IN THE SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS OF WEST VIRGINIA
January 2019 Term
_______________ FILED
No. 18-0936 June 6, 2019
released at 3:00 p.m.
_______________ EDYTHE NASH GAISER, CLERK
SUPREME COURT OF APPEALS
OF WEST VIRGINIA
STATE OF WEST VIRGINIA,
Plaintiff below, Petitioner
v.
DANIEL BECK,
Defendant below, Respondent
____________________________________________________________
A Certified Question from the Circuit Court of Marshall County
The Honorable David W. Hummel, Jr., Judge
Case No. 17-F-83
CERTIFIED QUESTION ANSWERED
____________________________________________________________
Submitted: May 14, 2019
Filed: June 6, 2019
Rhonda L. Wade, Esq. Kevin L. Neiswonger, Esq.
Eric M. Gordon, Esq. Neiswonger & White
Andrea C. Poling, Esq. Moundsville, West Virginia
Marshall County Prosecuting Counsel for Respondent
Attorney’s Office
Moundsville, West Virginia
Patrick Morrissey, Esq.
Attorney General
Lindsay S. See, Esq.
Solicitor General
Charleston, West Virginia
Counsel for the Petitioner
CHIEF JUSTICE WALKER delivered the Opinion of the Court.
JUSTICE WORKMAN concurs and reserves the right to file a separate opinion.
SYLLABUS BY THE COURT
1. “When a certified question is not framed so that this Court is able to fully
address the law which is involved in the question, then this Court retains the power to
reformulate questions certified to it under both the Uniform Certification of Questions of
Law Act found in W. Va.Code, 51-1A-1, et seq. and W. Va.Code, 58-5-2 [1967], the statute
relating to certified questions from a circuit court of this State to this Court. Syl. Pt. 3,
Kincaid v. Mangum, 189 W.Va. 404, 432 S.E.2d 74 (1993).” Syllabus Point 2, Pyles v.
Mason County Fair, Inc., 239 W. Va. 882, 806 S.E.2d 806 (2017).
2. “The appellate standard of review of questions of law answered and
certified by a circuit court is de novo.” Syllabus Point 1, Gallapoo v. Wal-Mart Stores,
Inc., 197 W.Va. 172, 475 S.E.2d 172 (1996).
3. Images of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct found in
temporary Internet cache files on a defendant’s computer are contraband in a prosecution
for a violation of West Virginia Code § 61-8C-3(a) (2014) on a theory of constructive
possession, where the State’s evidence proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant
knew of the cached images and exercised dominion and control over them. If the State
cannot prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew of the cached images and
exercised dominion and control over them, the cached images are still circumstantial
i
evidence that the State may use to prove that the defendant violated West Virginia Code §
61-8C-3(a).
ii
WALKER, Chief Justice:
In this case we consider a certified question concerning West Virginia Code
§ 61-8C-3 (2014) and child pornography found in the cache files of a defendant’s laptop
computer. Respondent Daniel Beck (Beck) is charged with one count of violating
§ 61-8C-3. By order entered October 19, 2018, the circuit court certified the following
question to this Court:
Is possession of a laptop computer containing cache files that
relate to material visually portraying a minor and/or minors
engaged in sexually explicit conduct, without evidence of
when or where said cache files were created and/or accessed
enough to establish the defendant knowingly and intentionally
possessed the material contained on said cache files in
violation within the meaning [sic] of West Virginia [C]ode
§[ ]61-8C-3(a)?[1]
The circuit court answered this question, “No.”
As the State acknowledges, the thrust of that question is “whether the
evidence in this case is sufficient to sustain a conviction for possession of material
depicting minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct” under § 61-8C-3(a). We decline to
respond to that question, though, because our answer would be an impermissible advisory
1
Emphasis in original. Section 61-8C-3(a) provides: “Any person who, knowingly
and willfully, sends or causes to be sent or distributes, exhibits, possesses, electronically
accesses with intent to view or displays or transports any material visually portraying a
minor engaged in any sexually explicit conduct is guilty of a felony.”
