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NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
D.D. : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee :
:
v. :
:
A.R.D. :
:
Appellant : No. 1552 WDA 2018
Appeal from the Order Entered September 28, 2018
in the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County
Domestic Relations at No(s): 4712 GN 2005
BEFORE: PANELLA, P.J., NICHOLS, J. and STRASSBURGER, J.*
MEMORANDUM BY STRASSBURGER, J. FILED APRIL 08, 2019
A.R.D. (Mother) appeals from the order entered September 28, 2018,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Blair County, which reinstated a prior child
custody order entered January 20, 2017. The prior order awarded primary
physical custody of her son, S.D.D. (Child), born in August 2003, to D.D.
(Father) during the school year. The order also awarded primary physical
custody of Child to Mother during his summer break from school and awarded
shared legal custody to both parties. Upon review, we affirm.
Mother and Father are former spouses, who separated in approximately
2005 and divorced in 2007. They had two children during the marriage: Child
and his adult brother, S.T.D. In 2012, Mother married S.R. (Stepfather). Prior
to the instant proceedings, the parties exercised custody of Child pursuant to
an order entered January 15, 2015, which granted Mother’s request to
relocate to Florida and awarded her primary physical custody of Child during
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* Retired Senior Judge assigned to the Superior Court.
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the school year. The order awarded partial physical custody to Father for one
weekend each month. In addition, the order awarded partial physical custody
to Father every time Child had four or more consecutive days off from school
and every time Child traveled to Blair County. The order awarded shared legal
custody to the parties.
Father filed a petition to modify custody on April 13, 2016, in which he
requested primary physical custody of Child during the school year. Therein,
he averred that Child had not adjusted well to residing in Florida and wanted
to return to Pennsylvania. The court1 conducted a hearing on November 29,
2016, during which it first heard testimony from Father. Father testified that
he was pursuing primary physical custody “because [Child] tells me he wants
to be happy. It’s not between [Mother] or I [sic]; it’s for [Child’s] happiness.”
N.T., 11/29/2016, at 14. Father acknowledged that he had encouraged Child
to express his unhappiness to Mother and to Child’s therapist. Id. at 12.
Father also complained that Mother had failed to involve him in, or keep him
informed of, the important events in Child’s life. For example, he testified that
Mother enrolled Child in a new school and began taking Child to a therapist
without discussing the matter with him first. Id. at 11.
Of particular relevance to this appeal, Mother’s counsel cross-examined
Father extensively about a series of text messages that he exchanged with
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1 For reasons that will become clear infra, we note that the Honorable Daniel
J. Milliron presided over the prior custody proceedings and entered the
January 15, 2015 order. The Honorable Elizabeth A. Doyle presided over the
November 29, 2016 hearing and the proceedings that followed.
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Child. In one such message, Father encouraged Child to tell his therapist that
he wanted to return to Pennsylvania. Id. at 28. Father insisted that he made
these statements because he “just wanted [Child] to express himself.” Id.
In another message, Father stated to Child that he would “go to pre-trial
Friday. That’s where they give you a trial date. I might end up in jail because
if it isn’t soon, I’m going to go nuts.” Id. at 31. Father explained that this
statement was merely a joke and that Child responded “Ha-ha” before the two
of them began discussing baseball. Id. at 31, 58. Finally, Counsel questioned
Father about a message he sent encouraging Child to “hang in there and stay
strong.” Id. at 32. Counsel suggested that Father made the statement to
imply to Child that “Florida is so terrible that you need to hang in there[.]”
Id. Father denied this, stating that he merely intended his statement to be
“a goodbye or see you later.” Id. at 33.
The trial court next heard testimony from Mother. Mother testified that
Child has a number of friends in Florida and that he is doing well academically.
Id. at 73-78. However, she acknowledged that Child is unhappy when he
returns to Florida from Pennsylvania. She stated, “when he comes back …
he’s very distraught … [B]ut then once we get back into our life there and
school activities, he’s back to normal.” Id. at 95. Mother explained that the
situation “makes me very sad because … he’s blaming me for his happiness
because I’m not changing my mind on where he should be.” Id. at 99. She
insisted that it would serve Child’s best interest to remain in her primary
physical custody during the school year “[j]ust for his everyday day-to-day
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activities, you know, a two parent household, you know, we share duties,
academics. I’m really concerned with that one.” Id. Significantly, Mother
conceded that she had failed to inform Father that she and Child moved into
a new residence in Florida “until after we literally moved into the home.” Id.
at 79. Likewise, she did not inform Father that she would be enrolling Child
in therapy until after she had already “[s]et it up.” Id. at 111.
