J-A05035-19
2019 PA Super 133
BETH ANNE F. WEBER : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
:
v. :
:
:
MARK D. WEBER :
:
: No. 1095 WDA 2018
v. :
:
:
MICHAEL WEBER :
:
:
APPEAL OF: MICHAEL WEBER :
:
Appeal from the Order Dated July 5, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Crawford County Civil Division at No(s):
AD No. 1999-1298
BEFORE: GANTMAN, P.J.E., SHOGAN, J., and MURRAY, J.
OPINION BY MURRAY, J.: FILED APRIL 26, 2019
Michael Weber (Son) appeals1 from the trial court’s order granting the
motion of Mark D. Weber (Father) for summary judgment, and dismissing
Son’s petition for special relief, which was filed in the divorce action between
Father and Beth Anne F. Weber (Mother).2 After careful consideration, we
____________________________________________
1As we discuss infra, this matter comes before this Court for the second time.
See Weber v. Weber, 168 A.3d 266 (Pa. Super. 2017).
2The underlying petition for relief was filed by Son solely and did not request
any payment or damages to be paid to Mother. However, Son’s notice of
J-A05035-19
hold that Father and Mother’s property settlement agreement, which obligated
them to share the costs of their children’s college expenses, was a continuing
contract. We further hold, however, that these obligations were subject to
the statute of limitations,3 which began to run when each child completed his
or her college education. Applying this rationale to the case before us, we
affirm.
We review the protracted procedural history of this case given the
relevancy to Son’s claims. Mother and Father were married and have two
adult children: Son, born in 1988, and a daughter, born in 1994. In 1999,
Mother and Father executed a written agreement (Agreement) as part of their
divorce proceedings. Paragraph 18 of the Agreement provided in pertinent
part:
18. POST SECONDARY EDUCATION: Parents shall share equally
the reasonable costs of an appropriate undergraduate college or
other post-secondary education for the children.
____________________________________________
appeal and appellate brief both identify Mother (who has separate counsel
from Son) as an additional “appellant.” Regardless of Mother’s personal
support for Son’s position and the fact that they have submitted joint filings
in support of Son’s petition, Mother is not an aggrieved party for purposes of
appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. 501 (“Except where the right of appeal is enlarged by
statute, any party who is aggrieved by an appealable order . . . may appeal
therefrom.”); In re Jackson, 174 A.3d 14, 24 (Pa. Super. 2017) (“An
aggrieved party must have a substantial interest at stake. . . . [T]he party’s
interest must be adversely affected in a manner[ ] which is both direct and
immediate.”). Accordingly, Mother does not have standing to appeal, and we
have amended the caption to reflect that Son is the sole appellant in this
appeal.
3See 42 Pa.C.S.A. § 5525(a)(8) (generally, an action upon a contract must
be commenced within 4 years).
-2-
J-A05035-19
Memorandum of Agreement, 11/10/99, at ¶ 18. A divorce decree was entered
in March of 2000.
Seven years later, in 2007, Mother filed a petition for special relief,
averring that Son was a freshman at Florida State University (FSU), and Father
was in breach of the Agreement because he failed to pay his share of Son’s
tuition as required by Paragraph 18. Son requested, and the trial court
granted him, intervenor status based on Son’s interest as an intended
beneficiary of the Agreement. Subsequently, however, Mother filed a
voluntary nonsuit, which stated that the parties agreed to withdraw the
petition. According to Son’s filings in the underlying matter, he studied at FSU
from 2007 through 2011. Son’s Pre-Hearing Narrative, 7/18/16.
There was no activity on Mother and Father’s divorce docket until April
of 2016, when Son (then approximately 28 years old) filed the instant petition
for special relief. The petition asserted, in pertinent part, that: Son
“graduated” from FSU; the total cost of his “undergraduate education at [FSU]
was approximately $166,148.71, one half of which is $79,988.44, plus interest
as paid by [Son] on student loans, in the approximate amount of $24,000.00”;
but Father has only paid $9,085.92.4 Son’s Petition for Special Relief, 4/1/16,
at ¶¶ 4, 11. Father filed an answer and new matter, averring that Son’s
____________________________________________
4 The parties’ pleadings presented numerous other issues which Son does not
raise on appeal.
