FILED
MARCH 21, 2019
In the Office of the Clerk of Court
WA State Court of Appeals, Division III
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
DIVISION THREE
STATE OF WASHINGTON, )
) No. 35782-1-III
Respondent, )
)
v. )
)
TYLER SCOTT FIFE, ) UNPUBLISHED OPINION
)
Appellant. )
FEARING, J. — This court previously remanded the prosecution of Tyler Fife for
resentencing and for the sentencing court to exercise discretion in determining whether to
grant a downward exceptional sentence. Fife claims he should receive an exceptional
sentence because he committed his crimes under duress and without a predisposition to
commit the crimes. The resentencing court refused the downward exceptional sentence.
Because the resentencing court exercised its discretion within the appropriate standards,
we affirm.
No. 35782-1-III
State v. Fife
FACTS
Tyler Fife confessed that he and three other individuals burglarized two homes and
an attached garage to one home on December 1, 2014. He contends that he participated
in the crimes because of duress imposed by Sean Dahlquist.
During trial, Tyler Fife testified that, because he resided in Okanogan County for a
long time, he “kind of” knew Sean Dahlquist. RP1 at 275. On cross-examination, Fife
admitted knowing Dahlquist to be a troublemaker. He recounted that, on December 1,
2014, Dahlquist appeared at a mutual friend’s home, they socialized for a while, and he,
his girlfriend, Samantha Garcia, and Chantelle Mendivil agreed to go on a drive with
Dahlquist.
At trial, Tyler Fife further testified that he and Samantha Garcia assisted with the
burglaries from fear that Sean Dahlquist, the instigator of the crime spree, would
physically harm them if either refused to abet. Fife testified that Dahlquist threatened
both him and Garcia: “‘If you guys don’t get out [of the truck][,] I’m going to make
you.’” RP1 at 291. Later, according to Fife, Dahlquist threatened to stab him with a
knife if he did not help burglarize the first home. When Fife did not comply, Dahlquist
grabbed his arm and forced him out of the truck and into the home.
After ransacking the first home, the quartet retired to the Nicholas Motel in Omak
to unload their bounty. Later that evening, Sean Dahlquist, Chantelle Mendivil, and
Tyler Fife departed toward Tonasket to burglarize the second home. Fife testified that
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No. 35782-1-III
State v. Fife
Dahlquist did not trust him to stay behind with Samantha Garcia at the hotel and said,
“‘[y]ou’re coming with me.’” RP1 at 308. When demanding Fife’s participation,
Dalhquist played with a stolen pistol from the first home. Fife obeyed again. Garcia
testified and confirmed Fife’s testimony of threats from Dahlquist.
PROCEDURE
The State of Washington charged Tyler Fife with thirteen criminal counts, which
included charges for burglary, theft, possession of stolen property, malicious mischief,
and possession of controlled substances, all related to the December 1 crime spree. The
charges included one count of first degree burglary based on Sean Dahlquist being armed
with a gun that he stole from the first home. Fife asserted the defense of duress. A jury
rejected Fife’s duress defense and found him guilty of all thirteen counts.
During initial sentencing, Tyler Fife requested an exceptional sentence downward
based on the mitigating factors of duress and a lack of criminal predisposition. The trial
court rejected Fife’s request for an exceptional sentence. Nevertheless, the court cited the
standard for the exceptional sentence as “substantial and compelling evidence that there
was duress” instead of “substantial and compelling reasons” for a departure shown by a
preponderance of the evidence. The trial court also failed to address the request for an
exceptional sentence on the basis that Fife lacked a predisposition for criminal behavior.
The trial court sentenced Fife to standard range sentences on all counts. Tyler Fife
appealed. In State v. Fife, No. 34442-8-III (Wash. Ct. App. Sept. 14, 2017),
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No. 35782-1-III
State v. Fife
(unpublished), https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/344428_unp.pdf, this court held
that the trial court applied the wrong legal standard under RCW 9.94A.535 for mitigating
factors and that the court failed to consider Fife’s request for an exceptional sentence
based on a lack of criminal predisposition. This court remanded for resentencing with
instructions that the court consider whether to grant a downward sentence based on Fife’s
claim that he suffered duress and lacked a criminal predisposition.