Finally, the trial court interviewed Child, who was thirteen at the time of
the hearing. Child explained that he dislikes living in Florida because “I don’t
have much [sic] friends. I don’t go outside as much because there’s hardly
any people around to do stuff with.” N.T., 11/29/2016 (Child Interview), at
16. He stated that he prefers Pennsylvania because “I can go outside where
there’s [sic] more outside activities, more family, more friends.” Id. at 17.
Child also explained that he does not like Stepfather. Id. at 6. He reported
that Stepfather “argues with [Mother]. Then he calls [Mother] names and he
really doesn’t take me any places, I guess. He bought me fishing rods and
then he never took me fishing.” Id. at 7. Child stated that Stepfather makes
fun of his friend’s speech impediment and even makes fun of Father “because
he stutters sometimes.” Id. at 31. When the trial court asked Child which
parent he believed was more involved in his education, Child replied,
I really --- I think my dad because my mom and [Stepfather], like,
I have homework and they really don’t help me with it, I guess,
because I just do my homework in my room and they kind of ---
they really don’t go over it and my dad will --- I always did
homework with him so he could check over it and stuff.
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Id. at 10. Child acknowledged that he last did his homework with Father prior
to Mother’s relocation to Florida. Id. at 10-11.
On January 20, 2017, the trial court entered an order awarding primary
physical custody of Child to Father during the school year. 2 The order awarded
Mother partial physical custody every time Child has four or more consecutive
days off from school and every time she travels to Blair County. During the
summer of 2017, the order awarded physical custody of Child to Mother from
July 1, 2017, until August 5, 2017. During the summer of 2018 and following,
the order awarded physical custody of Child to Mother from one week after
school ends in June until the beginning of the second or third3 week in August.
The order awarded shared legal custody to the parties.
On February 15, 2017, Mother filed an emergency petition for special
relief, in which she averred that Child had been untruthful during his interview
with the trial court on November 29, 2016. The court treated Mother’s petition
as a motion for reconsideration, which it granted. A hearing took place on
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2 In its order, the trial court stated that it was awarding Father “residential
custody” of Child. Order, 1/20/2017, at 1. We note that “residential custody”
is not a permissible custody award pursuant to our child custody statute. See
23 Pa.C.S. § 5323(a) (enumerating the types of custody awards). Therefore,
we characterize the court’s award as an award of primary physical custody
during the school year.
3 The order appears to contain a typographical error, as it states that Mother
“shall have [Child] for June-July, and the first two weeks in August … and will
return [Child] back to Father at the end of the first week in August.” Order,
1/20/2017, at 2.
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June 22, 2017, during which the court interviewed Child for a second time.
Child reported that he was enjoying his time in Pennsylvania. N.T., 6/22/2017
(Child Interview), at 3, 7. He informed the court that he was making more
friends in Florida and that his relationship with Stepfather was improving. Id.
at 7-8. Nonetheless, he confirmed that he still wanted to attend school in
Pennsylvania starting in the fall. Id. at 5. Child also confirmed that he was
being honest during his previous interview and that he did not have anything
new or different that he wanted to say. Id. at 2. On June 23, 2017, the court
entered an order explaining that it would make “no alteration to its previous
order” of January 20, 2017. Order, 6/23/2017. Mother timely filed a notice
of appeal on July 21, 2017, as well as a concise statement of errors complained
of on appeal.
On July 26, 2017, Mother filed an application for stay, in which she
requested that the trial court stay its award of primary physical custody to
Father during the school year while her appeal remained pending. Mother
averred that she was likely to prevail on appeal and that Child should remain
with her so that he can continue in his established residential and educational
setting. She also averred that the court acted improperly by denying her
request to present her own additional testimony during the reconsideration
proceeding on June 22, 2017. The court entered an order on July 28, 2017,
stating that it was “reopening the record on the Motion for Reconsideration to
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schedule testimony of [M]other for 1 hour” but denying all other relief. Order,
7/28/2017.
