FILED
Aug 08 2019, 5:49 am
CLERK
Indiana Supreme Court
Court of Appeals
and Tax Court
ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLANT ATTORNEYS FOR APPELLEE
Stephen T. Owens Curtis T. Hill, Jr.
Public Defender of Indiana Attorney General of Indiana
Jonathan O. Chenoweth Monika P. Talbot
Deputy Public Defender Deputy Attorney General
Indianapolis, Indiana Indianapolis, Indiana
IN THE
COURT OF APPEALS OF INDIANA
Alandus James, August 8, 2019
Appellant-Defendant, Court of Appeals Case No.
18A-PC-3063
v. Appeal from the Elkhart Superior
Court
State of Indiana, The Honorable Teresa L. Cataldo,
Appellee-Plaintiff Judge
Trial Court Cause No.
20D03-1704-PC-22
May, Judge.
[1] Alandus James appeals the denial of his amended petition for post-conviction
relief. James raises two issues on appeal: whether the trial court adequately
advised him of the rights he was waiving by pleading guilty to a habitual
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criminal offender (“HCO”) allegation; and whether the State met its burden of
showing James was nonetheless aware of the rights being waived. We affirm.
Facts and Procedural History
[2] On June 27, 2012, the State charged James with Class D felony battery on a
child, 1 Class D felony strangulation, 2 and Class D felony residential entry. 3 On
March 4, 2014, the State amended the charging information to add an HCO
sentencing enhancement because on two prior occasions James had been
convicted of sexual misconduct with a minor. On March 26, 2014, after being
convicted by a jury on the felony charges, James pleaded guilty to the HCO
enhancement without a plea agreement.
[3] James appealed, challenging the court’s order that he serve a thirty-month
sentence for Class D felony residential entry consecutive to two concurrent
eighteen-month sentences for Class D felony battery on a child and Class D
felony strangulation, and we affirmed the trial court in an unpublished decision.
See James v. State, No. 20A03-1405-CR-173 (Ind. Ct. App. Feb. 19, 2015). On
April 24, 2017, James filed his pro se petition for post-conviction relief. The trial
court appointed the Indiana State Public Defender to represent James, and on
June 21, 2018, James filed an amended petition for post-conviction relief
1
Ind. Code § 35-42-2-1 (2014).
2
Ind. Code § 34-42-2-9 (2014).
3
Ind. Code § 35-43-2-1.5 (2014).
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arguing that “his guilty plea was involuntary because the trial court had failed
to advise him that he was waiving his right to confront and cross-examine
witnesses and his right against self-incrimination.” (Br. of Appellant at 5.)
[4] On July 20, 2018, the court held an evidentiary hearing. On November 30,
2018, the court issued an order denying James’ amended petition for post-
conviction relief. The court concluded:
12. The Record herein shows that certain explicitly stated rights
were not articulated by the trial court judge at the specific
time of the guilty plea; however, they were expressed earlier
in the trial proceedings. Also, there was no evidence
presented at the post[-]conviction hearing from the Petitioner
that he was inadequately informed or unaware that he was
waiving the three rights stated in [Boykin 4]. Moreover, at the
time of his guilty plea, the trial court noted on the record that
the stage of the proceedings was just after the jury had
returned the guilty verdict on the three D felony counts, and
explained the Habitual Offender admission would apply to
and enhance the sentence. The judge asked the Petitioner if
he understood the penalties associated with the Habitual
Offender Enhancement, and Petitioner responded, “yes, your
Honor.” The trial court judge also said, “now you have all
the rights to have an attorney, which you have.” Petitioner
was also told that he had the right to a jury trial and that the
jury was “ready to roll,” and it appeared to the court that the
Petitioner was familiar with how the jury process worked,
trial having just ended. The court then asked the Petitioner if
he had any questions at all about his rights. The Petitioner
4
See Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969) (holding three federal constitutional privileges—the privilege
against compulsory self-incrimination, the right to trial by jury, and the right to confront one’s accusers—are
waived when a plea of guilty is entered in a state criminal trial).
