[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
________________________ FILED
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
No. 04-15053 ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
Non-Argument Calendar June 14, 2005
________________________ THOMAS K. KAHN
CLERK
D.C. Docket No. 03-00540-CV-CB-L
JACKIE R. HAINES,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
versus
JOHN E. POTTER,
Defendant-Appellee.
__________________________
Appeal from the United States District Court for the
Southern District of Alabama
_________________________
(June 14, 2005)
Before ANDERSON, DUBINA and MARCUS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
Jackie R. Haines, a black male with various medical restrictions, appeals the
district court’s order granting summary judgment in favor of his former employer,
John E. Potter, the Postmaster General of the United States Postal Service (“USPS”),
in this employment discrimination (disability and race) lawsuit alleging violations of
the Rehabilitation Act of 1974, 29 U.S.C. § 701, and Title VII of the Civil Rights Act
of 1964 (“Title VII”), 42 U.S.C. § 2000e, et seq. On appeal, Haines argues that the
following genuine issues of material fact should have prevented entry of summary
judgment on his claims: (1) whether USPS employees were motivated by
discriminatory intent (based on disability or race, or both) when they directed Haines
to park in a designated handicapped spot, rather than in a place near the dumpster that
was not a parking spot; and (2) whether, after he started parking in the handicapped
spot, the employees retaliated against him by asking him not to park in the spot if he
did not display his handicapped permit. After thorough review of the record and
careful consideration of the parties’ briefs, we affirm.
We review the district court’s order granting summary judgment de novo. See
Madray v. Publix Supermarkets, Inc., 208 F.3d 1290, 1296 (11th Cir. 2000). A
motion for summary judgment should be granted when “the pleadings, depositions,
answers to interrogatories, and admissions on file, together with the affidavits, if any,
show that there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and that the moving party
is entitled to a judgment as a matter of law.” Fed. R. Civ. P. 56 (c). “Where the
record taken as a whole could not lead a rational trier of fact to find for the non-
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moving party, there is no ‘genuine issue for trial.’” Matsushita Elec. Indus. Co. v.
Zenith Radio Corp., 475 U.S. 574, 587, 106 S. Ct. 1348, 1356, 89 L. Ed. 2d 538
(1986) (quoting First Nat’l Bank of Arizona v. Cities Serv. Co., 391 U.S. 253, 289,
88 S. Ct. 1575, 1592, 20 L. Ed. 2d 569 (1968)). In making this assessment, we “must
view all the evidence and all factual inferences reasonably drawn from the evidence
in the light most favorable to the nonmoving party,” Stewart v. Happy Herman’s
Cheshire Bridge, Inc., 117 F.3d 1278, 1285 (11th Cir. 1997), and “resolve all
reasonable doubts about the facts in favor of the non-movant.” United of Omaha Life
Ins. v. Sun Life Ins. Co., 894 F.2d 1555, 1558 (11th Cir. 1990).
Under Title VII, it is an unlawful employment practice for an employer to
discriminate against an employee “because he has opposed any practice made an
unlawful employment practice by this subchapter, or because he has made a charge,
testified, assisted, or participated in any manner in an investigation, proceeding, or
hearing under this subchapter.” 42 U.S.C. §§ 2000e-3(a). As with a discriminatory
treatment claim, a plaintiff alleging a retaliation claim under Title VII must begin by
establishing a prima facie case; the plaintiff must show that (1) he engaged in a
statutorily protected activity, (2) an adverse employment action occurred, and (3) the
adverse action was causally related to the plaintiff’s protected activities. See Little
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v. United Technologies, 103 F.3d 956, 959 (11th Cir. 1997); Coutu v. Martin County
Bd. of County Comm'rs, 47 F.3d 1068, 1074 (11th Cir. 1995) (per curiam).
An adverse employment action is an ultimate employment decision, such as
discharge or failure to hire, or other conduct that “alters the employee’s
compensation, terms, conditions, or privileges of employment, deprives him or her
of employment opportunities, or adversely affects his or her status as an employee.”
Robinson v. City of Pittsburgh, 120 F.3d 1286, 1300 (3rd Cir.1997) (citation and
internal marks omitted). Conduct that falls short of an ultimate employment decision
must meet “some threshold level of substantiality . . . to be cognizable under the anti-
retaliation clause.” Wideman v. Wal-Mart Stores, Inc., 141 F.3d 1453, 1456 (11th
Cir. 1998).
Here, the district court found the following: (1) Haines was afforded reasonable
accommodations because he was permitted to park in a designated handicapped
parking spot so long as he displayed the required permit; and (2) Haines presented
no evidence of an adverse employment action -- neither based on the occasion when
he was asked not to park in a place by the dumpster that was not a designated parking
space, nor when he was told to move his car from the designated handicapped spot
because he was not displaying his handicapped parking permit. In his brief, Haines
asserts that the district court erred by entering summary judgment because there
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remain genuine issues of material fact concerning his former employer’s alleged
discriminatory intent. We do not need to reach that issue since we find the district
court properly entered summary judgment based on Haines’s failure to allege an
adverse employment action under Title VII or the Rehabilitation Act. See Watkins
v. Bowden, 105 F.3d 1344, 1353 n. 17 (11th Cir. 1997) (appellate court may affirm
district court on any ground, even one not considered). Notably, in this appeal,
Haines does not challenge the district court’s findings that reasonable
accommodations -- such as allowing Haines to park in a designated handicapped
parking spot when displaying the required permit -- were made and that the incidents
of which Haines complained did not rise to the level of materially adverse
employment actions. Those findings alone support the district court’s decision and
obviate any need to address evidence of discriminatory intent. Accordingly, we affirm
the district court’s grant of summary judgment in favor of Potter.
AFFIRMED.
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