J-S29014-19
NON-PRECEDENTIAL DECISION - SEE SUPERIOR COURT I.O.P. 65.37
COMMONWEALTH OF PENNSYLVANIA, IN THE SUPERIOR COURT
OF
PENNSYLVANIA
Appellee
v.
SHAHEED WILLIAMS,
Appellant No. 2510 EDA 2018
Appeal from the PCRA Order Entered August 24, 2018
In the Court of Common Pleas of Philadelphia County
Criminal Division at No(s): CP-51-CR-0003684-2014
BEFORE: BENDER, P.J.E., LAZARUS, J., and FORD ELLIOTT, P.J.E.
MEMORANDUM BY BENDER, P.J.E.: FILED AUGUST 07, 2019
Appellant, Shaheed Williams, appeals from the post-conviction court’s
August 24, 2018 order dismissing his petition under the Post Conviction Relief
Act (PCRA), 42 Pa.C.S. §§ 9541-9546. Appellant contends that his trial
counsel acted ineffectively by erroneously advising him that if he testified on
his own behalf, he could be impeached with his prior, non-crimen falsi
convictions for gun-related offenses. After careful review, we affirm.
We need not set forth the complex factual history underlying Appellant’s
convictions for purposes of addressing the issue he raises on appeal. 1 In
regard to the procedural history of this case, the PCRA court stated:
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1 For a detailed summary of the facts, see PCRA Court Opinion (PCO),
10/29/18, at 2-6.
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On February 28, 2014, … [Appellant], along with his co-
defendant[,] Aki Jones, was arrested and charged with Attempted
Murder, Aggravated Assault, Intimidation of a Witness,
Conspiracy, and Possession of a Firearm Prohibited (“VUFA
6105”). Co-defendants Charles Alexander and Troy Cooper were
subsequently arrested and charged in connection to the instant
offenses. On June 8, 2015, Alexander and Cooper entered into
open guilty pleas.1
1On September 21, 2015, Alexander was sentenced to time
served to twenty-three months imprisonment, plus five
years of probation for Intimidation of a Witness and
Conspiracy. On the same date, Cooper was sentenced to 55
to 120 months of imprisonment for Conspiracy.
On June 15, 2015, a jury convicted … [Appellant] of Attempted
Murder, Aggravated Assault, Intimidation of a Witness,
Conspiracy, and “VUFA 6105.” On September 21, 2015, after
completion of Presentence and Mental Health Reports, this [c]ourt
sentenced … [Appellant] to twenty to forty years[’] imprisonment
for Attempted Murder,2 concurrent terms of five to ten years for
Conspiracy and “VUFA 6105,” and a consecutive term of eight to
sixteen years for Intimidation of a Witness, for a total sentence of
twenty-eight to fifty-six years of imprisonment.3
2 The Aggravated Assault count merged with [the]
Attempted Murder charge.
3 Jones was convicted of Attempted Murder, Aggravated
Assault, Intimidation of a Witness, and Conspiracy. Jones
received twenty to forty years for Attempted Murder, a
concurrent term of five to ten years for Conspiracy, and a
consecutive term of five to ten years for Intimidation of a
Witness for a total sentence of 25-50 years[’] imprisonment.
These sentences were imposed consecutive to a three-to-
six year sentence that Jones was currently serving for
Possession of a Firearm Prohibited.
On October 13, 2015, this [c]ourt denied … [Appellant’s] timely
Post-Sentence Motion. … [Appellant] appealed and on December
16, 2016, the Superior Court affirmed his judgment of sentence.
[Commonwealth v. Williams, 159 A.3d 1005 (Pa. Super. 2016)
(unpublished memorandum)]. On July 27, 2017, the Supreme
Court of Pennsylvania denied his Petition for Allowance of Appeal.
[Commonwealth v. Williams, 169 A.3d 1071 (Pa. 2017).]
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On December 8, 2017, … [Appellant] filed a timely[,] pro se
[]PCRA[] petition, his first. On May 2, 2018, appointed PCRA
counsel filed a no-merit letter pursuant to [Commonwealth v.
