NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4042-17T3
IN THE MATTER OF THE
APPLICATION FOR RETAIL
FIREARMS DEALER
LICENSE RENEWAL BY
CAYUSE, LLC, t/a WILD
WEST CITY – LICENSE #2530.
___________________________
Submitted March 18, 2019 – Decided April 1, 2019
Before Judges Sabatino, Haas and Sumners.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Sussex County.
Mary K. Stabile Benson, attorney for appellant Cayuse,
LLC, t/a Wild West City, and Michael Stabile.
Francis A. Koch, Sussex County Prosecutor, attorney
for respondent State of New Jersey (Shaina Brenner,
Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Appellant Cayuse, LLC, t/a Wild West City appeals from the Law
Division's April 16, 2018 order denying its application for renewal of an expired
retail firearms dealer license after a five-day plenary hearing. We affirm.
The essential procedural history and background facts of this case are set
forth in our previous opinion,1 and we incorporate that discussion here by
reference. The parties are also fully familiar with the proceedings that followed
our opinion and, therefore, only a brief summary is necessary here.
Michael Stabile is the sole owner, manager, and only member of Cayuse,
LLC (Cayuse). For a number of years, Stabile has operated a western theme
park known as "Wild West City"2 which, among other things, features
reenactments of gunfights put on by Stabile's employees. During this period,
Stabile held retail firearms dealer licenses in his own name, and in the names of
corporate entities he headed,3 including one called Western World, Inc.
1
In re Cayuse Corp., LLC, 445 N.J. Super. 80, 84-88 (App. Div. 2016).
2
The theme park is located in Sussex County.
3
These companies all traded as Wild West City.
A-4042-17T3
2
(Western). The retail firearms business was located on the theme park's
property.4
Stabile permitted his employees to use real handguns during their
performances even though most, if not all, of these employees did not possess
the required permit to legally carry a firearm under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b). Stabile
provided some of these firearms to the employees, and claimed he was not aware
that carry permits were required because he was operating a theme park. Stabile
testified that he had safety protocols in place that prohibited the employees from
using live ammunition during their performances. Instead, the employees were
supposed to use "blanks."
These protocols were obviously not effective because, on July 7, 2006,
one of the employees shot another worker in the head5 while using a real
handgun with live ammunition during a performance at the theme park. As a
result, a Sussex County grand jury returned a twenty-five count indictment
4
The property where the gun dealer business and theme park were located was
owned by another corporation, Cheyenne Corporation (Cheyenne), that was also
managed by Stabile and other family members.
5
The worker sustained a catastrophic brain injury, and was severely and
permanently disabled.
A-4042-17T3
3
charging Stabile, Western, Cheyenne, and two other individuals with a number
of criminal offenses, including unlawful possession of a firearm as the result of
Stabile permitting his employees to carry handguns without a permit. 6
Thereafter, Stabile formed Cayuse to take over operations from Western.
In August 2010, he filed an application to renew Western's retail firearms dealer
license and transfer it to Cayuse. 7 As discussed in our 2016 opinion, a Law
Division judge denied the application on March 12, 2012 without first
conducting a hearing. Cayuse, 445 N.J. Super. at 87-88. We vacated this order
due to the judge's failure to hold a hearing, and stated that because the license
had long since expired, Cayuse could file a new application for consideration in
accordance with the review procedures we outlined in the opinion. Id. at 98.
On April 11, 2012, Western pled guilty to third-degree unlawful
possession of a handgun in violation of N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b). Stabile executed
the plea form, and also provided the plea allocution on Western's behalf.
"Stabile stated in his allocution that [Western] provided operable handguns to
[his employees] and, to the corporation's knowledge, they did not have carry
6
This indictment was filed on June 5, 2008.
7
The license was designated as License #2530.
A-4042-17T3
4
permits." Id. at 88.8 The remaining charges against Stabile, Western, and
Cheyenne were dismissed, and Western was sentenced to one year of probation.9
Because Cayuse was now Western's successor in interest and alter ego, the
sentencing judge required Cayuse to abide by all of the terms of probation
imposed upon Western.
