In re Z.M.

2019 IL App (3d) 180424

Opinion filed June 21, 2019
_____________________________________________________________________________

IN THE

APPELLATE COURT OF ILLINOIS

THIRD DISTRICT

2019

In re Z.M., ) Appeal from the Circuit Court
) of the 12th Judicial Circuit,
a Minor ) Will County, Illinois.
)
(The People of the State of Illinois, )
)
Petitioner-Appellee, ) Appeal No. 3-18-0424
) Circuit No. 16-JA-42
v. )
)
Donald W., )
) The Honorable
Respondent-Appellant). ) Paula A. Gomora,
) Judge, presiding.
_____________________________________________________________________________

JUSTICE CARTER delivered the judgment of the court, with opinion.
Justice Holdridge concurred in the judgment and opinion.
Justice McDade specially concurred, with opinion.
_____________________________________________________________________________

OPINION

¶1 The respondent, Donald W., appeals from the circuit court’s order terminating his

parental rights as to his minor daughter, Z.M. On appeal, the respondent argues that (1) his right

to due process was violated throughout the proceedings terminating his parental rights, (2) the

trial court’s finding that he was an unfit parent was against the manifest weight of the evidence,
 and (3) the trial court’s finding that it was in Z.M.’s best interest to terminate his parental rights

was against the manifest weight of the evidence. We affirm.

¶2 I. BACKGROUND

¶3 On March 22, 2016, the State filed a petition alleging that Z.M., who was almost two

years old, was a neglected minor pursuant to section 2-3(1)(b) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987

(705 ILCS 405/2-3(1)(b) (West 2016)) in that her environment was injurious to her welfare. On

the same day, a shelter care hearing took place.

¶4 A. Shelter Care Hearing

¶5 At the shelter care hearing on March 22, 2016, Minnie Carr, a child protection specialist

with the Department of Children Family Services (DCFS), testified that on March 20, 2016, she

investigated a report of a domestic dispute at the apartment where Z.M. resided in Rockdale,

Illinois. A police officer told Carr that the apartment had “reeked of marijuana upon his entry”

and that respondent had called the police because someone had pulled a knife on him. Z.M.’s

mother was not at the apartment when Carr arrived. At the time of the incident, respondent had

not yet established paternity regarding Z.M.

¶6 Carr testified that respondent told her that, when he awoke that morning, Z.M.’s mother

and the cousin of Z.M.’s mother were in the living room smoking marijuana and he confronted

them. According to respondent, he was going to remove Z.M. from the home, but a knife was

pulled on him and he called police. Respondent indicated that he lived in the apartment and that

he has had custody of Z.M. for the past 1½ years. Respondent later gave Carr an address for

where he actually resides in Chicago, Illinois. Respondent could not participate in a safety plan

for Z.M. because his paternity of Z.M. had not been established.

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¶7 Carr spoke with Ariel, the cousin of Z.M.’s mother. Ariel indicated that she lived in the

apartment but Z.M.’s mother did not live in the apartment. Another cousin of Z.M.’s mother—

Yolanda—indicated that respondent did not live in the apartment but he was allowed to visit

Z.M. whenever he wanted and he sometimes spent the night. Ariel and her children lived in the

apartment, and Yolanda was in the process of moving into the apartment. Yolanda showed Carr a

letter from Z.M.’s mother granting Yolanda permission to care for Z.M. until further notice. Carr

also spoke with Z.M.’s mother, who indicated she was unsure if respondent was the father of

Z.M.

¶8 The trial court found probable cause to believe that Z.M. was neglected due to an

injurious environment. The factual basis for the trial court’s finding was that a domestic dispute

took place between Z.M.’s mother and respondent at 4 a.m. after respondent attempted to remove

Z.M., Ariel pulled a knife on respondent, and the apartment reeked of marijuana. The trial court

also noted that respondent had not established paternity. The trial court placed Z.M. in shelter

care and reiterated that the basis of its finding was “the domestic dispute between the parents,

smoking of marijuana, and the natural father not establishing paternity of the minor.” The trial

court ordered that Z.M. be placed in the temporary custody of DCFS and admonished respondent

and Z.M.’s mother to fully cooperate with DCFS to correct the conditions that required Z.M. to

be removed or they would risk the termination of their parental rights.

¶9 The trial court also ordered respondent to submit to a paternity test. The results of the

paternity test confirmed respondent’s paternity of Z.M.

¶ 10 B. Adjudication Hearing

¶ 11 On July 28, 2016, at the adjudication hearing, the parties stipulated that Z.M.’s

environment was injurious to her welfare and that Z.M. was a neglected minor, with the factual

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basis being that there had been “a domestic disturbance where [her] mother’s cousin had pulled a

knife on [her] father and the minor was present” and cannabis was being used in the home where

the minor was residing. The trial court accepted the stipulation of the parties and found that Z.M.

was neglected in that her environment was injurious to her welfare. At that time, a service plan

had not yet been established for respondent because he had missed two different appointments

for an assessment interview. The trial court ordered respondent to complete the assessment

interview with DCFS to determine what services he may need. The trial court admonished

respondent as follows:

“So you are going to need to do that fairly quickly because

in the next 30 days, we are going to have what is called a

disposition, which will determine whether or not [Z.M.] should be

made a ward of the Court.

And you will want to go through the service plan with your

attorneys so that they can kind of, they can look at the service plan

and decide also with you whether or not the services are those that

would be beneficial to you so that you regain custody of your

child.

***

This is your child. So you should be as involved as you can

be at this point. That means visiting, engaging the services, making

an effort, making progress with regard to the services.

If you are not getting the services in a timely fashion, you

need to talk with your lawyers. That is what they are here for. They

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 will in turn contact the caseworker and hound her to make sure that

you get into the services that you need or let me know about it the

next time we get together so I know that you are not getting the

services that you need in order to get your child back.

Our intention is not to keep your child in foster care for any

longer than we have to. And the ‘have to’ portion depends on you.

Okay. So it is very, very important that you are compliant with the

agency, that you do the services that are requested and demonstrate

that you are able to safely and appropriately parent your child. That

is all we are looking for.”

¶ 12 The trial court indicated that respondent’s interview would determine which services

would be necessary so respondent should set that up as soon as possible.

¶ 13 C. Dispositional Hearing

¶ 14 On October 26, 2016, a dispositional hearing took place. The State entered into evidence

the dispositional report, an addendum to the dispositional report, and the service plan dated

October 13, 2016, with no objection from respondent. In the dispositional report and addendum,

the caseworker indicated that respondent had been attempting to complete substance abuse

treatment since March 2016, tested positive for marijuana several times since the beginning of

the program, “recently” tested positive for both marijuana and cocaine (in September 2016), and

was referred to an intensive outpatient program due to the positive drug screen and missed drug

drops. The caseworker noted respondent’s substance abuse would have to be continually

monitored “due to extensive use since eighteen.” Respondent was to complete services of

substance abuse treatment, random drug testing, individual psychotherapy, and domestic

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 violence classes. He was also required to maintain adequate housing and income, improve his

parenting skills, and maintain an interest in the case. No other evidence was presented.

