St. Joan Antida High School In v. Milwaukee Public School Distri

In the United States Court of Appeals For the Seventh Circuit ____________________  No. 18‐1673    ST. JOAN ANTIDA HIGH SCHOOL INC.,  Plaintiff‐Appellant,  v.  MILWAUKEE PUBLIC SCHOOL DISTRICT,  Defendant‐Appellee.  ____________________  Appeal from the United States District Court for the  Eastern District of Wisconsin.   No. 2:17‐cv‐00413‐JPS — J.P. Stadtmueller, Judge.  ____________________  ARGUED SEPTEMBER 18, 2018 — DECIDED MARCH 25, 2019  ____________________  Before SYKES, BARRETT, and ST. EVE, Circuit Judges.  ST.  EVE,  Circuit  Judge.  There  have  been  several  constitu‐ tional challenges to school busing in Wisconsin over the years.  See, e.g., St. Augustine Sch. v. Evers, 906 F.3d 591 (7th Cir. 2018);  Racine Charter One, Inc. v. Racine Unified Sch. Dist., 424 F.3d 677  (7th Cir. 2005). This is another. Our focus here is on the Mil‐ waukee Public School District (“MPS”), private schools, and  the Equal Protection Clause.   2  No. 18‐1673  MPS  offers  free  transportation  to  public‐school  students  who  attend  certain  schools  outside  of  their  neighborhoods.  All  other  students—including  private‐school  students—are  only eligible if they live farther than one mile from the nearest  public‐transportation stop. MPS also requires private schools  to  submit  a  roster  of  students  who  need  transportation  by  July 1;  it  has  no  such  requirement  for  its  public  schools.  St.  Joan Antida High School, a private school, filed this lawsuit,  claiming  that  these  restrictions  violate  the  Equal  Protection  Clause.  This  is  especially  so,  St.  Joan  submits,  because state  law requires MPS to transport students with “reasonable uni‐ formity,” whether they attend public or private schools.  The district court granted summary judgment to MPS, and  St. Joan appeals. We affirm in part and reverse and remand in  part. Rational bases exist for the differences in busing eligibil‐ ity, and so we affirm on that ground. But more work needs to  be done to resolve St. Joan’s challenge to the July 1 deadline,  and so we reverse and remand on that ground.   I. Background  Busing parochial schoolchildren with public funding used  to  be  considered  unconstitutional  in  Wisconsin.  See  State  ex  rel. Reynolds v. Nusbaum, 115 N.W.2d 761, 770 (Wis. 1962). In  1967, however, the state held a referendum, which asked vot‐ ers whether Wisconsin’s constitution should be amended to  permit  state‐funded  transportation  of  private  and  parochial  students.  The  voters  decided  it  should,  and  the  Wisconsin  constitution  was  amended.  Wis.  Const.  art.  I,  § 23;  see  also  Cartwright v. Sharpe, 162 N.W.2d 5, 8 (1968).   After the amendment, Wisconsin passed enabling legisla‐ tion that requires school districts to provide transportation for  No. 18‐1673    3 both  public‐  and  private‐school  students.  See  Wis.  Stat.  § 121.54. There are exceptions, though. The most notable (for  our purposes) is the exception for a school district operating  within a metropolitan area. Under § 121.54’s “city option,” a  school district in a city need not—but can decide to—provide  transportation  if  other  public  transportation  is  generally  available  to  schoolchildren.  Id.  § 121.54(1).  Should  a  school  district exercise the city option, there must “be reasonable uni‐ formity in the transportation furnished to pupils, whether they  attend public or private schools.” Id. § 121.54(1)(b) (emphasis  added).   MPS has exercised the city option, and it therefore offers  transportation to Milwaukee‐area schools. There are two pri‐ mary types of public schools in the MPS system: (1) citywide  schools, which offer special courses, like language‐immersion  classes or International Baccalaureate® programs, and draw  from  the  entire  Milwaukee  area;  and  (2)  attendance‐area  schools,  which  generally  do  not  have  such  programs  and  draw  only  from  a  particular  neighborhood.  MPS,  at  times,  designates  certain  students  to  attendance‐area  schools  out‐ side  of  their  neighborhoods—making  the  school  a  “nonat‐ tendance‐area school” (as we will call it, for ease of reference).  The Milwaukee area, of course, also has private schools, like  St. Joan. MPS explains that, under state rules, St. Joan techni‐ cally  has  an  attendance  area;  but  unlike  public  attendance‐ area schools, St. Joan’s allotted area is the entire city of Mil‐ waukee.   To  ensure  transportation  to  these  schools,  MPS  devised  Policy 4.04. This lawsuit challenges two parts of that policy.   The first challenge concerns how MPS decides which stu‐ dents  are  eligible  for  busing.  Under  § 2  of  Policy  4.04,  high  4  No. 18‐1673  schoolers may receive free transportation only if they live two  or  more  miles  from  their  school  and  “more  than  one  mile  walking  distance  from  public  transportation”  (a  restriction  we will call the “one‐mile rule”).1 But § 5 provides more gen‐ erous  transportation  benefits  for  high  schoolers  who  attend  either citywide or nonattendance‐area schools. That section,  which is titled “Racial Balance, Modernization, Overload, and  Lack of Facility,” makes any student assigned to a school far‐ ther than two miles from her home eligible for free transpor‐ tation—regardless of the student’s proximity to public trans‐ portation. In fewer words, citywide and nonattendance‐area  students are not subject to the one‐mile rule under § 5.   The second challenge is to MPS’s roster‐notification dead‐ line.  Under  § 121.54(2)(b),  private  schools  must  submit  the  names,  grade  levels,  and  residences  of  all  students  who  are  eligible  to  receive  busing  to  MPS  by  May  15.  The  provision  allows a school board to “extend the notification deadline,”  which MPS has done. Policy 4.04 states that private schools  must submit the roster by the third Friday in September. In  practice, however, the parties agree that MPS requires the ros‐ ters by July 1. According to MPS, the deadline is necessary so  that it has sufficient time to arrange for the transportation of  eligible private‐school students before school starts. There is  no  like  roster‐notification  deadline  for  public  schools,  MPS  says,  because  it  has  immediate access  to  the  requisite  infor‐ mation needed for eligible public‐school students.   In 2016, St. Joan applied to MPS for student transportation  during the upcoming 2016–2017 school year. On May 14, 2016,                                                    1  Policy  4.04  provides  different  transportation  terms  for  elementary  schools. Those terms are not relevant to this dispute.   No. 18‐1673    5 St.  Joan  submitted  its  original  roster,  which  included  the  names of sixty‐two students relevant to this appeal; on Sep‐ tember  29,  2016,  it  updated  the  list  with  six  more  relevant  names. What prompted St. Joan to update its roster is unclear,  but MPS refused to bus any of these sixty‐eight students. Each  of  them  lived  within  one  mile  of  public  transportation,  and  the  six  later‐added  students  were  disclosed  after  the  July  1  deadline. St. Joan protested, but eventually covered transpor‐ tation for the students. Doing so cost a total of $178,640 for the  2016–2017 and 2017–2018 school years.   Looking to recover that loss, St. Joan brought this action,  which also seeks injunctive and declaratory relief. St. Joan as‐ serts two claims. The first claim alleges that Policy 4.04’s two  restrictions—the one‐mile rule and the July 1 deadline—vio‐ late  the  Equal  Protection  Clause  of  the  Fourteenth Amend‐ ment. See 42 U.S.C. § 1983. The second claim, brought under  Wis. Stat. § 121.54, asserts that the restrictions violate Wiscon‐ sin’s reasonable uniformity requirement.2 After discovery, the  parties  cross‐moved  for  summary  judgment.  The  district  court granted MPS’s motion and denied St. Joan’s, reasoning  that  Policy  4.04’s  two  restrictions  had  rational  bases.  293  F.  Supp. 3d 813 (E.D. Wis. 2018). With the constitutional claim                                                    2  St. Joan sued on its own behalf and on behalf of the sixty‐eight children’s  parents, from whom St. Joan received assignments of rights and claims.  The exemplar assignment in the record speaks only of a “full and complete  assignment of rights and claims under Wis. Stat. §§ 121.54 and 121.55”— it does not address assignment of § 1983 claims. The parties do not address  this issue. It does not deter us, though, because the law generally holds  that schools have standing to assert the constitutional rights of parents to  direct their children’s education. See Runyon v. McCrary, 427 U.S. 160, 175  n.13 (1976); Pierce v. Soc’y of the Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 535–36 (1925); Ohio  Ass’n of Indep. Sch. v. Goff, 92 F.3d 419, 422 (6th Cir. 1996).  