1
opinion that depends on disputed questions of material fact—namely the state of mind of
the defendant.2
Nevertheless, there is a legal issue in the question certified by the circuit court
that can be addressed at this point in the proceedings against Beck. We have held that it is
appropriate to reformulate a certified question when it
is not framed so that this Court is able to fully address the law
which is involved in the question, then this Court retains the
power to reformulate questions certified to it under both the
Uniform Certification of Questions of Law Act found in W.
Va.Code, 51-1A-1, et seq. and W. Va.Code, 58-5-2 [1967], the
statute relating to certified questions from a circuit court of this
State to this Court. Syllabus Point 3, Kincaid v. Mangum, 189
W.Va. 404, 432 S.E.2d 74 (1993).[3]
Under the authority granted to this Court by West Virginia Code § 58-5-2
(2012), we reformulate the circuit court’s certified question as follows:
May a jury consider images of a minor engaged in
sexually explicit conduct, contained in the temporary Internet
2
See Syl. Pt. 2, in part, Harshbarger v. Gainer, 184 W. Va. 656, 403 S.E.2d 399
(1991) (“Courts are not constituted for the purpose of making advisory decrees or resolving
academic disputes.”) (quoting Mainella v. Bd. of Trustees, 125 W. Va. 183, 185–86; 27
S.E.2d 486, 487–88 (1943)); Consol. Coal Co. v. Mineral Coal Co., 147 W. Va. 130, 145,
126 S.E.2d 194, 203 (1962) (“These conflicting allegations of the complaint and the answer
create a disputed question involving material facts which, of course, can not be considered
or resolved upon this certificate; and any such conflict in the material facts must be heard
and determined by the circuit court.”).
3
Syl. Pt. 2, Pyles v. Mason Cty. Fair, 239 W. Va. 882, 806 S.E.2d 806 (2017).
2
cache files on a defendant’s computer, as evidence of a
violation of West Virginia Code § 61-8C-3(a). Answer: Yes.
I. Case Background and Procedural Posture
On November 14, 2017, a grand jury returned a one-count indictment that
charged Beck with violating West Virginia Code § 61-8C-3(a) and -3(b) (2014). The
indictment alleged that on or about February 23, 2017, Beck knowingly possessed fifteen
images or files on his computer and that those images visually portrayed minor children
engaged in sexually explicit conduct.4
On May 18, 2018, the parties filed a joint motion to certify a question to this
Court addressing the issue of cache files. Prior to certifying the question, the circuit court
held a hearing to hear testimony about cache files from a State witness, Matthew Adams
(Adams). Adams is an investigator for the Ohio County Prosecuting Attorney’s Office,
and, for purposes of the hearing, Beck stipulated that Adams is expert in cyber-
investigation and recovery and acquisition of computer data. Adams testified about the
characteristics of cache files and their contents. He explained that a computer user does
not intentionally download information, including images, from the Internet to cache files.
Instead, a computer’s web browser automatically downloads information to the computer’s
cache files when the user views a website that displays images. The browser does this to
4
Beck was also indicted on an additional, unrelated count, which was later
dismissed.
3
enable a computer user to access that website more quickly in the future. In other words,
the information contained in the cache files enables the user to return to a website without
having to download the entire site again.
Adams explained that while a user has the ability to delete cache files from
his computer, the user does not intentionally create the files, in contrast to images that he
downloads and intentionally saves to his computer:
Circuit court: So a download of a file is different than a cache
of a picture?
Adams: Yes, sir. The way we’re speaking about it today,
yes, sir.
Circuit court: But a cache would indicate that that website or
that particular picture was viewed or this
computer connected with some computer that
had that image and it shows that in this example
his computer accessed that file?
Adams: Yes, sir. That’s correct.
Circuit court: If he manually or with purpose saved it to the
computer, you can tell that?
