 25 In response to this court’s decision in Provena, the General Assembly enacted Public Act
97-688 (eff. June 14, 2012), which, inter alia, added section 15-86 to the Property Tax Code
(35 ILCS 200/15-86 (West 2012)). The legislature expressly discussed Provena and the
legislative intent underlying the statute. The legislature observed that, subsequent to Provena,
“there is considerable uncertainty surrounding the test for charitable property tax exemption,
especially regarding the application of a quantitative or monetary threshold.” Id. § 15-86(a)(1).
The legislature further observed: “It is essential to ensure that tax exemption law relating to
hospitals accounts for the complexities of the modern health care delivery system.” Id.
§ 15-86(a)(3). The legislature expressly codified its intent as follows:
“(5) Working with the Illinois hospital community and other interested parties, the
General Assembly has developed a comprehensive combination of related legislation
that addresses hospital property tax exemption, significantly increases access to free
health care for indigent persons, and strengthens the Medical Assistance program. It is
the intent of the General Assembly to establish a new category of ownership for
charitable property tax exemption to be applied to not-for-profit hospitals and hospital
affiliates in lieu of the existing ownership category of ‘institutions of public charity.’ It
is also the intent of the General Assembly to establish quantifiable standards for the
issuance of charitable exemptions for such property. It is not the intent of the General
Assembly to declare any property exempt ipso facto, but rather to establish criteria to
be applied to the facts on a case-by-case basis.” Id. § 15-86(a)(5).
¶ 26 Section 15-86(c) provides for the hospital charitable property tax exemption in pertinent
part as follows:
“(c) A hospital applicant satisfies the conditions for an exemption under this
Section with respect to the subject property, and shall be issued a charitable exemption
for that property, if the value of services or activities listed in subsection (e) for the
hospital year equals or exceeds the relevant hospital entity’s estimated property tax
liability, as determined under subsection (g), for the year for which exemption is
sought.” (Emphasis added.) Id. § 15-86(c).
Subsection (c) also provides guidelines in specific situations, including where “the relevant
hospital entity is a hospital owner that owns more than one hospital” and where the hospital
applicant is “a multi-state hospital system or hospital affiliate.” Id.
¶ 27 Subsection (e) lists the “services and activities” that are considered in making the
calculations required by subsection (c). These include “[c]harity care,” defined as “[f]ree or
discounted services *** measured at cost”; health services to low-income and underinsured
individuals; subsidy of state or local governments; support for State health care programs for
low-income individuals; subsidy for treating dual-eligibility Medicare/Medicaid patients;
relief of the burden of government-related health care of low-income individuals; and “[a]ny
other activity by the relevant hospital entity that the Department determines relieves the burden

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 of government or addresses the health of low-income or underserved individuals.” Id.
§§ 15-86(e)(1)-(7).3
¶ 28 Before this court, plaintiff contends that section 15-86 is facially unconstitutional because
it mandatorily awards a property tax exemption based on satisfaction of its statutory criteria,
without regard to whether the subject property satisfies the constitutional “exclusive charitable
use” requirement. We disagree.
¶ 29 Statutes carry a strong presumption of constitutionality. Walker v. McGuire, 2015 IL
117138, ¶ 12; Elementary School District 159 v. Schiller, 221 Ill. 2d 130, 148 (2006). The
party challenging the validity of a statute has the burden of clearly establishing the alleged
constitutional infirmity. Napleton v. Village of Hinsdale, 229 Ill. 2d 296, 306 (2008);
Parentage of John M., 212 Ill. 2d at 266. It is a court’s duty to construe a statute so as to uphold
its constitutionality if reasonably possible. Further, if a statute’s construction is doubtful, a
court will resolve the doubt in favor of the statute’s validity. Napleton, 229 Ill. 2d at 306-07;
Eden, 213 Ill. 2d at 291-92 (collecting cases).
¶ 30 Plaintiff observes that section 15-86 does not provide, as a condition for the charitable
property tax exemption, that the subject property must be used exclusively for charitable
purposes. Further, according to plaintiff, section 15-86 lacks even “any general reference” to
the constitutional requirement of exclusive charitable use.
¶ 31 Admittedly, neither subsection (a) nor (c) of section 15-86 contains an explicit reference to
the constitutional requirement of exclusive charitable use, as is provided in section 15-65.
While such plain language crystallized the intent of the legislature in enacting section 15-65
(see Eden, 213 Ill. 2d at 291-92 (construing section 15-65)), the legislative intent of section
15-86 is nevertheless readily ascertainable.
¶ 32 We presume that the legislature enacts statutes in light of the constitution and intends to
enact constitutional legislation (Gill v. Miller, 94 Ill. 2d 52, 56 (1983)) and does not intend to
exceed its constitutional limitations (Methodist Old Peoples Home, 39 Ill. 2d at 156;
MacMurray College, 38 Ill. 2d at 277). Accordingly, where a statute does not expressly refer to
an applicable constitutional limitation, “it will be presumed that the legislature intended to
observe the constitution.” North Wichert Drainage District v. Chamberlain, 340 Ill. 644,
648-49 (1930); accord State ex rel. Burton v. Greater Portsmouth Growth Corp., 218 N.E.2d
446, 451 (Ohio 1966) (“the constitutional limitation is by implication a part of the statute, and
the mere failure to set it forth in the statute does not invalidate the provision” “on the basis that
it exceeds or is contrary to the constitutional provision”); 16A Am. Jur. 2d Constitutional Law
§ 169 (1998) (same).
¶ 33 In the case at bar, while section 15-86(c) does not expressly provide that the hospital
charitable property tax exemption is limited to applicants that satisfy the constitutional
requirement of exclusive charitable use, section 6 of article IX of the Illinois Constitution does
say so, and we presume that the legislature intended to comply with this constitutional
limitation. See North Wichert Drainage District, 340 Ill. at 648-49.

