IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF IOWA
No. 19-0265
Filed April 3, 2019
IN THE INTEREST OF G.B.,
Minor Child,
M.B., Father,
Appellant.
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Appeal from the Iowa District Court for Dubuque County, Thomas J. Straka,
Associate Juvenile Judge.
A father appeals the termination of his parental rights. AFFIRMED.
Benjamin Hamel of Iowa Legal Aid, Dubuque, for appellant.
Thomas J. Miller, Attorney General, and Mary A. Triick, Assistant Attorney
General, for appellee State.
Patricia Reisen-Ottavi, Dubuque, guardian ad litem for minor child.
Considered by Doyle, P.J., Mullins, J., and Mahan, S.J.*
*Senior judge assigned by order pursuant to Iowa Code section 602.9206 (2019).
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MAHAN, Senior Judge.
A father appeals the termination of his parental rights in his son, G.B., born
in 2018. He contends the district court erred in denying his request for additional
time to work toward reunification, termination is not in the child’s best interest, and
his bond with G.B. should preclude termination.
I. Background Facts and Proceedings
This family most recently came to the attention of the department of human
services in June 2018 when the mother passed out while caring for B.G. and
required emergency medical attention. She subsequently tested positive for
methamphetamine. As a result, G.B. was removed from the mother’s care.
Because the father admitted to recent methamphetamine use, the child could not
be placed with him. The juvenile court adjudicated G.B. a child in need of
assistance.
Initially, the father did not participate in services. He was jailed from July to
November 2018. Following release, the father began a substance-abuse program
and completed seven supervised visits with G.B. in November and December.
However, his visitation became sporadic by mid-December.
The State petitioned to terminate the parents’ parental rights to G.B. in
December. By early January 2019, the father was back in jail and tested positive
for methamphetamine. Following a hearing, the juvenile court granted the petition
to terminate parental rights pursuant to Iowa Code section 232.116(1)(g), (h), and
(l) (2018). The father appeals.1
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The mother’s appeal was dismissed as untimely.
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II. Scope and Standard of Review
Our review is de novo. See In re M.W., 876 N.W.2d 212, 219 (Iowa 2016).
We are not bound by the juvenile court’s factual findings, but we give them weight,
especially when witness credibility is critical to the outcome. See id. Proof must
be clear and convincing, meaning there are no “serious or substantial doubts as to
the correctness [of] conclusions of law drawn from the evidence.” In re D.W., 791
N.W.2d 703, 706 (Iowa 2010). “[R]eview of termination of parental rights under
Iowa Code chapter 232 is a three-step analysis.” M.W., 876 N.W.2d at 219. First,
we determine if “any ground for termination under section 232.116(1) has been
established.” Id. If a statutory ground authorizing termination has been
established, then we consider whether termination in is the child’s best interest.
See id. at 219–20. “Finally, if we do find that the statutory best-interest framework
supports the termination of parental rights, we consider whether any exceptions in
section 232.116(3) apply to preclude termination of parental rights.” Id. at 220.
III. Discussion
The father does not challenge the statutory grounds authorizing termination.
As a result, we need not discuss that issue. See Iowa R. App. P. 6.903(2)(g)(3);
In re P.L., 778 N.W.2d 33, 40 (Iowa 2010). We affirm termination of his parental
rights under paragraphs 232.116(1)(g), (h), and (l).
The father claims the juvenile court erred in denying his request for an
additional six months to work toward reunification. The court may defer termination
if “specific factors, conditions, or expected behavioral changes which comprise the
basis for the determination that the need for removal of the child from the child’s
home will no longer exist at the end of [an] additional six-month period.” Iowa Code
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§ 232.104(2)(b). A review of the record reveals no specific factor, condition, or
behavioral change that the juvenile court could have relied upon to grant an
extension. The father’s insistence that he will complete substance-abuse
treatment and seek mental-health treatment do not provide adequate support for
an extension of time. He admitted to previously failing to complete substance-
abuse treatment at least five times and summarized his inconsistent past mental-
health treatment at the termination hearing. As a result, we have no reason to
believe any concrete changes will occur in the next six months to eliminate the
need for removal. See In re A.A.G., 708 N.W.2d 85, 93 (Iowa Ct. App. 2005)
(concluding uncertainty regarding a parent’s sobriety weighed against granting an
additional six months to work toward reunification).
The father claims termination is not in G.B.’s best interest. We “give primary
consideration to the child’s safety, to the best placement for furthering the long-
term nurturing and growth of the child, and to the physical, mental, and emotional
condition and needs of the child.” Iowa Code § 232.116(2). When making a best-
interest determination, “we look to the parents’ past performance because it may
indicate the quality of care the parent is capable of providing in the future.” In re
J.E., 723 N.W.2d 793, 798 (Iowa 2006) (quoting In re C.K., 558 N.W.2d 170, 172
(Iowa 1997)); accord In re C.B., 611 N.W.2d 489, 495 (Iowa 2000) (“Insight for the
determination of the child’s long-range best interests can be gleaned from
‘evidence of the parent’s past performance for that performance may be indicative
of the quality of the future care that parent is capable of providing.’” (citation
omitted)).
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G.B. and the father have had limited interaction over the course of the
child’s life due to the father’s incarceration and continued drug abuse. The father
does not possess the skills necessary to parent; for example, he lacks insight
regarding basic child safety and how to feed the child. We also note G.B. is
developing well in his pre-adoptive foster home. On de novo review, we conclude
termination of the father’s parental rights is in G.B.’s best interest.
Section 232.116(3) provides statutory exceptions to termination. In certain
instances, a strong parent-child bond may preclude termination. See Iowa Code
§ 232.116(3)(c). The father contends termination would ignore his bond with the
child. However, we find no significant bond between parent and child here to
preclude termination, particularly due to G.B.’s young age. See In re A.M., 843
N.W.2d 100, 113 (Iowa 2014). We also find no other statutory exception provided
for in section 232.116(3) applicable here. See M.W., 876 N.W.2d at 225 (noting
the statutory exceptions to termination are “permissive not mandatory”).
IV. Conclusion
We affirm the termination of the father’s parental rights.
AFFIRMED.