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asked the judge if he was referring to a jury trial on the
Habitual, and the court said, “yes, right.” Then the
Petitioner asked the Court if all the [S]tate had to prove was
that he had two prior felonies, and the Court replied, that
was what it boiled down to. But, the trial court judge then
proceeded to explain to the Petitioner that he had the right to
“sit back and go through it, see how it comes out”, but that
his attorney had suggested that he may want to admit, to
which the Petitioner responded, “Yeah.”
13. The guilty plea colloquy proceeded with the judge asking the
Petitioner if he had any further questions and he responded,
“no.” Thereafter, the judge told the Petitioner that the court
had to be satisfied that the Petitioner understood the
proceedings and had the mental clarity of mind to decide to
plead guilty. The trial court judge indicated that he had
observed the Petitioner, heard his testimony and that he was
satisfied; however, the judge again asked the Petitioner if that
was a correct statement, and Petitioner said “yes.” The
Court asked Petitioner if it should go ahead with the guilty
plea on the Habitual enhancement, and the Petitioner said
“yes.” (Trial Transcript, pp. 504-507).
14. It is evident to the Court from the guilty plea colloquy that
Petitioner was specifically advised that he had the right to an
attorney. Also, the Court noted that based on the
Petitioner’s testimony earlier in the day and during the trial
process, he was acutely familiar with the rights against self[-
]incrimination. Further, he had employed his right to
confront and cross-examine witnesses during the
immediately preceding two[-]day trial. Additionally, the
court had told Petitioner that even though he was correct that
the [S]tate had to prove two prior felonies, the Petitioner had
the right to require the State to put on witnesses and evidence
to prove the Habitual Offender Enhancement. Therefore,
based on the record and evidence, it cannot be said that
Petitioner was unaware that he was waiving his [Boykin]
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rights.” [See, e.g. Winkleman], 22 N.E.3d at 852 (defendant
voluntary [sic] pled guilty to an enhancement in the midst of
a jury trial where [Boykin] rights were clearly on display;
therefore, defendant did not establish that he was unaware
that he was waiving those rights). To the contrary, the
record and evidence establish[] that the Petitioner understood
that by admitting the Habitual Offender Enhancement he
was waiving his right to an attorney, right to a jury trial, right
against self[-]incrimination and right to confront and cross-
examine witnesses.
Accordingly, his plea of guilty was voluntary. The Petitioner
has not met his burden of demonstrating that he was
inadequately advised of his rights at the Habitual Offender
stage of the proceedings held on March 25, 2014.
(Appellant’s App. Vol. II at 45-47.) 5
Discussion and Decision
[5] Post-conviction proceedings afford petitioners a limited opportunity to raise
issues that were unavailable or unknown at trial and on direct appeal. Connor v.
State, 711 N.E.2d 1238, 1244 (Ind. 1999), reh’g denied, cert. denied 531 U.S. 829
(2000); see also Ind. Post-Conviction Rule 1(1)(a). Such proceedings are not
“super appeals” through which convicted persons can raise issues that they
failed to raise at trial or on direct appeal. McCary v. State, 761 N.E.2d 389, 391
(Ind. 2002), reh’g denied. Post-conviction proceedings are civil in nature, and
5
We thank the post-conviction court for its thorough and informative order, which greatly assisted our
consideration of James’ claims.
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petitioners bear the burden of proving their grounds for relief by a
preponderance of the evidence. P-C.R. 1(5).
[6] When a petitioner appeals the denial of post-conviction relief, he appeals from a
negative judgment. Curry v. State, 674 N.E.2d 160, 161 (Ind. 1996).
Consequently, we may not reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court
unless the petitioner demonstrates that the evidence “as a whole, leads
unerringly and unmistakably to a decision opposite that reached by the post-
conviction court.” Id. We accept the post-conviction court’s findings of fact
unless they are clearly erroneous, but we do not give deference to the court’s
conclusions of law. State v. Van Cleave, 674 N.E.2d 1293, 1295-96 (Ind. 1996),
reh’g granted on other grounds 674 N.E.2d 1293, cert. denied 522 U.S. 1119 (1998).
