NOT FOR PUBLICATION FILED
UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS MAY 23 2019
MOLLY C. DWYER, CLERK
U.S. COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE NINTH CIRCUIT
AARON L. STRIBLING, AKA Aaron No. 18-16504
Lamont Stribling,
D.C. No.
Plaintiff-Appellant, 1:17-cv-01275-AWI-BAM
v.
MEMORANDUM*
E. WILSON, Correctional Officer in
individual and official capacity,
Defendant-Appellee.
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Eastern District of California
Anthony W. Ishii, District Judge, Presiding
Submitted May 21, 2019**
Before: THOMAS, Chief Judge, FRIEDLAND and BENNETT, Circuit Judges.
California state prisoner Aaron L. Stribling, AKA Aaron Lamont Stribling,
appeals pro se from the district court’s judgment dismissing his 42 U.S.C. § 1983
action alleging that he was wrongfully deprived of personal property. We have
*
This disposition is not appropriate for publication and is not precedent
except as provided by Ninth Circuit Rule 36-3.
**
The panel unanimously concludes this case is suitable for decision
without oral argument. See Fed. R. App. P. 34(a)(2).
jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. We review de novo. Belanus v. Clark, 796
F.3d 1021, 1024 (9th Cir. 2015) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C. § 1915A); Watison v.
Carter, 668 F.3d 1108, 1112 (9th Cir. 2012) (dismissal under 28 U.S.C.
§ 1915(e)(2)(B)(ii)). We affirm.
The district court properly dismissed Stribling’s Fourteenth Amendment due
process claim because Stribling failed to allege facts sufficient to show that a
meaningful post-deprivation remedy was unavailable to him. See Hudson v.
Palmer, 468 U.S. 517, 533 (1984) (holding an unauthorized intentional deprivation
of property by a state employee does not constitute a violation of the procedural
protections of the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment if a
meaningful post-deprivation remedy is available); Barnett v. Centoni, 31 F.3d 813,
816-17 (9th Cir. 1994) (“California [l]aw provides an adequate post-deprivation
remedy for any property deprivations.”).
To the extent that Stribling alleged that the deprivation of his property
violated the Fourth and Eighth Amendments, the district court properly dismissed
these claims because Stribling failed to allege facts sufficient to state a plausible
claim. See Ashcroft v. Iqbal, 556 U.S. 662, 678 (2009) (to avoid dismissal, “a
complaint must contain sufficient factual matter, accepted as true, to state a claim
to relief that is plausible on its face” (citation and internal quotation marks
omitted)); see also Taylor v. Knapp, 871 F.2d 803, 806 (9th Cir. 1989) (Fourth
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Amendment does not protect an inmate from the seizure or conversion of his
property).
AFFIRMED.
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