During resentencing, Tyler Fife again requested an exceptional downward
departure from the standard range sentence based on the mitigating factors of duress and
lack of criminal predisposition. During the resentencing hearing, the trial court
entertained comments from the State, defense counsel, Fife, and Fife’s mother.
When resentencing Tyler Fife, the resentencing court discussed this court’s
opinion in State v. Fife, No. 34442-8-III, clarified the standard for a downward sentence,
and addressed Fife’s request for an exceptional sentence based on duress and lack of
criminal predisposition. The court commented:
[B]ut for those of you in the courtroom, and for the record, and for
the sake of the Court of Appeals if there’s ever any other appellate matter
involving this case, I don’t want anyone to feel that the Court today has
disregarded any of the stated reasons for the defense’s request for an
exceptional sentence. In other words, be clear folks, that I am mindful of
the defendant’s claim of duress and—and that he lacked a pre-disposition
for criminal behavior. And I truly hope that everyone in this courtroom
feels like this Court has considered this matter at length because I have.
RP2 at 40.
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No. 35782-1-III
State v. Fife
The resentencing court rejected Tyler Fife’s request for an exceptional sentence
downward on duress and lack of criminal predisposition. The court remarked:
So, for purposes of re-sentencing, and for the record, and any future
potential appellate review, the Court today, again, rejects the defendant’s
request for an exceptional sentence. Specifically, and regardless of the
jury’s verdicts, the Court finds that Mr. Fife’s contention is arguable at
best. He claims he refused or couldn’t or didn’t leave due to his fear that
Mr. Dahlquist would hurt him or Ms. Garcia if he left or sought help. Yet,
the evidence presented at trial showed opportunities when he might have
left or ceased participation. The evidence is arguable and such that the
Court cannot conclude by a preponderance that the defendant acted under
duress or threat, even an amount less than necessary to establish the legal
defense of duress.
....
. . . Likewise, the Court today is denying an exceptional sentence
based on a lack of predisposition to crime and/or that someone else induced
him to commit the crimes.
It may be true that the defendant has minimal criminal history. But,
it’s interesting, as counsel pointed out last week, that Mr. Fife had only
been in Okanogan County for a very short period of time and in that time
managed to become acquainted with, and apparently to some degree,
befriended Mr. Dahlquist. I don’t like the word disingenuous, but it is a
contradiction to say really that on one hand Mr. Fife chose to hang out with
this other person, befriending him to some degree or another, but at the
same time, didn’t know what was going on. So, I’m not satisfied that the
evidence supports an exceptional sentence based on a lack of pre-
disposition or that someone else is somehow responsible.
We know Mr. Fife has some criminal history. We know he has other
issues and so the Court today declines to impose an exceptional sentence.
RP2 at 43-45. The resentencing court amended the sentence on the controlling
first degree burglary charge to the low end of the standard range, 77 months.
At the conclusion of resentencing, the court commented:
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No. 35782-1-III
State v. Fife
If you choose to appeal, you have the right to be represented by an
attorney. If you cannot afford to hire your own attorney, the Court will
appoint counsel to represent you and that’s at public expense. If you
choose to hire your own attorney, that’s your business. Either way, if you
choose to appeal, you must, within thirty days of today, file a notice of
appeal that sets forth any errors of law that you feel the Court has
committed. Again, at any stage of any of the proceedings at the trial Court
level.
RP2 at 47 (emphasis added).
LAW AND ANALYSIS
Tyler Fife asserts four contentions on appeal. First, insufficient evidence
supported his conviction for first degree burglary. Second, the exceptional sentence
sentencing statute is unconstitutional as applied to him. Third, the resentencing court
abused its discretion when refusing to grant a downward exceptional sentence because of
his duress. Fourth, the resentencing court abused its discretion when failing to grant a
downward exceptional sentence because of his lack of a criminal predisposition. Fife
raises the first two contentions for the first time on this second appeal.
