[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
_______________________
No. 04-16027
Non-Argument Calendar FILED
_______________________ U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
June 17, 2005
D. C. Docket No. 04-60231-CV-JIC THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK
CALVIN DAVID FOX,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
STATE OF FLORIDA,
JOHN F. HARKNESS,
Defendants-Appellees.
_________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Florida
_________________________
(June 17, 2005)
Before ANDERSON, DUBINA and KRAVITCH, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Plaintiff-Appellant Calvin David Fox appeals the district court’s dismissal of
his civil rights action brought pursuant to 42 U.S.C. § 1983. Fox’s complaint seeks
to challenge the Florida Supreme Court’s decision upholding the suspension of his
law license. We conclude that the district court lacked jurisdiction to hear this case
under the doctrine set forth in District of Columbia Court of Appeals v. Feldman, 460
U.S. 462, 476-82 (1983), and Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co., 263 U.S. 413, 415-16
(1923), and therefore affirm.
I. Facts
Fox’s complaint alleges due process violations in Florida’s suspension of his
law license. According to the complaint, John Serbin, the husband of one of Fox’s
clients, filed a complaint against Fox with The Florida Bar alleging that Fox failed
to return monies obtained during his representation of Linda Serbin, John’s wife.
After an investigation, the bar’s grievance committee requested that Fox turn over
documentation of the representation and of the related financial accounts. After Fox
repeatedly failed to produce the requested documents, the bar subpoenaed them.
When Fox again failed to produce them, the grievance committee held a hearing on
the issue of his failure to comply. Fox was unable to attend due to a scheduling
conflict, for which the committee refused to reschedule the hearing. At the hearing
the grievance committee found no good cause for Fox’s failure to comply.
2
Fox responded to the grievance committee ruling and was granted a rehearing
before a referee. At the rehearing, Fox admitted his non-compliance with the
subpoena and agreed to produce the records, but contested the proceedings on due
process grounds. The referee therefore ruled that if Fox failed to produce the
documents, his license would be suspended until he complied. Fox then moved to
vacate the referee’s recommendations, but his motion was denied. Fox later
petitioned for review by the Florida Supreme Court, which upheld the suspension.
Fox’s subsequent petition for rehearing before the state supreme court was denied.
Fox then filed the present action against the State of Florida in federal district
court in the Southern District of Florida.1 He alleged that the state violated his due
process rights under the Florida and federal constitutions. The complaint requested
declaratory and injunctive relief, quashing the disciplinary proceedings and
reinstating Fox to the bar, as well as damages in the amount of $5,000,000. The state
filed a motion to dismiss the complaint.
Fox later filed an amended complaint which added the Florida Supreme Court,
The Florida Bar, and six bar officials as defendants. This complaint was never served
1
The complaint was served on John Harkness, Executive Director of The Florida Bar. “In
an abundance of caution” due to ambiguities in the complaint, Harkness filed a motion to dismiss
below, which was granted along with the state’s. Harkness was not a named party, however, in
either the original or the amended complaint.
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on The Florida Bar or any of the bar-related defendants. The district court granted
the State’s motion to dismiss the amended complaint, finding that the Rooker-
Feldman doctrine applied, and closed the case. Fox then brought the instant appeal.
II. Standard of Review
We review the district court’s determination of subject-matter jurisdiction de
novo. Goodman ex rel. Goodman v. Sipos, 259 F.2d 1327, 1331 (11th Cir. 2001).
A federal court is obligated to dismiss a case if it determines that it lacks subject-
matter jurisdiction, and any party or the court sua sponte may raise the issue at any
stage of the proceedings. Id. at 1331 n.6. The court may consider evidence outside
the pleadings in determining its subject-matter jurisdiction. Id.
III. Discussion
Fox contends that the Rooker-Feldman doctrine does not preclude federal
jurisdiction over his complaint. Under the doctrine, federal courts lack jurisdiction
to review matters previously adjudicated in state court, as well as matters
“inextricably intertwined” with the state court judgment. District of Columbia Court
of Appeals v. Feldman, 460 U.S. 462, 476-82 (1983); Rooker v. Fidelity Trust Co.,
263 U.S. 413, 415-16 (1923). A federal case is “inextricably intertwined” where the
federal claim can only succeed to the extent that the state court wrongly decided the
issues before it. Goodman ex rel. Goodman v. Sipos, 259 F.3d 1327, 1332 (11th Cir.
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2001). If a party had the opportunity to raise federal claims in a state court
proceeding, the failure to raise those claims in state court does not grant the district
court jurisdiction over them. Id.; Dale v. Moore, 121 F.3d 624, 626 (11th Cir. 1997).
Fox contends that the conditions for application of the Rooker-Feldman
doctrine are not met because there was no final judgment in state court, and because
the bar’s actions were not judicial in nature. In Feldman itself, the Supreme Court
held that actions by a state bar are judicial actions. 460 U.S. at 477-80 (holding that
a bar committee’s decision to deny admission to the bar was a judicial action). We
have held that bar disciplinary actions are judicial in nature for Rooker-Feldman
purposes. In re Calvo, 88 F.3d 962, 965 (11th Cir. 1996). In the present case, The
Florida Bar’s activities had many characteristics of a judicial hearing: the grievance
committee called witnesses, issued subpoenas, heard evidence, and made factual
findings. As such, we find that the bar’s actions were indeed judicial.
Because the bar’s actions were judicial, the bar’s temporary suspension
constituted a final judgment. Furthermore, the Florida Supreme Court upheld the
bar’s order. Either of these rulings constitutes a final judgment for Rooker-Feldman
purposes.
Fox also argues that he did not raise his due process arguments in the state
proceeding, and that he should therefore be permitted to make those arguments in
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federal court. We hold, however, that Fox’s claims under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 are
“inextricably intertwined” with the state bar proceeding and the appeal, and that his
constitutional arguments were properly made there.2 His federal remedy would have
been a petition for certiorari to the United States Supreme Court from the ruling of
the Florida Supreme Court, which he did not pursue.
For the foregoing reasons, the judgment of the district court is AFFIRMED.
2
Because we hold that the due process issues are “inextricably intertwined” with the state
bar proceeding, we need not decide whether Fox actually raised them properly in that proceeding.
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