[Cite as State v. C.L.W., 2019-Ohio-1965.]
IN THE COURT OF APPEALS OF OHIO
TENTH APPELLATE DISTRICT
State of Ohio, :
Plaintiff-Appellant, :
v. : No. 18AP-658
(C.P.C. No. 12CR-5780)
C.L.W., :
(REGULAR CALENDAR)
Defendant-Appellee. :
D E C I S I O N
Rendered on May 21, 2019
On brief: Dave Yost, Attorney General, and Glenn P. Willer,
for appellant. Argued: Glenn P. Willer.
APPEAL from the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas
BEATTY BLUNT, J.
{¶ 1} Plaintiff-appellant, State of Ohio, appeals a decision from the Franklin
County Court of Common Pleas granting an application to seal a criminal record.
Defendant-appellee, C.L.W., has not appeared in the action.
I. FACTS AND PROCEDURAL HISTORY
{¶ 2} On April 3, 2013, appellee, C.L.W., pled guilty to one count of forgery, in
violation of R.C. 2913.31, a felony in the fifth degree, in Franklin C.P. No. 12CR-5780. The
trial court imposed one year of community control and ordered appellee to pay restitution
in the amount of $2,500 to the Ohio Department of Medicaid.
{¶ 3} On April 30, 2018, appellee paid $2,085 in restitution, which fulfilled her
outstanding restitution obligation.
{¶ 4} On June 22, 2018, appellee filed an application to seal her record. The state
objected to the application, arguing that appellee was not eligible to have her record sealed.
No. 18AP-658 2
{¶ 5} The trial court held a hearing on August 16, 2018. After providing both parties
the opportunity to speak, the trial court granted the application and ordered that the record
be sealed. The state appeals this decision.
II. ASSIGNMENT OF ERROR
{¶ 6} The state submits one assignment of error for our review:
THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN GRANTING AN
APPLICATION TO SEAL A CONVICTION WHEN THE
OFFENDER HAD NOT RECEIVED A FINAL DISCHARGE.1
III. STANDARD OF REVIEW
{¶ 7} An appellate court generally reviews a trial court's decision on an application
to seal a record of conviction under an abuse of discretion standard. State v. Paige, 10th
Dist. No. 15AP-510, 2015-Ohio-4876, ¶ 5, citing State v. Black, 10th Dist. No. 14AP-338,
2014-Ohio-4827, ¶ 6. Whether an applicant is an eligible offender for purposes of sealing
a criminal record, though, is an issue of law. Id. at ¶ 5, citing State v. Hoyles, 10th Dist. No.
08AP-946, 2009-Ohio-4483, ¶ 4. We review questions of law de novo. Id., citing Black at
¶ 6.
IV. LAW AND ANALYSIS
{¶ 8} The state argues that appellee was not eligible to have her record sealed
because it had not been three years since she satisfied her restitution obligation. We agree.
Pursuant to R.C. 2953.32(A)(1):
[A]n eligible offender may apply to the sentencing court * * *
for the sealing of the record of the case that pertains to the
conviction. Application may be made at one of the following
times:
(a) At the expiration of three years after the offender's final
discharge if convicted of one felony
1 Although the state refers to a "final discharge" in its assignment of error, its argument focuses only on
whether appellee waited three years after her final discharge, not on whether she had obtained a final
discharge. The assignment is inartful. Because the assignment submits that the trial court erred in granting
the application to seal, the issue is properly before the court, and we sustain the assignment of error.
No. 18AP-658 3
{¶ 9} Upon motion to seal, the trial court must hold a hearing on the motion. The
court is required to "[d]etermine whether the applicant is an eligible offender." R.C.
2953.32(C)(1)(a). "The first considerations in determining eligibility are whether the
offender has obtained a final discharge and whether three years have elapsed since that
event." State v. Aguirre, 144 Ohio St.3d 179, 2014-Ohio-4603, ¶ 18, citing R.C.
2953.32(A)(1). "[A] court may seal an offender's conviction record 'only when all
requirements for eligibility are met.' " Id. at ¶ 16, quoting State v. Boykin, 138 Ohio St.3d
97, 2013-Ohio-4582, ¶ 11 .
{¶ 10} The term "final discharge" is not defined by statute. Nonetheless, Ohio
courts, including the Supreme Court and this court, have consistently held that " '[a]n
offender is not finally discharged for purposes of R.C. 2953.32(A)(1) if the offender still
owes restitution.' " Aguirre at ¶ 19, quoting In re White, 165 Ohio App.3d 288, 290, 2006-
Ohio-233, ¶ 7 (10th Dist.) (citing State v. Wallace, 8th Dist. No. 79669 (Dec. 6, 2001); State
v. Pettis, 133 Ohio App.3d 618, 619-20 (8th Dist.1999); State v. Wainwright, 75 Ohio
App.3d 793, 795 (8th Dist.1991)). Plainly, "final discharge cannot occur until restitution is
fully paid[,and] [o]nly then does the three-year waiting period in R.C. 2953.32(A)(1)
commence to run." Aguirre at ¶ 20. Then, "only after the expiration of that period may [an
applicant] apply to have her record sealed." Id. Before the expiration of this three-year
period of time, an applicant is ineligible to have his or her record sealed. As we and the
Ohio Supreme Court recognize, " 'R.C. 2953.32 et seq. set out the limits of the trial court's
jurisdiction to grant a request to seal the record of convictions.' " In re Application for
Sealing of the Records of: A.R.H., 10th Dist. No. 18AP-554, 2019-Ohio-1325, ¶ 11, quoting
State v. Pariag, 137 Ohio St.3d 81, 2013-Ohio-4010, ¶ 12 .
No. 18AP-658 4
{¶ 11} It is undisputed that appellee did not fulfill her restitution obligations until
April 30, 2018. That is the date of "final discharge." At that time, the three-year clock began
to run for appellee to become eligible to have her record sealed under R.C. 2953.32.
Appellee's application was clearly premature and the trial court lacked jurisdiction to grant
the application. As such, we sustain the state's single assignment of error, and we reverse
the judgment of the Franklin County Court of Common Pleas. We remand this matter to
the trial court with instructions to vacate the order sealing the record and dismiss appellee's
application.
Judgment reversed; cause
remanded with instructions.
KLATT, P.J., and SADLER, J., concur.