6  No. 18‐1673  dismissed,  the  district  court  declined  to  exercise  supple‐ mental jurisdiction over St. Joan’s state‐law claim. 28 U.S.C.  § 1367(c)(3). St. Joan appeals.   II. Discussion  The  Equal  Protection  Clause  of  the  Fourteenth  Amend‐ ment  guarantees that “no State  shall … deny to  any  person  within its jurisdiction the equal protection of the laws.” U.S.  Const. amend. XIV, § 1. This is “essentially a direction that all  persons  similarly  situated  should  be  treated  alike.”  City  of  Cleburne, Tex. v. Cleburne Living Ctr., 473 U.S. 432, 439 (1985).  Although the Equal Protection Clause does not endow a pri‐ vate  right  of  action,  42  U.S.C.  § 1983  does  for  any  constitu‐ tional deprivation under color of state law. A municipal entity  acting under color of state law—like MPS—may be held liable  under  § 1983  where  it  is  responsible  for  the  constitutional  deprivation. Monell v. Dep’t of Soc. Servs. of City of New York,  436 U.S. 658, 694–695 (1978).  On appeal, St. Joan contends that the one‐mile rule and the  July 1 deadline violate the Equal Protection Clause. We first  determine how searching our inquiry must be—under either  strict‐scrutiny  or  rational‐basis  review—before  determining  whether  the restrictions  pass constitutional muster.  Because  this case comes to us after summary judgment, our review is  de novo. Dunn v. Menard, Inc., 880 F.3d 899, 905 (7th Cir. 2018).  We can affirm on any ground supported by the record. Terry  v. Gary Cmty. Sch. Corp., 910 F.3d 1000, 1004 (7th Cir. 2018).   A. Standard of Scrutiny  An equal‐protection claim merits strict scrutiny, our most  exacting inquiry, only if the state‐crafted classification disad‐ vantages a suspect class or “impermissibly interferes” with a  No. 18‐1673    7 fundamental right. Segovia v. United States, 880 F.3d 384, 390  (7th Cir. 2018). Otherwise rational‐basis review governs.3 See  Armour  v.  City  of  Indianapolis,  Ind.,  566  U.S.  673,  680  (2012);  Hooper v. Bernalillo Cty. Assessor, 472 U.S. 612, 618 (1985). This  case  does  not  involve  a  suspect  class,  like  race,  and  neither  education nor free transportation to school is a fundamental  right.  Kadrmas  v.  Dickinson  Pub.  Sch.,  487  U.S.  450,  457–62  (1988); Plyler v. Doe, 457 U.S. 202, 223 (1982); San Antonio Indep.  Sch. Dist. v. Rodriguez, 411 U.S. 1, 33–35 (1973); Racine Charter  One, Inc. v. Racine Unified Sch. Dist., 424 F.3d 677, 690 n.4 (7th  Cir. 2005).  St.  Joan,  however,  invokes  another  fundamental  right— the right of parents to direct the education of their children.  That  right  does  exist.  In  Pierce  v.  Soc’y  of  the  Sisters,  the  Su‐ preme Court struck down a ban on parochial education and  held that the “fundamental theory of liberty” protects parents  from state attempts to “forc[e]” students into public school‐ ing. 268 U.S. 510, 535 (1925); see also Troxel v. Granville, 530 U.S.  57, 65 (2000). But the existence of that fundamental right, and  its  potential  implication  here,  is  not  enough  to  trigger  strict  scrutiny. See, e.g., Harlan v. Scholz, 866 F.3d 754, 760 (7th Cir.  2017).  A  direct  and  substantial  interference  is  required.  See  Lyng v. Castillo, 477 U.S. 635, 638 (1986); Bowen v. Gilliard, 483  U.S. 587, 602–03 (1987); Zablocki v. Redhail, 434 U.S. 374, 386– 87 & n.12 (1978); see also Griffin High Sch. v. Illinois High Sch.  Ass’n, 822 F.2d 671 (7th Cir. 1987). St. Joan has shown no such  interference with the right recognized in Pierce.                                                    3  We set aside intermediate scrutiny, which generally applies to classifica‐ tions based on quasi‐suspect classes, like gender, because it has no poten‐ tial application to this case. See, e.g., Hayden ex rel. A.H. v. Greensburg Cmty.  Sch. Corp., 743 F.3d 569, 577 (7th Cir. 2014).  8  No. 18‐1673  St.  Joan  claims  that  the  withholding  of  free  busing,  a  state‐subsidized benefit, amounts to a prohibited interference  with  the  right  to  direct  a  child’s  education.  This  stretches  Pierce too far. As a general rule, a state’s “decision not to sub‐ sidize  the  exercise  of  a  fundamental  right  does  not  infringe  the right” and is therefore “not subject to strict scrutiny.” Re‐ gan v. Taxation with Representation of Washington, 461 U.S. 540,  549 (1983); see also, e.g., Sweeney v. Pence, 767 F.3d 654, 669 (7th  Cir. 2014). More to the point, a state that chooses not to assist  a private school does not breach the right Pierce described. In  Norwood v. Harrison, the Supreme Court explained:   It has never been held that if private schools are not  given some share of public funds allocated for edu‐ cation that such schools are isolated into a classifica‐ tion violative of the Equal Protection Clause. It is one  thing to say that a State may not prohibit the mainte‐ nance  of  private  schools  and  quite  another  to  say  that such schools must, as a matter of equal protec‐ tion, receive state aid.  413 U.S 455, 462 (1973). In Maher v. Roe, the Court added that  Pierce “casts no shadow over a State’s power to favor public  education by funding it.” 432 U.S. 464, 477 (1977); see also Cor‐ nerstone Christian Sch. v. Univ. Interscholastic League, 563 F.3d  127, 138 n.12 (5th Cir. 2009); Gary S. v. Manchester Sch. Dist.,  374 F.3d 15, 19–22 (1st Cir. 2004); Cass R. Sunstein, Is There an  Unconstitutional  Conditions  Doctrine?,  26  San  Diego  L.  Rev.  337, 340–42 (1989). Pierce, then, does not protect against a state  favoring  public  schools  with  public  dollars,  which  is—at  worst—all MPS has done.   St. Joan’s reach for strict scrutiny stretches the record, too.  There is no evidence that Policy 4.04 hamstrings the right of  parents to direct their children’s education. Parents can and  No. 18‐1673    9 do  choose  to  send  their  children  to  Milwaukee  private  schools,  despite  Policy  4.04.  Parents  who  cannot  rely  upon  private transportation have other options available. All sixty‐ eight  children  live  within  one  mile  of  public  transportation  (hence this lawsuit), and St. Joan in fact provided the students  with busing. To be sure, the record contains testimonial evi‐ dence that some unenumerated number of families declined  to send their children to St. Joan because it could not promise  free busing. But that Policy 4.04 caused some families to “de‐ cide  to  modify”  where  they  sent  their  children  “does  not  transform”  the  policy  into  an  intrusion  on  parental  rights.  Bowen, 483 U.S. at 601–02 & n.16; accord Califano v. Jobst, 434  U.S. 47, 54 (1977). The burden must be direct and substantial,  and no evidence shows that.   St. Joan also makes much of the fact that Wisconsin con‐ siders  free  transportation  for  private‐school  students  to  be  “important,” as evidenced by the 1967 constitutional amend‐ ment and § 121.54. This emphasis is misplaced. State‐specific  policies do not augment fundamental rights. Accord Washing‐ ton v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720–21 (1997) (only rights that  are  “deeply  rooted  in  this  Nation’s  history  and  tradition”  count as fundamental) (citation omitted). Wisconsin law has  implications  on  whether  there  are  rational  bases  for  Policy  4.04’s restrictions (as we discuss below), but not whether strict  scrutiny applies.   With strict scrutiny off the table, rational‐basis review gov‐ erns St. Joan’s challenges to the one‐mile rule and the July 1  deadline. That standard permits a court to invalidate a legis‐ lative classification only if there is no rational relationship be‐ tween  the  classification  and  “some  legitimate  government  purpose.”  Segovia,  880  F.3d  at  390.  “Some”  is  key—a  10  No. 18‐1673  classification  is  generally  valid  as  long  as  a  rational  basis  is  plausible, even if the legislature did not expressly endorse it.  See FCC v. Beach Commc’ns, Inc., 508 U.S. 307, 313–15 (1993);  Indiana Petroleum Marketers & Convenience Store Ass’n v. Cook,  808 F.3d 318, 322 (7th Cir. 2015). Rational‐basis review toler‐ ates  overinclusive  classifications,  underinclusive  ones,  and  other  imperfect  means‐ends  fits.  Heller  v.  Doe,  509  U.S.  312,  319–320  (1993);  Gregory  v. Ashcroft,  501  U.S.  452,  473  (1991);  Vance v. Bradley, 440 U.S. 93, 107–09 (1979). The standard also  imputes “a strong presumption of validity” on the contested  classification.  Beach  Commc’ns,  508  U.S.  at  314–15.  