The trial court heard testimony from Mother via telephone on August
10, 2017. In an effort to refute Child’s statements during his interview on
November 29, 2016, Mother testified that he has numerous friends in Florida
and that she and Stepfather help him with his homework. N.T., 8/10/2017,
at 11-12, 15-16. Mother further testified that the court’s January 20, 2017
custody order left Child intensely distraught. Id. at 9. She stated that Child
“basically cried all night” after learning of the order and refused to speak to
Father for three days. Id. Thereafter, on August 14, 2017, the court entered
an opinion and order denying Mother’s petition for special relief.4 The court
entered a separate opinion and order on the same day discussing the custody
relocation factors set forth at 23 Pa.C.S. § 5337(h). The court analyzed the
factors in response to Mother’s July 21, 2017 concise statement, and her July
26, 2017 application for stay, in which she averred that the court erred by
failing to do so before entering its order of January 20, 2017. Mother filed an
additional notice of appeal and concise statement of errors complained of on
appeal on August 23, 2017.
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4The trial court stated on the record that it denied the application for stay.
N.T., 8/10/2017, at 1, 21.
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While both of Mother’s appeals remained pending, she filed a petition
for special relief on December 1, 2017, in which she averred that Child’s school
performance was beginning to deteriorate.5 In response, Father filed a motion
to quash/motion for sanctions on December 4, 2017, in which he argued that
the trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant special relief due to Mother’s appeals
and requested reimbursement of his counsel fees. On December 8, 2017, the
court entered an order canceling the hearing it had scheduled on Mother’s
petition, but it did not address Father’s request for counsel fees.
On January 4, 2018, a prior panel of this Court vacated the trial court’s
January 20, 2017 order, due to the court’s failure to analyze the subsection
5337(h) relocation factors. D.D. v. A.R.(D.), 183 A.3d 1036 (Pa. Super.
2018) (unpublished memorandum at 1, 7-8). The panel explained that it was
necessary for the court to consider the relevant 5337(h) factors, even though
neither parent was requesting relocation, because Child stood to move a long
distance. Id. (unpublished memorandum at 7). The panel acknowledged that
the court had already considered the factors in its opinion of August 14, 2017,
but concluded that the court’s analysis was not sufficient because it failed to
conduct the analysis at or near the time it issued its decision. Id. (unpublished
memorandum at 7 n.8). The panel quashed Mother’s appeal from the order
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5 Per the trial court’s January 20, 2017 order, Father was awarded primary
custody of Child beginning on August 5, 2017. Child arrived and began
residing with Father on August 6, 2017 and shortly thereafter, began
attending school in Pennsylvania.
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entered August 14, 2017, reasoning that the trial court lacked jurisdiction to
enter the order, rendering it a legal nullity. Id. (unpublished memorandum
at 2, 5-6).
Subsequently, on January 22, 2018, the trial court entered an opinion
and order discussing the subsection 5337(h) relocation factors and the best
interest factors set forth at 23 Pa.C.S. § 5328(a). The court issued another
opinion and order discussing the factors on February 21, 2018, stating that it
entered its previous opinion and order in error because it did not receive the
record on remand until February 15, 2018. Mother filed a notice of appeal
and concise statement of errors complained of on appeal on March 19, 2018.
On March 26, 2018, this Court received a letter from the trial court, indicating
that it had failed inadvertently to discuss the custody relocation factor set
forth at subsection 5337(h)(5) and requesting that this Court remand the
matter so that it could conduct its analysis. On April 18, 2018, this Court
entered an order vacating the trial court’s opinion and order of February 21,
2018, and remanding the case.
Finally, on August 27, 2018, the trial court issued an opinion discussing
subsection 5337(h)(5), followed by an opinion addressing all of the relocation
factors and the subsection 5328(a) factors together on September 14, 2018.
In an order entered on September 28, 2018, the court indicated that it had
reconsidered the matter in light of subsection 5337(h)(5), and that it would
serve Child’s best interests to reinstate the order of January 20, 2017 granting
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Father primary custody of Child. The court issued an opinion in support of its
order, in which it once again discussed the subsection 5337(h) and subsection
5328(a) factors. Mother timely filed a notice of appeal on October 26, 2018,
along with a concise statement of errors complained of on appeal.
