NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-1006-17T4
KORNEGAY CONSTRUCTION,
LLC,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
UNIVERSITY HEIGHTS
CONDOMINIUM ASSOCIATION,
INC.,1
Defendant-Appellant.
Argued April 29, 2019 – Decided May 14, 2019
Before Judges Gooden Brown and Rose.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Union County, Docket No. DC-012131-16.
Paul F. Campano argued the cause for appellant
(Heinkel Law Firm, LLC, attorneys; Jessica A. Tracy,
on the brief).
Respondent has not filed a brief.
1
Improperly pled as University Heights Condominiums.
PER CURIAM
In this breach of contract action, defendant University Heights
Condominium Association, Inc. appeals from an October 11, 2017 Special Civil
Part order, denying its motions to: vacate a final judgment for plaintiff Kornegay
Construction, LLC; set aside the writ of execution; and quash plaintiff's
information subpoena. For the reasons that follow, we reverse and remand for
a new trial.
We summarize the pertinent procedural history that forms the focal point
of defendant's appeal from the trial court's oral decision following argument on
defendant's motions.
In November 2016, plaintiff Kornegay Construction, LLC filed a
complaint in the Small Claims Section of the Special Civil Part, demanding
damages in the jurisdictional amount of $3000 plus costs. Anthony O. Kornegay
(Kornegay), a non-attorney, 2 filed the complaint on behalf of plaintiff. See R.
6:11 (permitting "any authorized officer or employee [to] prosecute and defend
2
Kornegay's affiliation with plaintiff is unclear from the record. Although the
trial court noted Kornegay was plaintiff's "sole proprietor and owner," plaintiff
appears to be a limited liability company. During oral argument before us,
defendant claimed it presented evidence to the trial court indicating Kornegay
is plaintiff's agent, and not a principal as Kornegay contended. However,
defendant failed to include citations to the trial record supporting its contention.
A-1006-17T4
2
on behalf of a party which is a business entity, whether formally incorporated
or not"). Trial was scheduled for December 20, 2016.
The day before trial, defendant requested an adjournment seeking to file
a counterclaim. The trial court reluctantly granted the adjournment over
Kornegay's objection "in the spirit of allowing . . . defendant to prosecute . . . a
counterclaim." See R. 6:4-7(a) (requiring requests for adjournment to be made
"absent good cause . . . not less than 5 days before the scheduled court event").
Thereafter, defendant filed its answer and a five-count counterclaim
alleging breach of contract, breach of the duty of good faith and fair dealing,
violations of the New Jersey Consumer Fraud Act, N.J.S.A. 56:8-1 to -210,
intentional misrepresentation, and negligent misrepresentation. Although the
counterclaim did not set forth a sum certain for damages, it is undisputed that
the amount claimed exceeded the jurisdictional amount of $3000 for small
claims actions. Accordingly, the case was transferred from the Small Claims
Section to the Special Civil Part's "DC" docket. See R. 6:1-2(a)(2)
(jurisdictional amount); R. 6:11.3
3
Apparently, transfer is made by the clerk's office without the necessity of filing
a motion. Pursuant to Rule 6:11 (emphasis added), "Upon the filing of a
counterclaim for a sum in excess of the monetary limit of the Small Claims
Section, the action shall be transferred to the Special Civil Part proper upon
A-1006-17T4
3
Trial was rescheduled for January 23, 2017. Both parties appeared, but
defendant again requested an adjournment because its "key witness" was
unavailable. Kornegay objected to the adjournment because it was the second
time he missed work without pay. The court denied the adjournment request
and waited for the witness, but ultimately adjourned the matter when it was
unable to reach the case.
Trial was held on January 30, 2017. Prior to hearing testimony, the court
informed Kornegay that, because the complaint was filed by Kornegay
Construction, LLC, "the [R]ules require an LLC to have an attorney."
According to the trial court:
Mr. Kornegay responded by saying that he originally
filed this matter under a small claims docket and that
he was told, and rightfully, that he did not need an
attorney. And he was correct in that regard[], but the
matter was only transferred to the [DC] docket because
. . . defendant's claim of consumer fraud. . . . [requiring]
treble damages, which would be three times the amount
of the actual damages. And the actual damages were
only $1100. So Mr. Kornegay made a plea to the
[c]ourt to allow this trial to begin because he had taken
off [from] work. Th[at] would [have] be[en] the third
time without getting paid to pursue this matter.
