AFFIRMED and Opinion Filed July 30, 2019
S In The
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
No. 05-17-01296-CR
SRINIVAS EADHA, Appellant
V.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee
On Appeal from the 401st Judicial District Court
Collin County, Texas
Trial Court Cause No. 401-83015-2015
MEMORANDUM OPINION
Before Justices Schenck, Osborne, and Reichek
Opinion by Justice Reichek
Srinivas Eadha appeals his conviction for sexual assault. In a single issue, appellant
contends the evidence is legally insufficient to support the jury’s verdict. We affirm the trial
court’s judgment.
Factual Background
In April 2015, appellant purchased the stables at which the complainant, L.C., worked as a
riding instructor. A few weeks after making the purchase, appellant asked L.C. to go to dinner
with him to discuss promoting her to the position of barn manager. Without discussing it with her
beforehand, appellant took L.C. to Hooters.
After dinner, appellant drove L.C. back to the barn and asked her to step into the office to
further discuss the management position. L.C. stated that as soon as they got into the office,
“everything changed.” According to L.C., appellant closed the door, turned around, put his hands
on her hips and began pulling her towards him. L.C. pushed back and told appellant it wasn’t
appropriate and there was a line between business and personal relationships they needed to
maintain. Appellant responded that they had to trust each other and physical contact was an
important part of growing together as a “barn family.” L.C. stated appellant put his hands under
the back of her shirt and tried to get them down the back of her pants. Appellant also told L.C. he
expected her to be his “work wife,” which L.C. understood to mean more of a personal or physical
relationship than a normal work relationship.
When appellant began to move his hands towards her breasts, L.C. moved to try to stop
him and appellant pulled her towards him and kissed her. L.C. pushed back and told him to let her
go. When L.C. told appellant that someone would be there any minute to do the evening check on
the barn, he finally let her go. L.C. then went to her car and drove home.
L.C. stated she didn’t tell anyone what had happened because the barn was “her whole life”
and she didn’t want to “lose everything.” In addition to working there, L.C. also boarded her horse
at the barn and she stated she had no way to move him to another stable. Although L.C. was
married, her husband was temporarily living somewhere else. L.C. said she did not want to tell
her husband about what had happened with appellant because she didn’t want a confrontation that
would cause her to lose her job.
The next day, L.C. went to work and tried to stay away from appellant. Appellant sent
L.C. a text message asking her if she was angry with him. She responded she was not, but that she
was busy. At the end of the day, appellant texted her asking her to text him when she got home.
L.C. did so and said she was going to bed. Appellant then repeatedly requested to come by, stating
he wanted to talk to her and that it wouldn’t take long. L.C. ultimately agreed and gave appellant
the gate code to her apartment complex.
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When appellant arrived, L.C. let him inside. L.C. believed they could talk about what had
happened and set some clear boundaries. She thought this would allow them to move on and not
have to talk about it again. L.C. stated she told appellant what had happened was not appropriate
because they were both married and a personal relationship was not a good idea. According to
L.C., appellant argued with her saying he bought the barn because he saw her there and knew they
were supposed to be together. He further told her that when he bought the barn, she came with it.
She responded that it didn’t work that way. After some time, appellant appeared to agree with
L.C., and she believed they were done.
Appellant then moved towards L.C. on the couch. She thought he was getting up to leave,
but instead, appellant got on top of her and pushed her down. Appellant forced L.C.’s legs apart
with his hand and knee. He then put his hand down L.C.’s pants and penetrated her vagina with
his fingers. L.C. stated that, while this was occurring, she was pushing up on his collarbone and
trying to close her legs, but she could not move because she was pinned down by his weight. She
also stated that appellant’s mouth was on hers. When it appeared to L.C. that appellant was going
to take his pants off, she told him she couldn’t go that far but she promised him she would have
sex with him the next time they saw each other. L.C. stated she told him this because nothing else
was working and she just wanted him to leave. Appellant then left her apartment.
The next day, L.C. went to work. She stated she did not stay home because she was scared
to lose everything she had worked for and she did not know what appellant was capable of. At the
end of the day, appellant approached her and said he wanted to come back to her apartment that
night. When L.C. told him not to and that she was tired, he told her to rest and that he would come
over afterward. L.C. went home, packed a bag, and drove to Austin to stay with her cousin. She
sent appellant a text saying she had a family emergency.
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While L.C. was in Austin, appellant texted her saying he felt “guilty” that he “made [her]
leave for this trip” and that he “didn’t mean to hurt [her] at all.” When L.C. returned from Austin
four days later, she confided in a friend about what had happened and ultimately decided to go to
the police. L.C. gave the police a written statement describing the assault. The police then took
photographs of bruises on L.C.’s legs that she said were caused by appellant forcing her legs open.
Several days later, L.C. met with police detective Courtney Noel. L.C. told Noel that
appellant had been calling and texting her, trying to speak with her. Noel had L.C. call appellant
and they recorded the conversation. During the phone call, appellant apologized to L.C. for hurting
her and told her he had cried about what happened in her apartment. He said he had gotten excited
and “had no control,” but he realized he “should not be doing any of those things.” Later in the
conversation, appellant suggested that, if L.C. had said “no” he would have stopped and, because
she didn’t, he didn’t “put any brakes on [himself].” Appellant was arrested the next day and
charged with sexual assault.
At trial, the only witnesses to testify were L.C. and Detective Noel. The defense cross-
examined both women extensively. The defense argued L.C.’s sexual encounter with appellant
was consensual and she had ulterior motives for accusing him. The defense also suggested that
the multiple bruises on L.C.’s legs were caused by horseback riding, masturbation, and/or L.C.’s
use of a dance pole in her apartment, which appellant’s counsel characterized as a “stripper pole.”
