MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Jun 14 2019, 9:18 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Rodney T. Sarkovics Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Carmel, Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Matthew B. Mackenzie
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Anthony Steven Williams, Jr., June 14, 2019
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-CR-1808
v. Appeal from the Hamilton Circuit
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Paul A. Felix,
Appellee-Plaintiff. Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
29C01-1802-F3-768
Tavitas, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1808| June 14, 2019 Page 1 of 27
Case Summary
[1] Anthony Steven Williams, Jr., appeals from his convictions and sentences for
criminal confinement, a Level 3 felony; battery causing moderate bodily injury
and pointing a firearm, Level 6 felonies; battery with a deadly weapon, a Level
5 felony; and dealing in marijuana and possession of a controlled substance,
Class A misdemeanors. We affirm in part, reverse in part, and remand for
entry of a revised sentencing order.
Issues
[2] Williams raises six issues on appeal, which we restate as follows:
I. Whether sufficient evidence exists to support Williams’
conviction for criminal confinement.
II. Whether Williams’ convictions run afoul of double
jeopardy principles.
III. Whether the trial court erred in permitting the State to
amend the habitual offender information after the
commencement of trial.
IV. Whether the trial court improperly instructed jurors
regarding the habitual offender enhancement.
V. Whether the trial court’s treatment of Williams’ habitual
offender adjudication improperly resulted in a consecutive
sentence.
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Facts
[3] The facts most favorable to the judgment are as follows: From January 28 to
30, 2018, Eric Johnson stayed at the Fishers, Indiana, home of his long-time
friend, Ashley Jensen (“Ashley”). Williams was Ashley’s live-in boyfriend. On
January 29, Ashley and Johnson “got into a verbal altercation” during which
Johnson called Ashley “[a] wh*** and a c***.” Tr. Vol. II pp. 140, 144.
[4] On the evening of January 30, which was to be Johnson’s last night in town,
Johnson and Ashley planned to go out for drinks and to play pool with Ashley’s
friend, Kristen. Johnson was scheduled to fly home to Florida the following
morning. Around midnight, as Ashley, Kristen, and Johnson were “literally
getting ready to walk out the door,” Williams came home, accompanied by Jeff
Davis. Id. at 144. Johnson observed that Williams had a gun.
[5] Williams asked Ashley for a ride for his friends. Johnson objected and told
Williams that “it was unfair that [Williams] wanted to come in at midnight and
just expect [Ashley] to drop what she was doing to cater to [Williams] when
[Johnson] was leaving the next morning[.]” Id. Williams mentioned Johnson’s
“verbal altercation” with Ashley the night prior and said that “he was about
tired of [Johnson] being disrespectful.” Id. The men argued, and Williams
“came at [Johnson] and swung [at]” Johnson, missed, and grabbed Johnson
around his torso. Id. at 145. Johnson dropped to the kitchen floor, and
Williams “put[ ] him in a chokehold.” Id.
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[6] Davis “put his knee on [Johnson’s] chest, and Williams and Davis began
kicking, “swinging [and] throwing punches” at Johnson’s face and chest. Id. at
146. Williams hit the side of Johnson’s head with a gun. Id. Williams and
Davis ignored Johnson’s pleas “to be let up and to be let go.” Id. at 147.
“[T]hree or four minutes” later, Williams pressed his gun into Johnson’s back,
walked Johnson to the entrance of Ashley’s housing complex, and ordered
Johnson “to never come back.” Id. A bloodied Johnson flagged down a
passerby who called 911.
[7] Sergeant Joseph Wright of the Fishers Police Department responded to the
dispatch and encountered Johnson “scared, disoriented, and confused”;
Johnson was “bleeding severely from his face.” Id. at 199-200. Although it was
extremely cold, Johnson was not wearing a coat. Sergeant Wright called for
ambulance transport, and Johnson was taken to the hospital.
[8] Police investigators applied for a search warrant for Ashley’s house, but,
investigators, who went to the house, found no one at home. The investigators
remained on site and waited until Williams returned to the house; he was then
transported to Fishers Police headquarters, where Johnson identified Williams
in a lineup.
[9] Detective Robbie Ruble interviewed Williams and videotaped his statement.
Williams claimed to have acted in self-defense after Johnson called him a
“punk b****” and hit Williams in the back of his head. Tr. Vol. II p. 134.
