J. A12045/19
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION – SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
W.D.H : IN THE SUPERIOR COURT OF
: PENNSYLVANIA
v. :
:
A.V.H., : No. 162 WDA 2019
:
Appellant :
Appeal from the Order Entered December 20, 2018,
in the Court of Common Pleas of Erie County
Civil Division at No. No. 11399-2014
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., DUBOW, J., AND FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
JUDGMENT ORDER BY FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.: FILED JUNE 19, 2019
A.V.H. (“Mother”) appeals pro se from the December 20, 2018 order
that denied her request to have W.H. and D.H., the minor children of Mother
and W.D.H. (“Father”), reside with her and ordered that the custody orders of
March 26, 2018 and April 11, 2018, remain status quo. We dismiss.
At oral argument on this matter, this court cautioned Mother that defects
in her appellate brief may require dismissal of her appeal. A review of Mother’s
brief reveals that she has entirely failed to comply with Pa.R.A.P. 2111, which
sets forth the requisite contents of an appellant’s brief. Specifically, Mother
fails to include a statement of jurisdiction, a statement of both the scope of
review and the standard of review, a statement of the questions involved, a
statement of the case, a summary of the argument, an argument, and a short
conclusion stating the precise relief sought. Mother titles her brief “reply
J. A12045/19
brief.” In her “opening statement,” Mother states that the purpose of her brief
is to respond to allegations made against her by the trial court. (Mother’s
brief at unnumbered page 1.) Mother then sets forth her “reply,” which
consists of 14 bullet points setting forth her version of the case. (Id. at 1-2.)
Mother also includes a “closing statement,” which is a narrative of further
complaints Mother has concerning the trial court, as well as complaints
concerning Father.
As this court has stated, where, as here, “a court has to guess what
issues an appellant is appealing, that is not enough for meaningful review.”
Jones v. Jones, 878 A.2d 86, 89 (Pa.Super. 2005) (citation omitted). Here,
we do not know what issues specifically Mother wishes to appeal. She has not
directed us to any case authority from which to review the trial court’s
decision. Therefore, we could dismiss this appeal for the briefing defects
alone.
Although we are mindful that Mother is proceeding pro se, her choice
to do so does not relieve her of her responsibility to properly raise and develop
appealable claims. See Smathers v. Smathers, 670 A.2d 1159, 1160
(Pa.Super. 1996). Moreover, this court cannot act as Mother’s counsel.
See id. Accordingly, because the substantial defects in Mother’s brief
preclude us from conducting any meaningful judicial review, we are
constrained to dismiss this appeal. See Pa.R.A.P. Rule 2101; see also
Smathers, 670 A.2d at 1160-1161.
-2-
J. A12045/19
Appeal dismissed.1
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 6/19/2019
1 We recognize that the crux of Mother’s appeal is that the trial court erred in
not returning custody of her children to her because of the progress she has
made. Following a hearing, however, the trial court, while recognizing
Mother’s continuing progress, disagreed that this is the appropriate time to
return the children based on concerns with the stability of Mother’s living
conditions, which have not changed since the last custody review. At present,
the children’s needs are being met and their interests protected by the present
custody arrangement between Father and paternal grandmother. This does
not mean that, with continued progress, Mother may yet enjoy more
unsupervised time with her children. Custody cases always present difficult
issues for the trial court and this court. This court, however, is not permitted
to reverse a trial court’s decision on custody without a clear finding of error.
We find no error here.
-3-