Turner, 544 A.2d 927 (Pa. 1988), and] Commonwealth v.
Finley, 550 A.2d 213 (Pa. Super. 1988) (en banc)[,] and a Motion
to Withdraw. On May 4, 2018, after independent review, this
[c]ourt agreed that the instant petition was meritless and issued
a Notice of Intent to Dismiss pursuant to Pa.R.Crim.P. 907.[2] On
June 20, 2018, [Appellant] filed a pro se 907 Response, raising
four new issues.4 On August 2, 2018, … [Appellant], through
counsel, filed an Amended Petition. On August 24, 2018, after an
evidentiary hearing, this [c]ourt dismissed the Petition.
4 … [Appellant] requested permission to proceed pro se and
requested a forty-five day continuance to respond to the
[c]ourt’s 907 Notice. This [c]ourt granted a thirty-day
continuance.
PCO at 1-2.
Appellant filed a timely notice of appeal. It does not appear that the
PCRA court ordered him to file a Pa.R.A.P. 1925(b) statement, but it filed a
Rule 1925(a) opinion on October 29, 2018. Herein, Appellant states one issue
for our review: “Was trial counsel ineffective for giving inaccurate advice that
vitiated Appellant’s waiver of his fundamental and personal right to testify in
his own defense?” Appellant’s Brief at 2.
To begin, we note that:
Our standard of review of a PCRA court’s denial of petition for
relief is well-settled. We review an order of the PCRA court to
determine whether the record supports the findings of the PCRA
court and whether its rulings are free from legal error. To be
eligible for PCRA relief, a petitioner must plead and prove, by a
preponderance of the evidence, that his conviction or sentence
____________________________________________
2 While the court noted in the Rule 907 notice that Appellant’s counsel had
filed a petition to withdraw, the court did not rule on counsel’s motion.
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resulted from one or more of the reasons set forth in 42 Pa.C.S.[]
§ 9543(a)(2).
***
In order to obtain relief under the PCRA premised upon a
claim that counsel was ineffective, a petitioner must establish
beyond a preponderance of the evidence that counsel’s
ineffectiveness so undermined the truth-determining process that
no reliable adjudication of guilt or innocence could have taken
place. When considering such a claim, courts presume that
counsel was effective, and place upon the appellant the burden of
proving otherwise. Counsel cannot be found ineffective for failure
to assert a baseless claim.
To succeed on a claim that counsel was ineffective, [the
a]ppellant must demonstrate that: (1) the claim is of arguable
merit; (2) counsel had no reasonable strategic basis for his or her
action or inaction; and (3) counsel’s ineffectiveness prejudiced
him.
Furthermore:
to demonstrate prejudice, [the] appellant must show there
is a reasonable probability that, but for counsel’s error, the
outcome of the proceeding would have been different. When
it is clear the party asserting an ineffectiveness claim has
failed to meet the prejudice prong of the ineffectiveness
test, the claim may be dismissed on that basis alone,
without a determination of whether the first two prongs
have been met. Failure to meet any prong of the test will
defeat an ineffectiveness claim. Counsel is not ineffective for
failing to raise meritless claims.
Commonwealth v. Michaud, 70 A.3d 862, 867 (Pa. Super. 2013) (cleaned
up). Additionally,
[a]s our Supreme Court explained in Commonwealth v. Nieves,
… 746 A.2d 1102 ([Pa.] 2000):
The decision of whether or not to testify on one’s own behalf
is ultimately to be made by the defendant after full
consultation with counsel. In order to sustain a claim that
counsel was ineffective for failing to advise the appellant of
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his rights in this regard, the appellant must demonstrate
either that counsel interfered with his right to testify, or that
counsel gave specific advice so unreasonable as to vitiate a
knowing and intelligent decision to testify on his own behalf.
Michaud, 70 A.3d at 869 (citations omitted).
