This opinion was
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IN CLERKS OFFICE
filed for record
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COURT,StXIE CF WIvaiSIQTOM
A APP n n ?ni(t Ptisan L. Carlson
'Supreme Court Clerk
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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE STATE OF WASHINGTON
STATE OF WASHINGTON,
No. 95814-9
Respondent,
V. En Banc
JEREMIAH JAMES GILBERT,
Petitioner.
Filed APR 0 4 2019
JOHNSON,J.—This case concerns the scope of discretion a judge has in
resentencing pursuant toRCW 10.95.035. In 1992, when Jeremiah Gilbert was a
juvenile, he was charged and convicted of aggravated murder, premeditated
murder, and multiple other crimes. He was sentenced to life without parole for the
aggravated murder along with a consecutive sentence for the premeditated murder,
as required under the laws in effect at that time. When ROW 10.95.035 was
enacted, Gilbert became entitled to a new sentencing hearing. During his
resentencing, Gilbert argued that the judge should restructure his two sentences
such that they would run concurrently. However, the judge ruled that he lacked
State V. Gilbert, No. 95814-9
Statutory authority to address anything other than Gilbert's sentence for aggravated
murder and imposed a sentence of25 years to life, leaving intact the consecutive
sentence of280 months for the premeditated murder conviction. The Court of
Appeals affirmed. We reverse and remand for resentencing.
FACTS
When Gilbert was 15, he murdered two men and attempted to murder a
third. He and a companion had run away from home,journeying on foot to
Klickitat County, where they attempted to steal a Ford Bronco owned by Farrell
Harris. Harris, who was hunting nearby, returned and tried to halt the thefl;
however, Gilbert opened fire on him with a rifle. Harris was able to retreat to the
woods where he found cover. Robert Gresham came upon the scene on a
motorcycle shortly after and stopped. Gilbert shot Gresham twice in the shoulder
and then proceeded to shoot him in the head, killing Gresham. Another person,
Loren Evans, approached the scene in his truck, and Gilbert shot him in the head
through the windshield, instantly killing him. The two young men disabled the
Bronco they had been trying to steal and left in Evans's truck. Harris was able to
drive Gresham's motorcycle to a nearby home, and he alerted law enforcement,
who were able to apprehend Gilbert and his companion soon after.
The State charged Gilbert in adult court with six offenses: first degree
murder of Gresham, aggravated first degree murder of Evans, second degree
State V. Gilbert, No. 95814-9
assault, first degree burglary, first degree theft, and first degree robbery. The jury
convicted him on all charges and Gilbert was sentenced to life in prison without
parole for the aggravated first degree murder conviction along with a consecutive
sentence of 280 months for first degree murder. The sentences for the remaining
four convictions were to run concurrent with the aggravated murder sentence.
Following the United States Supreme Court's decision in Miller v. Alabama,
567 U.S. 460, 132 S. Ct. 2455, 183 L. Ed. 2d 407(2012), Washington amended
ROW 10.95.030 and enacted RCW 10.95.035, eliminating mandatory sentences of
life without parole for juvenile offenders and requiring resentencing for those who
had previously received such sentences. In accordance with the new and amended
statutes, the trial court held a resentencing hearing for Gilbert on September 21,
2015. Defense counsel argued for the court to go beyond merely adjusting
Gilbert's sentence of life without parole and to restructure his first degree murder
sentence such that it would run concuiTently. However, the judge rejected this
argument, holding that he lacked the authority to do anything other than adjust the
sentence for aggravated murder. The court imposed a sentence of 25 years to life
for aggravated murder and left intact the 280 month consecutive sentence for first
degree murder. Gilbert appealed, and the Court of Appeals affirmed his sentence.
State V. Gilbert, No. 33794-4-III(Wash. Ct. App. Apr. 3, 2018)(unpublished),
https://www.courts.wa.gov/opinions/pdf/337944_unp.pdf.
State V. Gilbert, No. 95814-9
Gilbert petitioned this court, and we granted review.' State v. Gilbert, 191
Wn.2d 1012, 426 P.3d 735 (2018).