Williams told Detective Ruble that his backpack was at Ashley’s house; he
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admitted owning the backpack’s contents. A subsequent search of Ashley’s
garage yielded Williams’ backpack, which contained mail addressed to
Williams; white, blood-spattered sneakers; a gun; a quantity of loose leaf as
well as individually-bagged marijuana; and tramadol, a controlled substance.
[10] On February 2, 2018, the State charged Williams with armed robbery and
criminal confinement, Level 3 felonies; battery resulting in moderate bodily
injury and pointing a firearm, Level 6 felonies; battery with a deadly weapon, a
Level 5 felony; and theft, dealing in marijuana, and possession of a controlled
substance, Class A misdemeanors. In a separate information, the State alleged
that Williams was a habitual offender.
[11] Williams was tried by a jury from April 16-18, 2018. The jury acquitted
Williams on the armed robbery and theft charges and found him guilty of the
remaining charges. In the habitual offender phase of the trial, the State
moved—over Williams’ objection—to amend the habitual offender information
to reflect that Williams had two—not three—prior unrelated felony convictions,
as the initial habitual offender information incorrectly provided. 1 In instructing
the jury, the trial court neglected to advise that, according to statute, of the two
prior unrelated felony convictions required for a habitual offender finding, one
1
On September 18, 2008, Williams was convicted of auto theft, a Class C felony; and on November 21,
2016, Williams was convicted of fraud, a Level 6 felony.
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must not be a Level 6 or Class D felony conviction. The jury subsequently
found that Williams was a habitual offender.
[12] At Williams’ sentencing hearing on July 5, 2018, the deputy prosecutor stated
the following in his closing remarks, “I do believe some of the counts do need
to be dismissed [for] double jeopardy purposes. We would ask that the Battery
Resulting in Bodily Injury and the Pointing of a Firearm both be dismissed for
double jeopardy purposes.” Tr. Vol. III p. 198. Defense counsel objected in the
following colloquy with the trial court:
THE COURT: All right. I will turn the floor back over to you,
[defense counsel], but before I do that it seems to me that the
State has asked to dismiss Count 5, Pointing a Firearm, due to
double jeopardy concerns, I suppose in relation to Count 2. And
also asked to dismiss Count 4 due to double jeopardy concerns in
regards to Count 3.
[State]: Yes.
THE COURT: I’m sure, [defense counsel], you don’t have any
objection to that?
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Well, actually, Judge, I do have an
objection. I’m not familiar under the law how the State can
dismiss counts that they have obtained a conviction on. It seems
to me like the horse has left the barn on that issue.
THE COURT: Well, the Court of Appeals is going to suggest
that I should not accept or enter a judgment against Mr.
Williams for offenses that would be a double jeopardy concern
for another offense for which he was convicted of.
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[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: Understood.
THE COURT: But if you want me -- it seems to me based on the
history of this case that the Court of Appeals will be looking at
this case in some point in time, so if you want the Court of
Appeals to have the full range of counts that he was convicted of,
ultimately I think the Court of Appeals will sua sponte remove
those counts on their own based upon double jeopardy issues.
[DEFENSE COUNSEL]: That may very well be, Your Honor,
but I don’t think the State has the ability to dismiss at this
morning’s hearing.
THE COURT: Okay, well, because of -- once again, because the
State’s asking for the sentences to be concurrent I don’t think
that’s going to affect the total sentence at all but, once again, I
think the Court of Appeals will get rid of those counts.
Id. at 198-99.
[13] The trial court then sentenced Williams as follows: for criminal confinement,
fifteen years, enhanced by ten years for the habitual offender finding, for an
aggregate sentence of twenty-five years, of which the court ordered that twenty
years should be executed in the Department of Correction, and five years
suspended to probation. As to the remaining convictions 2, the trial court
sentenced Williams as follows: battery with a deadly weapon, a Level 5 felony,
six years executed; battery resulting in moderate bodily injury, a Level 6 felony,
2
The trial court entered judgment of conviction as to all offenses, notwithstanding double jeopardy
considerations.
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two and one-half years executed; pointing a firearm, a Level 6 felony, two and
one-half years executed; dealing in marijuana, a Class A misdemeanor, one
year executed; and possession of a controlled substance, a Class A
misdemeanor, one year executed. The court ordered the latter sentences to be
served concurrently with Williams’ enhanced, aggregate twenty-five-year
sentence for criminal confinement.
[14] Specifically, as to Williams’ conviction for criminal confinement and the
habitual offender finding, the trial court’s sentencing order provides:
Count 2: Criminal Confinement, a Level 3 Felony, and Habitual
Offender Finding
Total sentence: 15 years in the Indiana Department of
Correction. This sentence is further enhanced by 10 years for the
Defendant being a Habitual Offender for a total of 25 years as to Count
2. . . .
Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 57 (emphasis added). Williams now appeals.
Analysis
I. Sufficiency of the Evidence
[15] First, Williams argues that the evidence is not sufficient to support his
conviction of criminal confinement with a deadly weapon, a Level 3 felony.
When there is a challenge to the sufficiency of the evidence, “[w]e neither
reweigh evidence nor judge witness credibility.” Gibson v. State, 51 N.E.3d 204,
210 (Ind. 2016) (citing Bieghler v. State, 481 N.E.2d 78, 84 (Ind. 1985), cert.
denied), cert. denied. Instead, “we ‘consider only that evidence most favorable to
the judgment together with all reasonable inferences drawn therefrom.’” Id.
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(quoting Bieghler, 481 N.E.2d at 84). “We will affirm the judgment if it is
supported by ‘substantial evidence of probative value even if there is some
conflict in that evidence.’” Id.; see also McCallister v. State, 91 N.E.3d 554, 558
(Ind. 2018) (holding that, even though there was conflicting evidence, it was
“beside the point” because that argument “misapprehend[s] our limited role as
a reviewing court”). Further, “[w]e will affirm the conviction unless no
reasonable fact-finder could find the elements of the crime proven beyond a
reasonable doubt.” Love v. State, 73 N.E.3d 693, 696 (Ind. 2017) (citing Drane v.
State, 867 N.E.2d 144, 146 (Ind. 2007)).
[16] Williams argues that “the jury was specifically informed that it could factually
find [Williams] guilty of confinement based upon an act which constituted
release.” Appellant’s Br. p. 19. Williams argues further that “releasing
Johnson was not an act of confinement as defined by law because the act was
not interfering with Johnson’s liberty.” Id.
[17] To convict Williams of criminal confinement, a Level 3 felony, the State was
required to prove that Williams knowingly or intentionally confined Johnson
without Johnson’s consent, while Williams was armed with a deadly weapon.
See Ind. Code § 35-42-3-3. The word “confine” is defined to mean to
“substantially interfere with the liberty of a person.” Ind. Code § 35-42-3-1.
[18] Here, the State presented evidence that Williams walked Johnson to the
entrance of Ashley’s subdivision with Williams’ gun pressed into Johnson’s
back and ordered Johnson to leave and never come back. It was the forced
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march at gunpoint that interfered with Johnson’s liberty, not Williams’ act of
releasing Johnson. Moreover, logically, a release follows a period of
confinement. That Williams ultimately released Johnson does not absolve him
of the confinement. Sufficient evidence exists to support Williams’ conviction
for criminal confinement with a deadly weapon.
II. Double Jeopardy
[19] Article 1, Section 14 of the Indiana Constitution provides, “No person shall be
put in jeopardy twice for the same offense.” Two or more offenses are the
“same offense” in violation of the Indiana Double Jeopardy Clause if, “‘with
respect to either the statutory elements of the challenged crimes or the actual
evidence used to convict, the essential elements of one challenged offense also
establish the essential elements of another challenged offense.’” Sistrunk v.
State, 36 N.E.3d 1051, 1053 (Ind. 2015) (quoting Richardson v. State, 717
N.E.2d 32, 49 (Ind. 1999)). The Richardson “actual evidence” test is not
violated if the evidentiary facts used to establish the essential elements of one
offense establish only one or even several, but not all, of the essential elements
of a second offense. Spivey v. State, 761 N.E.2d 831, 833 (Ind. 2002).
A. Enhancement for Use of a Deadly Weapon
[20] First, we address Williams’ argument that his use of a handgun was improperly
permitted to enhance both his convictions for criminal confinement and battery
with a deadly weapon, even though he “did not use the weapon repeatedly or
more than once.” Appellant’s Br. pp. 13-14.
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[21] We initially note that Williams has waived this issue by his failure to present a
cogent argument. See Ind. Appellate R. 46(A)(8)(a); see also Basic v. Amouri, 58
N.E.3d 980, 983-84 (Ind. Ct. App. 2016) (internal quotations and citations
omitted), reh’g denied. Waiver notwithstanding, we will address the merits of
Williams’ claim.