-3-
J-A05035-19
contract claim was barred by the 4-year statute of limitations at 42 Pa.C.S.A.
§ 5225(a)(8). Son responded that the Agreement was continuing in nature
and thus not subject to the statute of limitations.
On July 18, 2016, Son filed a brief in support of his petition for special
relief, which again stated that he “graduated from” FSU. Son’s Brief in Support
of Petition for Special Relief, 7/18/16, at 3. However, Son further stated, for
the first time, that he attended “graduate school” and that Father was also
obligated to pay half of those expenses:
[Son] attended Palm Beach Atlantic University for pharmacy
school until 2015. During his four years of graduate school, he
incurred $196,455.00 in student loan debt solely to provide for
tuition and housing. The language of the Agreement calls for the
parents to share in “other post-secondary” education costs, and
[Father] is responsible for one half or $98,227.50 of the graduate
school expenses incurred.
Id. at 4-5 (emphases added).
Three days later, the trial court heard oral argument from the parties
concerning various issues, including Father’s defense of the statute of
limitations. The trial court noted that Son’s petition for special relief did not
include graduate school expenses. N.T., 7/21/16, at 4-5. Son orally moved
to amend the petition to include them, and the trial court allowed this
amendment. Id. at 6, 13. The court did not enter any further rulings at this
hearing.
On August 8, 2016, the trial court issued a memorandum and order
dismissing Son’s petition for lack of standing. The court reasoned that
-4-
J-A05035-19
because Mother withdrew her 2007 petition for special relief and did not
participate in Son’s 2016 petition, Son lacked standing to seek special relief
under the Divorce Code. Son appealed. In an opinion published on August
11, 2017, a panel of this Court reversed, holding that Son had standing to
seek relief and remanding for further proceedings. Weber, 168 A.3d 266.
Upon remand, Father filed a motion for summary judgment on April 26,
2018, again arguing that Son’s 2016 petition was time-barred by the statute
of limitations. Additionally, around this time, in answering Father’s
interrogatories, Son stated that he had not earned any undergraduate degree.
Father’s Motion for Summary Judgment, 4/26/18, Exhibit 11 (Son’s Answers,
Responses & Objections to Interrogatories at 1). Instead, Son claimed that
when he had earned sufficient undergraduate credits to begin pharmacy
school, he enrolled in Palm Beach Atlantic University.
Son and Mother filed a joint responsive brief to Father’s summary
judgment motion. This brief stated — on the same page — that Son did not
graduate from FSU, yet incurred “graduate school costs” for pharmacy school.
Son’s Response & Brief, 5/16/18, at 19. In any event, the brief asserted that
under the plain language of the Agreement, Father was required to pay for
half of Son’s pharmacy education expenses because the phrase “post-
secondary” includes any education after high school. Id. at 17.
On July 5, 2018, the trial court issued a memorandum and order
granting Father’s motion for summary judgment and dismissing Son’s petition
-5-
J-A05035-19
for special relief. The court agreed with Father that the Agreement did not
create a continuing obligation, and thus Son’s petition was subject to the
statute of limitations. The court also found that Son’s pharmacy school
education was graduate-level and not included in Father’s obligations under
Paragraph 18. Memorandum & Order, 7/5/18, at 4-5 n.6 (noting that Son’s
claim, that he never obtained an undergraduate degree, was belied by his
earlier filings). The court then reasoned that “Son’s contractual relationship
with [Father] ended in 2011 when he completed his studies at FSU,” and
concluded that Son’s petition was time-barred by the statute of limitations.
Id. at 9.
Son filed a timely motion for reconsideration, but before the trial court
addressed it, Son filed a timely notice of appeal. See Schoff v. Richter, 562
A.2d 912, 913 (Pa. Super. 1989) (“[Pa.R.A.P. 1701] tolls the time for taking
an appeal only when the [trial] court files ‘an order expressly granting
reconsideration . . . within the time prescribed by these rules for the filing of
a notice of appeal.’”). Both the trial court and Son have complied with
Pennsylvania Rule of Appellate Procedure 1925.
