IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON, No. 77378-0-I
Respondent, DIVISION ONE
v. UNPUBLISHED OPINION
CHRISTOPHER GEORGE DREIER,
Appellant. FILED: March 11,2019
CHUN, J. — The State charged Christopher Dreier with first degree animal
cruelty after he shot and injured a dog. Dreier claimed self-defense, but the jury
convicted him as charged. On appeal, Dreier contends the State failed to prove
beyond a reasonable doubt that his actions were unlawful. Because sufficient
evidence supports the conviction, we affirm.
BACKGROUND
One April evening in 2016, Dreier was helping his neighbors with work on
their home. His three young children played near the river that passed through
the property. His small Pomeranian dog was also on site with them.
On previous days, Dreier had seen a pit bull mix dog roaming unleashed
on the property. Dreier claimed the dog had acted aggressively toward him and
his Pomeranian, and had chased a deer with seemingly lethal intent. Dreier had
a negative history with pit bulls, having witnessed a different pit bull attack and
kill one of his dogs the year before.
No. 77378-0-1/2
On this day, the pit bull mix passed through the yard, roaming unleashed.
Upon seeing the dog walk through the property, Dreier went to his home for his
.22 caliber rifle. He returned to the property with the gun. When a neighbor
announced the return of the dog, Dreier became concerned about the safety of
his children. He retrieved the gun and stood between the dog and his children.
Dreier attempted to “shoo” the dog away, but the dog continued tO approach with
its tail up. When the dog was 15 feet away, Dreier fired the gun at least twice.
Neighbors, Misty Sattler and her family, heard the gunshots and a dog
yelping. They found their dog, Lailay, lying in a pool of blood. Sattler saw Dreier
standing nearby with the gun, and he admitted that he had shot her dog. Sattler
called 911 and a deputy with the Snohomish County Sheriff’s Office responded to
the incident. Dreier readily cooperated with the deputy, believing he had done
nothing wrong.
Sattler took Lailay to the veterinarian who found multiple puncture
wounds, bullet fragments, and a fracture of the humerus in her left leg. Lailay’s
injuries required surgery. She survived the shooting but almost lost her leg and
still has deeply embedded bullet fragments in her body. She spent
approximately 12 weeks in a cast but regained little use of her leg.
Nine months after the incident, the State charged Dreier with one count of
first degree animal cruelty. During the jury trial, Dreier argued that he was
defending himself and his children. The jury found him guilty as charged.
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Dreier appeals.1
ANALYSIS
Dreier contends the State failed to prove all the essential elements of first
degree animal cruelty beyond a reasonable doubt. Specifically, he claims the
State did not meet its burden of proving that he acted unlawfully. We disagree
and affirm.
Due process requires that the State prove every element of a crime
beyond a reasonable doubt. State v. Johnson, 188 Wn.2d 742, 750, 399 P.3d
507 (2017). Under Washington’s “law of the case” doctrine, this burden includes
“otherwise unnecessary elements of the offense when such added elements are
included without objection in the ‘to convict’ instruction.” State v. Hickman, 135
Wn.2d 97, 102, 954 P.2d 900 (1998); Johnson, 188 Wn.2d at 756. On appeal, a
defendant may challenge the sufficiency of the evidence of the added element.
Hickman, 135 Wn.2d at 102.
To determine whether sufficient evidence supports a conviction, an
appellate court must “view the evidence in the light most favorable to the
prosecution and determine whether any rational fact finder could have found the
elements of the crime beyond a reasonable doubt.” State v. Homan, 181 Wn.2d
102, 105, 330 P.3d 182 (2014). A claim of insufficient evidence admits the truth
of the State’s evidence and all reasonable inferences from that evidence, and
those inferences must be interpreted in favor of the State and most strongly
1 Initially, the State filed a cross-appeal. The State withdrew its cross-appeal on July 10,
2018.
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against the defendant. State v. Salinas, 119 Wn.2d 192, 201, 829 P.2d 1068
(1992). Additionally, an appellate court “must defer to the trier of fact for
purposes of resolving conflicting testimony and evaluating the persuasiveness of
the evidence.” Homan, 181 Wn.2d at 106.
A person commits first degree animal cruelty when, “except as authorized
in law, he or she intentionally (a) inflicts substantial pain on, (b) causes physical
injury to, or (c) kills an animal by a means causing undue suffering or while
manifesting an extreme indifference to life.” RCW 16.52.205(1). The trial court
provided the jury with a to-convict instruction articulating these elements:
To convict the defendant of the crime of Animal Cruelty in the First
Degree, each of the following elements of the crime must be proved
beyond a reasonable doubt:
(1) That on or about the 3rd day of April, 2016, the Defendant
intentionally and unlawfully;
(a) Inflicted substantial pain on an animal; or
(b) Caused physical injury to an animal; and
(2) That any of these acts occurred in the State of Washington.
As an attempt to translate the statutory element of “except as authorized by law,”
the jury instruction included the requirement that Dreier acted ‘unlawfully.” As a
result, the to-convict instruction established “unlawfully” as an additional element
requiring proof beyond a reasonable doubt by the State. See Johnson, 188
Wn.2d at 756.
The jury instructions also instructed that “[i}t is a defense to the charge of
Animal Cruelty in the First degree that the force used was lawful as defined in
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this instruction.” The instruction required the State to prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the force used by Dreler was not lawful.
The State argues it presented sufficient evidence that Dreier did not act in
self-defense or defense of others, thereby proving beyond a reasonable doubt
that Dreler unlawfully inflicted pain on the dog. Dreier contends the State
conflates “unlawfulness” with “not acting in self-defense,” when numerous other
statutorily acceptable ways exist to lawfully inflict pain or injury on an animal.
Specifically, Dreier cites food production, hunting, laboratory testing, and
religious reasons as lawful means of causing pain or injury to an animal. ~
RCW 16.58.040; RCW 77.32.450; RCW 16.52.220; RCW 16.50.150. According
to Dreier, the State may have proved he did not act in self-defense or defense of
others, but failed to demonstrate he violated any of the statutes allowing injury to
animals.
Dreler invoked self-defense and defense of others as the only lawful
reasons for his conduct. The jury instructions adhered to this choice of defense
by providing, “It is a defense to the charge of Animal Cruelty in the First Degree
that the force used was lawful as defined in this instruction.” This was the only
jury instruction provided on the issue of lawfulness. Dreler does not argue, nor
does the record show, that he requested further instruction on other lawful
reasons to cause pain or injury to an animal such as food production, hunting,
laboratory testing, or religious reasons.
Dreier does not dispute the State met its burden of proving that the use of
force was not lawful for self-defense or defense of others. Therefore, in light of
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the sole instruction provided to the jury on the issue of lawfulness, the State
provided sufficient evidence that Dreier’s action satisfied the “unlawful” element
of the to-convict instruction. To be sure, in this case, the State was not required
to prove that Dreier’s reason for shooting the dog was not for food production,
hunting, laboratory testing, or religious reasons.
Affirmed.
I
WE CONCUR:
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