Adams: Yes, sir.
Circuit court: As a download file?
Adams: Yes, sir.
Circuit court: But if it’s a cache, that’s something that the
computer does by default?
Adams: That’s correct.
4
Adams also explained that he can use software called Forensic Tool Kit to
extract images from cache files even when a computer is not connected to the Internet. But
Forensic Took Kit is not available to the general public. And without it, Adams testified,
a lay person cannot access an image directly from a cache file and would have to seek out
that image on the Internet in order to see it again.
Following the hearing, the circuit court granted the parties’ motion to certify
a question to this Court. That question is as follows:
Is possession of a laptop computer containing cache files that
relate to material visually portraying a minor and/or minors
engaged in sexually explicit conduct, without evidence of
when or where said cache files were created and/or accessed
enough to establish the defendant knowingly and intentionally
possessed the material contained on said cache files in
violation within the meaning [sic] of West Virginia [C]ode
§[ ]61-8C-3(a)?
The circuit court answered the question “No,” then stayed the matter pending this Court’s
answer to the certified question.5
5
The circuit court did not explain its answer in the October 2018 order. But, at the
end of the hearing held in July 2018, the court stated that it concluded that possession of
cache files does not constitute possession of child pornography under § 61-8C-3(a) because
“[w]ithout forensic software, the user of the computer could not access the images in the
cache files.”
5
II. Standard of Review
“The appellate standard of review of questions of law answered and certified
by a circuit court is de novo[,]”6 meaning that “we give plenary consideration to the legal
issues that must be resolved to answer the question” certified by the circuit court.7
III. Discussion
Beck is charged with violating subsection (a) of West Virginia Code § 61-
8C-3. In pertinent part, that statute provides:
(a) Any person who, knowingly and willfully, sends or
causes to be sent or distributes, exhibits, possesses,
electronically accesses with intent to view or displays or
transports any material visually portraying a minor engaged in
any sexually explicit conduct is guilty of a felony.
We found a prior version of § 61-8C-3(a) to be unambiguous.8 We find the current version
of the statute is similarly clear so we accept the statute’s plain meaning.9
6
Syl. Pt. 1, Gallapoo v. Wal–Mart Stores, Inc., 197 W. Va. 172, 475 S.E.2d 172
(1996).
7
Michael v. Appalachian Heating, LLC, 226 W. Va. 394, 398, 701 S.E.2d 116, 120
(2010).
8
State v. Shingleton, 237 W. Va. 669, 686, 790 S.E.2d 505, 522 (2016).
9
See Syl. Pt. 2, State v. Elder, 152 W. Va. 571, 165 S.E.2d 108 (1968) (“Where the
language of a statute is clear and without ambiguity the plain meaning is to be accepted
without resorting to the rules of interpretation.”).
6
Numerous state and federal cases have analyzed the implications of child
pornography stored in temporary Internet cache files. These authorities instruct that child
pornography contained in cache files may be used in at least two ways in a prosecution
under § 61-8C-3(a), as contraband or as circumstantial evidence.
A. Method 1: Cached Images of Child Pornography as Contraband
First, child pornography stored in the cache files on a defendant’s computer
may be the “material visually portraying a minor engaged in any sexually explicit
conduct”—that is, the actual offense contraband. Under this approach, the images of child
pornography stored in the cache files on the defendant’s computer are themselves the
material banned by the statute.10 As one commentator has explained,
Under this approach, the computer is analogous to a file cabinet
and the cache is a file drawer. The user has reached out to the
Internet through use of a web browser and selected an image,
after which the computer automatically “files” a copy of that
image in its file drawer. Viewed this way, the possession of the
image begins when the image is cached and ends when the file
is deleted and overwritten by other data.[11]
10
As detailed below, this “present possession” approach is distinguishable from the
approach that views the cached images as “merely evidence of child pornography.” See,
e.g., State v. Linson, 896 N.W.2d 656, 659 (S.D. 2017) (“This Court has not previously
considered whether cached images are themselves the contraband that a defendant
possesses or whether they are merely evidence of possession of child pornography.”)