Son presents one issue, in two parts, for our review:
WHETHER THE TRIAL COURT ERRED AS A MATTER OF LAW IN
HOLDING THAT THE STATUTE OF LIMITATIONS HAD EXPIRED
AND GRANTING [FATHER’S] MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT
BECAUSE:
A. [SON’S] ATTENDANCE AT PHARMACY SCHOOL
CONSTITUTES “OTHER POSTSECONDARY EDUCATION”
UNDER THE TERMS OF THE AGREEMENT IN QUESTION AND
-6-
J-A05035-19
SON FILED THE PETITION FOR SPECIAL RELIEF WITHIN FOUR
YEARS OF COMPLETING PHARMACY SCHOOL?
B. WHETHER THE AGREEMENT TO PAY FOR AN
“APPROPRIATE UNDERGRADUATE COLLEGE OR OTHER POST-
SECONDARY EDUCATION” CREATES A CONTINUING
CONTRACT, THEREFORE, TOLLING THE STATUTE OF
LIMITATIONS[?]
Son’s Brief at 5.
We first note the standard of review of an order granting or denying a
motion for summary judgment:
We view the record in the light most favorable to the nonmoving
party, and all doubts as to the existence of a genuine issue of
material fact must be resolved against the moving party. Only
where there is no genuine issue as to any material fact and it is
clear that the moving party is entitled to a judgment as a matter
of law will summary judgment be entered. Our scope of review of
a trial court’s order granting or denying summary judgment is
plenary, and our standard of review is clear: the trial court’s order
will be reversed only where it is established that the court
committed an error of law or abused its discretion.
Kozel v. Kozel, 97 A.3d 767, 772 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citation omitted). See
also Pa.R.C.P. 1035.2(1) (“After the relevant pleadings are closed . . . any
party may move for summary judgment in whole or in part as a matter of law
. . . whenever there is no genuine issue of any material fact as to a necessary
element of the cause of action or defense which could be established by
additional discovery or expert report[.]”).
Furthermore:
[W]e have held that a grant of relief under a petition for special
relief based upon the interpretation of a marital settlement
agreement “is within the sound discretion of the trial court and is
an exercise of the court’s equitable powers, and will not be
-7-
J-A05035-19
disturbed on appeal unless the trial court’s decision is an abuse of
discretion.”
delCastillo v. delCastillo, 617 A.2d 26, 28-29 (Pa. Super. 1992) (citation
omitted).
Son first contends that the trial court erred in finding that the phrase in
“other post-secondary education” did not include his pharmacy school studies.
Son avers that “post-secondary education” is an “expansive term,” whose
plain meaning includes any education after high school, and thus Paragraph
18 obligated Father to pay for Son’s pharmacy school expenses. Son’s Brief
at 11, 19. Son acknowledges that in delCastillo, this Court held that
language in a divorce property settlement-agreement — “to provide education
for the children beyond the high school level” — “limited the obligation to
undergraduate education.” Son’s Brief at 20, citing delCastillo, 617 A.2d at
27, 29. However, he reasons that delCastillo, which was decided 20 years
ago, was “based on the idea that graduate school studies were not necessary,”
but now, “the need for a graduate degree is greater than ever.” Id. at 21,
citing Laura Pappano, The Master’s as the New Bachelor’s, N.Y. TIMES, July 22,
2011. Additionally, Son contends that Father was aware of, but did not object
to, his “enter[ing] his undergraduate studies with a long-term goal of being a
pharmacist.” Id. at 22.
This Court has stated:
“It is well established that in Pennsylvania, a settlement
agreement between a husband and wife is governed by the
law of contracts unless the agreement itself provides
-8-
J-A05035-19
otherwise.” When interpreting a property settlement
agreement, the trial court is the sole determiner of facts and
absent an abuse of discretion, we will not usurp the trial
court’s fact-finding function.
delCastillo, 617 A.2d at 28 (citations omitted). “[U]nder the law of contracts,
the court must ascertain the intent of the parties when interpreting a
contractual agreement.” Crispo v. Crispo, 909 A.2d 308, 313 (Pa. Super.
