MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Jul 16 2019, 10:28 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
estoppel, or the law of the case. and Tax Court
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Marietto V. Massillamany Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Massillamany Jeter & Carson, LLP Attorney General
Fishers, Indiana
George P. Sherman
Supervising Deputy Attorney
General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Quantae A. Johnson, July 16, 2019
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-CR-2836
v. Appeal from the
Hamilton Superior Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable
Appellee-Plaintiff Jonathan M. Brown, Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
29D02-1608-F6-6740
Vaidik, Chief Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-2836 | July 16, 2019 Page 1 of 5
Case Summary
[1] Quantae A. Johnson appeals the trial court’s determination that he violated his
community corrections and probation by refusing to testify against his wife at
her trial. Because Johnson agreed to testify against his wife in his plea
agreement, we affirm the trial court.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] In 2016, the State charged Johnson with Level 5 felony neglect of a dependent
and two counts of Level 6 felony neglect of a dependent for withholding food
from two of his children, Qua.J. and Que.J., resulting in their severe
malnutrition. See Johnson v. State, No. 29A05-1712-CR-2974 (Ind. Ct. App. Jan.
23, 2019). Johnson’s wife, Brandee Johnson, was also charged in connection
with these events. See State v. Brandee Johnson, 30D0l-1801-F5-168.
[3] In November 2017, Johnson and the State entered into a detailed plea
agreement under which Johnson would plead guilty to Level 5 felony neglect of
a dependent and one count of Level 6 felony neglect of a dependent in
exchange for the dismissal of the other count of Level 6 felony neglect of a
dependent. In addition, the plea agreement provided that Johnson’s sentences
would be served consecutively. For the Level 5 felony, the sentence would be
six years, with twenty-one months executed “as a direct commitment to
Hamilton County Community Corrections Electronic Home Monitoring” and
four years and three months suspended (with four years of probation).
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Appellant’s App. Vol. II p. 129. For the Level 6 felony, the sentence would be
910 days, with 40 days executed in the Department of Correction and 870 days
suspended to probation. Finally, the plea agreement set forth “special
conditions” of Johnson’s probation and community corrections, including that
he “testify truthfully” in the State’s case against Brandee:
8. Shall testify truthfully in State v. Brandee Johnson under [30D0l-
1801-F5-168]. Specifically, the Defendant shall testify that
Brandee Johnson is the mother of [Qua.J.] and [Que.J.]. Both
boys were dependents of Brandee Johnson. Brandee Johnson did
knowingly place both boys in a dangerous situation by
withholding food from them. Brandee Johnson further
endangered both boys by making them do excessive exercises,
either of her own accord or she agreed with the Defendant’s
actions of making . . . them do the exercises. While there was
always sufficient food in the home to feed and provide sufficient
nutrition to both [Qua.J.] and [Que.J.], Brandee Johnson (with
Defendant’s complicity) routinely withheld the nourishment as a
form of punishment. This lack of proper nutrition endangered
the lives of both [Qua.J.] and [Que.J.]. (The State will not charge
the Defendant with perjury based upon the statements made
prior to the guilty [plea] that might be construed to contradict the
statements contained in this paragraph.)
Id. at 129, 130. The trial court accepted the plea agreement and sentenced
Johnson in accordance with its terms. See id. at 138-40. Condition 8 above was
specifically included in the terms of Johnson’s community corrections and
probation. Id. at 143, 165.
[4] A jury trial was held in Brandee’s case on May 21, 2018. Johnson, however,
did not testify at her trial. Tr. p. 5. Thereafter, a notice of non-compliance with
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community corrections and a notice of probation violation were filed against
Johnson. Both notices alleged that Johnson did not testify at Brandee’s trial.
Following a hearing, the trial court found that Johnson violated both
community corrections and probation. Appellant’s App. Vol. III p. 17. The
court ordered Johnson to “serve 2,685 days in the [DOC], less credit time [and]
1 year suspended to 1 year probation under all of the terms previously ordered.”
Id. at 18.
[5] Johnson now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
[6] Johnson contends that the trial court erred in finding that he violated both
community corrections and probation because the condition that he testify
truthfully against Brandee was “improper” as it violated his Fifth Amendment
right not to incriminate himself and was not reasonably related to his
rehabilitation. Appellant’s Br. p. 7. In support of his argument that this was an
improper condition, Johnson cites Carroll v. State, 740 N.E.2d 1225 (Ind. Ct.
App. 2000). In that case, the defendant was convicted following a jury trial,
and the trial court placed him on probation. One of the terms of the
defendant’s probation required him to “give a clean-up statement.” Id. at 1228.
On appeal, the defendant challenged this probation condition, arguing that
because it “was not coupled with a grant of immunity,” any statement given by
him “could result in his prosecution for other offenses.” Id. at 1233. We found
that this “unilaterally imposed” probation condition was improper because it
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was not related to the defendant’s rehabilitation. Id. at 1234. Importantly
however, we emphasized that such provisions are “commonly and properly
included in negotiated plea agreements” but that this condition was “not
negotiated and agreed upon” by the defendant. Id.
[7] As the State points out, Johnson specifically agreed to testify against Brandee as
part of his negotiated plea agreement. This fact alone distinguishes this case
from Carroll and the other cases cited by Johnson on appeal. “Defendants
waive a whole panoply of rights by voluntarily pleading guilty,” including the
right against self-incrimination. Mapp v. State, 770 N.E.2d 332, 334-35 (Ind.
2002). In addition, once a plea agreement is accepted by the trial court, it is
binding upon all parties. Bethea v. State, 983 N.E.2d 1134, 1144 (Ind. 2013).
Because Johnson agreed to testify against his wife as part of his negotiated plea
agreement, the trial court properly found that he violated both community
corrections and probation when he did not testify at her trial.1
[8] Affirmed.
Kirsch, J., and Altice, J., concur.
1
To the extent Johnson argues that the State should have granted him full immunity for his testimony at
Brandee’s trial, he could have negotiated for such a term in his plea agreement. Notably, Johnson’s plea
agreement granted him immunity from a perjury charge. Moreover, Johnson’s claim of entitlement to full
immunity was premised on the fact that an appeal challenging his guilty plea was pending. Johnson posited
that if he won his appeal, then he would be “technically an innocent man . . . awaiting trial” and therefore
would have incriminated himself by testifying at his wife’s trial. Tr. p. 6. Johnson, however, lost his appeal.
See Johnson, No. 29A05-1712-CR-2974, slip op. at 6 (holding that the trial court did not err by denying
Johnson’s motion to withdraw his guilty plea).
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