To  over‐ come that presumption, a challenger must negate “every con‐ ceivable basis which might support” the classification. Id.  B. The One‐Mile Rule  Policy 4.04 draws a line. On one side are private schools,  like St. Joan, and attendance‐area schools, both of which are  subject to the one‐mile rule; on the other side are citywide and  nonattendance‐area  schools,  which  are  not.  St.  Joan  argues  that this line‐drawing violates equal protection, at least as ap‐ plied to it, because the one‐mile rule irrationally treats private  schools differently.   Equal‐protection  claims  start  with  the  question:  treated  differently  than  whom?  See  Erwin  Chemerinsky,  CONSTITUTIONAL LAW: PRINCIPLES AND POLICIES § 9.1, 698 (5th  ed. 2015). In cases like this, where the challenged regulation  provides  explicit  classifications,  the  answer  should  be  easy.  Driving laws may treat fifteen‐year‐olds differently than six‐ teen‐year‐olds. Liquor laws may treat saloons differently than  grocery stores. And so on. The parties, however, muddle the  answer  here. MPS submits that  St. Joan is technically an  at‐ tendance‐area  school,  because  it  has  an  allotted  attendance  No. 18‐1673    11 area under state regulations. Thus, MPS contends, St. Joan is  treated differently only when compared to dissimilar schools;  but it is treated the same as its relevant comparator—attend‐ ance‐area schools. St. Joan vehemently disagrees, arguing that  it must be compared to citywide schools. St. Joan has an at‐ tendance area, the school concedes, but that attendance area  is the entire city—just like citywide schools.   The debate is unnecessary. Arguments over whether there  is an apt “similarly situated” comparator are suited for class‐ of‐one equal‐protection cases, in which the individual claim‐ ant must show that she was treated differently (and irration‐ ally so) than someone else. See, e.g., Harvey v. Town of Merrill‐ ville, 649 F.3d 526, 532 (7th Cir. 2011). But where, as here, “the  classification appears in the text of” the challenged regulation,  we do not “need to identify a comparator.” Monarch Beverage  Co. v. Cook, 861 F.3d 678, 682 (7th Cir. 2017). The regulation  that imposes the burden does the work for us.   Here, Policy 4.04 treats private schools, like St. Joan, dif‐ ferently  than  citywide  schools  and  nonattendance‐area  schools—and that requires a rational basis. St. Joan submits  that there is no rationale for the different treatment, especially  in light of § 121.54’s reasonable uniformity requirement. MPS  responds  with  two  rational  bases:  (1)  furthering  its  educa‐ tional mandate by reducing overcapacity and expanding ac‐ cess to special programs; and (2) cost savings. We will address  whether those justifications suffice on their own terms, then  consider the impact of § 121.54.   MPS, a public‐school district, has obvious legitimate inter‐ ests  in  reducing  overcapacity  in  crowded  attendance‐area  schools  and  in  expanding  special  program  access  to  its  stu‐ dents. See Lewis v. Ascension Par. Sch. Bd., 806 F.3d 344, 363 (5th  12  No. 18‐1673  Cir. 2015); Spurlock v. Fox, 716 F.3d 383, 403 (6th Cir. 2013); Doe  ex rel. Doe v. Lower Merion Sch. Dist., 665 F.3d 524, 557 (3d Cir.  2011). Either goal requires the same feat—to put more kids in  citywide and nonattendance‐area classrooms. To that end, ex‐ empting students who attend those schools from the one‐mile  rule means more kids will get busing to those schools, which  in turn encourages and makes easier their attendance to those  schools. That is rational.   There  is  a  related  reason  for  limiting  the  one‐mile  rule’s  application. MPS students who attend citywide or nonattend‐ ance‐area schools are, logically, more likely to have to travel  farther from their home to get to school than students who go  to  attendance‐area  schools.  That  beckons  a  trade‐off.  In  ex‐ change  for  MPS  students  traveling  farther,  MPS  makes  the  travel easier by ensuring free busing for most students.   Faced with these rational bases, St. Joan reframes the issue.  It posits, and the district court concluded, that the question is  not whether MPS had a rational basis for exempting citywide  and nonattendance‐area students from the one‐mile rule (the  district court accepted that it did). The question, St. Joan says,  is whether there is a rational basis for not extending the same  benefit to private‐school students. St. Joan sees an upside to  the  latter  formulation,  believing  it  requires  MPS  to  identify  something undeserving about private‐school students to jus‐ tify denying them the busing benefits some public‐school stu‐ dents receive. But that is not how rational‐basis review works.   The standard, like most in constitutional law, is a means‐ end test. See G. Stone et al., CONSTITUTIONAL LAW 453 (7th ed.  2013). We need only identify a legitimate end and ask whether  the means—the classification—bears a rational relationship to  the end. E.g., Armour, 566 U.S. at 680; Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S.  No. 18‐1673    13 at 315–20. So if, for example, a state is concerned with the suc‐ cess of its small‐business sector, and, in response, it passes a  regulation offering more generous grant terms to companies  with fewer than fifty employees, the regulation is rationally  related  to  the  state’s  legitimate  concern.  The  analysis  ends  there. See U.S. R.R. Ret. Bd. v. Fritz, 449 U.S. 166, 176–79 (1980).  On rational‐basis review, we do not additionally require the  state to persuade us why a company with, say, two‐hundred  employees would not also benefit from more grant money. Cf.  Rothe Dev., Inc. v. U.S. Depʹt of Def., 836 F.3d 57, 73 (D.C. Cir.  2016)  (deeming  rational  a  grant  program  for  socially  disad‐ vantaged  businesses).  Lawmakers  often  have  to  draw  lines  when  “classifying  governmental  beneficiaries,”  and  some‐ times that means those with “strong claim[s] to favored treat‐ ment” will be left out. Beach Commc’ns, 508 U.S. at 315–16; see  also, e.g., Fitzgerald v. Racing Assʹn of Cent. Iowa, 539 U.S. 103,  108 (2003); Regan, 461 U.S. at 550–51; Maher, 432 U.S. at 477;  City of New Orleans v. Dukes, 427 U.S. 297, 303–06 (1976) (per  curiam);  Dandridge  v.  Williams,  397  U.S.  471,  486  (1970)  (per  curiam).   That is what happened here. MPS has legitimate interests  in reducing overcrowding and expanding educational access  in MPS schools. With those goals in mind, MPS eased trans‐ portation to and from the schools that can help it do both. Eas‐ ing  transportation  for  private‐school  (and  attendance‐area)  students, on the other hand, would do little to further MPS’s  goals. And that distinction gives MPS reason enough to treat  the  schools  differently  under  rational‐basis  review.  See,  e.g.,  Idaho Dep’t of Employment v. Smith, 434 U.S. 100, 101 (1977) (per  curiam).  14  No. 18‐1673  St. Joan attacks the rationality of MPS’s application of the  one‐mile rule on other grounds. It asserts that overcrowding  is not truly a problem in MPS schools, because many attend‐ ance‐area schools are not at maximum capacity. St. Joan ar‐ gues further that MPS has no reason to differentiate St. Joan  from citywide schools because St. Joan also offers special pro‐ gramming. These arguments may have held water if St. Joan  had  a  strict‐scrutiny  case.  But  it  does  not.  On  rational‐basis  review, classifications can be both underinclusive and overin‐ clusive and still survive. E.g., Wisconsin Educ. Ass’n Council v.  Walker, 705 F.3d 640, 655–56 (7th Cir. 2013). MPS, moreover,  does not need conclusive support from “evidence or empiri‐ cal  data”  to  make  the  rational  decisions  it  has.  Beach  Commc’ns, 508 U.S. at 313–15.   Turning  to  MPS’s  second  justification,  cost  savings  may  serve as a rational basis for classifications. See Bankers Life &  Cas. Co. v. Crenshaw, 486 U.S. 71, 83–84 (1988); Bowen, 483 U.S.  at 599; Srail v. Vill. of Lisle, Ill., 588 F.3d 940, 948 (7th Cir. 2009);  Irizarry v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chicago, 251 F.3d 604, 610 (7th  Cir. 2001). The cases that so hold generally identify potential  costs that are unique or distinct to the disfavored group. See  Bankers Life, 486 U.S. at 83–84 (charging assessments on non‐ monetary judgments “would impose a considerable cost in ju‐ dicial resources”); Irizarry, 251 F.3d at 610 (excluding unmar‐ ried  persons  from  dependent  benefits  resulted  in  “distinct”  savings). In another busing case, for example, we concluded  that a school district had a rational basis for not transporting  a charter school’s students, because doing so would have re‐ sulted in “unique and additional costs” to the school district.  