Respondent’s attorney noted that respondent was scheduled to complete parenting classes on

October 29, 2016, and he was “actively involved” in substance abuse classes, had stable housing

in Chicago, Illinois (although he admittedly still needed to provide proof of his housing to the

caseworker), had “income from a legal settlement that occurred sometime ago,” and was

working (although he admittedly still needed to provide his pay stubs to the caseworker).

¶ 15 The trial court found that it was in the best interest of Z.M. to make her a ward of the

court and found both parents unfit to care for, protect, train, or discipline Z.M., with the factual

basis being that “both parents have yet to complete services outlined in their service plan in order

for the minor to be returned home safely.” The trial court ordered that Z.M. be placed in the

custody and guardianship of DCFS, granted visitation at the discretion of DCFS, and set the

permanency goal for Z.M. as returning home within 12 months. The trial court did not admonish

respondent that he had the right to appeal.

¶ 16 D. Proceedings Following the Dispositional Hearing

¶ 17 1. Permanency Review Hearings

¶ 18 On April 26, 2017, at a permanency review hearing, respondent’s attorney indicated that

respondent had completed substance abuse treatment (on November 15, 2016), was in individual

counseling, and had supervised visits with Z.M. multiple times per week. The guardian ad litem

reported that, while respondent had completed his substance abuse program, he “tested dirty a

week before he was discharged” and had missed a random drug drop in December 2016. The

trial court ordered that drug screens be performed more frequently to determine “with certainty

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 that there is progress.” The trial court found respondent had made substantial progress toward the

goal of returning Z.M. home and set the permanency goal as returning home within 12 months.

¶ 19 On October 3, 2017, at a permanency review hearing, respondent’s attorney

acknowledged that respondent needed to “work on his drug drops” but indicated that respondent

had been visiting Z.M. and had completed individual counseling. Reports from the guardian

ad litem and the caseworker indicated that respondent had completed substance abuse treatment

on November 15, 2016, failed to appear for a drug screen on June 21, 2017, had a clean drug

screen on July 12, 2017, failed to complete a drug screen on August 4, 2017 (due to respondent

producing too little urine and then leaving the building even though he had been asked to remain

in the building to try again), and failed to appear on September 15, 2017. The result of the drug

screen performed on September 27, 2017, was still pending. The caseworker reported that since

the last court date respondent had completed individual therapy, was currently addressing

domestic violence issues in therapy, and had two-hour supervised visits with Z.M. once per

week. Respondent was allowed to visit Z.M. twice per week but failed to indicate another day

that he was available to do so each week. On September 20, 2017, respondent had submitted

proof of employment at a temporary staffing agency and three check stubs, each for one day of

employment. The trial judge stated, “I am going to order that the agency take the case to legal

screening, whatever the results are,” and changed the permanency goal to “return home pending

status.”

¶ 20 On November 6, 2017, at a status hearing, the caseworker indicated that the legal

screening had not yet taken place. The respondent’s attorney indicated that she was concerned

that respondent had not been receiving any drug testing. The caseworker explained that she had

not been requesting drug drops because respondent had tested positive for marijuana at the end

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 of September and was still “dropping dirty” after completing treatment. The trial court indicated

that the permanency goal was still returning home “so services should continue.”

¶ 21 On November 17, 2017, the caseworker confirmed that the matter had passed legal

screening. The trial court continued the case until January 3, 2018, for a status on the filing of the

termination petition. On January 3, 2018, the assistant state’s attorney stated:

“My first nine-month period is from July of 2016 to April

of 2017. Dad was satisfactory during that period. I don’t have a

second nine-month period. My second nine-month period doesn’t

end until January 28th.

So I can’t file anything until after January 28th.

Now, during the second nine-month period, there is no

progress; but during the first nine-month period, I’ve got

progress.”

¶ 22 On February 21, 2018, at a status hearing, the assistant state’s attorney confirmed that she

had not filed a termination petition because during the first nine-month period respondent had

been rated as “satisfactory” and she had been waiting for the completion of the second nine-

month period. 1 The assistant State’s attorney indicated that she wanted to review the

caseworker’s report to “determine whether or not there ha[d] been any changes or if [she could]

file a petition to terminate.” The caseworker reported that respondent had tested positive for

marijuana in September 2017 and January 2018. The caseworker indicated that she offered to

refer respondent to substance abuse treatment in his area but respondent had indicated that he

1
As noted above, Z.M. was adjudicated neglected on July 28, 2016, and at a subsequent
permanency review hearing on April 26, 2017, the trial court found respondent had made “substantial
progress.”

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had a provider and he would contact the caseworker with the information of that provider so that

she could provide a referral. Respondent confirmed that he was waiting on “Gateway to call

[him] back.” The following colloquy ensued:

“[RESPONDENT’S ATTORNEY]: Isn’t the agency

supposed to be making referrals instead of having dad do it?

THE COURT: Yes.

[ASSISTANT STATE’S ATTORNEY]: I believe she

indicated that she was having him call her with places in his area

so that she can refer him.

THE COURT: Can’t you reach out to DCFS in Chicago to

see what services are available near him so he doesn’t have to hunt

them down. I mean I understand if there are services in his area,

but it may be beneficial to have some assistance.

[CASEWORKER]: Okay. I will try DCFS in his area.

There are services in his area that he was aware of. I gave him

those.

THE COURT: He lives in Chicago.

[CASEWORKER]: I gave him those in his area when the

case first started, like five or six places, but he wanted to do

Stepping Stones which he attempted like three or four times.

THE COURT: Okay. We need a PRH [(permanency review

hearing)].

***

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 THE COURT: Is it going back to legal screening?

[ASSISTANT STATE’S ATTORNEY]: It doesn’t need to

go back to legal screening. I can make that determination based on

the information that [the caseworker] did provide me today.

THE COURT: Why don’t we have a status?

[ASSISTANT STATE’S ATTORNEY]: Judge, it passed

legal screening. It was my determination [that] I didn’t have

enough that first nine-month period. I was waiting for the second.

THE COURT: Okay. Why don’t we have a status on the

filing of the petition. I want to make sure that we don’t lose the

PRH [permanency review hearing] date.

¶ 23 The case was set for a status on the filing of the petition to terminate parental rights on

March 26, 2018, and a permanency review hearing on April 18, 2018.