ISSUE
Whether a judge performing a resentencing pursuant to RCW 10.95.035 has
discretion to impose an exceptional downward sentence.
ANALYSIS
In 2005,the United States Supreme Court decided Roper v. Simmons, in
which it held,"The Eighth and Fourteenth Amendments forbid imposition of the
death penalty on offenders who were under the age of 18 when their crimes were
committed." 543 U.S. 551, 578, 125 S. Ct. 1183, 161 L. Ed. 2d 1 (2005). Then, in
2010, the Court held that the United States Constitution also forbids the imposition
of life without parole on a juvenile offender who did not commit homicide.
Graham v. Florida, 560 U.S. 48, 82, 130 S. Ct. 2011, 176 L. Ed. 2d 825 (2010).
Finally, in 2012, the Court decided Miller, in which it expanded on Graham,
holding it unconstitutional to require a life without parole sentence on a juvenile
offender for any crime. The Court did not completely foreclose life sentences for
juvenile offenders, but it held that at the very least, courts must have the
'Gilbert challenged his resentencing in a direct appeal to the Court of Appeals and then
to this court. Because the State did not raise the issue of whether a direct appeal is the proper
method for challenging the resentencing, we do not address it. See RCW 10.95.035(3).
State V. Gilbert, No. 95814-9
opportunity to consider mitigating circumstances of youth before imposing a life
without parole sentence. Miller, 567 U.S. 460.
The Washington Legislature responded to Miller by enacting Second
Substitute Senate Bill 5064, 63d Leg., Reg. Sess.(Wash. 2014)(SSSB 5064). The
bill amended RCW 10.95.030, the sentencing statute for aggravated first degree
murder, to eliminate mandatory life sentences for juvenile offenders and, instead,
establish mandatory minimum sentences of at least 25 years with a maximum
sentence of life in prison. The bill also created RCW 10.95.035, which required
resentencing for any juvenile offender sentenced to life without parole prior to
passage of SSSB 5064. The statute requires resentencing of these offenders to be
performed consistent with the amended RCW 10.95.030. Finally, the bill enacted
RCW 9.94A.730, which allows most juvenile offenders to petition for release once
they have served 20 years in prison.^
Under RCW 10.95.035, Gilbert was entitled to a resentencing hearing. At
the resentencing hearing, defense counsel argued that aside from adjusting his
aggravated murder sentence, the court should restructure Gilbert's sentences such
that they would run concurrently. The State argued that the only issue before the
court was adjusting the minimum term for Gilbert's aggravated murder conviction
^ We requested supplemental briefing on the applicability of RCW 9.94A.730 to Gilbert's
sentence. Both parties seem to agree the statute does not apply, so we do not address it.
State V. Gilbert, No. 95814-9
because the statute "did not include authority . . . that allows the court to reconsider
the concurrent/consecutive nature of the sentences." Clerk's Papers at 29. The
State also asserted that even if the court revisited the issue of consecutive or
concurrent sentences, ROW 9.94A.589 required consecutive sentences because
Gilbert's crimes involved two or more serious violent offenses arising from
separate and distinct criminal conduct. The court adopted the State's argument in
toto, agreeing with its analysis ofthe law and the statute. Report ofProceedings at
20;
Gilbert argued to the Court of Appeals that the resentencing judge erred in
this determination and that the judge did have discretion to consider an exceptional
downward sentence. The Court of Appeals rejected this argument and affirmed his
sentence. The court held that reconsideration of the other sentences is not part of
RCW 10.95.035 and that the only issues presented in the resentencing were those
related to the aggravated murder sentence. The court recognized that our recent
holding in State v. HoMston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d 1, 391 P.3d 409(2017), may
entitle Gilbert to consideration of an exceptional sentence; however, it held that
such relief would be available to him only through a timely personal restraint
petition. Gilbert, No. 33794-4-III, slip op. at 8. This conclusion mischaracterizes
Houston-Sconiers and misreads the statutory resentencing requirements under
RCW 10.95.035 and .030.