Racine Charter One, 424 F.3d at 685–87. That is not to say that  states can randomly discriminate to keep costs down. If the  state’s cutoff is arbitrary or invidious, then the classification  No. 18‐1673    15 is by definition not rational. See Mem’l Hosp. v. Maricopa Cty.,  415 U.S. 250, 263 (1974); Shapiro v. Thompson, 394 U.S. 618, 633  (1969), overruled on other grounds by Edelman v. Jordan, 415 U.S.  651 (1974).  Cost savings, in the context of MPS’s other goals, provide  an  additional  rational  basis  here.  It  may  well  be  true,  as  St.  Joan asserts, that a St. Joan student is no more expensive to  bus than a citywide or nonattendance‐area student. But MPS  is already stretched thin; it spent forty‐million dollars to pro‐ vide busing in the 2016–2017 school year, barely any of which  state aid covered. Despite those straits, MPS could believe that  overcrowding and access concerns were worth taking on the  added cost of busing most citywide and nonattendance‐area  students.  It  has  no  similar  reason  to  take  on  those  costs  for  private  and  attendance‐area  students.  So  MPS  made  the  ra‐ tional choice: pay more to expand busing to schools that could  reduce overcrowding and promote program access, but not to  schools  that  are  less  likely  provide  the  same  returns.  See  Bowen, 483 U.S. at 596; Idaho Dep’t of Employment, 434 U.S. at  101.  The  one‐mile  rule  therefore  has  rational  bases.  But  how  does § 121.54’s reasonable uniformity requirement factor in?  Courts typically ask whether a rational basis is conceivable,  without  paying  mind  to  what  the  state  actually  said  or  thought. Monarch Beverage, 861 F.3d at 685. St. Joan, however,  argues that this case is different, because § 121.54 precludes  MPS from relying on the rational bases that it has.   St. Joan’s argument derives from Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal  Co. v. Cty. Comm’n of Webster Cty., W. Va., 488 U.S. 336 (1989).  In Allegheny, the Supreme Court considered a county’s prop‐ erty‐tax  assessment  scheme  that  “systematically  produced  16  No. 18‐1673  dramatic differences in valuation”—in some cases assessing  property  at  more  than  thirty  times  the  rate  of  comparable  properties.  Allegheny,  488  U.S.  at  341.  The  county  defended  the scheme by arguing that it aimed to peg “properties at true  current value.” But that goal, the Court held, could not ration‐ ally explain the gross disparities in tax treatment. Id. at 343– 44. Nor could state law. The Court recognized that states can  make rational distinctions among taxpayers and assess differ‐ ent tax burdens, but the state had “not drawn such a distinc‐ tion.” Id. at 345. To the contrary, West Virginia’s constitution  mandated that “taxation shall be equal and uniform throughout  the State.”  Id. at 338 (emphasis added). The Court therefore  saw no conceivable rational bases for the scheme. Id. at 345– 46.  Allegheny’s holding is quite narrow. Three years after Alle‐ gheny came Nordlinger v. Hahn, another equal‐protection chal‐ lenge  involving  property  taxes.  505  U.S.  1  (1992).  Like  the  scheme  in  Allegheny,  the  law  in  Nordlinger  “resulted  in  dra‐ matic disparities in taxation.” Id. at 14. But Allegheny was dis‐ tinguishable,  according  to  the  Court.  Citing  the  Allegheny  county’s irrational justification and the state‐law uniformity  directive,  the  Court  concluded  that  Allegheny  “was  the  rare  case where the facts precluded any plausible inference” of a  rational basis. Id. at 14–16; see also Fitzgerald, 539 U.S. at 109– 10; Chemerinsky, CONSTITUTIONAL  LAW  718 (after Nordlinger,  Allegheny “seems limited to challenges of arbitrary and unjus‐ tifiable  administrative  decisions”).  Two  decades  after  Nord‐ linger,  the  Court  again  emphasized  Allegheny’s  limits  in  Ar‐ mour.   In Armour, the Supreme Court evaluated how Indianapo‐ lis divvied up the costs of a new sewer project among local  No. 18‐1673    17 homeowners. Indiana law required that such costs be “appor‐ tioned  equally.”  Ind.  Code  § 36‐9‐39‐15(b)(3)  (2011).  Indian‐ apolis did so, at least at first, by assessing each homeowner  the same rate. After the assessment, some paid in lump sums  and  others  began  paying  in  installments.  The  city  soon  re‐ versed course, though, and opted to use bonds to pay for the  project.  It  then  forgave  any  outstanding  installments  owed,  but  it  refused  to  pay  back  homeowners  who  had  paid  in  a  lump sum. Armour, 566 U.S. at 678–79. The result: homeown‐ ers who paid upfront spent as much as thirty times more than  other homeowners. See id. at 679.   Despite  the  parallels—a  state  uniformity  law  and  gross  disparity—the  Court  in  Armour  held  that  Allegheny  did  not  control. Id. at 687. Allegheny, the Court explained, “involved a  clear state law requirement clearly and dramatically violated.”  Id.  (emphases  added).  Not  so  in  Armour,  according  to  the  Court, because the city followed state law in the first instance,  and state law said nothing about forgiveness plans. The Court  went no further on the state‐law question, rejecting the view  that  “ordinary  violations  of  ordinary  state  tax  law”  can  amount to “violations of the Federal Constitution.” Id. at 687– 88. The Court repeated that Allegheny was the “‘the rare case  where the facts precluded’ any alternative reading of state law  and  thus  any  alternative  rational  basis.”  Id.  at  687  (quoting  Nordlinger, 505 U.S. at 16).   This is not one of those rare cases. MPS’s avowed rational  bases are sound, and § 121.54 does not render them implausi‐ ble. For one, § 121.54’s reasonable uniformity requirement is  not  “clear.”  See Armour,  566  U.S.  at  687.  It  is  the  opposite— “ambiguous”—as St. John Vianney  Sch. v. Bd. of Educ. of Sch.  Dist.  of  Janesville  held.  336  N.W.2d  387,  393  (Wis.  Ct.  App.  18  No. 18‐1673  1983). There is also little caselaw explaining the requirement.  St. John Vianney, for its part, noted that the requirement pre‐ vents  discrimination  based  on  how  far  students  live  from  school. Id. at 393–94; see also Wis. Stat. § 121.54(2)(c), (4) (dis‐ cussing reasonable uniformity in terms of the distances trans‐ ported  to  and  from  school).  That,  however,  does  not  move  much here, because the one‐mile rule does not discriminate  on a distance‐from‐school basis. What is more, absent “clear”  law, we do not see what MPS “clearly and dramatically” vio‐ lated. See Armour, 566 U.S. at 687. It is true that the one‐mile  rule effectively denies busing to most of the St. Joan students  who applied for it. But we decline to speak for the Wisconsin  courts as to whether that result is “reasonable” as a matter of  local busing policy. MPS is financially strained as it is, and the  rule does apply uniformly to private and attendance‐area stu‐ dents.4   Of course, none of this means that the one‐mile rule com‐ plies with § 121.54. That question is not before us, and the an‐ swer,  unsettled  as  it  is,  should  come  from  the  Wisconsin  courts.  To  resolve  the  equal‐protection  claim  before  us,  we  hold only that MPS has offered rational bases that are plausi‐ ble notwithstanding state law.   In coming out the other way, the dissent goes further than  we are willing. It draws on legislative history and potentially                                                    4  We said earlier that we do not need to determine, for equal‐protection  purposes, what types of schools St. Joan is most like (citywide or nonat‐ tendance area, who generally get busing, or attendance‐area schools, who  generally do not). At the same time, we have no basis to say what practical  and regulatory distinctions will matter to the Wisconsin courts for § 121.54  purposes.     No. 18‐1673    19 comparable  lower‐court  decisions  (like  St.  John  Vianney)  to  conclude  that  the  one‐mile  rule  violates  § 121.54  clearly  enough to implicate Allegheny and negate MPS’s rational ba‐ ses.  With  respect,  we  think  that  approach  does  more  than  what Allegheny and Armour did. For even if the one‐mile rule  violates § 121.54,5 a mere violation of state law does not boot‐ strap itself into a violation of the Equal Protection Clause. Ar‐ mour, 566 U.S. at 687–88; see also William C. Cohen, State Law  in  Equality  Clothing: A  Comment  on Allegheny  Pittsburgh  Coal  Company v. County Commission, 38 UCLA L. Rev. 87, 99–103  (1990).   C. The July 1 Deadline  MPS  additionally  requires  private  schools  to  provide  by  July 1 the names of students who need busing. This deadline  applies  only  to  private‐school  students,  not  MPS  students,  and thus St. Joan claims that it also violates equal protection.  