NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1874-17T4
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
NAJEE CROOM,
Defendant-Appellant.
__________________________
Submitted February 6, 2019 – Decided July 31, 2019
Before Judges Fuentes and Moynihan.
On appeal from the Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Somerset County, Indictment No. 15-02-
0089.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Tamar Yael Lerer, Assistant Deputy Public
Defender, of counsel and on the briefs).
Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for
respondent (Claudia Joy Demitro, Deputy Attorney
General, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
On February 18, 2015, a Somerset County Grand Jury indicted defendant
Najee Croom charging him with second degree unlawful possession of a
handgun, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b), and fourth degree possession of hollow-nose
bullets, N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(f). After arraignment, defendant filed a motion to
suppress the evidence against him.
Pursuant to Rule 3:5-7(c), the trial court conducted an N.J.R.E. 104
evidentiary hearing on August 27, 2015, at which Franklin Township Police
Officers Deyo Swartz, Steven Ellmyer, and Alexander Sodbinow testified.
Defendant did not call any witnesses. The motion judge reserved decision at the
conclusion of the hearing. The judge issued a memorandum of opinion the
following day at which he explained the factual and legal basis for denying
defendant's motion to suppress.
On December 8, 2014, all three police officers "observed a silver Ford
Taurus travelling after dark, southbound on Norma Ave[nue] in Franklin
Township, without its headlights on." Although the car's headlights were later
turned on, "the driver admitted the lights had not been on." After they stopped
the car, the officers noticed the man in the front passenger seat, whom they later
identified as defendant, was not wearing his seatbelt, in violation of N.J.S.A.
39:3-76.2f. When the officers obtained defendant's pedigree information to
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issue him a summons for this infraction, they discovered there was an open,
active warrant for defendant's arrest out of North Brunswick.
The officers removed defendant from the car and arrested him on the open
warrant. A Terry1 pat-down revealed defendant had "a loaded handgun tucked
into his waistband." The judge found the testimony of all three police officers
credible in all respects.
Defendant was tried before a jury on the two charges in the indictment on
two separate occasions. The trial court declared a mistrial both times after the
jury was unable to reach a unanimous verdict on any of the two charges.
Defendant thereafter entered into a negotiated agreement with the State through
which he pled guilty to an amended charge of a fourth degree violation of
firearms regulations under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-10(a)(1) and fourth degree
possession of hollow points bullets under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-3(f). The State agreed
to dismiss the second degree charge of unlawful possession of a handgun and
recommend that the court sentence defendant to two concurrent terms of one-
year probation and time served.
1
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1, 27 (1968).
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The court sentenced defendant on September 28, 2017 in accordance with
the terms of the plea agreement. The judge found these two charges were
defendant's "third and fourth adult indictable convictions in the [S]tate of New
Jersey, defendant having prior convictions for resisting arrest [and] . . . violation
of [a] domestic violence Order." The judge found defendant was "entitled to a
total of seven hundred twenty-two [722] days jail time credit from December
8th, 2014, through November 28th, 2016." Defendant did not challenge the jail
time credit awarded by the court.
In this appeal, defendant raises the following argument:
POINT I
THE MANNER IN WHICH THE MOTOR VEHICLE
STOP WAS CONDUCTED WAS
UNCONSTITUTIONAL.
We reject this argument and affirm. At the suppression hearing, defendant
argued the police officers did not have reasonable suspicion to stop the car
because the headlights were operational and activated before the stop. The
motion judge disagreed. Here, defendant argues the motion judge's findings are
not supported by a DVD video recording of the initial motor vehicle stop which
shows the car had its headlights on before the police stopped it. However, the
police officer who made the stop testified at the suppression hearing that
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although the headlights were on when he stopped the car, they were off when he
first saw the car drive by him. The officer also testified that the driver admitted
he was driving without the headlights on before he was stopped. The driver
turned on the headlights only after he saw the police car's overhead light and
heard the siren.
In State v. Williamson, 138 N.J. 302, 304 (1999), the Court held that "the
State need prove only that the police lawfully stopped the car, not that it could
convict the driver of the motor-vehicle offense." The Court reaffirmed this
standard in State v. Locurto, when it held that "[t]o satisfy the articulable and
reasonable suspicion standard, the State is not required to prove that the
suspected motor-vehicle violation occurred." 157 N.J. 463, 470 (1999) (citing
Williamson, 138 N.J. at 304). Based on the testimony of the police officers, the
motion judge found the car did not have its headlights on when the officers first
saw the vehicle. We discern no legal basis to question the motion judge's
findings under the deferential standard of review established in State v. S.S.,
229 N.J. 360, 380-81 (2017).
Affirmed.
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