MEMORANDUM DECISION
Pursuant to Ind. Appellate Rule 65(D),
this Memorandum Decision shall not be FILED
regarded as precedent or cited before any Jul 17 2019, 10:42 am
court except for the purpose of establishing CLERK
the defense of res judicata, collateral Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
estoppel, or the law of the case.
ATTORNEY FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Jill Gonzalez Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Public Defender Attorney General of Indiana
Muncie, Indiana
Henry Flores
Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Alonzo Williams, July 17, 2019
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-CR-1563
v. Appeal from the
Delaware Circuit Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable
Appellee-Plaintiff. Thomas A. Cannon, Jr., Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
18C05-1702-MR-1
Kirsch, Judge.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1563 | July 17, 2019 Page 1 of 11
[1] Alonzo Williams (“Williams”) appeals his convictions for murder,1 a felony,
criminal confinement while armed with a deadly weapon, 2 a Level 3 felony,
and his adjudication as an habitual offender.3 He raises two issues, which we
restate as:
I. Whether the trial court undermined Williams’s ability to
help prepare his defense, and thus violated his rights under
the federal and Indiana constitutions, by rescinding its
earlier order that gave Williams access to the jail law
library; and
II. Whether the State committed prosecutorial misconduct by
failing to provide a copy of the deposition that allegedly
contained exculpatory evidence.
[2] We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[3] On the evening of February 13, 2017, Terrance Walker (“Walker”) picked up
Williams at a Delaware County residence, and the two drove to Walker’s wife’s
residence. Tr. Vol. II at 56-57. Once they arrived, Walker told Williams that
Jeffery Brown (“Brown”) was involved in the murder of Williams’s cousin
Joseph Johnson (“Johnson”). Id. at 56-58. This information confused and
1
See Ind. Code § 35-42-1-1(1).
2
See Ind. Code § 35-42-3-3(a), (b)(2)(A).
3
See Ind. Code § 35-50-2-8.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1563 | July 17, 2019 Page 2 of 11
angered Williams. Id. at 58. Williams later drove away in Walker’s SUV to
sell marijuana. Id. at 58-61. A few hours later, Williams returned,
accompanied by Brown and Jeremy Holland (“Holland”). Id. at 61-62.
Williams told Walker that he, Brown, and Holland planned to commit a
robbery “to help [ ] Brown get out of town.” Id. at 65.
[4] Williams, Holland, and Brown drove to another Delaware County residence,
ostensibly to visit three of Williams’s friends, Steven McPherson
(“McPherson”), Curtis Atkinson, and Shelli Goode (“Goode”). Tr. Vol. III at
8-9. The situation seemed normal until Williams asked to see Brown’s gun and,
when Brown hesitated, Williams grabbed Brown’s gun, removed the magazine,
ordered Brown to stand against the wall, and checked him for weapons while
Holland held Brown at gunpoint. Id. at 16-18. At Williams’s direction,
McPherson and Goode bound Brown’s hands behind his back. Tr. Vol. II at
177; Tr. Vol. III at 19, 58. Williams and Holland, while pointing guns at
Brown, escorted Brown out of the residence and put Brown into the SUV. Tr.
Vol. III at 22-23. As Williams was about to drive away with Brown and
Holland, Williams told McPherson that “he was going to give [Brown] a pass,
drive him out of town and let him go, and he’s not supposed to come back to
town.” Id. at 22.
[5] Meanwhile, around 1:00 a.m., Gary Greenlee (“Greenlee”) heard a vehicle
driving in front of his Delaware County residence and then observed the vehicle
pull onto his parents’ nearby property. Tr. Vol. I at 130-33. Minutes later,
Greenlee heard gunshots. Id. at 133. Greenlee called his parents and 911. Id.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1563 | July 17, 2019 Page 3 of 11
at 133, 136. When Greenlee’s father came to the scene, he could see that the
gate to his property had been forced open by a vehicle. Id. at 155-57. When he
returned the next day to fix the gate, he discovered Brown’s body and called
911. Id. at 152-58.
[6] The next day, Williams contacted his friend Danny Terry (“Terry”). State’s Ex.
265. Williams asked Terry to drive him to Indianapolis. Id. On the way to
Indianapolis, Williams admitted to Terry that he had killed Brown. Id.
Williams and Terry tossed the guns used during the crime into a retention
pond. Id. An autopsy later determined that Brown died from multiple nine-
millimeter gunshot wounds, including seven shots to his face and head. Tr. Vol.
II at 41-42; State’s Ex. 132. On February 22, 2017, the State charged Williams
with murder, felony murder, criminal confinement while armed with a deadly
weapon, and also alleged that he was an habitual offender. Appellant’s App. Vol.
II at 67-69, 81.
[7] On January 3, 2018, Williams’s counsel learned that the State had identified
Terry as a potential State’s witness. Tr. Vol. I at 91; Appellant’s Br. at 9. On
January 31, 2018, the State deposed Terry, who explained his role in helping
Williams dispose of the guns. State’s Ex. 265. On February 5, 2018, the trial
court issued an order that allowed Williams two hours per day, either in the law
library or a visiting room, to review transcripts of DVDs and depositions.