¶ 24 On March 2, 2018, the State filed a petition to terminate respondent’s parental rights,

alleging that respondent (1) failed to maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, and

responsibility as to Z.M.’s welfare under section 1(D)(b) of the Adoption Act (750 ILCS

50/1(D)(b) (West 2016)); (2) failed to make reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were

the basis for the removal of Z.M. (from April 28, 2017, to January 28, 2018), pursuant to section

1(D)(m)(i) of the Adoption Act (id. § 1(D)(m)(i)); and (3) failed to make reasonable progress

toward the return of Z.M. during any nine-month period after the end of the initial nine months

following the adjudication of neglect (from April 28, 2017, to January 28, 2018), pursuant to

section 1(D)(m)(ii) of the Adoption Act (id. § 1(D)(m)(ii)).

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¶ 25 On April 18, 2018, a permanency review hearing took place. The most recent service

plan, dated March 20, 2018, indicated that respondent had provided proof of employment from

October 2017 through January 10, 2018, but provided no proof of employment thereafter.

Respondent did not make himself available for home visits, did not provided a new lease or rent

receipts, and did not communicate with the caseworker as requested. Respondent’s last positive

urine screen was on January 24, 2018, and he was assessed by his new substance abuse treatment

provider (Healthcare Alternative Systems (HAS)) on March 5, 2018. Respondent was

recommended for intensive outpatient treatment. He needed to sign consents for the caseworker

to receive reports from HAS. Without objection from respondent, the trial court found

respondent had failed to make reasonable efforts or reasonable progress and changed the

permanency goal to substitute care pending the court’s determination of the termination petition.

¶ 26 On May 18, 2018, Z.M.’s mother surrendered her parental rights. The case was continued

for a trial on the termination petition as to respondent.

¶ 27 2. Unfitness Hearing

¶ 28 On July 12, 2018, at the unfitness hearing, the caseworker testified that Z.M. was four

years old, and Z.M.’s mother had surrendered her parental rights to Z.M. the previous month.

Two service plans covering the six-month period of February to August 28, 2017, and the six-

month period of September 2017 to March 20, 2018, were entered into evidence. The services

that respondent was expected to perform, as outlined in the service plans, were to provide proof

of and maintain adequate housing; allow monthly home visits; provide proof of working utilities

and landlord information; provide monthly check stubs to show proof of employment; keep

DCFS informed of any changes in address, phone number, employment, or household

composition; sign releases and consents; complete a domestic violence assessment and any

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 recommended treatment; participate in individual therapy; submit to random urine screens;

complete a substance abuse assessment and any recommended treatment (including parenting

classes); attend all court dates; attend visits with Z.M. as scheduled; and call the caseworker at

least once a month to inform her of progress or problems.

¶ 29 The service plans and the testimony of the caseworker indicated that respondent had

initially attempted substance abuse counseling shortly after Z.M. had been removed in March

2016 but he had trouble maintaining sobriety. He tested positive for both marijuana and cocaine

on August 30, 2016, and was recommended for intensive outpatient treatment, which he

completed in November 2016. The caseworker had attempted to allow unsupervised visits

between respondent and Z.M., but respondent did not perform the requested drug drop for her to

do so in December 2016.

¶ 30 During the six-month time period of February through August 2017, respondent was a

“no show” from some requested drug screens (which are considered to be positive for drugs).

Respondent attended individual counseling and domestic violence treatment from March to June

2017 and was successfully discharged. On August 4, 2017, respondent missed a drug drop after

he left the building following a visit with Z.M., even though he had been requested to remain in

the building to redo a drug screen because he had produced too little urine in his first attempt. As

of August 31, 2017, respondent’s visits with Z.M. had become “sporadic,” with respondent

visiting three out of the eight available times per month. Respondent could have visited Z.M.

twice per week, but he failed to relay to the caseworker his availability for a second day per

week.

¶ 31 During the six-month time period of September 2017 to March 2018, the issues

respondent still needed to address were additional substance abuse treatment and consistent

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 visitations with Z.M. During that time, respondent’s visits with Z.M. remained inconsistent, with

respondent still only averaging three visits per month. Respondent missed a drug drop on

September 5, 2017, and tested positive for marijuana on September 27, 2017. The caseworker

spoke with respondent on October 4, 2017, and again on January 24, 2017, about which

substance abuse treatment provider he had chosen so she could provide a referral.

¶ 32 On January 24, 2017, respondent was asked to provide a urine screen after his visit with

Z.M., but respondent claimed not to have identification. After the caseworker verified

respondent’s identification, respondent submitted a clear urine specimen that did not have a

“temperature” after having refused to leave his coat in another room and turning away from the

person observing the drop. Respondent was instructed to give a second urine sample, which had

color and “temperature” and which was positive for marijuana. Respondent returned to substance

abuse treatment in March 2018, in Chicago. The caseworker did not have verification that

respondent had completed the program. The caseworker also did not receive another lease from

respondent after his lease expired in October of 2017.

¶ 33 Respondent testified that, during the pendency of this case, he had worked at a Pizza Hut

and he currently worked at a different fast food restaurant. He also testified that he had stable

housing in Chicago. Respondent testified that he was referred for substance abuse treatment in

October 2017 and January 2018, but he did not start treatment until March 2018 due to a problem

with his insurance. Respondent testified he had canceled or rescheduled some visits because he

“didn’t have car fare” to travel to Joliet from Chicago. Respondent testified that, during his visits

with Z.M., they played with toys and Barbie dolls and read books. Respondent brought fast food

to the visits and fed Z.M. Respondent also attended most court dates regarding Z.M. and

contacted his attorney when he was unable to do so.

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¶ 34 After the State had presented its evidence and prior to the respondent testifying, the

respondent’s attorney had motioned the trial court for a directed finding. At that time, the trial

court found that the State did not present sufficient evidence that respondent had failed to make

reasonable efforts to correct the conditions that were the basis of Z.M.’s removal. After

respondent testified and the attorneys gave closing arguments, the trial court found, by clear and

convincing evidence, that respondent was unfit in that he failed to maintain a reasonable degree

of interest, concern, or responsibility as to Z.M.’s welfare and failed to make reasonable progress

toward the return of Z.M. after Z.M. was adjudicated neglected, during the nine-month period of

April 29, 2017, to January 28, 2018. The trial court noted “the heart of the case [was] substance

abuse treatment as well as domestic violence” and respondent continued to test positive for

drugs, failed to show for requested drug screens, had difficulty obtaining and maintaining

sobriety, failed to complete intensive outpatient treatment (after being provided with treatment

facilities in his area), and only visited Z.M. once per week rather than twice per week, averaging

only three visits per month. The trial court also noted that respondent had tested positive for

marijuana on September 27, 2017, and January 24, 2018, and had been recommended for

intensive outpatient treatment, which he did not did not begin until after the applicable nine-

month period had ended.