2006) (citations omitted). “When construing agreements involving clear and
unambiguous terms, a trial court need only examine the writing itself to give
effect to the parties’ understanding. A court may not modify the plain meaning
of the words under the guise of interpretation.” Id. (citations omitted). When
interpreting the word “or” in a contract, “[w]e are bound to give ‘or’ its normal
disjunctive meaning unless its ordinary meaning would ‘produce a result that
is absurd or impossible of execution or highly unreasonable . . . .’” In re
Fiedler, 132 A.3d 1010, 1022 (Pa. Super. 2016) (citation omitted).
As acknowledged by Son, in delCastillo, the parties executed a
marriage-separation property settlement agreement, which set forth the
parties’ obligation “to provide education for their children beyond the high
school level.” See delCastillo, 617 A.2d at 27. The parties’ son sought
specific performance of this provision, arguing that it obligated the parties to
pay not only for his undergraduate college education, but also his post-
graduate education. Id. at 28. The trial court disagreed, and on appeal, this
Court affirmed:
“This [C]ourt has previously declined to require an extension
-9-
J-A05035-19
of the parental obligation to support children in their
educational pursuits to postgraduate and professional
school.” . . . “[C]ase law sets the limits of parental obligation
[for educational support] at college or majority[.]” Obviously,
a contract specifically mandating a parent’s obligation to pay
for graduate school studies will be enforced. But where, as
here, a contract is ambiguous as to the parents’ intentions,
we conclude that a twenty-seven year old married man with
a child cannot expect the courts to enforce such a claim.
Id. at 29 (citations omitted).
Instantly, Son appears to argue that his pharmacy school education
should be considered a part of his undergraduate studies. See Son’s Brief at
19-20 (arguing that a doctor of pharmacy degree “is considered a first-
professional degree” and “an entry level degree in the field of pharmacy,” and
that “[u]nder the facts of this case, Son was not required to earn an
undergraduate degree before enrolling in pharmacy school”). However, as
the trial court pointed out, this argument would contradict Son’s own
statements that he graduated from FSU, as well as his numerous references
to his FSU studies as his “undergraduate” education and his pharmacy studies
as “graduate school.” See Son’s Petition for Special Relief, 4/1/16, at ¶ 4;
Son’s Brief in Support of Petition for Special Relief, 7/18/16, at 3 (“[Son]
attended and graduated from [FSU.]” Prior to [Son’s] graduation from [FSU]
. . . . ”), 4 (“Following his graduation from [FSU, Son] enrolled in graduate
school. He attended Palm Beach Atlantic University for pharmacy school until
2015.”). Furthermore, Son created and filed spreadsheets, attached to his
“Pre-Hearing Narrative,” which bore the headings “Undergraduate Costs” and
- 10 -
J-A05035-19
“Graduate School Costs.” Father’s Motion for Summary Judgment, 4/26/18,
Exhibit 9 (Son’s Pre-Hearing Narrative, 7/18/16, at 1). Furthermore, Son
acknowledges in his brief that he finished the undergraduate portion of his
post-secondary education in May of 2011.” Son’s Brief at 11 (emphasis
added).
We note that Son relies on webpages from the U.S. Department of
Education’s website, which, according to him, state that a Doctor of Pharmacy
degree is considered both a first-professional degree and an entry-level
degree. Son’s Brief at 20. The trial court, however, pointed out that the same
webpage stated that first-professional degrees, including a doctor of
pharmacy, “are considered graduate-level programs in the U.S. system
because the [sic] follow prior undergraduate studies.” Memorandum & Order,
7/5/18, at 5 n.6, citing Son’s Response & Brief in Opposition to Father’s Motion
for Summary Judgment, 5/16/18, Exhibit B (Affidavit of Son & “Structure of
the U.S. Education System: First -Professional Degrees”5).
Furthermore, with respect to Son’s insistence that a Doctor of Pharmacy
degree is a “first-professional degree,” we note that the same Department of
Education webpage also included, as “first-professional degree titles,” the
____________________________________________
5 Appellant’s printed copy of this webpage, appearing in the record, provide
the internet address http://www.ed.gov/international/usnei/edlite-
index.html. However, as of the date of this writing, that address no longer
links to the page cited by Appellant, and instead, we found the page at
https://www2.ed.gov/about/offices/list/ous/international/usnei/us/professio
nal.doc.