Insufficient Evidence
Tyler Fife argues that he did not have the requisite mental state for the first degree
burglary conviction. He emphasizes that the State presented no evidence to support an
inference that he entered the residence with the intent to commit a crime therein, an
element of first degree burglary under RCW 9A.52.020.
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No. 35782-1-III
State v. Fife
A claim of insufficient evidence in support of a conviction is an issue of
constitutional magnitude that an appellant may raise for the first time on appeal. RAP
2.5(a)(3); State v. Cardenas-Flores, 194 Wn. App. 496, 508-09, 374 P.3d 1217 (2016),
aff’d, 189 Wn.2d 243, 401 P.3d 19 (2017). Nevertheless, a defendant is generally
prohibited from raising issues, including constitutional issues, on a second appeal that he
could have raised on the first appeal. State v. Sauve, 100 Wn.2d 84, 87, 666 P.2d 894
(1983); State v. Mandanas, 163 Wn. App. 712, 716-17, 262 P.3d 522 (2011).
The appeal now before this court is Tyler Fife’s second appeal. Fife asserts,
however, that he is entitled to raise any assignments of error from any portion of the
proceedings against him because of the resentencing court’s broad comment, at the
conclusion of resentencing:
if you choose to appeal, you must, within thirty days of today, file a
notice of appeal that sets forth any errors of law that you feel the Court has
committed. Again, at any stage of any of the proceedings at the trial Court
level.
RP2 at 47 (emphasis added). We do not read the trial court’s statement as broad as Fife.
The resentencing court did not promise Fife that this reviewing court would entertain any
assignment of error from any stage of the prosecution. Instead, the resentencing court
informed Fife that, assuming he wishes to appeal any ruling during any stage of the
proceeding, he must file a notice of appeal within thirty days. Also, we know of no rule
that permits the superior court to bind the Court of Appeals into an obligation to entertain
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No. 35782-1-III
State v. Fife
an assignment of error otherwise not reviewable.
Tyler Fife cites no authority, in his opening brief, establishing that a defendant
may raise a contention not asserted in the first appeal. He instead cites RAP 2.5(a)(2) and
(3) and RAP 2.5(c) in his reply brief. The applicable rule, RAP 2.5(c)(1), states:
. . . If a trial court decision is otherwise properly before the appellate
court, the appellate court may at the instance of a party review and
determine the propriety of a decision of the trial court even though a similar
decision was not disputed in an earlier review of the same case.
RAP 2.5(c)(1) has its limits. The rule does not automatically revive every issue or
decision not raised in an earlier appeal. State v. Barberio, 121 Wn.2d 48, 50, 846 P.2d
519 (1993). Rather, we will entertain a new issue on the second appeal only if the trial
court, on remand, exercised independent judgment and reviewed and ruled again on the
issue. State v. Barberio, 121 Wn.2d at 50. Tyler Fife’s resentencing court did not
consider the sufficiency of the evidence for any conviction. Therefore, we deny review
of this assignment of error.
We deem State v. Mandanas, 163 Wn. App. 712 (2011) controlling. Bayani
Mandanas appealed his sentence. This court found that the trial court abused its
discretion in its determination of same or separate criminal conduct, and this court
remanded for resentencing. In a second appeal, Mandanas raised a double jeopardy claim
to challenge his convictions. This court held that the defendant’s double jeopardy
challenge was not timely since Mandanas never raised it in his first appeal. The court
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No. 35782-1-III
State v. Fife
observed that even an issue of constitutional import cannot be raised in a second appeal.
At some point, the appellate process must stop.
Constitutionality of Sentencing Statute
At the time of the initial sentencing and the resentencing, Tyler Fife sought a
downward exceptional sentence under RCW 9.94A.535. The statute permits the
sentencing court to sentence below the standard range if, based on a preponderance of
evidence, the sentencing court finds:
The defendant committed the crime under duress, coercion, threat, or
compulsion insufficient to constitute a complete defense but which
significantly affected his or her conduct.