[22] Our Supreme Court has long adhered to the rule that precludes a “[c]onviction
and punishment for an enhancement of a crime where the enhancement is
imposed for the very same behavior or harm as another crime for which the
defendant has been convicted and punished.” Sistrunk, 36 N.E.3d at 1054
(quoting Richardson, 717 N.E.2d at 56). “[C]ommitting two or more separate
offenses each while armed with a deadly weapon—even the same weapon—is
not[,] [however] within the category of rules precluding the enhancement of
each offense based on ‘the very same behavior.’” Sistrunk, 36 N.E.3d at 1054.
Stated differently, use of a single deadly weapon during the commission of
separate offenses may enhance the level of each offense without running afoul
of the prohibition against double jeopardy. Id.
[23] Here, Williams threatened Johnson with harm from the gun during his
commission of the battery with a deadly weapon and criminal confinement
offenses. In each instance, the threat from the gun was distinct. For the
criminal confinement offense, Williams pressed the gun into Johnson’s back
and forced Johnson to walk at gunpoint out of Ashley’s housing complex. For
the battery with a deadly weapon offense, Williams struck Johnson’s head with
the gun during the altercation in Ashley’s kitchen. See Gates v. State, 759 N.E.2d
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631, 633 n.2 (Ind. 2001) (affirming judgment wherein defendant’s convictions
for rape, criminal deviate conduct, and criminal confinement were all enhanced
to Class B felonies for defendant’s use of the same knife); see also Miller v. State,
790 N.E.2d 437, 439 (Ind. 2003). We conclude that the trial court did not run
afoul of double jeopardy principles by enhancing Williams’ convictions for
criminal confinement and battery with a deadly weapon for his use of the same
deadly weapon.
B. Alleged Double Jeopardy Violations
[24] Next, Williams argues that his convictions for criminal confinement, battery by
means of a deadly weapon, battery resulting in moderate bodily injury, and
pointing a firearm violate the prohibition against double jeopardy. He argues
that “[t]he same facts used to convict [him] of criminal confinement were also
used to convict him of Battery by Means of a Deadly Weapon, Battery
Resulting in Moderate Bodily Injury[,] and Pointing a Firearm.” Appellant’s
Br. p. 10.
1. Battery Resulting in Moderate Bodily Injury
and Pointing a Firearm
[25] In addition to the constitutional test prescribed by Richardson, Indiana courts
adhere to rules of statutory construction and common law that prohibit multiple
convictions, as delineated in Justice Sullivan’s concurring opinion in
Richardson. Sistrunk, 36 N.E.3d at 1053-54. One of those rules prohibits
“[c]onviction and punishment for a crime which consists of the very same act as
an element of another crime for which the defendant has been convicted and
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punished.” Richardson, 717 N.E.2d at 55 (Sullivan, J., concurring). An
example of that rule’s application is Wethington v. State, 560 N.E.2d 496, 508
(Ind. 1990), in which our Supreme Court vacated a confinement conviction
because the confinement was coextensive with the behavior or harm necessary
to establish an element of the defendant’s robbery conviction. Id.
[26] We initially note that, at Williams’ sentencing hearing, the deputy prosecutor
moved to vacate Williams’ convictions for pointing a firearm and battery
resulting in moderate bodily injury. Defense counsel objected, and the trial
court indicated that the court was agreeable to vacating the convictions on
double jeopardy grounds. Ultimately, the trial court entered judgments of
conviction on “the full range of counts [Williams] was convicted of,”
acknowledging that “the Court of Appeals will sua sponte remove those counts
on [its] own based upon double jeopardy issues.” Tr. Vol. III p. 199.
[27] To the extent that Williams now alleges double jeopardy violations from the
trial court’s entry of judgments of conviction on his convictions, we agree with
the State that these claims are precluded by the invited error doctrine; however,
as our Supreme Court has determined, “a double jeopardy violation, if shown,
implicates fundamental rights and the invited error doctrine must ‘yield to the
constitution.’” See Roach v. State, 695 N.E.2d 934, 942 (Ind. 1998); see Cuto v.
State, 709 N.E.2d 356, 361 (Ind. Ct. App. 1999). We must, therefore, decline
the State’s invitation that we should allow convictions that violate double
jeopardy principles to stand. Because we find that there is a reasonable
possibility that the jury used the same evidentiary facts to establish the offenses
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of pointing a firearm and battery resulting in moderate bodily injury as it used
to establish battery with a deadly weapon and criminal confinement, we now
vacate Williams’ convictions for battery resulting in moderate bodily injury and
pointing a firearm on double jeopardy grounds as the trial court anticipated,
and we remand for entry of a revised sentencing order.