¶ 35 3. Best Interest Hearing

¶ 36 At the best interest hearing directly following the unfitness hearing, the caseworker

testified that Z.M. had been placed in relative foster care with her maternal great aunt and uncle,

who are in their late forties and live in a three-bedroom home. The caseworker visited the home

at least once per month and had not observed any safety concerns. Z.M. had her own bedroom,

furniture, and toys. Z.M. called her aunt “mama” and her uncle “uncle.” The couple treated Z.M.

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 in a “loving and caring way.” The caseworker testified that Z.M. is closely bonded with her

foster mother. Z.M.’s foster parents viewed Z.M. as their daughter and viewed themselves as her

main caregivers. Interactions between Z.M. and her foster parents were appropriate, and Z.M.

appeared to be a happy child. Z.M. was doing well in preschool and had made friends. Z.M.’s

foster parents take Z.M. on various outings, do various activities with Z.M., and keep Z.M.

involved with her maternal extended family. Z.M.’s foster parents were able to provide for

Z.M.’s financial, medical, and emotional needs and were willing to adopt Z.M. The caseworker

testified that she believed it was in Z.M.’s best interest if Z.M.’s foster parents adopted Z.M.

Z.M. appeared to love her foster parents, and they love her.

¶ 37 The caseworker also testified that Z.M. was bonded to and loved respondent. Z.M. called

respondent “dad,” and their visits together were appropriate. During visits, respondent and Z.M.

played. Respondent talked with Z.M. and remained engaged with Z.M. throughout the entire

visit. He would also bring Z.M. food each visit and brought gifts at times as well.

¶ 38 Respondent testified that he last visited with Z.M. the day prior to the court hearing, and

Z.M. was “very happy” to see him. During the visit they played with toys and ate fast food.

During their other visits, respondent and Z.M. would also play and eat together. Respondent

testified that he loved Z.M. and that he was willing to continue to engage in services. He also

testified that he was able to financially support Z.M. through his employment and a monthly

settlement payment that he receives for $2100.

¶ 39 In ruling, the trial judge stated:

“I could say unequivocally, I understand that [respondent] loves

his daughter.

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 It’s also this Court’s responsibility to make sure that the

minor is provided permanency in their [sic] life and are able to

reside in a home where she’s going to be taken care of.

During the time period that was alleged by the State, the

services that needed to be completed mainly again, substance

abuse treatment, was not completed. Again, the matter came in in

2016.”

¶ 40 The trial court found, by a preponderance of the evidence, that it was in the best interest

of Z.M. that respondent’s parental rights be terminated. Respondent appealed.

¶ 41 II. ANALYSIS

¶ 42 On appeal, respondent argues that the trial court’s decision to terminate his parental rights

should be reversed because (1) his right to due process was violated during the termination

proceedings by the trial court failing to admonish him of his right to appeal following the entry

of the dispositional order entered on October 26, 2016, the State not having an objective reason

to recommend substance abuse treatment as part of respondent’s service plan, the trial court

ordering DCFS to take the case to legal screening sua sponte, DCFS failing to refer respondent

to additional substance abuse treatment in September 2017, and his parental rights having been

terminated for no reason other than a recreational use of cannabis; (2) the trial court’s findings

that respondent was unfit pursuant to sections 1(D)(b) and section 1(D)(m)(ii) of the Adoption

Act were against the manifest weight of the evidence; and (3) the trial court erred in finding that

it was in Z.M.’s best interest to terminate respondent’s parental rights.

¶ 43 A. Due Process

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¶ 44 Pursuant to the fourteenth amendment of the United States Constitution no person shall

be deprived of life, liberty, or property without due process of law. U.S. Const., amend. XIV,

§ 1. The due process clause provides “ ‘heightened protection against government interference

with certain fundamental rights and liberty interests.’ ” In re M.H., 196 Ill. 2d 356, 362 (2001)

(quoting Washington v. Glucksberg, 521 U.S. 702, 720 (1997)). These liberty interests that are

protected by the due process clause include a parent’s fundamental right in the care, custody, and

control of his or her children. Id. at 362-63. Due process in the context of interference with

parental rights is achieved by compliance with the provisions of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987

and fundamental fairness. In re D.T., 2017 IL App (3d) 170120, ¶ 23. Claims of due process

violations are questions of law that we review de novo. In re A.M., 402 Ill. App. 3d 720, 723

(2010); In re D.W., 214 Ill. 2d 289, 309 (2005).

¶ 45 In Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319, 335 (1976), the United States Supreme Court

identified three factors to be considered when determining what due process safeguards require

in proceedings that implicate fundamental liberty interests: (1) the private interest implicated by

the official action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation of that interest through the

proceedings used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or substitute safeguards; and

(3) the government’s interest, including the function involved and the fiscal and administrative

burdens that the additional or substitute safeguards would entail. In re Andrea F., 208 Ill. 2d 148,

165 (2003) (citing Mathews, 424 U.S. at 335). The Mathews factors have been applied to cases

involving the termination of parental rights. Id.

¶ 46 1. Right to Appeal the Dispositional Order

¶ 47 First on appeal, respondent argues the trial court erred by failing to admonish him of his

right to appeal following the entry of the dispositional order entered on October 26, 2016, and

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 requests that this court vacate all proceedings subsequent to the entry of the dispositional order.

Respondent did not raise this issue in the trial court and requests that we review the issue for

plain error. See People v. Herron, 215 Ill. 2d 167, 178-79 (2005) (the plain error doctrine allows

this court to consider forfeited issues when a clear or obvious error occurred and the evidence is

closely balanced or the error affects substantial rights). Respondent notes that he had stipulated

that Z.M. was neglected and contends that “[h]is stipulation to neglect was in essence a guilty

plea.” Analogizing the stipulation in this case to a guilty plea in a criminal case, respondent

argues he would have had to have filed a motion to withdraw his stipulation that Z.M. was

neglected in order to appeal the dispositional order entered in this case and, thus, should have

received admonishments “similar to the requirements of Rule 605(b).” See Ill. S. Ct. R. 605(b)

(eff. Oct. 1, 2001) (providing, inter alia, that when a judgment is entered upon a plea of guilty, at

the time of imposing sentence, the defendant should be admonished that prior to taking an appeal

the defendant must file a written motion asking the trial court to reconsider the sentence or

vacate the judgment and for leave to withdraw the plea of guilty). Respondent contends that, as a

result of the trial court’s error of failing to admonish him of his right to appeal the dispositional

order, “all proceedings subsequent to October 26, 2016, including the termination of [his]

parental rights should be vacated and the case remanded for a redo.”