Defendant's attorney did not object.
payment by the defendant of the required fees." But cf. R. 6:4-1(c) (requiring a
defendant whose counterclaim exceeds the $15,000 monetary limit of the
Special Civil Part to make an application to transfer the action to the Law
Division).
A-1006-17T4
4
The [c]ourt[,] understanding that Mr. Kornegay
wanted to finish the trial and was willing to represent
himself, and that he initially filed his matter in small
claims court, which he was entitled to[; and] . . .
defendant only making a claim of consumer fraud, but
the actual damages being $1100[;] . . . the [c]ourt, in its
discretion, allowed this matter to proceed with Mr.
Kornegay representing himself since he had originally
filed in small claims court. And there was no objection
by defendant's attorney, nor was there any prejudice
that would have come to . . . defendant by allowing Mr.
Kornegay to represent himself in this matter.
....
The only prejudice in th[e] court's opinion to not
allowing the trial to go forward would have been to Mr.
Kornegay because if the [c]ourt would [ha]ve
adjourned it, the [c]ourt would [ha]ve had to give
[plaintiff] at least two weeks to find an attorney. He
would ha[ve] had to take off again from work and that
would ha[ve] been a fourth time. And the [c]ourt found
that in its discretion it was proper to allow him to
proceed on his own unless he requested an adjournment
for an attorney. And he had stressed to th[e c]ourt that
at that time he wanted to proceed without one, that he
originally filed in small claims because he did [no]t
want to have an attorney. And but for the counterclaim,
which was dismissed, the matter was bumped up to the
[DC docket of the S]pecial [C]ivil [P]art.
The matter then proceeded to trial without a jury. 4 Kornegay represented
plaintiff. At the conclusion of trial, the court entered a judgment for plaintiff in
4
Defendant did not provide the trial transcript on appeal.
A-1006-17T4
5
the amount of $2399, including costs. The court dismissed defendant's
counterclaim, finding defendant failed to "prove[] a cause of action upon which
relief could be granted under R[ule] 4:6-2(e) and there was no consumer fraud."
Defendant did not file a motion for reconsideration nor appeal from the final
judgment.
Nor did defendant satisfy the judgment. Accordingly, on April 3, 2017,
plaintiff sent an information subpoena by certified mail to defense counsel. A
writ of execution was issued by the court on April 5, 2017. On May 16, 2017
Kornegay, on behalf of plaintiff, filed a motion to enforce litigant's rights.
Defendant did not appeal from the ensuing order granting plaintiff's motion.
However, on May 17, 2017, defendant filed a motion to vacate the
judgment pursuant to Rule 4:50-1,5 set aside the writ of execution and quash the
information subpoena, or in the alternative, stay execution of the judgment
pending appeal. During oral argument before the trial court, defendant
contended the judgment was voidable at its election because plaintiff was not
represented by an attorney at trial, the information subpoena was not certified,
5
Rule 4:50-1(d) provides, in pertinent part, "[o]n motion, with briefs, and upon
such terms as are just, the court may relieve a party . . . from a final judgment
or order . . . [if] the judgment or order is void . . . ."
A-1006-17T4
6
and the motion to enforce litigants rights was filed under a DC docket by
Kornegay, a non-attorney. The court denied the motions.
In sum, the trial court determined defendant's motions were not filed until
"[s]ome five months after the judgment was entered" 6 and only after plaintiff
filed a motion to enforce litigant's rights. Finding the order and judgment were
not void, the court reiterated that it granted Kornegay's request to represent
plaintiff because he had already missed work three times for prior adjournments,
and defendant did not object to Kornegay's representation at the time of trial.
Further, the court found defendant's counterclaim "was a strategic ploy . . . to
allege consumer fraud and treble damages only to allow Mr. Kornegay to have
to expend monies on attorneys' fees." Thus, the court "exercised its discretion
in the [S]pecial [C]ivil [P]art, [and] relaxed . . . [R]ule [1:21-1(c)] in favor of
Mr. Kornegay."
On appeal, defendant renews its argument that the trial court erred by
allowing plaintiff, as a limited liability company (LLC), to appear at trial and
6
The judgment was entered on January 30, 2017 and defendant's motion to
vacate was filed on May 17, 2017. As such, the delay was less than four months.
Nonetheless, pursuant to Rule 4:50-2, a motion for relief from judgment must
be filed "within a reasonable time" for certain bases, including if the judgment
is alleged to be void.