State V. Gilbert, No. 95814-9
In Houston-Sconiers, we recognized the discretion a judge possesses during
juvenile sentencing when, similar to Gilbert's case, mandatory firearm
enhancements were required by statute to be served consecutively. In that case,
during sentencing the judge expressed frustration at being unable to impose an
exceptional downward sentence to avoid consecutive sentences. We disagreed
with the judge's conclusion that he lacked such discretion and reversed, remanding
for resentencing and holding that sentencing courts must account for the mitigating
qualities of youth and have absolute discretion to consider an exceptional
downward sentence in light of such mitigating factors. We held that sentencing
courts possess this discretion to consider downward sentences for juvenile
offenders regardless of any sentencing provision to the contrary. Houston-
Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d at 21.
Although Houston-Sconiers did not involve a resentencing under RCW
10.95.035, it did address and resolve the discretion judges have in sentencing for
crimes committed by juveniles and, important to the issue here, the discretion to
consider exceptional sentencing even where statutes would otherwise limit it. Our
opinion in that case cannot be read as confined to the firearm enhancement statutes
as it went so far as to question any statute that acts to limit consideration ofthe
mitigating factors of youth during sentencing. Nor can it be read as confined to, or
excluding, certain types of sentencing hearings as we held that the courts have
7
State V. Gilbert, No. 95814-9
discretion to impose downward sentences "regardless of how the juvenile got
there." Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d at 9.
Thus, even if the resentencing court here was correct in its conclusion that
RCW 10.95.035, on its face, limits the scope of a resentencing hearing to merely
adjusting aggravated murder sentences—it was, nevertheless, required to consider
Gilbert's youth as a mitigating factor and had discretion to impose a downward
sentence. RCW 10.95.035 cannot act to limit that discretion.
We also recognized that the court must consider the mitigating
circumstances related to the defendant's youth, including, but not limited to, the
juvenile's immaturity, impetuosity, and failure to appreciate risks and
consequences—the nature of the juvenile's surrounding environment and family
circumstances, the extent of the juvenile's participation in the crime, the way
familial and peer pressures may have affected him or her, how youth impacted any
legal defense, and any factors suggesting that the juvenile might be successfully
rehabilitated. Houston-Sconiers, 188 Wn.2d at 23 (quoting and citing Mz7/er, 567
U.S. at 477.)
The sentencing court should consider these circumstances, the convictions at
issue, the standard sentencing ranges, and any other relevant factors—and should
then determine whether to impose an exceptional sentence, taking care to
thoroughly explain its reasoning. "While formal written findings of fact and
State V. Gilbert, No. 95814-9
conclusions of law are not strictly required, they are always preferable to ensure
that the relevant considerations have been made and to facilitate appellate review."
State V. Ramos, 187 Wn.2d 420, 444, 387 P.3d 650, cert, denied, 138 S. Ct. 467
(2017).^ If, after considering such factors, the trial court does find an exceptional
sentence is warranted, it may adjust the standard sentence to provide for a reduced
term of years, for concurrent rather than consecutive sentences, or for both.
Because the judge presiding over Gilbert's resentencing believed he did not
have discretion to consider anything other than an adjustment to the aggravated
murder sentence, he did not consider whether the mitigating factors of Gilbert's
youth might warrant an exceptional sentence. We hold this to be error. Gilbert
was entitled at his resentencing to consideration of an exceptional sentence in light
of the potential mitigating factors of youth. Therefore, we reverse and remand for
^ In Ramos, we confronted the issue of what procedures are required before sentencing a
juvenile offender to a sentence that is the functional equivalent of life without parole. The trial
court that sentenced Ramos followed procedures closely mirroring those we have outlined here
and in Houston-Sconiers, and we held this to be adequate to uphold the sentence imposed by the
court. Ramos, 187 Wn.2d at 450-53.
State V. Gilbert, No. 95814-9
resentencing.^
WE CONCUR:
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Gilbert also sought relief on claims that he faces an unconstitutional de facto life
sentence and that his sentence constitutes an equal protection violation. Because we reverse and
remand for resentencing, we do not reach these claims.
10