¶ 48 In response, the State concedes the trial court’s error in failing to admonish respondent of

his right to appeal the dispositional order entered on October 26, 2016. The State, however,

argues that respondent’s argument is an attack on the dispositional order entered on October 26,

2016, over which this court lacks jurisdiction because respondent failed to file a timely notice of

appeal or late notice of appeal pursuant to Illinois Supreme Court Rule 303 (eff. July 1, 2017).

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 The State, therefore, contends that this court should dismiss respondent’s appeal “relative to the

arguments regarding the original dispositional order.”

¶ 49 In reply, respondent reiterates that he is not contesting the entry of the dispositional order

or the neglect finding but that he is “appealing the trial court’s failure to advise him of his

appellate right which denied him due process.”

¶ 50 Here, as the State concedes, the trial court erred by failing to admonish respondent of his

right to appeal following the entry of the dispositional order. See 705 ILCS 405/1-5(3) (West

2016) (providing that, at the dispositional hearing, “the court shall inform the parties of their

right to appeal therefrom as well as from any other final judgment of the court”). We agree with

the State that we lack jurisdiction to review the adjudication and dispositional orders entered in

this case because respondent did not file a timely notice of appeal or motion to file a late notice

of appeal in regard to the adjudication or dispositional orders. See In re Zariyah A., 2017 IL App

(1st) 170971, ¶ 65 (citing In re Barion S., 2012 IL App (1st) 113026, ¶ 36 (the dispositional

order is a final and appealable order)); Ill. S. Ct. R. 303 (eff. July 1, 2017) (a notice of appeal in a

civil case must be filed within 30 days after entry of the final order, unless the appellant files a

motion to file a late notice of appeal within 30 days after the expiration of time to file the notice

of appeal showing a reasonable excuse for failing to file a timely notice of appeal). Contrary to

the State’s assertion, respondent has not raised any issue pertaining to the validity of the

dispositional order entered on October 26, 2016. Rather, respondent argues that “all proceedings

subsequent to October 26, 2016, including the termination of [his] parental rights should be

vacated and the case remanded for a redo.” This appeal, which is from the final order terminating

respondent’s parental rights, was timely filed. See Ill. S. Ct. R. 303 (eff. July 1, 2017). We,

therefore, have jurisdiction to review respondent’s arguments on appeal.

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¶ 51 In applying the Mathews factors in this case, we do not find that due process requires this

court to vacate the proceedings subsequent to the dispositional hearing. Here, the private interest

at stake is respondent’s interest in the control, custody, and care of his child, Z.M., which is a

fundamental right that will not be terminated lightly. See M.H., 196 Ill. 2d at 362-63. The trial

court’s procedural error of failing to admonish respondent of his right to appeal following the

entry of the dispositional order increased the risk of an erroneous deprivation of respondent’s

rights, which implicates the perceptions of judicial fairness and the integrity of the judicial

proceedings. See A.M., 402 Ill. App. 3d at 725. However, there would be little value in vacating

the proceedings subsequent to the dispositional hearing as a substitute safeguard because there is

no indication that respondent would have appealed from the dispositional order or that there was

any issue of merit that could have been raised in such an appeal. See In re S.P., 2019 IL App (3d)

180476, ¶ 48. Additionally, in considering the governmental interest involved, vacating the 18

months of proceedings subsequent to the entry of the dispositional hearing in this case would be

unduly burdensome upon the State’s interests of preserving and promoting Z.M.’s welfare and

reducing the cost and burden of the termination proceedings. See M.H., 196 Ill. 2d at 367 (the

State’s interests in parental termination proceedings are an interest in preserving and promoting

the welfare of the child and an administrative interest in reducing the cost and burden of such

proceedings); A.M., 402 Ill. App. 3d at 725 (delays in termination of parental rights proceedings

impose a serious cost on the function of the government and intangible costs to the lives of the

children involved). Therefore, our application of the Mathews factors indicates that due process

does not require this court to vacate the proceedings following the entry of the dispositional

order entered in this case.

¶ 52 2. Requiring Substance Abuse Treatment

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¶ 53 In so far as respondent is arguing that “due process require[d] the State to have an

objective reason to recommend substance abuse treatment,” we find the issue to be without

merit. “Any tasks the court requires of the parents, guardian, or legal custodian or child prior to

returning the child home, must be reasonably related to remedying a condition or conditions that

gave rise to or which could give rise to any finding of child abuse or neglect.” 705 ILCS 405/2-

28(2) (West 2016).

¶ 54 In this case, requiring respondent to complete substance abuse treatment as part of his

service plan was reasonably related to remedying the condition that gave rise to Z.M. being

removed from the home on March 20, 2016. At the adjudication hearing on July 28, 2016,

respondent stipulated that Z.M. was neglected, with the factual basis being that a knife had been

pulled on respondent and cannabis was being used in the home where Z.M. resided. Although

respondent claimed that Z.M.’s mother and her cousin were responsible for the marijuana smell

in the home, the fact remains that Z.M. was removed, in part, because of drug use in the home.

At the time of the adjudication hearing on July 28, 2016, there was no service plan for

respondent in place because respondent had failed to attend two scheduled assessment interviews

with DCFS, but he had begun substance abuse treatment shortly after Z.M. was removed in

March 2016, and respondent had tested positive for marijuana “several times in the beginning of

[that] program.” Additionally, on August 30, 2016, respondent submitted a urine sample that was

positive for both marijuana and cocaine. Based on the record before us, there is no merit to

respondent’s assertion that there was not an objective reason for the State to recommend

substance abuse treatment.

¶ 55 3. Legal Screening

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¶ 56 Respondent contends the manner in which this case was referred to legal screening

violated his right to due process. Specifically, respondent argues that the trial court improperly

“assumed a prosecutorial function” by sua sponte ordering DCFS to send the case to “legal

screening.” The State argues that the trial court had ordered DCFS to take the case to legal

screening “whatever the results are,” which was not a predetermination by the trial court as to

whether respondent’s parental rights should have been terminated.

¶ 57 In this case, at the time of the permanency review hearing at which the trial court ordered

DCFS to send the case to legal screening, it had been 15 months since Z.M. had been adjudicated

neglected. Since the adjudication of neglect on July 28, 2016, respondent completed outpatient

substance abuse treatment on November 15, 2016, but continuously missed drug drops for the

next year. At the permanency hearing on October 3, 2017, the trial court ordered DCFS to take

the case to legal screening and changed the permanency goal to return home pending a status

hearing, as the trial court was authorized to do so pursuant to section 2-28(2)(B-1) of the

Juvenile Court Act of 1987. See id. § 2-28(2)(B-1) (at the permanency review hearing, the trial

court shall set one of the listed permanency goals, which includes the goal of the minor being “in

short-term care with a continued goal to return home pending a status hearing”). Pursuant to the

Illinois Administrative Code, “[w]hen one of the grounds for termination of parental rights

appears to exist and return home as a permanency goal for the child is no longer appropriate,

[DCFS] shall conduct an internal legal screening.” 89 Ill. Adm. Code 309.80(a) (2018). We find

no error committed by the trial court in ordering DCFS to take the case to legal screening where

grounds for termination of respondent’s parental rights appeared to exist and the trial court had

changed the permanency goal to return home pending a status hearing. See id.