2. Criminal Confinement with a Deadly Weapon and
Battery with a Deadly Weapon
[28] Having vacated Williams’ convictions for battery resulting in moderate bodily
injury and pointing a firearm on double jeopardy grounds, we proceed to
Williams’ contention that “the same facts used to convict [Williams] of criminal
confinement were also used to convict him of Battery by Means of a Deadly
Weapon[.]” Appellant’s Br. p. 10. As stated above, the Richardson “actual
evidence” test is not violated if the evidentiary facts used to establish the
essential elements of one offense establish only one or even several, but not all,
of the essential elements of a second offense. Spivey, 761 N.E.2d at 833.
[29] To convict Williams of criminal confinement, the State was required to prove
that Williams, while armed with a deadly weapon, knowingly or intentionally
confined Johnson without Johnson’s consent. To prove that Williams
committed battery by means of a deadly weapon, the State was required to
prove that Williams knowingly or intentionally touched Johnson by punching,
kicking, and striking Johnson with a handgun—a deadly weapon.
[30] The Richardson “actual evidence” test is not violated here. The State presented
evidence of two separate incidents of criminal confinement. The first incident
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occurred in Ashley’s kitchen and involved Williams forcing Johnson to the
floor; hitting and kicking Johnson; hitting Johnson with a gun; and refusing to
let Johnson up or leave, as Davis held Johnson down. The second incident
occurred when Williams walked Johnson from Ashley’s house, at gunpoint, to
the entrance of Ashley’s housing complex and ordered Johnson to leave and
never return. We conclude there is no reasonable possibility that the jury used
the same evidentiary facts to establish the essential elements of the offense of
battery with a deadly weapon as it used to establish criminal confinement with
a deadly weapon. Williams’ convictions for criminal confinement, a Level 3
felony, and battery with a deadly weapon do not run afoul of double jeopardy.
III. Habitual Offender Amendment
[31] Williams argues that the trial court erred in allowing the State to amend the
habitual offender information after the jury was impaneled and his jury trial had
commenced. Specifically, Williams argues that “[the] amendment was
improper because the [habitual offender] information was not amended at least
30 days prior to trial, or in the alternative[,] [the] request was not made prior to
the commencement of trial.” Appellant’s Br. p. 14. The State counters that it
did not amend the habitual offender information but, rather, corrected a
scrivener’s error to comport with the applicable statute.
[32] Indiana Code Section 35-50-2-8(a) provides that “[t]he State may seek to have a
person sentenced as a habitual offender for a felony by alleging, on one (1) or
more pages separate from the rest of the charging instrument, that the person
has accumulated the required number of prior unrelated felony convictions in
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accordance with this section.” Also, Indiana Code Section 35-50-2-8(b)
provides:
(a) A person convicted of murder or of a Level 1 through Level 4
felony is a habitual offender if the state proves beyond a
reasonable doubt that:
(1) the person has been convicted of two (2) prior
unrelated felonies; and
(2) at least one (1) of the prior unrelated felonies is not a
Level 6 felony or a Class D felony.
Here, Williams was convicted of criminal confinement, a Level 3 felony.
[33] Indiana Code Section 35-34-1-5, governing, amendment of charges inter alia,
provides, in pertinent part, as follows:
(a) An indictment or information which charges the commission
of an offense may not be dismissed but may be amended on
motion by the prosecuting attorney at any time because of any
immaterial defect, including:
(1) any miswriting, misspelling, or grammatical error;
...
(6) any mistake in the name of the court or county in the
title of the action, or the statutory provision alleged to
have been violated;
...
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(9) any other defect which does not prejudice the
substantial rights of the defendant.
*****
(c) Upon motion of the prosecuting attorney, the court may, at
any time before, during, or after the trial, permit an amendment to
the indictment or information in respect to any defect,
imperfection, or omission in form which does not prejudice the
substantial rights[3] of the defendant.
I.C. § 35-34-1-5 (emphasis added).
[34] The first step in evaluating the permissibility of amending an information is to
determine whether the amendment was addressed to a matter of substance or
one of form or immaterial defect. Fajardo v. State, 859 N.E.2d 1201, 1207 (Ind.
2007), superseded in part on other grounds, Ind. Code § 35-34-1-5, effective May 7,
2007. If the amendment was one of substance, the trial court was not permitted
to allow it, regardless of prejudice or lack thereof, because it occurred after the
trial started. See Ind. Code § 35-34-1-5(b)(2). “[A]n amendment is one of form,
3
As we have previously stated:
A defendant’s substantial rights include a right to sufficient notice and an opportunity to
be heard regarding the charge; and, if the amendment does not affect any particular
defense or change the positions of either of the parties, it does not violate these rights.