In the case sub judice, Appellant claims that his trial counsel acted
ineffectively by advising him that if he testified on his own behalf at trial, he
could be impeached with his two prior convictions for gun-related offenses.
He contends that his firearm offenses are not crimen falsi crimes and, thus,
they are not admissible as impeachment evidence. See Pa.R.E. 609 (“For the
purpose of attacking the credibility of any witness, evidence that the witness
has been convicted of a crime, whether by verdict or by plea of guilty or nolo
contendere, must be admitted if it involved dishonesty or false statement.”).
Appellant insists that “[h]e wanted to testify in his own defense, and … he
would have testified that he was innocent of the crimes charged, but for trial
counsel’s erroneous legal advice that he would be subject to cross-
examination and impeachment for prior arrests and/or convictions not
involving crimen falsi.” Appellant’s Brief at 19. Consequently, Appellant
claims that his counsel acted ineffectively and he is entitled to a new trial.
We disagree. In rejecting this claim, the PCRA court reasoned:
At the August 24, 2018 evidentiary hearing, ... [Appellant]
testified that trial counsel advised him that if he testified, his prior
convictions for firearms offenses would be introduced to the jury.
N.T.[ PCRA Hearing,] 8/24/2018[,] at 22-24. This [c]ourt found
... [Appellant’s] testimony incredible. As a preliminary matter,
this [c]ourt notes that [Appellant] had a juvenile conviction for
Receiving Stolen Property, which is a crime of crimen falsi,
pursuant to Pa.R.E. 609, and [Appellant] could have been
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impeached if he testified at trial.[3] [Additionally,] [a]t the
evidentiary hearing, trial counsel testified that he advised ...
[Appellant] not to testify as a matter of strategy, based off the
belief that he could effectively cross-examine the Commonwealth
witnesses. Id. at [37-40]. Trial counsel properly advised ...
[Appellant] that if he testified, he risked “opening the door” to his
prior [firearm] convictions being admitted.
PCO at 8. The court also stressed that, at trial, it had conducted a thorough
colloquy of Appellant regarding his waiver of his right to testify. Appellant
indicated that he understood the implications of that waiver, and that he had
no questions for the court or counsel. See id. at 9-11.
Clearly, the PCRA court made a credibility determination to believe trial
counsel’s testimony that he advised Appellant not to testify as a matter of
strategy, and to protect against Appellant’s ‘opening the door’ to the evidence
of his prior gun-related offenses. The court did not believe Appellant’s claim
that counsel told him that his firearm offenses would be automatically
admissible for impeachment purposes. We cannot reverse the PCRA court’s
credibility determinations, which are supported by the record. See
Commonwealth v. Dennis, 17 A.3d 297, 305 (“[W]here the record supports
the PCRA court’s credibility determinations, such determinations are binding
on a reviewing court.”) (citation omitted). Moreover, we agree with the court
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3 Rule 609(d) states that, “[i]n a criminal case only, evidence of the
adjudication of delinquency for an offense under the Juvenile Act, 42 Pa.C.S.
§§ 6301 et seq., may be used to impeach the credibility of a witness if
conviction of the offense would be admissible to attack the credibility of an
adult.” Pa.R.E. 609(d). Receiving stolen property is recognized as a crime
involving dishonesty for which an adult defendant can be impeached. See
Commonwealth v. McEnany, 732 A.2d 1263, 1270 n.1 (Pa. Super. 1999)
(citations omitted).
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that counsel’s advice was legally sound and reasonable. See
Commonwealth v. Murphy, 182 A.3d 1002, 1005 (Pa. Super. 2018)
(“Evidence that might otherwise be inadmissible may be introduced for some
other purpose, particularly where [the defendant’s] own testimony ‘opens the
door’ for such evidence to be used for impeachment purposes.”) (citation
omitted). Consequently, we discern no error in the court’s rejecting
Appellant’s ineffectiveness claim and dismissing his petition.
Order affirmed.
Judgment Entered.
Joseph D. Seletyn, Esq.
Prothonotary
Date: 8/7/19
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