After hearing the evidence, the jury found appellant guilty of sexual assault and assessed
punishment at three years’ confinement. The sentence of confinement was suspended and
appellant was placed on community supervision for a period of five years. This appeal followed.
Analysis
In a single issue, appellant contends the evidence is legally insufficient to support his
conviction. Specifically, appellant argues the State failed to produce evidence he committed the
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offense intentionally or knowingly because there was “no evidence presented which showed
beyond a reasonable doubt that appellant realized his sexual advances were unwelcome or
unwanted until actual sexual activity may have occurred.”
When reviewing a challenge to the legal sufficiency of the evidence supporting a criminal
conviction, we view the evidence in the light most favorable to the verdict and determine whether
a rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the offense beyond a reasonable
doubt. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 319 (1979); Lucio v. State, 351 S.W.3d 878, 894 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2011). We do not resolve conflicts of fact, weigh evidence, or evaluate the credibility
of the witnesses as this is the function of the trier of fact. See Dewberry v. State, 4 S.W.3d 735,
740 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999). Instead we determine whether both the explicit and implicit findings
of the trier of fact are rational by viewing all the evidence admitted at trial in the light most
favorable to the adjudication. Adelman v. State, 828 S.W.2d 418, 422 (Tex. Crim. App. 1992).
The factfinder is the sole judge of the witnesses’ credibility and their testimony’s weight. See
Bonham v. State, 680 S.W.2d 815, 819 (Tex. Crim. App. 1984). Each fact need not point directly
and independently to the guilt of the appellant as long as the cumulative force of all the
incriminating circumstances is enough to warrant conviction. See Kennemur v. State, 280 S.W.3d
305, 313 (Tex. App.—Amarillo 2008, pet. ref’d). Circumstantial evidence is as probative as direct
evidence and can be sufficient alone to establish an accused’s guilt. Id. We review all of the
evidence in the case regardless of whether it was erroneously admitted. See Clayton v. State, 235
S.W.3d 772, 778 (Tex. Crim. App. 2007). The testimony of a victim, standing alone, is sufficient
to support a conviction for sexual assault. Villalon v. State, 791 S.W.2d 130, 133 (Tex. Crim. App.
1990).
The indictment in this case alleged that appellant intentionally or knowingly caused the
penetration of L.C.’s sexual organ by means of his finger without her consent. The victim of a
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sexual assault is not required to resist; sexual assault is defined by the attacker’s compulsion and
not by the victim’s resistance. Gonzales v. State, 2 S.W.3d 411, 415 (Tex. App.—San Antonio
1999, no pet.). The fact that the defendant did not see resistance or hear an outcry during the
encounter is no evidence that the complainant consented to the act. Hawkins v. State, 509 S.W.2d
607, 608 (Tex. Crim. App. 1974).
Sexual assault is a nature-of-conduct offense. Huffman v. State, 267 S.W.3d 902, 906 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2008). A person acts intentionally with respect to the nature of his conduct when it is
his conscious objective or desire to engage in the conduct. TEX. PENAL CODE ANN. § 6.03(a). A
person acts knowingly with respect to the nature of his conduct when he is aware of the nature of
his conduct. Id. § 6.03(b). Knowledge and intent may be inferred from circumstantial evidence
such as the acts, words, and conduct of the appellant. Guevara v. State, 152 S.W.3d 45, 50 (Tex.
Crim. App. 2004); Stahle v. State, 970 S.W.2d 682, 687 (Tex. App.—Dallas 1998, pet. ref’d). In
reviewing the sufficiency of the evidence, we look at events occurring before, during, and after the
commission of the offense. Guevara, 152 S.W.3d at 49.
In this case, the evidence showed that, the evening before the incident in question, L.C.
rejected appellant’s sexual advances and told him she did not want anything other than a
professional relationship with him. On the night of the incident, L.C. reiterated that she did not
want to have a personal relationship with appellant because it was inappropriate. Accordingly,
appellant was made aware that L.C. was not interested in any type of physical relationship with
him. Despite this, appellant proceeded to pin L.C. down with his body and force her legs open,
leaving bruises, before penetrating her vagina with his finger. While this was happening, L.C. was
attempting to push appellant off of her. Afterwards, appellant repeatedly apologized to L.C.,
saying he felt guilty and that he hadn’t meant to hurt her. Appellant told L.C. he “lost control”
and had cried about what had happened. Conduct on the part of a person accused of a crime
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subsequent to its commission that indicates a consciousness of guilt is strong evidence he
committed the act with which he is charged. Torres v. State, 794 S.W.2d 596, 598 (Tex. App.—
Austin 1990, no pet.).
After reviewing the record as a whole, we conclude the evidence is legally sufficient to
support the jury’s conclusion that appellant acted intentionally or knowingly with respect to the
nature of his conduct. We affirm the trial court’s judgment.
/Amanda L. Reichek/
AMANDA L. REICHEK
JUSTICE
Do Not Publish
TEX. R. APP. P. 47.2(b)
171296F.U05
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S
Court of Appeals
Fifth District of Texas at Dallas
JUDGMENT
SRINIVAS EADHA, Appellant On Appeal from the 401st Judicial District
Court, Collin County, Texas
No. 05-17-01296-CR V. Trial Court Cause No. 401-83015-2015.
Opinion delivered by Justice Reichek.
THE STATE OF TEXAS, Appellee Justices Schenck and Osborne participating.
Based on the Court’s opinion of this date, the judgment of the trial court is AFFIRMED.
Judgment entered July 30, 2019
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