3
Also, section 15-86 expressly provides that an otherwise eligible hospital applicant is not
precluded from obtaining or maintaining a property tax exemption pursuant to other provisions of the
Property Tax Code. 35 ILCS 200/15-86(i) (West 2012).

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¶ 34 Beyond this presumption, the legislature stated in section 15-86(a)(5): “It is the intent of
the General Assembly to establish a new category of ownership for charitable property tax
exemption to be applied to not-for-profit hospitals and hospital affiliates in lieu of the existing
ownership category of ‘institutions of public charity’.” 35 ILCS 200/15-86(a)(5) (West 2012).
This is an explicit reference to section 15-65, which in turn contains the explicit reference to
the constitutional limitation of exclusive charitable use. Id. § 15-65. Construing these
provisions together as a whole (Murphy-Hylton, 2016 IL 120394, ¶ 25), we conclude that the
legislature intended to comply with this constitutional limitation.
¶ 35 Nevertheless, plaintiff contends that section 15-86(c), which provides that if the hospital
applicant satisfies the statutory requirements for a hospital charitable property tax exemption,
the hospital “shall be issued a charitable exemption for that property” (emphasis added) (35
ILCS 200/15-86(c) (West 2012)), mandates the issuance of the exemption without
consideration of the constitutional requirement of exclusive charitable use. Indeed, according
to plaintiff, there is “nothing in the language” of section 15-86 suggesting that, if the
requirements of subsection (c) are met, a hospital may nevertheless be refused the hospital
charitable property tax exemption. On the other hand, defendants contend that section 15-86(c)
is not mandatory but, rather, permissive or directory.
¶ 36 Plaintiff and defendants invoke the rules of statutory construction pertaining to the separate
questions of whether a statutory provision is mandatory or permissive and whether the
provision is mandatory or directory. See People v. Delvillar, 235 Ill. 2d 507, 514-15 (2009);
People v. Ousley, 235 Ill. 2d 299, 310-11 (2009); People v. Robinson, 217 Ill. 2d 43, 51-52
(2005). Employing these rules of construction, plaintiff contends that the issue here is whether
section 15-86(c) is mandatory or permissive. She argues that the provision is mandatory and,
consequently, section 15-86 is unconstitutional.
¶ 37 “Legislative intent, however, remains the primary inquiry and controls the court’s
construction of a statute. [Citations.] Traditional rules of statutory construction are merely aids
in determining legislative intent, and those rules must yield to such intent.” Collins v. Board of
Trustees of the Firemen’s Annuity & Benefit Fund, 155 Ill. 2d 103, 111 (1993); see People
ex rel. Cason v. Ring, 41 Ill. 2d 305, 309-10 (1968) (same). We are presented with a situation
where the legislature omitted a specific reference to the constitution’s exclusive charitable use
requirement. In similar circumstances, “courts have allowed the substitution of language in
order to carry out the demonstrable legislative intention, observing, however, when doing so,
that this technique of construction is to be exercised with caution.” Gill, 94 Ill. 2d at 58; see
People ex rel. Barrett v. Anderson, 398 Ill. 480, 485 (1947) (same). “[W]here applying
language literally in a clause of an otherwise coherent statute would frustrate the spirit of the
statute and the intent of the legislature, language may be disregarded, modified or supplied to
give effect to the legislative design.” Gill, 94 Ill. 2d at 59; see Klein v. Department of
Registration & Education, 412 Ill. 75, 86 (1952) (same).
¶ 38 In the case at bar, the legislature was certainly aware of section 6 of article IX of the
constitution and its requirement of exclusive charitable use, and it intended to enact a
constitutional hospital charitable property tax exemption. To construe subsection (c) as
plaintiff argues would cast doubt on the constitutionality of section 15-86, which, as we have
concluded, is a result the legislature could not have intended. “Accordingly, an interpretation
under which the statute would be considered constitutional is preferable to one that would