RCW 9.94A.535(1)(c). Fife argues that the statutory scheme is unfair to him under the
context when the State charged him with first degree burglary. For the jury to convict
him of first degree burglary, the jury must find that he or one of his accomplices armed
himself with a firearm. The State presented testimony that Sean Dahlquist armed
himself. Yet, Fife testified and argued that Dahlquist employed the firearm as a
mechanism of the duress, coercion, threat or compulsion that Fife suffered. Thus, Fife
asserts that he needed to either forgo his right to present a defense of duress or remain
silent. Thus, the law and evidence coerced him into testifying against himself and
interfered in his right to defend himself in violation of his Fifth and Sixth Amendment
rights.
We applaud Tyler Fife’s resourcefulness in asserting this contention.
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No. 35782-1-III
State v. Fife
Nevertheless, we decline to review the argument since Fife did not raise the contention
during his first appeal or during trial. As stated before, a defendant may not raise even a
constitutional argument for the first time on a second appeal. State v. Sauve, 100 Wn.2d
at 87 (1983); State v. Mandanas, 163 Wn. App. at 717 (2011).
Duress
Tyler Fife contends that the trial court erred when refusing his request for a
downward exceptional sentence based on duress because the trial court failed to employ
the proper procedure in its consideration and denied the request on impermissible
grounds. The State concedes that a defendant may appeal the procedure a trial court
follows when considering an exceptional sentence. Nevertheless, the State argues that
Fife does not present an appealable issue because no procedural errors occurred on
resentencing. The State also contends that, even if the issue is appealable, the trial court
thoroughly analyzed the issue of whether Fife established duress for the purpose of
sentencing, and the court did not abuse its discretion.
Although a standard range sentence is generally not appealable due to the rigid
language of RCW 9.94A.585, a defendant may appeal the procedure the trial court
followed when imposing his sentence. State v. Knight, 176 Wn. App. 936, 957, 309 P.3d
776 (2013). While no defendant is entitled to an exceptional sentence below the standard
range, every defendant is entitled to ask the trial court to consider such a sentence and
have the alternative actually considered. State v. Grayson, 154 Wn.2d 333, 342, 111 P.3d
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No. 35782-1-III
State v. Fife
1183 (2005). Failure to consider an exceptional sentence is reversible error. State v.
Grayson, 154 Wn.2d at 342.
When a defendant requests an exceptional sentence downward, the denial of that
request can be reviewed if the sentencing court either “refused to exercise discretion at all
or has relied on an impermissible basis for refusing to impose an exceptional sentence.”
State v. Garcia-Martinez, 88 Wn. App. 322, 330, 944 P.2d 1104 (1997). A court refuses
to exercise discretion if it refuses categorically to impose an exceptional sentence below
the standard range under any circumstances. State v. Garcia-Martinez, 88 Wn. App. at
330. A court relies on an impermissible basis for declining to impose an exceptional
sentence below the standard range when, for example, the court determines that no drug
dealer should get an exceptional sentence or it refuses to consider a request on the basis
of the defendant’s race, sex or religion. State v. Garcia-Martinez, 88 Wn. App. at 330.
Conversely, when a court considers facts and finds no legal or factual basis for an
exceptional sentence, the sentencing court has exercised its discretion, and the defendant
cannot appeal that ruling. State v. McGill, 112 Wn. App. 95, 100, 47 P.3d 173 (2002).
The Sentencing Reform Act of 1981, chapter 9.94A RCW, allows trial courts to
consider a “failed defense” as a mitigating factor justifying an exceptional sentence
below the standard range even if the jury convicted the defendant and rejected the
proffered defense. State v. Jeannotte, 133 Wn.2d 847, 858-59, 947 P.2d 1192 (1997).