In response, MPS proffers one rational basis in support of the  deadline: administrative necessity.   There is no question that administrative concerns can jus‐ tify certain classifications. E.g., Armour, 566 U.S. at 683; Bank‐ ers Life, 486 U.S. at 84; Hearne v. Bd. of Educ. of City of Chicago,  185  F.3d  770,  775  (7th  Cir.  1999).  Such  concerns  exist  here.                                                    5  It is worth adding that in Allegheny, unlike here, the state courts at least  had  an  opportunity  to  decide  whether  the  challenged  scheme  violated  state law. West Virginia’s highest court assumed that it did, but the court  refused to order relief because it concluded that absent “intentional and  systemic” undervaluation the petitioners had to seek relief from the asses‐ sor. Allegheny, 488 U.S. at 342–43 (citing In re 1975 Tax Assessments Against  Oneida Coal Co., 360 S.E.2d 560, 565 (W.Va. 1987)); see also John Hart Ely,  Another Spin on Allegheny Pittsburgh, 38 UCLA L. Rev. 107, 109 (1990) (ex‐ plaining the “strange” circumstances of Allegheny).   20  No. 18‐1673  Before school starts, MPS must determine which students are  eligible for transportation, compare school rosters to confirm  that students are not double booked, and arrange for bus ser‐ vices  or  contract  for  alternative  transportation  services.  See  Wis. Stat. § 121.55. These tasks all require MPS to have the stu‐ dents’ information well in advance of the school year. While  MPS has direct access to its own students’ information, it does  not  have  the  same  for  private‐school  students.  As  a  result,  some deadline by which private schools must provide student  information is logistically rational—and statutorily mandated  by Wis. Stat. § 121.54(2)(b). Whether July 1, as opposed to, say,  September 1, is the wisest or fairest choice is not for us to de‐ cide. See, e.g., Heller, 509 U.S. at 319–320; Nordlinger, 505 U.S.  at 18; Hodel v. Indiana, 452 U.S. 314, 331 (1981).  That is sufficient to deem the deadline constitutional on its  face.6 See Midwest Fence Corp. v. U.S. Dep’t of Transp., 840 F.3d  932, 941–46 (7th Cir. 2016); see also United States v. Salerno, 481  U.S. 739, 745 (1987). St. Joan, however, also lobs a related chal‐ lenge to what comes after the deadline. According to St. Joan,  MPS treats students who enroll near or after July 1 differently  depending on their school. To illustrate, St. Joan offers a hy‐ pothetical.  Suppose  MPS  completes  transportation  arrange‐ ments  for  all  schools  (public  and  private)  by  August  15.  A  week later, two families, each with a fourteen‐year‐old, move  to Milwaukee. One family decides to send its child to a private                                                    6  We use the term “on its face” advisedly, although we note that the July 1  deadline has not been recorded anywhere (at least as far as this record is  concerned). That is odd, particularly because the July 1 deadline conflicts  with the September deadline set forth in Policy 4.04 and the May 15 dead‐ line in Wis. Stat. § 121.54(2)(b). St. Joan, however, has not argued that these  facts impact the constitutional analysis, and so we do not address them.   No. 18‐1673    21 school outside of her neighborhood; the other opts for a pub‐ lic school outside of her neighborhood. And then MPS learns  of the two students, and their need for busing, on the exact  same day. The private‐school student cannot get busing; yet  the public‐school student could, according to St. Joan.   That prospect gives us pause. The time needed to arrange  for transportation before the school year justifies imposing a  roster‐notification  deadline  on  private  schools.  But  pre‐ar‐ rangement  needs  offer  no  justification  for  treating  post‐ar‐ rangement latecomers differently. Granted, some rigidity in  the deadline may be rational (to motivate private schools to  comply with the it); but even that would not justify treating  students who move to the district near or after the deadline  differently, based only on whether they go to private or public  school. We see no rational basis for that distinction, and MPS  has not provided any. Perhaps there are heightened burdens  associated with latecomer private‐school students that do not  exist  for  public‐school  students,  but  again,  MPS  has  not  pointed to any.   That said, we cannot order relief on this record. Unlike the  dissent, at least two things remain unclear to us. First, we do  not know whether, in fact, MPS enforces the July 1 deadline  in  the  manner just described. At oral argument, counsel for  MPS  hedged  when  asked  directly;  and  the  parties  have  not  directed us to a part of the record that reveals a clear answer.  Second, we do not know why St. Joan updated its roster after  the  July  1  deadline—whether  the  result  of  latecomers,  pro‐ crastination, or something else. These facts matter, of course,  because  an  as‐applied  challenge  concerns  only  the  present  case, not hypotheticals. See, e.g., Hegwood v. City of Eau Claire,  676  F.3d  600,  603  (7th  Cir.  2012);  United  States  v.  Skoien,  614  22  No. 18‐1673  F.3d 638, 645 (7th Cir. 2010) (en banc). We therefore conclude  that further fact‐finding is necessary. See, e.g., Shimer v. Wash‐ ington, 100 F.3d 506, 510 (7th Cir. 1996). After that occurs, it is  up to the district court in the first instance to decide what re‐ lief, if any, is appropriate.   III. Conclusion  For  these  reasons,  we AFFIRM  the  district  court’s  judg‐ ment with respect to the one‐mile rule and we REVERSE and  REMAND for further proceedings consistent with this opin‐ ion with respect to the July 1 deadline.  No. 18-1673 23 SYKES, Circuit Judge, dissenting. I respectfully dissent. Un- like my colleagues, I think this is indeed the “rare case” in which a state-law uniformity mandate removes otherwise plausible policy justifications for a local legislative classifica- tion, leaving no rational basis for the local rule. Nordlinger v. Hahn, 505 U.S. 1, 16 (1992) (describing Allegheny Pittsburgh Coal Co. v. Cty. Comm’n of Webster Cty., W. Va., 488 U.S. 336 (1989)). I would reverse and remand for entry of judgment for the plaintiff. * * * To understand this unusual equal-protection claim, it’s helpful to review the relevant state legal history. In 1962 the Wisconsin Supreme Court held that the state constitution prohibited the expenditure of public funds to transport children to parochial and private schools. State ex rel. Reynolds v. Nusbaum, 115 N.W.2d 761, 769–70 (Wis. 1962). Wisconsin voters responded by amending the constitution. In 1967 they added this language: “Transportation of school children. Nothing in this constitution shall prohibit the legislature from providing for the safety and welfare of children by providing for the transportation of children to and from any parochial or private school or institution of learning.” WIS. CONST. art. I, § 23. Acting on this new constitutional authority, the Wisconsin legislature immediately “elect[ed] to provide for the transportation of children to any parochial or private school by amending the existing statutes … to provide for transportation for students attending private or parochial schools and public schools upon a reasonably uniform basis.” Cartwright v. Sharpe, 162 N.W.2d 5, 8 (Wis. 1968) (emphasis added). The enabling legislation included an explicit state- 24 No. 18-1673 ment of statutory purpose: “The intent of this act is to pro- vide for the safety and welfare of children by providing for their transportation to and from public and private schools.” Ch. 68, § 1, 1967 Wis. Sess. Laws 144. To that end, the legislature amended the school- transportation statutes to require “every school board” to provide transportation to and from public and private schools for all students who reside in the district and live “2 miles or more” from their school. WIS. STAT. § 121.54(2)(a), (b) (mandating public and private school transportation on these terms). So school districts have a statutory duty to provide free transportation to and from school for all resi- dent children who live two miles or more from their school, whether public or private. School districts may of course provide more generous transportation service. The statutory scheme recognizes that school boards may elect to transport “all or some of the pupils” who reside in the district and live less than two miles from their school. Id. § 121.54(2)(c). If they choose to do so, however, they may not use different distance standards for public and private school students: “If transportation is provided for less than all such pupils[,] there shall be rea- sonable uniformity in the minimum distance that pupils attending public and private schools will be