- 11 -
J-A05035-19
degrees of juris doctor (J.D.), doctor of medicine (M.D.), doctor of dental
science (D.D.S.) and doctor of dental medicine (D.M.D.).
Nevertheless, Son also argues on appeal that the phrase, “an
appropriate undergraduate college or other post-secondary education” in the
Agreement, includes both undergraduate and graduate studies. Son’s Brief
at 20. Son thus contends that the statute of limitations began to run when
he completed pharmacy school in 2015, and not in 2011 as decided by the
trial court.
Son ignores, however, the trial court’s discussion of the disjunctive term
“or,” which the court interpreted to mean either college or another type of
post-high school education, but not both. See Memorandum & Order, 7/5/18,
at 4 n.6. Given Son’s admissions that he “graduated” from FSU before
enrolling in pharmacy school, we agree with the trial court’s analysis. See In
re Fiedler, 132 A.3d at 1022. In the absence of explicit language requiring
Mother and Father to pay for any graduate program, the court did not abuse
its discretion in rejecting Son’s request to construe such a requirement. See
delCastillo, 617 A.2d at 28-29. Finally, to the extent that Son relies on
Father’s alleged “awareness and lack of objection” to Son’s “long-term goal of
being a pharmacist,” such fact is not relevant to the court’s interpretation of
the terms of the Agreement. See Crispo, 909 A.2d at 313 (“[A] trial court
need only examine the writing itself to give effect to the parties’
understanding.”). Therefore, we discern no basis upon which to disturb the
- 12 -
J-A05035-19
court’s finding that the Agreement did not obligate Father to pay for Son’s
pharmacy school expenses. We next consider Son’s claims that the
Agreement was a continuing contract and that it was not subject to the statute
of limitations.
Son alleges that the trial court erred in finding that the Agreement was
not a continuing contract. Son’s Brief at 25. He maintains that property
settlement agreements have been deemed continuing contracts when there
were no specified deadlines for payment or no specific amounts, and that here,
the Agreement did not set any dates for payment. Son relies, in pertinent
part, on Crispo, 909 A.2d 308 (discussed infra).
This Court has explained:
“[A] question regarding the application of the statute of limitations
is a question of law.” . . . “Our standard of review over questions
of law is de novo and to the extent necessary, the scope of our
review is plenary as [the appellate] court may review the entire
record in making its decision.”
K.A.R. v. T.G.L., 107 A.3d 770, 775 (Pa. Super. 2014) (citations omitted).
The statute of limitations for contracts is four years. 42 Pa.C.S. §
5525(a)(8). “[T]he statute of limitations begins to run as soon as
the right to institute and maintain a suit arises.” However,
“[w]hen a contract is continuing, the statute of limitations will run
either from the time the breach occurs or when the contract is
terminated.” Crispo[, 909 A.2d at 313.] “The test of continuity,
so as to take the case out of the operation of the statute of
limitations, is to be determined by the answer to the question
whether the services were performed under one continuous
contract, whether express or implied, with no definite time fixed
for payment, or were rendered under several separate contracts.”
Id. at 775-776 (some citations omitted). Property settlement agreements in
- 13 -
J-A05035-19
divorce actions have been held to be continuing contracts “where the duties
of the parties are ongoing.” Crispo, 909 A.2d at 315.
In Crispo, the parties’ 1995 property settlement agreement provided
that: (1) each party would assume responsibility for specified credit card
debts; (2) the husband would pay the wife $22,500 for her interest in his
business; (3) the wife agreed “to defer payment of this amount until August
1, 2001, providing [the husband did] not seek a decrease of the present child
support Order;” and (4) if the husband filed a petition to decrease his court-
ordered child support obligation, he would pay the wife $22,500 within 30
days of his filing the petition. Crispo, 909 A.2d at 309. Sometime in the fall
of 1996, the husband filed a petition to modify the child support order, but did
not pay wife the $22,500 as required by their agreement; he also did not pay
the credit card balances that were allocated to him. Id. at 310. In 2004, the
wife filed a petition for special relief, arguing that the husband failed to comply
with the agreement. Id. at 309. The husband responded that her claims were
barred by the statute of limitations, but the trial court disagreed. Id. at 310.