(emphasis added).
11
Ty E. Howard, Don’t Cache Out Your Case: Prosecuting Child Pornography
Possession Laws Based on Images Located in Temporary Internet Files, 19 BERKELEY
TECH. L.J. 1227, 1254–55 (2004) (hereinafter, Howard).
7
But, the presence of cached images of child pornography on a defendant’s
computer—standing alone—cannot prove that the defendant actually possessed that
contraband. As the State’s expert Adams testified, when a computer user visits a website,
the computer’s browser automatically saves the images displayed on that page to the
computer’s cache files. Thus, those images exist in the cache files although the user may
not know that they are there.12 Exactly for that reason, we cannot conclude that the mere
presence of child pornography in cache files on a particular computer proves that the
individual who controls that computer knowingly and willfully possesses child
pornography in violation of § 61-8C-3(a).13
Under the contraband approach the State may still proceed on a theory that
the defendant constructively, rather than actually, possessed the cached images.14 Our
12
See United States v. Dobbs, 629 F.3d 1199, 1201 (10th Cir. 2011) (recounting
expert testimony that “[t]he cache is populated with these images regardless of whether
they are displayed on the computer’s monitor. In other words, a user does not necessarily
have to see an image for it to be captured by the computer’s automatic-caching function.”).
13
Id. at 1205 (reversing conviction for knowing receipt of child pornography;
concluding “that the presence of the child pornography files in the cache of Mr. Dobbs’s
computer does not alone demonstrate—circumstantially or otherwise—his knowing
receipt of those files.”) (emphasis added).
14
Compare Syl. Pt. 4, State v. Dudick, 158 W. Va. 629, 213 S.E.2d 458 (1975)
(“The offense of possession of a controlled substance also includes constructive
possession, but the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had
knowledge of the controlled substance and that it was subject to defendant’s dominion and
control.”).
8
analysis of constructive possession in State v. Cummings is instructive.15 There, Cummings
argued that the State had not proven at trial that he constructively possessed matches and
pseudoephedrine (items commonly used to make methamphetamine) seized from a vehicle
when the State’s only evidence of possession was Cummings’s status as the vehicle’s
driver.16 We rejected the State’s theory that Cummings’s presence in the stopped vehicle
was enough to prove constructive possession at trial17 and, instead, adopted the rule that
“the State must prove beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant had knowledge of the
presence of the [contraband] and that [it] was subject to the defendant’s dominion and
control.”18 Applying that rule, we held that the State failed to prove that Cummings
constructively possessed the methamphetamine ingredients because it had not offered any
evidence that Cummings knew of or controlled those items.19
The circumstances in Cummings and those raised by the reformulated
certified question are parallel.20 In both scenarios, the question of constructive possession
15
220 W. Va. 433, 647 S.E.2d 869 (2007).
16
Id. at 439, 647 S.E.2d at 875.
17
Id. at 440, 647 S.E.2d at 876.
18
Id. at Syl. Pt. 4 (emphasis added) (quoting Dudick, Syl. Pt. 4).
19
Id. at 440–41, 647 S.E.2d at 876–77.
20
See United States v. Kain, 589 F.3d 945, 950 (8th Cir. 2009) (“The presence of
child pornography in temporary internet and orphan files on a computer’s hard drive . . . is
not conclusive evidence of knowing possession and control of the images, just as mere
9
turns on the defendant’s knowledge of the contraband and dominion and control over it.
Given those similarities, we believe that the logic of Cummings also applies in this context.