transported.” Id. The uniformity requirement is repeated in the subsection governing transportation to summer classes. School districts are permitted (but not required) to bus children to summer school, but “[i]f the school board provides transportation for less than all pupils, there shall be reasonable uniformity in the minimum and maximum distances pupils are transport- ed.” Id. § 121.54(4). No. 18-1673 25 Finally, and most relevant here, the transportation man- date excludes children who live in cities served by public transit systems. Id. § 121.54(1)(c). Under the so-called “city option,” school districts in cities with public transit service are not required to provide free student transportation. If they choose to do so, however, “there shall be reasonable uniformity in the transportation furnished to the pupils, whether they attend public or private schools.” Id. § 121.54(1)(b). In this way the “city option,” like the other transportation provisions, requires equal treatment of public and private school students. The 1967 legislation soon spawned litigation. In a key early case interpreting the new statutory scheme, the Wisconsin Supreme Court explained that “[t]he important change” ushered in by the constitutional amendment and enabling legislation “was to provide that where transporta- tion is furnished, either mandatory or permissive, it must be on a reasonably uniform basis to children attending either public or private schools.” Cartwright, 162 N.W.2d at 10–11. Put slightly differently, “[w]hat the constitutional amend- ment and enabling legislation accomplished was to provide that the same consideration of safety and welfare should apply to public and private students alike.” Id. at 11. * * * The Milwaukee Public School District (“MPS” or “the District”) qualifies for the city option. The District serves children in the City of Milwaukee, where public bus service (operated by the Milwaukee County Transit System) is available. MPS has chosen to provide free transportation service to some resident children and thus is bound by the 26 No. 18-1673 statutory obligation to treat public and private school stu- dents alike. MPS Administrative Policy 4.04 contains the District’s transportation regulations. Two features of the policy are at issue here. The first concerns the distance standards for determining eligibility for free transportation. The policy draws no distinction between public and private elementary- school students. Tracking the statutory mandate for noncity schools, MPS provides free transportation for public and private school students in grades K–8 who live “two miles or more” from their school. ADMINISTRATIVE POLICIES OF THE MILWAUKEE PUBLIC SCHOOLS, POLICY 4.04(2)(a)1., (b)1. (Nov. 12, 2014). The eligibility rules are different for students in grades 9– 12. MPS conditions free transportation service for high- school students on the two-mile rule plus an additional distance requirement. The District will transport only those high-school students who live “two miles or more” from their school and “more than one mile walking distance from public transportation.” Id. 4.04(2)(a)3., (b)2. So families of high-school students who live within one mile of a public transit stop must pay their own transportation costs. But MPS lifts this second condition for students who attend citywide public high schools or public high schools outside their neighborhood attendance area. Id. 4.04(5)(a)2., (b)2. In other words, students who attend public citywide high schools and live two miles or more from school get free transportation from the District regardless of their proximity to public transportation; their counterparts in private citywide high schools do not. The latter are ineligible for free No. 18-1673 27 transportation unless they live more than one mile from a public transit stop. Students at private schools are disadvantaged in another way. Milwaukee children who attend private schools (re- gardless of grade level) cannot receive transportation from MPS unless the private school “submits the names, grade levels, and location of eligible students no later than the third Friday of September.” Id. 4.04(2)(b)4. As my colleagues explain, in practice MPS requires private schools to submit their transportation rosters by July 1. Students who enroll after that date—whether later in the summer or after the school year has begun—are ineligible to receive transporta- tion service from MPS for that school year. The roster re- quirement and July 1 cutoff date apply only to private schools. Late and mid-year enrollees in the District’s own schools are not denied free transportation. * * * St. Joan Antida High School challenges these disparate transportation rules on behalf of itself and its students. St. Joan Antida is a private, all-girls high school in the City of Milwaukee with a citywide attendance area. That is, its students come from all over Milwaukee, not just the imme- diate neighborhood, so they are similarly situated in all material respects to students in public citywide high schools. Yet MPS treats them unequally for purposes of transporta- tion eligibility. They are denied free transportation if they live within one mile of a public transportation stop. MPS does not apply this extra distance requirement to their counterparts at public citywide high schools. This difference in treatment, the school argues, violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause. St. Joan Antida also 28 No. 18-1673 challenges the July 1 roster deadline, which operates as a cutoff date to receive transportation service but applies only to students in private schools. My colleagues conclude that the challenged rules do not burden a fundamental right and thus do not trigger strict scrutiny under prevailing equal-protection doctrine. I agree and have nothing to add to the analysis in Section IIA of the majority opinion. The challenged rules need only be ration- ally related to a legitimate governmental interest. This is a highly deferential standard. As the majority explains, under rational-basis review, (1) the challenged law enjoys a pre- sumption of validity; (2) the government’s actual reasons for adopting it do not matter; and (3) the fit between the gov- ernment’s means and its ends can be both hypothetical and very loose. In short, as long as some legitimate governmental purpose is conceivably in play and the law might rationally be thought to serve that purpose, the test is satisfied. It’s almost impossible to flunk this lenient standard. Even so, there is a legal baseline below which local laws may not fall and still be thought minimally rational for equal-protection purposes. If state law places persons in the same class and directs local governments to treat everyone in the class uniformly, local governments cannot discriminate on the very terms forbidden by state law and expect to survive rational-basis review. The Supreme Court explained and applied this principle in Allegheny. There the Court reviewed a tax-assessment method used by a West Virginia county that assessed property based on its purchase price when last sold and adjusted stale data on an ad hoc and sporadic basis to account for the passage of time. Allegheny, 488 U.S. at 338. In practice this assessment method produced No. 18-1673 29 “gross disparities in the assessed value of generally compa- rable property.” Id. State law, however, mandated that “taxation shall be equal and uniform throughout the State, and all property, both real and personal, shall be taxed in proportion to its value.” Id. (quoting W. VA. CONST. art. X, § 1). Affected property owners sued, claiming that the county’s assessment method violated their rights under the Equal Protection Clause. The county maintained that its assessment method was a rational way to measure “true current value” because it used actual sale prices plus periodic adjustments “[a]s those data grow stale.” Id. at 343. The Court disagreed, though it did “not intend to cast doubt upon the theoretical basis of such a scheme.” Id. “That two methods are used to assess property in the same class is, without more, of no constitutional moment. The Equal Protection Clause ‘applies only to taxation which in fact bears unequally on persons or proper- ty of the same class.’” Id. (quoting Charleston Fed. Savings & Loan Ass’n v. Alderson, 324 U.S. 182, 190 (1945) (collecting cases)). The factual predicate was easily established in Allegheny: “Petitioners’ property has been assessed at rough- ly 8 to 35 times more than comparable neighborhood proper- ty, and these discrepancies have continued for more than 10 years with little change.” Id. at 344. The Court continued: “The States, of course, have broad powers to impose and collect taxes … [and] may divide different kinds