[7] In Boykin v. Alabama, 395 U.S. 238 (1969), the United States Supreme Court
held a trial court must advise a defendant of his right against self-incrimination,
right to trial by jury, and right to confront his accusers. Id. at 243. Our court
has held Boykin “does not require that the record of the guilty plea proceeding
show that the accused was formally advised that entry of his guilty plea waives
certain constitutional rights[,]” nor does the holding require that the record
contain a formal waiver of those rights. Barron v. State, 330 N.E.2d 141, 144,
164 Ind. App. 638, 644 (1975). However, we are required to reverse a
conviction if the defendant did not know he was waiving his Boykin rights when
he pled guilty. Dewitt v. State, 755 N.E.2d 167, 171 (Ind. 2001).
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[8] James asks us to reverse the judgment of the post-conviction court and vacate
his HCO enhancement because: (1) the trial court did not advise him that he
was waiving his Boykin rights prior to accepting his guilty plea to the HCO
charge, and (2) the State did not meet its burden of showing James nonetheless
was aware of the rights he was waiving.
[9] James first argues the court, prior to accepting his guilty plea, made no mention
of the right to confront witnesses or the right to remain silent. We agree, based
on the following dialogue, that the trial court did not explicitly advise James of
his Boykins rights:
[Court]: Now, you have all rights to have an attorney, which you
have. I think you ought to kind of be familiar with the jury
process now. You have a right to a jury trial, and they’re ready
to roll I think. And so do you have any questions at all about
your rights there?
[James]: A jury trial on the Habitual?
[Court]: Yes. Right.
[James]: All you have to prove [is] that I have two prior felonies?
[Court]: Well, that’s what it boils down to. Okay. But you know
you have the right to sit back and go through it, just kind of see
how it comes out, or the suggestion that your attorney had made
a little bit ago was that it sounded like you might just want to say
you are going to admit that’s true and put this up for sentencing
on the D with Habitual?
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[James]: Yeah.
(Prior Case Tr. Vol. III at 504-05.)
[10] However, because the HCO stage of James’ trial immediately followed his jury
trial, we reject James’ second argument that “the fact that he exercised them at
the felony phase does not show such knowledge, as it does not show that James
knew that those rights would carry over to the habitual phase.” (Appellant’s Br.
at 11.) The trial court told James he had a right to a jury and that James “ought
to kind of be familiar with the jury process now,” (Prior Case Tr. Vol. III at
504), because James had just finished the jury trial of the underlying felonies.
The court’s language indicates the process for the HCO phase would be the
same as the felony phase. Accordingly, the record demonstrates James was
aware of the rights he was waiving to plead guilty during the HCO phase
because he had just exercised those rights during the felony phase. See
Winkleman v. State, 22 N.E.3d 844, 851 (Ind. Ct. App. 2014) (defendant knew
Boykin rights based on the fact he was in the midst of a jury trial at the time he
admitted to habitual offender allegation), trans. denied; see also Barron, 330
N.E.2d at 144, 164 Ind. App. at 644 (defendant knew his rights under Boykin
based on the fact that he was advised of his rights during arraignment); see also
Dewitt, 755 N.E.2d at 171 (defendant knew his rights under Boykin because he
had been advised of them during arraignment). James has not demonstrated
the post-conviction court’s denial of his petition was contrary to law.
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Conclusion
[11] As we conclude James knew his constitutional rights under Boykin when he
pled guilty to the HCO by virtue of the trial court’s partial advisement, which
occurred just after the jury had returned its verdicts on James’ underlying
felonies, James has not demonstrated the post-conviction court’s judgment was
contrary to law. Accordingly, we affirm.
[12] Affirmed.
Mathias, J., and Brown, J., concur.
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