Ultimately, the question is whether the defendant had a reasonable opportunity to
prepare for and defend against the charges.
Gomez v. State, 907 N.E.2d 607, 611 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009) (citations and internal quotations
omitted), trans. denied.
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not substance, if both (a) a defense under the original information would be
equally available under the amendment, and (b) the accused’s evidence would
apply equally to the information in either form.” Fajardo, 859 N.E.2d at 1207.
Even if the above two criteria are satisfied, however, the amendment may yet
be one of form, because “an amendment is one of substance only if it is
essential to making a valid charge of the crime.” Id.
[35] In support of his position, Williams relies upon Nunley v. State, 995 N.E.2d 718,
724-726 (Ind. Ct. App. 2013), clarified on reh’g, 4 N.E.3d 669 (Ind. Ct. App.
2013); however, Nunley is distinguishable from the instant facts. In Nunley, the
State’s original habitual offender information identified Nunley’s prior
convictions for theft and possession of cocaine as predicate offenses for
enhancing Nunley’s sentence. By application of an exception enumerated in
Indiana Code Section 35-50-2-8(d)(3), Nunley’s conviction for possession of
cocaine did not qualify for purposes of the habitual offender statute. The day
after a jury was impaneled for Nunley’s jury trial, the State sought leave to
amend the habitual offender information to delete the possession offense and
“to add additional theft charges that would go to a[] habitual offender
allegation.” Id. at 722. The trial court permitted the State’s amendment and
postponed the start of the trial to allow the defense to prepare.
[36] On appeal of this issue, a panel of this court reversed the trial court’s judgment
and concluded that, “[b]ecause the amendment was essential to the allegation
of Nunley being a[] habitual offender, and because Nunley’s defense under the
original information[,] [namely, that the State could not establish that he was a
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habitual offender based on the information as alleged] evaporated under the
amendment, the amendment was one of substance rather than form and was
not allowed under subsection (c).” Id. at 724. In Nunley, of the two predicate
offenses asserted by the State, one was excepted and, but for the substantive
amendment improperly permitted by the trial court, the State could not have
established that Nunley was a habitual offender.
[37] Here, the State’s original habitual offender information alleged that Williams
had three prior, unrelated felony convictions. To prove that Williams was a
habitual offender, the State was required to prove that Williams—if he was
convicted of a Level 3 felony—had two prior unrelated felony convictions of
which “at least one . . . [was] not a Level 6 felony or a Class D felony.” See I.C.
§ 35-50-2-8(b).
[38] By asserting three predicate offenses, the State included one more predicate
offense than was required under the statute. While this may be overkill, it did
not prejudice Williams. Unlike Nunley, Williams was not, thereby, stripped of
an available defense; nor was a predicate felony attributed to Williams that was
explicitly exempted from habitual offender consideration. Williams could
proceed with the same defense before and after the State’s amendment.
Moreover, the amendment was not “essential to making a valid charge” that
Williams was a habitual offender. See Fajardo, 859 N.E.3d at 1207. We,
therefore, conclude that the amendment was one of form that corrected an
immaterial defect; and because amendments of form may be made “at any
time,” we find that Williams suffered no prejudice to his substantial rights from
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the amendment of the habitual offender information after the commencement
of trial. See I.C. § 35-34-1-5(c).
IV. Habitual Offender Instruction
[39] Next, Williams alleges fundamental error regarding the trial court’s instruction
to the jury. Williams concedes that he did not object at trial; however, he
argues that the trial court improperly instructed the jury regarding the habitual
offender enhancement by failing to instruct the jury that “at least 1 of the prior
unrelated felony convictions [may] not [be] a level 6 or Class D felony
conviction.” Appellant’s App. p. 16.
[40] “Failure to object to a jury instruction results in waiver on appeal, unless giving
the instruction was fundamental error.” Wright v. State, 730 N.E.2d 713, 716
(Ind. 2000). An error may be fundamental and, thus, not subject to waiver, if it
is a “substantial blatant violation of basic principles.” Moreland v. State, 701
N.E.2d 288, 294 (Ind. Ct. App. 1998) (internal quotation omitted). “This
exception to the general rule requiring a contemporaneous objection is narrow,
providing relief only in ‘egregious circumstances’ that made a fair trial
impossible.” Pattison v. State, 54 N.E.3d 361, 365 (Ind. 2016).