Appellant’s App. Vol. IV at 43. However, the same day the trial court issued that
order, Williams made several calls from jail in which he attempted to interfere
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1563 | July 17, 2019 Page 4 of 11
with witnesses and made physical threats regarding witnesses Terry and
Walker. Tr. Vol. I at 94-96; State’s Ex. 1A, 3.
[8] Therefore, the State moved the trial court to rescind its previous order that gave
Williams access to the law library. Tr. Vol. I at 70-72. The trial court held a
hearing, and after reviewing the evidence, granted the State’s request to rescind
the order. Appellant’s App. Vol. IV at 131. However, the trial court still allowed
Williams to review discovery materials if accompanied by his attorney. Id.
[9] The trial commenced on February 13, 2018. Tr. Vol. I at 102. On February 21,
2018, the jury found Williams guilty as charged. Appellant’s App. Vol. IV at 166-
68. During the second phase of the trial, the jury found Williams was an
habitual offender. Id. at 167-68. At the April 24, 2018 sentencing hearing, the
trial court merged Williams’s felony-murder conviction into his murder
conviction to avoid a potential double jeopardy violation. Appellant’s App. Vol.
V at 103. It then sentenced Williams to sixty years for murder, enhanced by
seventeen years for his habitual offender status, and thirteen years for his Level
3 felony criminal confinement conviction. Id. at 110-11. The trial court
ordered the sentences to run consecutively for an aggregate term of ninety
years. Id. at 111. Williams now appeals.
Discussion and Decision
I. Order Rescinding Access to Law Library
[10] Williams argues that when the trial court rescinded its order that allowed him
to spend two hours per day in the jail’s law library to review discovery
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1563 | July 17, 2019 Page 5 of 11
materials, it violated his fundamental rights under both Article 1, Section 12 of
the Indiana Constitution and the United States Constitution.4 Williams claims
that by restricting his access to these materials, the trial court undermined his
ability to help his attorney prepare his defense.
[11] The United States Constitution requires that inmates have meaningful access to
the courts.
Although the Fourteenth Amendment does not guarantee
criminal defendants a general right to discovery, Weatherford v.
Bursey, 429 U.S. 545, 559 (1977), it does require prisons to allow
inmates “meaningful access to the courts,” either by “providing
... adequate law libraries or adequate [legal] assistance,” Bounds v.
Smith, 430 U.S. 817, 824 (1977).
Griffith v. State, 59 N.E.3d 947, 952 (Ind. 2016) (some citations omitted); see also
Engle v. State, 467 N.E.2d 712, 715 (Ind. 1984).
[12] Similarly, the Indiana Constitution confers a right of access to the courts:
All courts shall be open; and every person, for injury done to him
in his person, property, or reputation, shall have remedy by due
course of law. Justice shall be administered freely, and without
purchase; completely, and without denial; speedily, and without
delay.
4
Williams does not specify which provision in the United States Constitution was violated by the trial court’s
decision to rescind its earlier order.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1563 | July 17, 2019 Page 6 of 11
Ind. Const. art. 1, § 12.
[13] Williams has waived this issue for lack of cogent argument. “A party waives an
issue where the party fails to develop a cogent argument or provide adequate
citation to authority and portions of the record.” Wingate v. State, 900 N.E.2d
468, 475 (Ind. Ct. App. 2009); see also Ind. Appellate Rule 46(A)(8)(a) (requiring
an appellant to support contentions with cogent reasoning and citations to
authorities, statutes, and appendix or parts of record on appeal). Here, the full
extent of Williams’s argument is the following statement: “Without these
materials, [Williams] would be in the dark and unable to assist his counsel in
his own defense.” Appellant’s Br. at 8. Williams’s argument lacks supporting
legal authority. While he refers to both the federal and Indiana constitutions in
his Statement of the Issues, his argument provides no legal authority, let alone
apply any legal authority to the facts and circumstances of his case. Finally, he
does not specify how his ability to help his attorney prepare a defense was
compromised by the trial court’s order that rescinded his access to the jail law
library.
[14] Waiver aside, in rescinding its earlier order that had allowed Williams to review
discovery materials in the jail law library, the trial court did not undermine
Williams’s ability to help his attorney prepare his defense, and, therefore, it did
not violate his rights under either Article 1, Section 12 of the Indiana
Constitution or the United States Constitution.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1563 | July 17, 2019 Page 7 of 11
[15] In Greene v. State, Frederick Greene, an inmate at the Michigan City prison, was
placed in administrative segregation, which barred him from visiting the law
library at his correctional facility. Greene v. State, 515 N.E.2d 1376, 1379 (Ind.
1987) (overruled in part on other grounds by Myers v. State, 532 N.E.2d 1158,
1159 (Ind. 1989)). Greene argued that his administrative segregation inhibited
his efforts to assist in his defense by limiting his ability to do research in the
library. Id. In rejecting this argument, our Supreme Court held that segregation
did not impede Greene’s defense because he had unlimited access to the record
through his attorney. Id. Likewise, in Shoulders v. State, 462 N.E.2d 1034 (Ind.