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 leave its constitutionality in doubt.” Braun v. Retirement Board of the Firemen’s Annuity &
Benefit Fund, 108 Ill. 2d 119, 127 (1985) (collecting cases). We therefore construe the word
“shall” in section 15-86(c) to be permissive and not mandatory. This reading of section
15-86(c) would avoid the possible constitutional infirmity, and that is the construction we
adopt.
¶ 39 Therefore, a hospital applicant seeking a section 15-86 charitable property tax exemption
must document the services or activities meeting the statutory criteria. Additionally, the
hospital must show that the subject property meets the constitutional test of exclusive
charitable use.
¶ 40 Significantly, plaintiff’s action is framed solely as a facial challenge to the constitutional
validity of section 15-86 of the Property Tax Code. As such, we have before us only the statute
itself. Reno v. Flores, 507 U.S. 292, 300-01 (1993). A facial challenge to the constitutionality
of a statute is the most difficult challenge to make successfully. A statute is facially invalid
only if no set of circumstances exists under which the statute would be valid. Napleton, 229 Ill.
2d at 305-06; Parentage of John M., 212 Ill. 2d at 269; see United States v. Salerno, 481 U.S.
739, 745 (1987). The fact that the statute could be found unconstitutional under some set of
circumstances does not establish its facial unconstitutionality. Napleton, 229 Ill. 2d at 306;
Parentage of John M., 212 Ill. 2d at 269; In re M.T., 221 Ill. 2d 517, 536-37 (2006). Thus, if
any situation exists where a statute could be validly applied, a facial challenge must fail.
People v. Rizzo, 2016 IL 118599, ¶ 24; M.T., 221 Ill. 2d at 537 (and cases cited therein).
¶ 41 Several of plaintiff’s supporting amici invite this court to discard the “no set of
circumstances” test in determining the facial constitutionality of legislation. However, plaintiff
herself does not raise this issue. An amicus takes the case as it finds it, with the issues framed
by the parties. Accordingly, this court has repeatedly rejected attempts by amici to assert issues
not raised by the parties. Bruns v. City of Centralia, 2014 IL 116998, ¶ 15 n.1 (citing Karas v.
Strevell, 227 Ill. 2d 440, 450-51 (2008)). Consequently, we decline this invitation.
¶ 42 In the case at bar, plaintiff concedes before this court, as she did before the appellate court
(2016 IL App (1st) 152691, ¶ 47), that it is hypothetically possible for a hospital applicant to
satisfy the requirements of section 15-86(c), i.e., that the hospital services and activities listed
in subsection (e) equal or exceed the hospital’s estimated property tax liability, and for the
hospital to use its property exclusively for charitable purposes as required under section 6 of
article IX of the Illinois Constitution. We cannot say that a hospital applicant, per se, may
never satisfy both the statutory requirements of section 15-86 and the constitutional
requirement of exclusive use for charitable purposes. See, e.g., Chicago Bar Ass’n, 163 Ill. 2d
at 300.
¶ 43 While it is possible that specific future applications of section 15-86 may produce actual
constitutional problems, it will be time enough to consider any such problems when they arise.
See Napleton, 229 Ill. 2d at 306; Parentage of John M., 212 Ill. 2d at 269 (both citing Village of
Hoffman Estates v. The Flipside, Hoffman Estates, Inc., 455 U.S. 489, 504 (1982)). Here, we
deal only with the statute on its face. So considered, we hold that plaintiff has failed to
establish the facial invalidity of section 15-86 of the Property Tax Code.

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¶ 44 III. CONCLUSION
¶ 45 For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the appellate court is affirmed.

¶ 46 Affirmed.

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