of property into classes and assign to each class a different tax burden so long as those divisions and burdens are reasonable.” Id. “But West Virginia has not drawn such a distinction. Its Constitution and laws provide that all property of the kind held by petitioners shall be 30 No. 18-1673 taxed at a rate uniform throughout the State according to its estimated market value.” Id. at 345. State law required reasonable uniformity, but the county’s assessment scheme “systematically produced dramatic differences in valuation” for similarly situated properties. Id. at 341. Because the valuation method consistently produced results that trans- gressed the state-law uniformity norm, it was not rationally related to a legitimate governmental purpose. Id. at 343–45. That is, state law negated any conceivable rational basis for the local discriminatory practice. The Court found an equal- protection violation. Id. at 346. As my colleagues observe, the Court later described Allegheny as “‘the rare case where the facts precluded’ any alternative reading of state law and thus any alternative rational basis” for the challenged local practice or rule. Armour v. City of Indianapolis, 566 U.S. 673, 687 (2012) (quot- ing Nordlinger, 505 U.S. at 16). In Armour homeowners sued the City of Indianapolis after it changed its method of fund- ing sewer projects. Indiana law required that “costs [for sewer improvements] be primarily apportioned equally among all abutting lands or lots.” IND. CODE § 36-9-39- 15(b)(3) (2011). Indianapolis did just that, though it gave homeowners the option to pay the special assessment all at once or in installments. Armour, 566 U.S. at 676–77. The City later abandoned that method in favor of a system that primarily relied on citywide bonds, spreading the cost across the entire municipal tax base. With this shift in policy, the City forgave any unpaid installments but did not refund homeowners who had already finished paying. Id. at 678–79. The Court held that the case did not implicate Allegheny. The statute required Indianapolis to apportion costs No. 18-1673 31 equally—which the City plainly had done—but state law said nothing about later forgiveness. The Court explained: “[T]he City followed state law by apportioning the cost of its [sewer] projects equally. State law says nothing about for- giveness, how to design a forgiveness program, or whether or when rational distinctions in doing so are permitted.” Id. at 687. That distinguished Armour from Allegheny. The Court characterized Allegheny as a “rare case” because it “involved a clear state law requirement clearly and dramatically violat- ed.” Id. Unlike my colleagues, I do not read this last sentence as materially changing Allegheny’s fundamental holding. True, the Court in Allegheny said that the county’s assessment method produced “dramatic differences in valuation,” but that statement was descriptive, not doctrinal. If Armour truly limits Allegheny to local rules or practices that “dramatically” depart from state law, we’d need some standard to distin- guish “dramatic” departures from those that are not. But Armour did not elaborate. On this point at least, I hesitate to read this passage from Armour as a doctrinal limitation on Allegheny. Perhaps it’s fair to read Armour as limiting Allegheny’s holding to clear violations of clear state uniformity man- dates. If so, we have that here. As I’ve explained, the school- transportation statutes say—again and again—that school districts must treat public and private school students reasonably equally when it comes to access to publicly funded transportation. Districts operating under the city option need not provide free school transportation to any resident children, but if they provide it to some, then the law requires “reasonable uniformity in the transportation fur- 32 No. 18-1673 nished to the pupils, whether they attend public or private schools.” § 121.54(1)(b). Put another way, if the city option were not in play, MPS would have a plain statutory duty to transport all students who live two miles or more from their school, whether public or private. § 121.54(2). But because public transit is readily available in Milwaukee, MPS may (1) provide no busing at all or (2) provide busing on equal terms to public and private school students. § 121.54(1)(b). MPS has chosen a third way. It provides transportation for students in public citywide high schools who satisfy the two-mile rule but not their counterparts in private citywide high schools. It has invoked the city option on discriminatory terms expressly forbidden by the statute. That’s an irrational policy choice as a matter of law. It’s true, as my colleagues point out, that § 121.54(1)(b) has not been the subject of much appellate litigation in the state courts. The Wisconsin Supreme Court has not had occasion to address its scope. In one case the state court of appeals concluded that the term “reasonable uniformity” in § 121.54(1)(b) is ambiguous. St. John Vianney Sch. v. Bd. of Educ. of Sch. Dist. of Janesville, 336 N.W.2d 387, 393 (Wis. Ct. App. 1983). The precise question in St. John Vianney was whether the uniformity mandate in § 121.54(1)(b) requires school districts to provide the same mode of transportation to public and private school students. More particularly, the plaintiffs argued that if the district provided so-called “yel- low school bus” service for students in public schools, then it had to provide “yellow school bus” service for students in private schools. Id. at 388–89. The court rejected that argu- ment. Reading § 121.54(1)(b) in the context of the statutory No. 18-1673 33 scheme as a whole, the court noted that the school- transportation code gives school boards the discretion to use any of five different modes of transportation to comply with their statutory obligations. See WIS. STAT. § 121.55. The court said: “It would be unreasonable to conclude that the ‘rea- sonable uniformity’ requirement of sec. 121.54(1) abrogates the board’s option to provide transportation by any of the methods expressly permitted under sec. 121.55.” St. John Vianney, 336 N.W.2d at 393. That was enough to decide the case, but the opinion con- tinues with some extensive dicta. The court went on to observe that “[t]he overall concern behind the school trans- portation statutes is the safety and welfare of pupils.” Id. Recognizing that “many factors affect … safety and welfare,” the court deduced from the broader statutory scheme that “[t]he distance a child lives from school is … the principal factor with which the statutes are concerned.” Id. Acknowl- edging that § 121.54(1)(b) “is silent regarding a distance standard in connection with the reasonable uniformity requirement,” the court read the statute to “prevent[] a school board from distinguishing for transportation purpos- es between public and private school pupils on the basis of the distance they live from school.” Id. at 394. On this under- standing, the court said that “whatever … distance standard the board chooses, the distance standard must be reasonably uniform in its application to public and private school pupils.” Id. The actual holding in St. John Vianney is limited. The court held only that the uniformity mandate in § 121.54(1)(b) does not require school districts to use identical modes of transportation for public and private school students. The 34 No. 18-1673 court’s extended discussion goes further, suggesting that whatever else the term “reasonable uniformity” may entail, at a minimum it prevents school districts from using differ- ent distance-from-school standards for public and private school students to determine their eligibility for free trans- portation. MPS’s one-mile rule is a materially similar dis- tance standard; high-school students who live within one mile of a public transit stop are ineligible for free transporta- tion to school. But the rule is discriminatory on its face: it applies only to students at private citywide high schools; students at public citywide high schools get free transporta- tion regardless of their proximity to public transit. On the reasoning of St. John Vianney, the statutory uniformity mandate forbids precisely this kind of discrimination by local school districts in the provision of free school transportation. A case decided four years before St. John Vianney sheds even more light on the scope and operation of the uniformity requirement. In Hahner v. Board of Education, a school district provided busing on almost uniform terms to public and private schools. The problem was that it routinely refused to bus students to certain Catholic schools that held classes during a week when other schools in the district (public and private) had spring break. 