On appeal, Mother presents several issues for our review, all of which
involve the trial court’s consideration of the custody and relocation factors, as
well as the court’s ultimate finding that Father should have primary custody
of Child during the school year. We review Mother’s claims in accordance with
our well-settled standard of review.
In reviewing a custody order, our scope is of the broadest type
and our standard is abuse of discretion. We must accept findings
of the trial court that are supported by competent evidence of
record, as our role does not include making independent factual
determinations. In addition, with regard to issues of credibility
and weight of the evidence, we must defer to the presiding trial
judge who viewed and assessed the witnesses first-hand.
However, we are not bound by the trial court’s deductions or
inferences from its factual findings. Ultimately, the test is whether
the trial court’s conclusions are unreasonable as shown by the
evidence of record. We may reject the conclusions of the trial
court only if they involve an error of law, or are unreasonable in
light of the sustainable findings of the trial court.
V.B. v. J.E.B., 55 A.3d 1193, 1197 (Pa. Super. 2012) (citations omitted).
When a trial court makes an award of custody, the best interest of the
child is paramount. S.W.D. v. S.A.R., 96 A.3d 396, 400 (Pa. Super. 2014).
The factors that a court must consider when awarding custody are set forth
at subsection 5328(a):
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(a) Factors.--In ordering any form of custody, the court shall
determine the best interest of the child by considering all relevant
factors, giving weighted consideration to those factors which
affect the safety of the child, including the following:
(1) Which party is more likely to encourage and permit
frequent and continuing contact between the child and
another party.
(2) The present and past abuse committed by a party
or member of the party’s household, whether there is
a continued risk of harm to the child or an abused
party and which party can better provide adequate
physical safeguards and supervision of the child.
(2.1) The information set forth in section 5329.1(a)
(relating to consideration of child abuse and
involvement with protective services).
(3) The parental duties performed by each party on
behalf of the child.
(4) The need for stability and continuity in the child’s
education, family life and community life.
(5) The availability of extended family.
(6) The child’s sibling relationships.
(7) The well-reasoned preference of the child, based
on the child’s maturity and judgment.
(8) The attempts of a parent to turn the child against
the other parent, except in cases of domestic violence
where reasonable safety measures are necessary to
protect the child from harm.
(9) Which party is more likely to maintain a loving,
stable, consistent and nurturing relationship with the
child adequate for the child’s emotional needs.
(10) Which party is more likely to attend to the daily
physical, emotional, developmental, educational and
special needs of the child.
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(11) The proximity of the residences of the parties.
(12) Each party’s availability to care for the child or
ability to make appropriate child-care arrangements.
(13) The level of conflict between the parties and the
willingness and ability of the parties to cooperate with
one another. A party’s effort to protect a child from
abuse by another party is not evidence of
unwillingness or inability to cooperate with that party.
(14) The history of drug or alcohol abuse of a party or
member of a party’s household.
(15) The mental and physical condition of a party or
member of a party’s household.
(16) Any other relevant factor.
23 Pa.C.S. § 5328(a).
Further, our custody statute sets forth the subsection 5337(h) relocation
factors as follows.
(h) Relocation factors.--In determining whether to grant a
proposed relocation, the court shall consider the following factors,
giving weighted consideration to those factors which affect the
safety of the child:
(1) The nature, quality, extent of involvement and
duration of the child’s relationship with the party
proposing to relocate and with the nonrelocating
party, siblings and other significant persons in the
child’s life.
(2) The age, developmental stage, needs of the child
and the likely impact the relocation will have on the
child’s physical, educational and emotional
development, taking into consideration any special
needs of the child.
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(3) The feasibility of preserving the relationship
between the nonrelocating party and the child through
suitable custody arrangements, considering the
logistics and financial circumstances of the parties.
(4) The child’s preference, taking into consideration
the age and maturity of the child.
(5) Whether there is an established pattern of conduct
of either party to promote or thwart the relationship
of the child and the other party.
(6) Whether the relocation will enhance the general
quality of life for the party seeking the relocation,
including, but not limited to, financial or emotional
benefit or educational opportunity.
(7) Whether the relocation will enhance the general
quality of life for the child, including, but not limited
to, financial or emotional benefit or educational
opportunity.