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¶ 58 Moreover, respondent’s due process rights were not violated by the trial court ordering

the case to go to legal screening. The trial court made no determination as to whether the State

should file a termination of parental rights petition. The purpose of DCFS conducting an internal

legal screening is to determine (1) whether there is sufficient evidence to support a finding that

there are grounds for termination of parental rights, (2) whether it is in the best interest of the

child to seek termination of parental rights, and (3) steps that need to be completed to permit the

filing of a petition to terminate parental rights. 89 Ill. Adm. Code 309.80(b) (2018). Here, there

was no risk of an erroneous deprivation of respondent’s parental rights solely because the trial

court ordered that the case be submitted for a legal screening where the permanency goal

remained returning home and DCFS was still obligated to provide reunification services. See 705

ILCS 405/2-28(2) (West 2016) (where the court has selected a permanency goal other than

returning home for a child age 15 or under, DCFS shall not provide further reunification

services). Thus, we find no violation of respondent’s due process rights as the result of the

manner in which this case was referred to legal screening.

¶ 59 4. Failure to Refer Respondent to Additional Substance Abuse Treatment

¶ 60 Respondent argues that he should have been referred to additional substance abuse

treatment in September 2017. He contends that DCFS requiring him to find a treatment provider

in his area was a “delaying tactic” that was used while “the State waited for the clock to run out

on the second nine month period to file a petition to terminate parental rights.”

¶ 61 Here, during the relevant nine-month period respondent missed a drug drop on September

15, 2017, and tested positive for marijuana on September 27, 2017. At the permanency review

hearing on October 3, 2017, the trial court ordered that the case be submitted to legal screening

and changed the permanency goal to returning home pending a status hearing (id. § 2-28(2)(B-

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 1)). Respondent acknowledges that on October 4, 2017, the day after the permanency review

hearing, he and the caseworker met “to discuss substance abuse providers in his area.” The

caseworker had previously given respondent information for numerous service providers in

respondent’s area and attempted to coordinate further services for respondent when they met on

October 4, 2017. Respondent hindered those efforts by indicating that he would choose the

treatment provider but failing to relay the provider’s information to the caseworker so she could

provide a referral. Respondent failed to select a treatment provider and again tested positive for

marijuana in January 2018. Based on this record, there is no merit to respondent’s argument that

DCFS had “given up” on him or that DCFS did not refer him to relapse counseling or additional

treatment in an attempt to “run out the clock” on his parental rights.

¶ 62 5. Recreational Use of Cannabis

¶ 63 Respondent also argues that his right to due process was violated because his parental

rights were terminated over a “recreational” use of cannabis, which he contends was conduct that

was “less serious than a speeding ticket.” We interpret respondent’s arguments to be that due

process required the State and the trial court to view his marijuana use as a nonfactor in this case.

¶ 64 In examining the Mathews factors, we again note that respondent has a private interest in

the control, custody, and care of his child. See M.H., 196 Ill. 2d at 362. The trial court

considering respondent’s marijuana use did not create a risk of an erroneous deprivation of

respondent’s parental rights in this case where there is no indication that the trial court failed to

comply with the provisions of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 in doing so. See D.T., 2017 IL App

(3d) 170120, ¶ 23 (due process in the context of interference with parental rights is achieved by

compliance with the provisions of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 and fundamental fairness).

Additionally, ignoring respondent’s marijuana use in this case would have been of little value

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 when balanced against the government’s interests of preserving and promoting Z.M.’s welfare

and reducing the cost and burden of the termination proceedings. See M.H., 196 Ill. 2d at 367.

Regardless of whether respondent’s suspected substance abuse pertained to marijuana, alcohol,

prescription medication, or any other substance, whether legal or illegal, respondent’s right to

due process was not violated where Z.M. was not returned home partly because the issue of

respondent’s suspected substance abuse remained unresolved as the result of respondent

continuing to miss requested drug screens, testing positive for marijuana, and failing to comply

with securing an additional treatment provider. See In re C.N., 196 Ill. 2d 181, 216-17 (2001)

(the benchmark for measuring a parent’s progress toward the return of the child encompasses the

parent’s compliance with the service plans and the court’s directives in light of the conditions

that gave rise to the removal of the child and in light of other conditions that later become known

that would prevent the court from returning custody of the child to the parent). In applying the

Mathews factors, we do not find that due process required the trial court or the State to ignore

respondent’s marijuana use in this case. See Andrea F., 208 Ill. 2d at 165 (citing Mathews, 424

U.S. at 335).

¶ 65 B. Unfitness

¶ 66 On appeal, respondent also argues that the trial court’s findings were against the manifest

weight of the evidence where the trial court found that respondent was unfit for failing to

maintain a reasonable degree of interest, concern, and responsibility as to Z.M.’s welfare

pursuant to section 1(D)(b) of the Adoption Act and for failing to make reasonable progress

toward the return of Z.M. during any nine-month period after the end of the initial nine months

following the adjudication of neglect pursuant to section 1(D)(m)(ii) of the Adoption Act, with

the nine-month period being April 28, 2017, to January 28, 2018. The State and the guardian

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 ad litem for Z.M. both argue that the trial court’s findings were not against the manifest weight

of the evidence.

¶ 67 In reviewing a trial court’s finding of parental unfitness, the trial court’s decision will not

be reversed on appeal unless the finding was against the manifest weight of the evidence. C.N.,

196 Ill. 2d at 208. Only if the record shows that it is clearly apparent that the trial court should

have reached the opposite conclusion should the trial court’s decision be deemed to be against

the manifest weight of the evidence. Id.

¶ 68 In this case, the trial court found respondent was unfit pursuant to section 1(D)(m)(ii) of

the Adoption Act because he failed to make reasonable progress during the nine-month period of

April 28, 2017, to January 28, 2018. See 750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m)(ii) (West 2016) (a ground of

parental unfitness is the failure “to make reasonable progress toward the return of the child to the

parent during any 9-month period following the adjudication of” neglect). Our supreme court has

interpreted section 1(D)(m)(ii) as requiring a parent to make demonstrable movement toward the

goal of reunification. C.N., 196 Ill. 2d at 211. The benchmark for measuring a parent’s

reasonable progress includes compliance with service plans and court directives in light of the

condition that gave rise to the removal of the child and other conditions that later become known

that would prevent the court from returning custody of the child to the parent. Id. at 216-17.