278 N.W.2d 474, 475–76 (Wis. Ct. App. 1979). As a result, a small number of students attend- ing Catholic schools did not receive busing for the entirety of their school year. Addressing the “reasonable uniformity doctrine” in the school-transportation code, 1 the court held that the district 1 Hahner does not specifically mention § 121.54(1)(b), but it relies on authorities that do. Hahner v. Bd. of Educ., 278 N.W.2d 474, 478–80 (Wis. No. 18-1673 35 did not have the discretion to deny transportation to Catholic school students when their schools were in session but the public schools were not. Id. at 478, 479–80. The opinion is significant for what it tells us about the dimen- sions of the reasonable-uniformity requirement: even a one- week denial of transportation to private school students is impermissible, as are deviations from the uniformity norm unrelated to student safety and welfare. Here is the key passage: The crucial question is whether a school board’s discretion in coordinating the schedul- ing of the transportation of pupils to public and private schools extends to not transporting pupils to private schools during a week when the public schools are closed for vacation. … [T]he purpose of coordinating these transpor- tation activities is “to insure the safety and wel- fare of the pupils” as provided in sec. 121.56, Stats. This court believes the objective of this requirement is to prevent discriminatory treatment of pupils attending private schools in the transportation provided them. The fact that the school district would save money by not trans- porting private school pupils during a week when the public schools are closed for vacation is a factor which bears no relationship to the safety and welfare of the pupils being transported to public schools. Id. at 479 (emphasis added). Ct. App. 1979) (citing Cartwright v. Sharpe, 162 N.W.2d 5, 10–11 (Wis. 1968), and 61 Wis. Op. Att’y Gen. 240, 241 (1972)). 36 No. 18-1673 Together, St. John Vianney and Hahner make clear that MPS’s discriminatory one-mile rule violates the statutory requirement of reasonable uniformity in the provision of free transportation to public and private school students. The challenged rule is unequal on its face and cannot be justified by reference to student safety and welfare, which are the only legitimate public-policy interests recognized by state law as justifications for school-transportation distinctions between public and private school students. Simply put, state law forbids MPS from making a policy choice to allo- cate free transportation on these unequal terms. MPS defends its discriminatory one-mile rule based on abstract goals of avoiding overcapacity in its neighborhood schools, expanding access to special programming, and saving money. My colleagues accept these justifications as rational reasons for discriminating against private school students. With respect, state law leaves no room for these possible policy justifications. The state legislature has de- creed a public policy of reasonably uniform treatment of public and private school students when it comes to free school transportation. School districts may not have different eligibility rules for public and private school students (ex- cept perhaps for safety and welfare reasons). Under clear state law, discriminating between public and private school students is not an available means to achieve other policy goals. Put somewhat differently, a local rule that defies the state-law uniformity command serves no legitimate govern- mental purpose. Like the county tax-assessment method in No. 18-1673 37 Allegheny, the MPS rule violates the Equal Protection Clause. 2 In reaching this conclusion, I do not purport to “speak for the Wisconsin courts” any more than the Supreme Court purported to “speak for the West Virginia courts” when it found an equal-protection violation in Allegheny. Majority Op. at p. 18. My conclusion simply recognizes that the statutory uniformity mandate removes the plausible policy justifications for this discriminatory local rule, which classi- fies students on the precise terms forbidden by statute. 3 2 In Racine Charter One, Inc. v. Racine Unified School District, we accepted a school district’s “cost” justification as a rational basis for not busing students to a charter school. 424 F.3d 677, 685–87 (7th Cir. 2005). I question that holding, which flatly contradicts Hahner. Racine Charter One held in the alternative that the charter school’s students were not similarly situated “to those students who do receive the busing benefit.” Id. at 683. I question that holding as well, but the case is perhaps distin- guishable from ours on that ground. 3 My colleagues say that I’ve gone too far because my analysis “draws on legislative history and potentially comparable lower-court decisions (like St. John Vianney).” Majority Op. at p. 18–19. That misunderstands Wisconsin’s approach to statutory interpretation and the constitutional status of the state court of appeals. Wisconsin has adopted a textualist method of statutory interpreta- tion that limits the use of legislative history. State ex rel. Kalal v. Circuit Court for Dane Cty., 681 N.W.2d 110, 124–26 (Wis. 2004). But statutory history is not the same as legislative history. Statutory History, BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY (10th ed. 2014) (“The enacted lineage of a statute, including prior laws, amendments, codifications, and repeals.”); Legisla- tive History, id. (“The proceedings leading to the enactment of a statute, including hearings, committee reports, and floor debates.”). Statutory history provides context for statutory terms and is an accepted part of Wisconsin’s textualist interpretive method. See County of Dane v. Labor & 38 No. 18-1673 For similar reasons, the District’s enforcement of the July 1 roster deadline violates the Equal Protection Clause. As I understand this claim, St. Joan Antida does not object to a general rule requiring private schools to submit a transpor- tation roster by a date certain. It challenges the District’s practice of denying free transportation to students who enroll after the deadline passes. Late and mid-year enrollees at public schools do not suffer the same fate. This policy, too, violates the state-law requirement of reasonable uniformity, leaving no rational basis for the discriminatory treatment. My understanding of this claim differs from the majori- ty’s in another way. St. Joan Antida challenges the enforce- ment of the roster policy as a general matter. The school seeks an injunction against the discriminatory denial of transportation to students who enroll in private school after Indus. Review Comm’n, 759 N.W.2d 571, 580 (Wis. 2009); Kalal, 681 N.W.2d at 126. The same is true of statements of purpose contained in the statutory text. Kalal, 681 N.W.2d at 125. Finally, Wisconsin’s approach to statutory interpretation reads statutory language “in the context in which it is used; not in isolation but as part of a whole; in relation to the language of surrounding or closely-related statutes; and reasonably, to avoid absurd or unreasonable results.” Id. at 124. Everything I’ve said here is consistent with Wisconsin law. Further, the state court of appeals, though divided into four districts, is a unitary court, and its published opinions are binding statewide precedent until “overrule[d], modif[ied,] or withdraw[n]” by the state supreme court. Cook v. Cook, 560 N.W.2d 246, 256 (Wis. 1997). My analysis draws on a seminal decision of the state supreme court (Cartwright) and two decisions of the court of appeals (St. John Vianney and Hahner). All three have binding statewide precedential effect. No. 18-1673 39 the July 1 deadline. St. Joan Antida also seeks damages; the monetary remedy is of course keyed to facts peculiar to the school and its students. But the parties have stipulated to damages. My colleagues share some of my concerns about the ra- tionality of this policy and remand for further clarification and development of this claim. As I see it, all that remains to be done on remand is to fashion an appropriate injunctive remedy and enter judgment granting injunctive and mone- tary relief. St. Joan Antida has explained that students who have not yet enrolled in private school by the July 1 deadline (and thus do not appear on a private school’s roster) are denied free transportation for the ensuing school year. Late and mid-year enrollees in the public schools are not. MPS has not denied that it enforces its July 1 roster policy in this way. In light of the statutory uniformity mandate, this discriminatory treatment cannot be justified as rationally related to a legitimate governmental interest. For these reasons, I would reverse and remand with in- structions to enter judgment for St. Joan Antida.