RCW 9.94A.535 reads, in relevant part:
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No. 35782-1-III
State v. Fife
The court may impose a sentence outside the standard sentence
range for an offense if it finds, considering the purpose of this chapter, that
there are substantial and compelling reasons justifying an exceptional
sentence. . . .
....
(1) Mitigating Circumstances—Court to Consider
The court may impose an exceptional sentence below the standard
range if it finds that mitigating circumstances are established by
a preponderance of the evidence. The following are illustrative only and are
not intended to be exclusive reasons for exceptional sentences.
....
(c) The defendant committed the crime under duress, coercion,
threat, or compulsion insufficient to constitute a complete defense but
which significantly affected his or her conduct.
Tyler Fife asserts that the trial court impermissibly focused only on duress and
failed to address other statutory words such as coercion, threat, or compulsion. Fife also
contends that the trial court erred in its inquiry because it focused solely on his ability or
lack thereof to abandon the criminal enterprise and therefore the court employed an
incorrect legal standard under RCW 9.94A.535(1)(c). We disagree.
The resentencing court properly exercised its discretion when it considered Tyler
Fife’s request for an exceptional sentence. The court understood its options and the
appropriate standards and determined that an exceptional sentence downward was not
appropriate for Fife. The court considered the evidence and did not find that Fife acted
under duress or threat. The court did not use the words “compulsion or coercion,” but we
deem those words to bear the same meaning in this context to the words uttered by the
court: “duress” and “threat.”
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No. 35782-1-III
State v. Fife
The sentencing court likewise did not rely solely on an impermissible basis in
denying his request for an exceptional sentence. At the resentencing hearing, the court
entertained comments from the State, defense counsel, Tyler Fife’s mother, and Fife
himself. The court found that evidence presented at trial showed times when Fife could
have refused to participate or ceased participation altogether and imposed a standard
range sentence.
Tyler Fife complains that the trial court impermissibly based its decision on an
incorrect legal standard because abandonment of the criminal enterprise is nowhere to be
found under RCW 9.94A.535(1)(c). Nevertheless, a court’s discussion regarding a
defendant’s opportunity to remove oneself from participating in the criminal activity
relates to whether the defendant acted under coercion and duress.
Lack of Criminal Predisposition
Tyler Fife also contends the trial court improperly denied his request for a
downward exceptional sentence because of his lack of a predisposition to commit
criminal acts. RCW 9.94A.535(1)(d) allows an exceptional sentence when:
The defendant, with no apparent predisposition to do so, was
induced by others to participate in the crime.
We employ the same analysis employed with regard to the factor of duress. A
defendant may appeal the procedure the trial court followed when imposing a standard
range sentence or in considering an exceptional sentence. State v. Knight, 176 Wn. App.
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No. 35782-1-III
State v. Fife
at 957. The reviewing court’s inquiry is limited to whether the trial court refused to
exercise discretion at all or relied on an impermissible basis for its refusal of an
exceptional sentence. State v. Garcia-Martinez, 88 Wn. App. at 330.
Tyler Fife contends that the resentencing court erred because it relied on facts
outside the record and such a “foray” is an impermissible basis for declining a downward
exceptional sentence based on a lack of criminal predisposition. He takes exception to
the trial court’s comment regarding his “befriending” of Sean Dahlquist.
We agree with Tyler Fife that a sentencing court may not rely on extrajudicial
information, but must rely on facts admitted, proved, or acknowledged when determining
any sentence. State v. Grayson, 154 Wn.2d at 338-39 (2005). Nevertheless, trial
testimony showed that Fife knew Sean Dahlquist and they spent time together. The court
could draw a reasonable inference that Fife and Dahlquist were friends. Fife knew
Dahlquist had a criminal past. Also, Fife possessed a criminal history.
CONCLUSION
We affirm the trial court’s resentencing of Tyler Fife.
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No. 35782-1-III
State v. Fife
A majority of the panel has determined this opinion will not be printed in the
Washington Appellate Reports, but it will be filed for public record pursuant to RCW
2.06.040.
Fearing, J.
WE CONCUR:
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Pennell, A.CJ.
15