Reasonable progress occurs when the trial court can conclude that the progress being made by a

parent to comply with the directives given for the return of the minor is sufficiently demonstrable

and of such quality that the court would be able to order the child returned to the parent’s

custody in the near future. In re J.H., 2014 IL App (3d) 140185, ¶ 22. In determining whether a

parent has made reasonable progress toward the return home of the minor, the trial court is to

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 consider evidence occurring only during the relevant nine-month period. In re J.L., 236 Ill. 2d

329, 341 (2010).

¶ 69 During the relevant nine-month period in this case, respondent failed to comply with

requirements of the service plans and the court’s directives. Respondent failed to complete

requested drug screens on June 21, August 4, and September 5, 2017, and he tested positive for

marijuana on September 15, 2017, and January 24, 2018. In the beginning of the case, the

caseworker provided respondent a list of substance abuse providers near where respondent

resided in Chicago. In October 2017 and January 2018, the caseworker and respondent discussed

respondent’s needing to secure additional substance abuse treatment. Respondent indicated that

he would contact the caseworker with the information of his preferred treatment provider so that

she could give a referral for treatment, but respondent failed to do so. Respondent did not start

treatment until March 2018, which was beyond the relevant nine-month period. Additionally,

during the nine-month period, respondent’s visits with Z.M. had become sporadic. While

respondent testified he canceled or rescheduled some weekly visits because he did not have “car

fare” to travel to Joliet, there is no indication that he relayed this issue to the caseworker or to the

trial court at any point during the relevant nine-month period. Rather, the evidence is clear that

while respondent could have visited Z.M. twice per week, he only attended visits approximately

once per week and averaged only three visits per month.

¶ 70 Therefore, based on our review of the evidence presented at the unfitness hearing, the

trial court’s finding that respondent failed to make reasonable progress during the relevant nine-

month period was not against the manifest weight of the evidence. Because only one ground for

a finding of unfitness is necessary to uphold the trial court’s finding of parental unfitness, we

need not review the other basis for the court’s unfitness finding. See In re Gwynne P., 215 Ill. 2d

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 340, 349 (2005) (a parent’s rights may be terminated if even a single alleged ground for unfitness

is supported by the evidence).

¶ 71 C. Best Interest

¶ 72 Lastly, respondent argues that the trial court’s finding that it was in the best interest of

Z.M. to terminate his parental rights was against the manifest weight of the evidence. The State

and the guardian ad litem argue the trial court did not err in finding that it was in Z.M.’s best

interest to terminate respondent’s parental rights.

¶ 73 At the best interest stage, the State must prove by a preponderance of the evidence that it

is in the child’s best interest to terminate parental rights. In re D.T., 212 Ill. 2d 347, 365-66

(2004). In making its determination, a court must consider several factors “in the context of the

child’s age and developmental needs,” including (1) the child’s physical safety and welfare,

including food, shelter, health, and clothing; (2) the development of the child’s identity; (3) the

child’s background and ties, including familial, cultural, and religious background; (4) the

child’s sense of attachment, including love, security, familiarity, and continuity of relationships

with parent figures; (5) the child’s wishes and long-term goals; (6) community ties, including

church, school, and friends; (7) the child’s need for permanence; (8) the uniqueness of every

family and every child; (9) the risks related to substitute care; and (10) the preferences of the

persons available to care for the child. 705 ILCS 405/1-3(4.05) (West 2016). At this stage of the

proceedings, “the parent’s interest in maintaining the parent-child relationship must yield to the

child’s interest in a stable, loving home life.” D.T., 212 Ill. 2d at 364. Once a trial court has

found that a parent is unfit, all considerations yield to the best interest of the minor and the

minor’s interest in a stable, loving, and safe home environment. Id. A trial court’s best interest

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 determination will only be disturbed if it is against the manifest weight of the evidence. In re

Austin W., 214 Ill. 2d 31, 51-52 (2005).

¶ 74 Here, the evidence shows that Z.M. lived with her great aunt and uncle in a three-

bedroom home, with no safety issues. Z.M. appeared to be happy, and her aunt and uncle were

able and willing to meet her financial, medical, and emotional needs. She was bonded with her

foster mother, and she participated in activities with her extended family members. While there

was evidence that Z.M. was bonded with respondent, the evidence also indicated that Z.M. was

in need of permanency. Z.M. had been living with her aunt and uncle since she was removed

from the care of her mother and respondent in March 2016 and her foster parents were willing to

adopt her. Based on the evidence presented, we conclude that the trial court’s determination that

it was in Z.M.’s best interest to terminate respondent’s parental rights was not against the

manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 75 CONCLUSION

¶ 76 The judgment of the circuit court of Will County is affirmed.

¶ 77 Affirmed.

¶ 78 JUSTICE McDADE, specially concurring:

¶ 79 Due Process Violation

¶ 80 Relying on what I believe to be the fundamental justice and fairness that the due process

clause protects (Lyon v. Department of Children & Family Services, 209 Ill. 2d 264, 272 (2004)

(“[t]he due process clause protects fundamental justice and fairness”)), I cannot agree with the

majority’s ultimate finding that no due process violation occurred in this case. I, therefore,

respectfully dissent from that conclusion.

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¶ 81 The essence of respondent’s argument on this issue is that the trial court’s failure to

admonish him of his right to appeal the adjudicatory order making Z.M. a ward of the court

violated his constitutionally guaranteed right to due process. It seems clear to me that he is

correct in this conclusion.

¶ 82 A parent has a fundamental due process right to the care, custody, and control of his

children. In re Andrea F., 208 Ill. 2d 148, 165 (2003). However, the right is subject to

termination. Id. Because of this, “the procedures employed in this type of proceeding must

comply with the requirements of procedural due process.” Id. “Procedural due process claims

question the constitutionality of the procedures used to deny a person’s life, liberty, or property.”

Lyon, 209 Ill. 2d at 272. The due process clause mandates that the opportunity to be heard occur

at a meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. Id. at 277. A due process issue presents a

question of law reviewed de novo. In re Kenneth F., 332 Ill. App. 3d 674, 677 (2002).

¶ 83 The Supreme Court in Mathews v. Eldridge, 424 U.S. 319 (1976), classified three factors

that this court must consider in determining whether due process was given in a proceeding:

(1) the private interest implicated by the official action; (2) the risk of an erroneous deprivation

of that interest through the proceedings used, and the probable value, if any, of additional or

substitute safeguards; and (3) the government’s interest, including the function involved and the

fiscal and administrative burdens that the additional or substitute safeguards would entail.