On appeal, this Court affirmed, concluding that the agreement was a
continuing contract, and thus the statute of limitations did not apply. Crispo,
909 A.2d at 312-314. We observed that “both parties agreed to assume the
payment of certain credit card balances and included no specific deadline by
which those debts would be paid,” and the agreement’s provision that the
husband would pay the wife $22,500 for her interest in his business did “not
- 14 -
J-A05035-19
provide a specific start date for the first installment.” Id. at 313. We further
noted: “[I]n the case of continuing contracts, such as postnuptial agreements,
where the duties of the parties are ongoing, the statute of limitations generally
does not run.” Id. at 315.
We next consider the decision in K.A.R., 107 A.3d 770, upon which the
trial court in this case relied. In that case, the husband and wife’s equitable
distribution agreement provided, generally, that “if and when” the husband
sold stocks in his business, the wife would receive 45% of the net proceeds.6
K.A.R., 107 A.3d at 773. Subsequently, the wife filed a petition to enforce
the agreement, claiming that the husband sold a portion of his stocks, but
failed to pay her proceeds. Id. at 773-774. The trial court denied relief on
the basis that the wife’s claims were time-barred by the statute of limitations.
Id. at 775.
On appeal, this Court agreed, and rejected the wife’s contention that
the parties’ agreement was a continuing contract. K.A.R., 107 A.3d at 775-
776. The K.A.R. Court considered, but distinguished, Crispo, emphasizing
that the phrase “if and when [the stock] would be sold” “clearly set[ ] a
‘definitive time fixed for payment’: Wife’s right to receive a percentage of
Husband’s remuneration from the sale of the . . . stock arose when Husband
____________________________________________
6 The facts in K.A.R. are more complex, but because the complexities are not
relevant to our disposition of Son’s claim, we omit them. See K.A.R., 107
A.3d at 773-774.
- 15 -
J-A05035-19
disposed of this stock.” Id. at 776-777. We further held that the agreement
identified the amount owed to the wife — 45% of the net proceeds. Id. at
778.
Instantly, the trial court applied K.A.R. to conclude that “by implication,
[Father’s] obligations under [P]aragraph 18 of the Agreement would arise
simultaneously if and when a child (having the aptitude and desire) attended
an undergraduate college or undertook another type of post-secondary
education.” Memorandum & Order, 7/5/18, at 7 After careful review, we
disagree that the “if and when” language in the K.A.R. agreement — which
pertained to the single, isolated action of the husband’s selling stocks — can
be read into the Agreement in this case. Instead, the Agreement required the
parties to share their children’s college or undergraduate expenses, which
presumably would span several years. Thus, the Agreement was a continuing
contract. See Crispo, 909 A.2d at 315.
We agree, however, with the trial court’s analysis that the agreement to
share the children’s college or undergraduate expenses was nevertheless
subject to the statute of limitations. See Memorandum & Order, 7/5/18, at 7
(“Even if we were to conclude that the provision regarding the children’s post-
secondary education created a continuing contract, this does not mean that
the statute of limitations could never become operative.”). As stated in
Crispo: “When a contract is continuing, the statute of limitations will run
either from the time when the breach occurs or when the contract is in some
- 16 -
J-A05035-19
way terminated.” Crispo, 909 A.2d at 313. As discussed above, any breach
of Paragraph 18 would have occurred, at the latest, “in 2011 when [Son]
completed his studies at FSU,” see Memorandum & Order, 7/5/18, at 9, and
the four-year statute of limitations began to run at that time. See 42
Pa.C.S.A. § 5525(a)(8); Memorandum & Order, 7/5/18, at 9. Son’s petition
for special relief, filed in 2016, was thus out of time.
For the above reasons, we affirm the order granting Father’s motion for
summary judgment and dismissing Son’s petition for relief.
Order affirmed.
P.J.E. Gantman joins the opinion.
Judge Shogan files a concurring dissenting opinion.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 4/26/2019
- 17 -