[41] In considering a claim of fundamental error with respect to jury instructions, we
look to the instructions as a whole to determine if they were adequate. Munford
v. State, 923 N.E.2d 11, 14 (Ind. Ct. App. 2010). “When determining whether a
defendant suffered a due process violation based on an incorrect jury
instruction, we look not to the erroneous instruction in isolation, but in the
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context of all relevant information given to the jury, including closing
argument, and other instructions.” Boesch v. State, 778 N.E.2d 1276, 1279 (Ind.
2002) (internal citations omitted). When all information, as a whole, does not
mislead the jury as to the correct understanding of the law, there is no due
process violation. Id.
[42] As noted above, Indiana Code Section 35-50-2-8 provides that a person
convicted of a Level 3 felony, as Williams was, is a habitual offender if the State
proves: “(1) the person has been convicted of two (2) prior unrelated felonies;
and (2) at least one (1) of the prior unrelated felonies is not a Level 6 felony or a Class D
felony.” I.C. § 35-50-2-8 (emphasis added).
[43] In instructing the jury regarding the habitual offender enhancement, the trial
court stated:
In this case, the State of Indiana has charged the Defendant with
an additional count of the Information in this case that charges
the Defendant with being a[] habitual offender. This Count reads
as follows:
The charge, omitting formal parts, reads as follows:
That on or about January 31, 2018, in the County of Hamilton,
State of Indiana, Anthony Steven Williams, Jr. was a habitual
offender in that he accumulated two prior unrelated felony
convictions; to-wit:
One, the Defendant was convicted of and sentenced for Auto
Theft, a Class C felony, on or about September 18, 2008 in Cause
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Number 29D01-0804-FC-25 in the Hamilton County Superior
Court 1, Hamilton County, Indiana.
Thereafter, the Defendant committed Fraud, a Level 6 felony, on
or about June 28, 2016 and was convicted and sentenced for that
offense on or about November 21, 2016 in Cause Number
29D05-1607-F6-5369 in the Hamilton County Superior Court 5,
Hamilton County, Indiana; and
All of which is contrary to the form of the statute in such case
made and provided, and against the peace and dignity of the
State of Indiana.
The State may seek to have a person sentenced as a[] habitual
offender for a Level 3 felony by proving that the person has
accumulated two prior unrelated felony convictions.
The Court instructs you that Auto Theft and Fraud are both
felonies.
You may find the Defendant to be a habitual offender only if the State
has proven each of the following facts beyond a reasonable doubt: one,
the Defendant; two, committed and was convicted and sentenced for
Auto Theft, a Class C felony, and; three, later committed and was
convicted and sentenced for Fraud, a Level 6 felony, and; four, later
committed Count 2, Criminal Confinement, a Level 3 felony.
If the State failed to prove each of these facts beyond a reasonable
doubt, you must find the Defendant is not a habitual offender.
Tr. Vol. III pp. 178-79.
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[44] Williams takes issue with the trial court’s failure to instruct jurors that, in order
to arrive upon a habitual offender finding, “at least one (1) of the prior unrelated
felonies [may] not [be] a Level 6 felony or a Class D felony.” I.C. § 35-50-2-8
(emphasis added). While we agree with Williams that the trial court did not
include the above-emphasized statutory provision in its jury instruction, the
omission does not constitute fundamental error as alleged. First, the issue of
whether “at least one (1) of the prior unrelated felonies [may] not [be] a Level 6
felony or a Class D felony” is a question of law for the trial court to determine;
and, accordingly, no jury instruction was required.
[45] Moreover, the jury instruction at issue appears to be based on the Indiana
Pattern Jury instructions. See Santiago v. State, 985 N.E.2d 760, 763 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2013) (“The preferred practice in Indiana is to use pattern jury
instructions.”). Pattern Instruction 15.1240, regarding the elements for a
habitual offender adjudication where the defendant faces a Level 1, 2, 3, or 4
felony as the principal charge, provides:
The State may seek to have a person sentenced as a habitual
offender for a Level [1] [2] [3] [4] felony by proving that the
person has accumulated two (2) prior unrelated felony
convictions.
The Court instructs you that [name first alleged prior, e.g.
“burglary”] and [name second alleged prior] are both felonies.
You may find the Defendant to be a habitual offender only if the
State has proven each of the following facts beyond a reasonable
doubt:
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1. The Defendant:
2. committed and was convicted and sentenced for [name
alleged felony, e.g. “““““burglary”], and;
3. later committed and was convicted and sentenced for
[name alleged second felony], and;
4. later committed Count ____________ [and/or Count
____________ (name felony(s) of which Defendant was
convicted in Phase I), a Level [1] [2] [3] [4] felony.