Andrea F., 208 Ill. 2d at 165. “These same factors are considered in resolving what procedural

safeguards are required by the due process clause of the Illinois constitution.” Id. Our supreme

court has applied the Mathews factors in cases involving the termination of parental rights. Id.

¶ 84 In the instant situation, all of the relevant questions have been answered for us by higher

authorities. Relative to the first factor, the founding fathers and the Supreme Courts of the United

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 States and the State of Illinois have determined that a parent has a fundamental due process right

to the care, custody, and control of his children and that a parent cannot be deprived of that right

without due process of law. The second and third factors relating to the risk of erroneous

deprivation and the government’s interest have been evaluated and resolved by the Illinois

legislature through its enactment of section 1-5(3) of the Juvenile Court Act of 1987 (705 ILCS

405/1-5(3) (West 2016)). The legislature implicitly determined that the removal of a child from

the custody of his or her parent through an adjudication transferring wardship to the State

(1) posed a risk of erroneous deprivation requiring an opportunity to appeal and (2) that any

fiscal and administrative burdens of an appeal did not override the need to provide appellate

review. Accordingly, the opportunity to appeal the adjudication of wardship is necessary to due

process and, therefore, to fundamental justice and fairness.

¶ 85 The State has conceded that the trial court did not admonish respondent of his right to

appeal and presumably also concedes the resulting denial of due process. But the State argues

that none of that matters because respondent did not timely file a notice of appeal from the

specific orders and this court, therefore, lacks jurisdiction to hear his challenge to the

adjudicatory and dispositional orders that were entered in October 2016.

¶ 86 The majority agrees, making a specific finding that we do not have jurisdiction to review

the October 2016 orders because no appeal was timely filed. Supra ¶ 50. Although the majority

acknowledges the potential of a due process violation, it finds, as did the State, it does not matter

but for a different reason. The majority relies on the fact that respondent is not actually

challenging those orders that the legislature deemed he had a right to appeal. The majority has

that “out” because, in order to avoid jurisdictional preclusion, respondent has forgone the direct

challenge and has instead argued that all orders subsequent to the 2016 orders are void because

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 of the due process violation. The majority finds that we do have jurisdiction to review that claim.

Although not explicitly stated, I believe the majority applied a variant of the “step in the

procedural progression” rule in reaching its conclusion. See Burtell v. First Charter Service

Corp., 76 Ill. 2d 427, 435 (1979) (“the unspecified judgment is reviewable if it is a step in the

procedural progression leading to the judgment specified in the notice of appeal” (internal

quotation marks omitted)). I accept that conclusion.

¶ 87 Turning to the merits of the due process argument, I have no problem finding that the

trial court’s error did, in fact, deprive respondent of notice and an opportunity to be timely heard

on the removal of his daughter from his custody and her placement under the wardship of the

State. I would also find it beyond dispute that this error constituted an actual and complete

violation of respondent’s right to due process—a violation that cannot be eradicated or negated

by the majority’s post facto assessment that respondent would not have appealed even if he had

known he possessed the right.

¶ 88 Unlike the majority, I believe that, although the question is irrelevant, there is a

reasonable likelihood that respondent would have challenged the order of wardship had he

known he could. He had joined in the stipulation that Z.M.’s environment was injurious to her,

but he was not responsible for that environment. Z.M. was removed from the custodial residence

by police who had been called to the home by respondent, who was there by permission for

agreed-upon visitation with his daughter. He awoke from sleep to the odor of marijuana, and

when he objected to its use in the child’s presence, he was physically attacked by either the

child’s mother or the mother’s cousin. In an appeal of the wardship decision, respondent could

have advanced a reasonable argument that he was fit to have custody and there is a not-

unreasonable chance that, absent all of the subsequent proceedings and the mistakes and missteps

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 he later made, he might have succeeded in securing custody of his daughter. He was actually

prejudiced by being caught up long term in the often-flawed process for dealing with children

deemed to be abused and neglected.

¶ 89 Clearly respondent’s constitutional right to due process was violated. The real question is

whether the violation can be redressed either by the relief sought by respondent or in any other

way. The complete do-over that respondent seeks in this case has some appeal for me simply

because it seems fair and is, perhaps, in the ultimate best interest of Z.M. Unfortunately I think

any meaningful relief of this violation is precluded by the concept of timeliness, not in the

jurisdictional sense but by the requirement that notice and the opportunity to be heard occur at a

meaningful time and in a meaningful manner. Lyon, 209 Ill. 2d at 277. Here I believe the

potential for relief has been mooted by all of the very real circumstances that have occurred

within this family between October 2016 and now. They all happened, and we cannot make them

unhappen, and we cannot rewrite their consequences. In my opinion, there was a due process

violation, and we cannot redress it.

¶ 90 Fitness and Best Interest Findings

¶ 91 Turning to the merits of respondent’s appeal from the finding of unfitness and the

termination of his parental rights, I reach the same conclusion as that reached by the trial court

and the majority. I start with a truth that seems to be frequently ignored or discounted by the

State in its zealous judicial advocacy for uprooted children: there are no perfect parents; there are

only degrees of parental imperfection. In this case, the majority has found that Donald failed to

comply with the directives in his service plan during the relevant nine-month period, as

designated by the State. I would note that he had, nonetheless, taken substantial steps in

complying with that plan during the initial nine-month period. During that time, Donald

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 maintained adequate housing and income. He also completed domestic violence courses,

completed individual therapy, and completed substance abuse treatment, which included

parenting classes. When it became apparent that Donald would need to undergo a second round

of substance abuse treatment, a miscommunication between Donald and his caseworker about

the source of provider information resulted in a delay in his commencement of treatment until

March 2018. He did, however, begin the treatment after the designated nine-month period had

ended.

¶ 92 Although Donald’s visits with his daughter became “sporadic,” this was largely due to his

lack of transportation. Even given this limitation, Donald participated appropriately in visits with

Z.M., and they had a great relationship. Indeed, although the child called her foster mother

“mama,” she referred to her foster father as “uncle” and continued to call Donald “dad.” Notably,

the trial court observed “I could say unequivocally, I understand that [respondent] loves his

daughter.” Clearly, Donald and his daughter were strongly and lovingly bonded.

¶ 93 Nonetheless, the statutory directive of section 1(D)(m), which states that “ ‘failure to

make reasonable progress toward the return of the child to the parent’ includes a parent’s failure

to substantially fulfill his or her obligations under the service plan” (750 ILCS 50/1(D)(m) (West

2016)), compels a finding that, based on the facts, the trial court’s finding of unfitness was not

against the manifest weight of the evidence.

¶ 94 For these reasons, I concur with the majority’s finding that Donald was properly found

unfit and his parental rights were appropriately terminated.

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