(8) The reasons and motivation of each party for
seeking or opposing the relocation.
(9) The present and past abuse committed by a party
or member of the party’s household and whether
there is a continued risk of harm to the child or an
abused party.
(10) Any other factor affecting the best interest of the
child.
23 Pa.C.S. § 5337(h).
Instantly, in its opinion of September 28, 2018, the trial court provided
a thorough analysis of both the subsection 5328(a) and 5337(h) factors. 6 In
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6The trial court did not analyze separately subsection 5328(a)(2.1). However,
the parties presented no evidence relevant to that factor during the hearing.
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its analysis, the court emphasized Child’s positive relationship with Father and
with his adult brother, S.T.D., who continues to reside with Father, and noted
that Child has more extended family and more friends in Pennsylvania than in
Florida. Trial Court Opinion, 9/28/2018, at 3-6, 11-13, 15-16, 18-20, 24-25.
The court also noted Child’s belief that Father is more involved in his education
than Mother, because Father helped Child with his homework and Mother does
not. Id. at 4, 13, 15, 18, 22-23. The court expressed concern that Child has
a strained relationship with Stepfather and experiences frequent arguments
between Stepfather and Mother. Id. at 4-5, 11-13, 17, 20-22, 25. The court
also found credible Father’s testimony that he has not attempted to interfere
with Child’s relationship with Mother since her relocation and that Mother has
failed to keep him informed of the important events in Child’s life. Id. at 8-
10, 14, 25. The court stressed Child’s preference to return to Pennsylvania,
which it characterized as strong and mature. Id. at 7, 13, 16, 22-23, 25-26.
While the court stated that it placed “heavy weight” on Child’s preference, it
clarified that it based its decision on all of the statutory factors and the totality
of the evidence. Id. at 13, 26.
We address Mother’s seven7 claims on appeal together, as they are
interrelated and often duplicative of each other. In her first and second claims,
which she combines in her brief, Mother argues that the trial court’s findings
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7 Mother includes an eighth issue in her statement of questions involved, but
indicates that she is withdrawing the issue on appeal. Mother’s Brief at 7.
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with respect to the subsection 5337(h) relocation factors were not supported
by the record, and that the record did not support “any change from the
conclusions drawn by the Honorable Daniel J. Milliron in the January 9, 2015,
Opinion ….” Mother’s Brief at 16-32. In essence, Mother argues that the court
should have weighed the evidence in this case differently and reached
conclusions more favorable to her. She argues that Child dislikes Florida
because of Father’s negative influence and directs our attention to his text
messages with Child, as discussed above. Id. at 26-29. She also stresses
Child’s educational needs, arguing that she has been more involved in Child’s
schooling than Father. Id. at 22-26, 31. She maintains that the court was
bound by Judge Milliron’s decision entered two years earlier, because Judge
Milliron focused primarily on Mother’s superior involvement in Child’s
education and “[n]othing has changed in that regard.” Id.
In her third claim, Mother argues that the trial court erred by granting
primary physical custody to Father during the school year because Child was
doing well in Florida and the court “failed to cite any evidence on the very real
possibility of a detrimental effect of taking [Child] out of his community while
he was doing so well.” Id. at 32-33. Similarly, in her fourth claim, Mother
argues that Father failed to meet his burden of proving that Child’s “relocation”
would be in Child’s best interest pursuant to subsection 5337(i)(1). Id. at 33-
34.
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In Mother’s fifth and sixth claims, which she once again combines in her
brief, she argues that the trial court’s findings with respect to the subsection
5328(a) best interest factors were not supported by the record, and that “the
record did not show any change from the record at the proceeding” before
Judge Milliron. Id. at 34-56. Mother repeats her previous arguments that
Father is the source of Child’s dislike for Florida, that the court should have
awarded primary physical custody to her during the school year because of
her superior involvement in Child’s education, and that the court was unable
to deviate from Judge Milliron’s order entered two years earlier. Id. at 42-
56. Finally, in her seventh claim, Mother argues that the court erred by giving
determinative weight to Child’s preference. Id. at 56-64. She asserts that
the court should have placed less weight on Child’s preference and focused
instead on her superior involvement in Child’s education, among other things.
Id. at 60-64.
