NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-5632-14T3
JEFFREY S. FELD,
Plaintiff-Appellant,
v.
THE CITY OF ORANGE TOWNSHIP,
DWIGHT MITCHELL, as the city's
Custodian of Government Records,
and THE CITY OF ORANGE
TOWNSHIP CITY COUNCIL,
Defendants-Respondents.
________________________________
Argued February 7, 2018 – Decided April 18, 2019
Before Judges Fuentes, Koblitz and Suter.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Essex County, Docket No. L-1969-10.
Jeffrey S. Feld, appellant, argued the cause pro se.
Respondents have not filed a briefs.
The opinion of the court was delivered by
FUENTES, P.J.A.D.
Plaintiff Jeffrey S. Feld appeals two orders of the Law Division den ying
his requests for attorney's fees and sanctions under the Open Public Records Act
(OPRA), N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1 to -13. Specifically, plaintiff argues that, as an
attorney admitted to practice in this State, he is entitled to recover fees for the
professional services he performed in the prosecution of this case
notwithstanding that he was acting on his own behalf as plaintiff. N.J.S.A.
47:1A-6. Plaintiff also seeks the reversal of the trial court's order denying his
application for the imposition of penalties against the custodian of records under
N.J.S.A. 47:1A-11. We affirm.
On March 12, 2010, plaintiff filed a verified complaint and order to show
cause against defendants, the City of Orange Township (City), the City's
custodian of records Dwight Mitchell, and the City's governing council
(Council). The complaint alleged numerous OPRA violations concerning access
to the Council's agendas and other items. In an order entered on April 10, 2015,
the Law Division denied in part defendants' summary judgment motion and
ordered the custodian of records "to produce the 28 items appended as an exhibit
. . . ." The court also denied plaintiff's application for an award of counsel fees
under N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6 as a matter of judicial discretion.
A-5632-14T3
2
We start our analysis by reaffirming a well-settled principle of appellate
jurisprudence: "appeals are taken from orders and judgments and not from
opinions, oral decisions, informal written decisions, or reasons given for the
ultimate conclusion." Hayes v. Delamotte, 231 N.J. 373, 387 (2018) (quoting
Do-Wop Corp. v. City of Rahway, 168 N.J. 191, 199 (2001)). Thus, although
we affirm the trial court's order denying plaintiff's application for counsel fees
under OPRA, we disagree with the reasons expressed by the court in reaching
this conclusion.
An award of counsel fees to a prevailing party under N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6 is
mandatory as a vital part of the public policy underpinning the public's right of
access to government records:
[u]nder the OPRA, it is the declared public policy of
this State that "government records shall be readily
accessible for inspection, copying, or examination by
the citizens of this State." N.J.S.A. 47:1A-1. To obtain
records that are not made available, "[a] person who is
denied access to a government record by the custodian
of the record . . . may . . . institute a proceeding to
challenge the custodian's decision by filing an action in
Superior Court." N.J.S.A. 47:1A-6. If the court
determines that the custodian unjustifiably denied
access to the record in question, he or she is entitled to
a "reasonable attorney's fee." Ibid. Without that fee-
shifting provision, "the ordinary citizen would be
waging a quixotic battle against a public entity vested
with almost inexhaustible resources. By making the
custodian of the government record responsible for the
A-5632-14T3
3
payment of counsel fees to a prevailing requestor, the
Legislature intended to even the fight." Courier News
v. Hunterdon Cty. Prosecutor's Office, 378 N.J. Super.
539, 546 (App. Div. 2005).
[New Jerseyans for a Death Penalty Moratorium v. N.J.
Dep't of Corr., 185 N.J. 137, 153 (2005).]
However, it is equally well-settled that an attorney who represents himself
or herself is not entitled to recover counsel fees. Segal v. Lynch, 211 N.J. 230,
258-64 (2012). This bar applies even in cases involving fee-shifting statutes.
Plaintiff's remaining arguments lack sufficient merit to warrant discussion in a
written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
Affirmed.
A-5632-14T3
4