A-1006-17T4
7
file a post-trial motion through a non-attorney rather than counsel. Defendant
does not, however, contend the court's decisions were incorrect on the merits.
Ordinarily, our review might be hampered by defendant's failure to
provide the transcript of the trial proceedings. See R. 2:5-3(b) ("[T]he transcript
shall include the entire proceedings . . . ."). Indeed, this deficiency might also
prompt us simply to dismiss the appeal. See Pressler & Verniero, Current N.J.
Court Rules, cmt. 2 on R. 2:5-3 (2019); Cipala v. Lincoln Tech. Inst., 179 N.J.
45, 55 (2004) (failing to provide the complete transcript may result in dismissal
of the appeal); In re Zakhari, 330 N.J. Super. 493, 495 (App. Div. 2000); R. 2:8-
2 (providing that an appellate court may, at any time and on its own motion,
dismiss an appeal).
Here, however, defendant challenges the trial court's decision to permit
Kornegay to represent plaintiff on legal grounds. Because defendant does not
attack the underlying judgment on the merits, we are therefore confident we
have sufficient information in the record to undertake meaningful appellate
review.
Rule 1:21-1(c) governs our analysis and provides as follows (emphasis
added):
Except as otherwise provided by paragraph (d) of this
rule and by R. 1:21-1A (professional corporations), R.
A-1006-17T4
8
1:21-1B (limited liability companies [engaged in the
practice of law]), R. 1:21-1C (limited liability
partnerships), R. 6:10 (appearances in landlord-tenant
actions), R. 6:11 (appearances in small claims actions),
R. 7:6-2(a) (pleas in municipal court), R. 7:8-7(a)
(presence of defendant in municipal court) and by R.
7:12-4(d) (municipal court violations bureau), an
entity, however formed and for whatever purpose, other
than a sole proprietorship shall neither appear nor file
any paper in any action in any court of this State except
through an attorney authorized to practice in this State.
This portion of the rule "makes clear that any entity, regardless of its purpose or
organization, must be represented in court by an attorney." Pressler & Verniero,
Current N.J. Court Rules, cmt. 3 on R. 1:21-1(c) (2019). Because the amount in
controversy exceeded $3000, the more lenient provisions of Rule 6:11 are
inapplicable.
In Gobe Media Group, LLC v. Cisneros, 403 N.J. Super. 574, 575-76
(App. Div. 2008), an LLC successfully obtained a judgment in the Special Civil
Part. The defendant argued, for the first time on appeal, that the Special Civil
Part judge should not have allowed the plaintiff's non-attorney officer to
represent the LLC at trial, and that the judgment was void ab initio. Id. at 576-
77.
We held "that a judgment entered in favor of a business entity without
representation of counsel is voidable rather than void, at the option of the
A-1006-17T4
9
adverse party[,] without proving plain error[.]" Id. at 580. We explained that,
"[t]o require the adverse party to prove plain error would open the door for
business entities to appear in court without counsel in hope of succeeding in the
action, and if challenged on appeal, shift the burden to the adverse party to prove
plain error." Ibid. Accordingly, "the more appropriate remedy is to establish a
bright line test on appeal to discourage business entities from violating Rule
1:21-1(c) in the first instance." Ibid. Consequently, we reversed and remanded
for a new trial. Ibid.
Guided by these principles, we reverse the judgment on appeal, and
remand for a new trial in accordance with the "bright line test" enunciated in
Gobe Media and pursuant to the mandates of Rule 1:21-1(c). While we
acknowledge the trial court's laudable desire to spare Kornegay any further
inconvenience by adjourning the trial an additional time so that plaintiff could
retain counsel, the court improperly exercised its discretion by relaxing the Rule,
which applies to "appearances in small claims matters" and not to cases on the
DC docket. Because we conclude the judgment must be vacated on that basis,
we need not reach the additional points raised by defendant in this appeal.
On remand, the matter should be assigned to a different Special Civil Part
judge. See Entress v. Entress, 376 N.J. Super. 125, 133 (App. Div. 2005) ("In
A-1006-17T4
10
an abundance of caution, we direct that this matter be remanded to a different
judge for the plenary hearing to avoid the appearance of bias or prejudice based
upon the judge's prior involvement with the matter . . . ."). We express no
opinion about the merits of the parties' claims.
Reversed and remanded. We do not retain jurisdiction.
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11