After review of the record, we conclude that Mother’s claims do not
entitle her to relief. The record supports the trial court’s finding that Child
was unhappy living in Florida and preferred Pennsylvania. Child provided a
well-reasoned basis for his preference, explaining that he has more extended
family and friends in Pennsylvania, and that he disliked living with Stepfather
due to Stepfather’s contentious relationship with Mother. It was within the
court’s discretion to accept Father’s testimony that he did not attempt to
manipulate Child or influence what Child would say during his interview with
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the trial court. V.B., 55 A.3d at 1197. It was also within the court’s discretion
to accept Child’s statement that Mother and Stepfather typically did not help
him with his homework, while Father had helped him with his homework prior
to Mother’s and Child’s relocation. Id.
While Mother now argues that this Court should reweigh the evidence
and make its own factual findings contrary to those of the trial court, we are
not at liberty to comply with her request. Our case law is clear that we must
defer to the court’s findings of fact and weight determinations when the record
supports them. Id. Indeed, the amount of weight that a court gives to any
one factor in its analysis is almost entirely within its discretion. See M.J.M.
v. M.L.G., 63 A.3d 331, 339 (Pa. Super. 2013) (“It is within the trial court’s
purview as the finder of fact to determine which factors are most salient and
critical in each particular case.”). Further, we have explained the deference
we must extend to trial courts in child custody matters as follows.
[W]e have consistently held that the discretion that a trial court
employs in custody matters should be accorded the utmost
respect, given the special nature of the proceeding and the lasting
impact the result will have on the lives of the parties concerned.
Indeed, the knowledge gained by a trial court in observing
witnesses in a custody proceeding cannot adequately be imparted
to an appellate court by a printed record.
Ketterer v. Seifert, 902 A.2d 533, 540 (Pa. Super. 2006) (quoting Jackson
v. Beck, 858 A.2d 1250, 1254 (Pa. Super. 2004)). Our deference to the trial
court is particularly important in this case, as the court based its decision in
part on Child’s demeanor at the time of his interview. During the proceedings
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on June 22, 2017, the court recalled, “the child’s affect was depressed; he
appeared to be miserable; he appeared to be -- I was worried about him
actually if I returned him to [M]other’s house in Florida, I was worried about
him harming himself actually.” N.T., 6/22/2017, at 7.
With respect to Mother’s claim that the trial court remained bound by
Judge Milliron’s decision from January 2015, we reject this assertion as well.
It is well-settled that a change of circumstances is not necessary to support
the modification of a custody award. Moore v. Moore, 634 A.2d 163, 169
(Pa. 1993) (“As this Court emphatically stated … there is no need for either
parent to prove that something is wrong with the current custody
arrangement, or that some dramatic change has occurred before the court will
consider a request to alter the custody arrangement.”); but see R.M.G., Jr.,
v. F.M.G., 986 A.2d 1234, 1239 (Pa. Super. 2009) (quoting Hutchinson v.
Hutchinson, 549 A.2d 999, 1001 (Pa. Super. 1988)) (“‘Best interest cannot
be considered in a vacuum and w[h]ere the circumstances [are] unchanged
from those that resulted in the initial custody arrangement, it must be
presumed that what was in the child’s best interest continues.’”).
Even accepting for the sake of argument that Mother is correct and that
a change of circumstances was necessary for the trial court to modify custody,
the record demonstrates that a change in circumstances did occur in this case.
At the time Judge Milliron entered his order in January 2015, Child had never
before resided in Florida. It was possible that Child would grow to enjoy living
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in Florida and begin thriving in his new community. However, by the time
Judge Doyle interviewed Child in November 2016, it was clear that this was
not the case. Instead, after living in Florida for nearly two years, Child was
unhappy, lonely, and longing to return to Pennsylvania. See Karis v. Karis,
544 A.2d 1328, 1331-32 (Pa. 1988) (stressing the “dynamism of the process
of growth and maturity of children, as well as the circumstances of their
parents’ lives, where the only constant is change” and that custody cases “may
require continuing review of the best interest of the child, and demand a
degree of flexibility such as would allow the court the discretion to make
necessary changes when the best interest[s] of the child require such”).
Based on the foregoing, we conclude that the trial court did not abuse
its discretion or commit an error of law by reinstating its order of January 20,
2017. Therefore, we affirm.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/8/2019
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