If the State failed to prove each of these facts beyond a
reasonable doubt, you must find the Defendant is not a habitual
offender.
[46] The trial court’s habitual offender instruction here mirrored Pattern Instruction
15.1240 and properly conveyed the law to the jury; thus, we conclude that the
trial court did not err in instructing the jury.
V. Abuse of Sentencing Discretion
[47] Lastly, Williams argues that the trial court erred because it “did not attach the
habitual offender enhancement to [Williams’] level 3 felony conviction but
rather improperly ordered that his habitual offender enhancement be imposed
as a consecutive sentence.” Appellant’s Br. p. 20. He argues, “It cannot be said
that [Williams’] habitual offender enhancement is anything other than a
consecutive sentence if he received a 25-year sentence for a crime which [ha]s a
16-year maximum.” We reject this tortured argument, which reflects a
misreading of the pertinent statute.
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[48] Indiana Code Section 35-50-2-8 provides that “[t]he court shall sentence a
person found to be a habitual offender to an additional fixed term that is between
six (6) and twenty (20) years, for a person convicted of murder or a Level 1
through Level 4 felony. . . .” 4 I.C. § 35-50-2-8(i) (emphasis added). Indiana
Code Section 35-50-2-8 further provides:
Habitual offender is a status that results in an enhanced sentence.
It is not a separate crime and does not result in a consecutive sentence.
The court shall attach the habitual offender enhancement to the
felony conviction with the highest sentence imposed and specify
which felony count is being enhanced. If the felony enhanced by
the habitual offender determination is set aside or vacated, the
court shall resentence the person and apply the habitual offender
enhancement to the felony conviction with the next highest
sentence in the underlying cause, if any.
I.C. § 35-50-2-8(j) (emphasis added).
[49] In sentencing Williams, the trial court stated, in pertinent part, the following:
THE COURT: [ ] You were convicted of Count 2 in this case.
The matter of Criminal Confinement as a Level 3 felony. A
Level 6 felony carries with it a sentence between 3 to 16 years
with an advisory sentence of 9 years. The Court has reviewed
with you numerous aggravating and mitigating circumstances.
Based upon the aggravating circumstances, which I do believe
outweigh the mitigating circumstances, the Court believes that a
4
Here, Williams was convicted of a Level 3 felony.
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15[-]year sentence is appropriate in regards to Level 3, or in
regards to Count 2.
The Habitual Offender Enhancement will add ten years to that
sentence, making Count 2 a 25[-]year sentence. Of the 25 years,
I will order that 20 years are to be executed and 5 years
suspended. Of the 20 years that are executed, I will order that all
20 years are to be served in the Department of Correction[].
Tr. Vol. III p. 209.
[50] Thus, as explicitly prescribed by Indiana Code Section 35-50-2-8(j), the trial
court affixed the ten-year habitual offender enhancement to Williams’ felony
conviction with the highest sentence imposed—criminal confinement, a Level 3
felony—and specified which felony count the trial court intended to enhance.
The record establishes that the trial court enhanced Williams’ felony conviction
with the highest sentence and did not impose a consecutive sentence. We find
no abuse of the trial court’s sentencing discretion.
Conclusion
[51] Williams’ convictions for criminal confinement, a Level 3 felony, and battery
with a deadly weapon, a Level 5 felony, do not violate the prohibition against
double jeopardy; however, his convictions for battery resulting in moderate
bodily injury and pointing a firearm, Level 6 felonies, violate double jeopardy
principles. Accordingly, we vacate Williams’ convictions for battery resulting
in moderate bodily injury and pointing a firearm, Level 6 felonies, and we
remand for entry of a revised sentencing order.
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[52] The trial court did not err in enhancing two of Williams’ convictions for his use
of the same deadly weapon. Nor did the trial court err in allowing the State to
amend the habitual offender information after the commencement of trial to
correct a scrivener’s error. No fundamental error arose from the trial court’s
instructions to the jury regarding the habitual offender enhancement. Sufficient
evidence exists to support Williams’ conviction for criminal confinement. The
trial court did not improperly impose consecutive sentences when it sentenced
Williams on the habitual offender adjudication. We affirm in part, reverse in
part, and remand for entry of a revised sentencing order.
[53] Affirmed in part, reversed in part, and remanded.
Baker, J., and May, J., concur.
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