In the Matter of the Involuntary Termination of the Parent-Child Relationship of S.A. (Minor Child), and A.A. (Mother) and C.A. (Father) v. The Indiana Department of Child Services (mem. dec.)

MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Apr 30 2019, 10:49 am

court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
the defense of res judicata, collateral Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.

ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT A.A. ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Mark Small Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Indianapolis, Indiana Attorney General

Robert J. Henke
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana

IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA

In the Matter of the Involuntary April 30, 2019
Termination of the Parent-Child Court of Appeals Case No.
Relationship of S.A. (Minor 18A-JT-2192
Child), Appeal from the Owen Circuit
and Court
The Honorable Kelsey B. Hanlon,
A.A. (Mother) and C.A. Judge
(Father),
Trial Court Cause No.
Appellants-Respondents, 60C02-1803-JT-58

v.

The Indiana Department of
Child Services,
Appellee-Petitioner

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 Crone, Judge.

Case Summary
[1] A.A. (“Mother”) appeals the trial court’s order involuntarily terminating her

parental rights to her minor child, S.A. (“Child”). Mother claims that she did

not receive adequate notice of the termination proceedings, and therefore her

due process rights were violated. Because the record establishes that she

received adequate notice, we affirm.

Facts and Procedural History
[2] The relevant facts are undisputed. In January 2015, Child was born to Mother

and C.A. (“Father”) (collectively “Parents”). In September 2016, the trial court

authorized the Indiana Department of Child Services (“DCS”) to remove Child

from Parents’ custody. At that time, Parents were living in a tent. In October

2016, the court found Child to be a child in need of services (“CHINS”)

because of Parents’ substance abuse issues and medical neglect of Child, as well

as Father’s acts of domestic violence. In its dispositional decree, the court

ordered Parents to complete substance-related assessments and services, visit

Child, maintain suitable housing and employment, and participate in chemical

testing. Parents failed to comply with the decree, and in September 2017 the

court changed Child’s permanency plan from reunification to termination of

parental rights with adoption.

[3] On March 8, 2018, DCS filed a petition to terminate Parents’ parental rights

and a motion for hearing; the petition states that Parents resided at 620 South

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Walnut Street in Bloomington. 1 On March 9, the trial court set an initial

hearing for April 2, and DCS sent notices of the petition and the initial hearing

to Parents via certified mail at the Walnut Street address. On March 14,

Parents signed the certified mail receipts. Mother’s receipt appears in the

record; she does not claim that the signature is not hers. Appellant’s App. Vol.

2 at 15. Parents failed to appear at the initial hearing, during which the

factfinding hearing was scheduled for July 20. See id. at 4 (chronological case

summary entry for April 2: “Cause comes on for initial hearing.… Respondent

Parents do not appear. Court schedules fact-finding hearing on July 20, 2018 at 9:00

a.m. Order to follow.”). On April 3, an order on the initial hearing was sent to

Parents via certified mail at the Walnut Street address. On April 6, Parents

signed the certified mail receipts. Both receipts appear in the record. Id. at 17-

18. Mother characterizes the signature on her receipt as “illegible” but does not

claim that it is not hers. Appellant’s Br. at 6. Parents failed to appear at the

July 20 factfinding hearing, which was held in their absence. The court took

1
The trial court’s chronological case summary (“CCS”), which was printed on December 18, 2018, lists
Father’s address as 620 South Walnut Street in Bloomington. On September 11, 2018, more than a month
after the termination order was issued, Mother notified the court that her current address is in care of Phillip
Poff on East Fall Creek Road in Spencer.

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 the matter under advisement and on August 6 issued a four-page order, with

findings of fact and conclusions thereon, terminating Parents’ parental rights. 2

[4] On September 5, 2018, the trial court received a handwritten letter from Mother

“asking for a hearing to be put in place” and “to appeal the decisions that have

been made on the termination of parental rights and adoption of [Child].”

Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 24. The letter states,

I … never recieved [sic] notice of many court hearings after the
[CHINS] case was closed and the order for termination was put
in place. Thus being the reason for my absence in the prior court
dates. I do believe I recieved [sic] one court notice that I may
have signed for, but didn’t have transportation, which I had
called the courts and advised them of that at that time. I would
like to appeal the decisions made and do not have an attorney to
represent myself at this time. So I am also asking for one to be
appointed to me.

Id. The record does not indicate that Mother called the court about a lack of

transportation. The trial court appointed counsel for Mother, and counsel filed

a motion to file a belated notice of appeal, which was granted. 3

2
Among other things, the trial court found that “Parents do not have stable housing and have been unable to
maintain stable employment”; that they “failed to consistently participate in chemical testing” and “have not
established a pattern of sobriety sufficient to allow the Child to be returned to their care”; that they “are
unable or unwilling to address the safety concerns that led to the Child’s removal from their care”; that
“Child is placed in relative care with her maternal great aunt and great uncle”; and that “Child is bonded
with her current placement and is thriving in their care.” Appealed Order at 3-4.
3
Father does not participate in this appeal.

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 Discussion and Decision
[5] Mother does not challenge any of the trial court’s findings or conclusions

justifying its decision to terminate her parental rights. Instead, she claims that

she did not receive adequate notice of the [termination] petition
despite [the DCS family case manager] having met with her, to
take a sample from [her] for a urine screen, only six (6) days after
the petition was filed.[ 4] The parent-child relationship is
fundamental in our society and because adequate service is
necessary for due process [sic]. The [termination] order should
be vacated and this case remanded.

Appellant’s Br. at 10. 5 The record establishes that Mother was adequately

served.

[6] We have held that Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-6.5 (see footnote 4 supra),

“which lays out the notice requirements in a termination proceeding, …. does

not require compliance with Indiana Trial Rule 4, which governs service of

process and incorporates a jurisdictional component.” In re C.C., 788 N.E.2d

847, 851 (Ind. Ct. App. 2003), trans. denied. “Rather, in order to comply with

4
We presume that this statement refers to Indiana Code Section 31-35-2-6.5, which provides in pertinent part
that “[a]t least ten (10) days before a hearing on a petition or motion under this chapter: (1) the person or
entity who filed the petition to terminate the parent-child relationship under section 4 of this chapter … shall
send notice of the review to the persons listed in subsections (c) and (d)[,]” which include the child’s parents.
(Emphasis added.) The petition’s affirmation was signed by the DCS family case manager, but the DCS
attorney actually filed the petition for DCS. Appellant’s App. Vol. 2 at 11. In any event, the statute did not
require the family case manager to personally serve notice on Parents.
5
In passing, Mother complains that she was never appointed counsel in the termination proceeding and that
the trial court erred in conducting the factfinding hearing in her absence, but she cites no relevant authority
and makes no cogent argument regarding these claims. Consequently, they are waived. Zavodnik v. Harper,
17 N.E.3d 259, 264 (Ind. 2014).

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 the notice statute, one need only meet the requirements of Indiana Trial Rule 5,

which governs service of subsequent papers and pleadings in the action.” Id.

“Indiana Trial Rule 5 authorizes service by U.S. mail and ‘[s]ervice upon the

attorney or party shall be made by delivering or mailing a copy of the papers to

him at his last known address.’” Id. (quoting Ind. Trial Rule 5(B)) (emphasis

and footnote omitted). The record reflects that DCS served notices of the

petition and the initial hearing as well as the factfinding hearing on Mother at

620 South Walnut Street in Bloomington, which apparently was her last known

address, and that Mother actually received those notices at that address. 6

Therefore, we affirm.

[7] Affirmed.

Bradford, J., and Tavitas, J., concur.

6
Mother notes that she was living in a tent when the CHINS proceeding was initiated, but she does not
specifically assert that the Walnut Street address was not her last known address when the termination
proceeding was initiated. Even if Mother did not actually receive the notices at that address, the notices were
not defective. See In re B.J., 879 N.E.2d 7, 16 (Ind. Ct. App. 2008) (holding that notice sent to parent’s last
known address was not defective, even though DCS knew that parent did not live at that address, where
parent never notified DCS of his new address), trans. denied.

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