For that reason, we conclude that images of minors engaged in sexually explicit conduct
found in temporary Internet cache files on a defendant’s computer are contraband in a
prosecution for a violation of West Virginia Code § 61-8C-3(a) (2014) on a theory of
constructive possession, where the State’s evidence proves beyond a reasonable doubt that
the defendant knew of the cached images and exercised dominion and control over them.21
B. Method 2: Cached Images of Child Pornography as Circumstantial Evidence
The second way cache files may be used in a prosecution under § 61-8C-3(a)
is as circumstantial evidence. When the State cannot prove that a defendant constructively
presence in a car from which the police recover contraband does not, without more,
establish actual or construction [sic] possession of the contraband by a passenger.”).
21
See United States v. Kuchinski, 469 F.3d 853, 863 (9th Cir. 2006) (holding that
“[w]here a defendant lacks knowledge about the cache files, and concomitantly lacks
access to and control over those files, it is not proper to charge him with possession and
control of the child pornography images located in those files, without some other
indication of dominion and control over the images” and vacating sentencing order)
(emphasis added); United States v. Romm, 455 F.3d 990, 1005, 1006 (9th Cir. 2006)
(affirming conviction of possession of child pornography found in cache files where
evidence showed that the defendant knew of cache files and took steps to access and delete
them); United States. v. Tucker, 305 F.3d 1193, 1204, 1205 (10th Cir. 2002) (affirming
conviction of possession of child pornography found in cache files where defendant knew
the browser cached images and testimony before the district court established that images
in the cache files could be accessed, emailed, uploaded to the internet, or printed).
10
possessed child pornography found in his computer’s cache files, a jury may still consider
the cached images as circumstantial evidence of a prior violation of the statute.
Under this “evidence of” method, the cache files are no longer analogous to
a file cabinet in which a defendant stores the contraband images of child pornography.
Instead, the computer itself is analogous to a “video camera that records all of the activity
of the computer user.”22 Viewed in this manner, images found in the cache file are similar
to the video, itself, and can be a record of a computer user’s previous activity. Thus, the
cache files are circumstantial evidence of a violation of § 61-8C-3(a) at an earlier point in
time, but they do “not represent the literal contraband” under this approach.23 The Court
of Appeals of Georgia succinctly explained this distinction in New v. State:
In the case sub judice, even if the State did not (and could not)
present evidence that New was aware of the shadow copy
images’ existence and, thus, could not prove present
possession of those files, there was more than sufficient
circumstantial evidence for the jury to conclude that New
knowingly possessed child pornography on his computer at a
prior point.[24]
22
New v. State, 755 S.E.2d 568, 576 n.26 (Ga. 2014) (quoting Howard, 19
BERKELEY TECH. L.J. at 1255).
23
Id. at 576.
24
Id. (emphasis in original). See also Marsh v. People, 389 P.3d 100, 107–08 (Colo.
2017) (stating that “[i]t is for the fact-finder to determine the weight to give cache images
in light of all the other evidence in any given case”); Linson, 896 N.W.2d at 660 (agreeing
“with those courts holding that the mere presence of child pornography in a computer’s
cache is not sufficient to establish that a defendant knowingly possessed it; the cached
images are not themselves the contraband. Instead, cached images or files are evidence of
possession.”).
11
In short, under the “evidence of” method, the presence of child pornography in the cache
files on a defendant’s computer is circumstantial evidence of a violation of § 61-8C-3(a).
IV. Conclusion
Based on the analysis presented above, we hold that images of minors
engaged in sexually explicit conduct found in temporary Internet cache files on a
defendant’s computer are contraband in a prosecution for a violation of West Virginia Code
§ 61-8C-3(a) (2014) on a theory of constructive possession, where the State’s evidence
proves beyond a reasonable doubt that the defendant knew of the cached images and
exercised dominion and control over them. If the State cannot prove beyond a reasonable
doubt that the defendant knew of the cached images and exercised dominion and control
over them, the cached images are still circumstantial evidence that the State may use to
prove that the defendant violated West Virginia Code § 61-8C-3(a). Therefore, we answer
the reformulated certified question in the affirmative.
Having answered the reformulated certified question, we remand this case to
the Circuit Court of Marshall County for further proceedings consistent with this Opinion.
Certified Question Answered.
12