1984), Shoulders was placed in administrative segregation after he was involved
in a fatal stabbing. Shoulders argued that the segregation limited his ability to
interview witnesses and seek assistance of counsel for his defense. Our
Supreme Court ruled that Shoulders had not demonstrated that segregation
denied him access to his attorney or potential witnesses. Id. at 1036. Cf. Best v.
State, 566 N.E.2d 1027, 1030 (Ind. 1991) (pro se defendant’s right of access to
court was not undermined when he was denied direct access to a law library
where he had access to legal materials through standby counsel).
[16] Here, while the trial court rescinded Williams’s access to the law library, it
allowed his attorney to use a jail computer when visiting Williams to share
electronic records with Williams. Appellant’s App. Vol. IV at 131. Thus,
Williams had unlimited access to the record through his attorney, so the trial
court’s ruling did not undermine Williams’s ability to help prepare his defense.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1563 | July 17, 2019 Page 8 of 11
Id. Therefore, the trial court did not deny Williams “meaningful access to the
courts.” See Griffith, 59 N.E.3d at 952; see also Greene, 515 N.E.2d at 1382.
II. State Withholding Exculpatory Evidence
[17] Williams claims the State committed prosecutorial misconduct, violating its
duty under Brady v. Maryland, 373 U.S. 83 (1963), by withholding exculpatory
evidence from Williams until three weeks before trial. Specifically, Williams
appears to argue that the State delayed in providing him with a copy of the
deposition of Terry, who Williams learned would be testifying as a witness for
the State even though he had helped Williams dispose of the murder weapons.
[18] Before explaining why Williams has waived this claim, we first observe that
Williams’s claim lacks merit because he merely alleges that the State delayed in
providing a copy of the deposition, not that the State never provided a copy of
the deposition. To prevail on a Brady claim, a defendant must show, among
other things, that the State failed to disclose the evidence. See Bunch v. State,
964 N.E.2d 274, 297 (Ind. Ct. App. 2012), trans. denied. Williams, however,
appears to concede that the State disclosed the evidence asking, as he does in
his brief, whether it was “prosecutorial misconduct to hold Brady material until
three (3) weeks before jury trial . . . ?” See Appellant’s Br. at 12 (emphasis
added).
[19] However, even if the State failed to provide a copy of the deposition, Williams
has waived this argument. First, he did not object to the admission of the Terry
deposition; indeed, his trial counsel affirmatively agreed to its admission. Tr.
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1563 | July 17, 2019 Page 9 of 11
Vol. III at 95. Thus, Williams has waived this claim by failing to make a Brady
objection in the trial court and also by affirmatively acquiescing to the
admission of the deposition. See Leatherman v. State, 101 N.E.3d 879, 885 (Ind.
Ct. App. 2018) (a party may not present an argument for the first time on
appeal, and the failure to present an argument below results in waiver on
appeal); see also Cole v. State, 28 N.E.3d 1126, 1136 (Ind. Ct. App. 2015) (when
defendant affirmatively states he has “no objection” to proffered evidence, he
invites any error in its admission, and a claim of fundamental error may be
waived if appellant invited the alleged fundamental error).
[20] Second, Williams has waived this claim because he fails to make a cogent
argument. See Wingate, 900 N.E.2d at 475; App. R. 46(A)(8)(a). His full
argument, as set out below, is nothing more than a statement of the issue:
Was it prosecutorial misconduct to hold Brady material until
three (3) weeks before jury trial, that the prosecutor had in his
possession for three (3) months before [Williams] found out
about his witness during a deposition of a police officer, where
the information was slipped in by the officer?
Appellant’s Br. at 12.
[21] This cursory argument neither shows nor alleges that Williams made a specific
request to the prosecutor for a copy of Terry’s deposition. See United States v.
Agurs, 427 U.S. 97, 106 (1976). Williams does not demonstrate that the
deposition was material to the issue of guilt and that access to the deposition
would have created a reasonable probability of a different outcome at trial. See
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1563 | July 17, 2019 Page 10 of 11
Bunch, 964 N.E.2d at 297. Thus, Williams has waived this claim for lack of
cogent argument. See Wingate, 900 N.E.2d at 475; App. R. 46(A)(8)(a).5
[22] Affirmed.
Vaidik, C.J., and Altice, J., concur.
5
Finally, we observe that even if Williams had made a cogent argument in support of this claim, we could
not review this issue. Because Williams did not object to the admission of the deposition – and indeed
affirmatively agreed to its admission – the only way the issue would properly be before us is if Williams had
alleged fundamental error on appeal. See Hollingsworth v. State, 987 N.E.2d 1096, 1098-99 (Ind. Ct. App.
2013), trans. denied. However, even if Williams had raised this claim within the context of fundamental error,
such a claim arguably would have been waived because Williams invited any error in the admission of the
deposition by affirmatively agreeing to its admission. See Cole v. State, 28 N.E.3d 1126, 1136 (Ind. Ct. App.
2015).
Court of Appeals of Indiana | Memorandum Decision 18A-CR-1563 | July 17, 2019 Page 11 of 11