In April 2016, one month after our decision in Cayuse, Stabile filed an
application to renew License #2530 to be held in the name of Cayuse. 10 In
accordance with the procedures outlined in that opinion, 11 the application was
first considered by Detective Michael Kassey and Lieutenant Glenn Ross of the
New Jersey State Police. Following their investigation, the State Police
8
At the licensing hearing that is the subject of the present appeal, Stabile
repeated this same testimony.
9
As part of its plea agreement, Western retained the right to appeal the trial
court's denial of its motion to dismiss the unlawful possession of a handgun
charge, based on Western's contention that workers at a theme park may carry
real guns without the required permit. Western did file an appeal from its
conviction under Docket No. A-3007-12, but later withdrew it.
10
As noted in our decision, we anticipated that Stabile would file an application
for a new license because License #2530 had expired in 2010. Cayuse, 445 N.J.
Super. at 98. However, the State Police assigned the application a new number,
License #4211, and processed it as a new application. Therefore, the trial judge
properly rejected the State's claim at the hearing that the application should not
be considered because Stabile mistakenly filed it as a renewal application.
11
See Cayuse, 445 N.J. Super. at 89-90.
A-4042-17T3
5
recommended that the application be denied. Lieutenant Ross testified that
based upon the serious shooting incident that occurred at the theme park and
Western's conviction for permitting employees to carry handguns without a
permit, Stabile, who was responsible for operations at the theme park and who
now owned and managed Cayuse, had demonstrated that he could not "engage
in business as a retail dealer of firearms . . . without any danger to the public
safety, health and welfare" under N.J.S.A. 2C:58-2(a).
After Detective Kassey and Lieutenant Ross testified at the hearing about
their investigation, Stabile took the stand as Cayuse's only witness. As noted
above, Stabile testified about his role in managing Western leading up to the
2006 shooting and, as the trial court found in its oral decision at the conclusion
of the hearing, Stabile was aptly described as "the 'chief, cook, and bottle
washer'" at Western because he was "in charge of the whole enterprise on a day-
to-day basis." This included the retail firearms business and the theme park.
Stabile did not dispute that he permitted employees to carry and use real
handguns during the simulated gun fights. The transcript of his plea allocution
on behalf of Western was also admitted in evidence. In testifying on behalf of
Western during that proceeding, Stabile admitted that handguns were distributed
to Western's employees "to be used during reenactments and skits as part of the
A-4042-17T3
6
day-to-day corporation's operations[.]" Stabile also stated that these handguns
were given to employees on the day of the near-fatal shooting, even though it
was known that the employees did not hold the permits required to carry
handguns under N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b).
Stabile claimed that he had safety protocols in place that prohibited the
use of live ammunition in the handguns that were distributed to the unpermitted
employees. However, other than providing a "Wild West City Gun Safety
Review" sheet12 to his employees, and sometimes requiring them to participate
in a "Gun Safety Seminar" on "handling, loading, unloading and proper
discharge technique of revolvers and shotguns used" at the theme park, Stabile
did not further identify or explain these protocols. Thus, for example, nothing
in the record indicates that Stabile ever checked each employee's handgun prior
to a performance to ensure it was properly loaded with blanks rather than live
ammunition.
On the basis of these undisputed facts, Judge William J. McGovern, III
rendered a comprehensive oral opinion denying Cayuse's application for a retail
firearms dealer license. The judge found that Cayuse, through Stabile, failed to
12
With regard to the use of live ammunition in the theme park, the safety review
sheet stated, "NO REAL AMMO EVER! NOT EVEN LOCKED IN YOUR
CAR!!"
A-4042-17T3
7
demonstrate that it could engage in the business of selling and storing firearms
"without any danger to the public safety, health and welfare" as required by
N.J.S.A. 2C:58-2(a).
In this regard, Judge McGovern relied upon this court's seminal opinion
in In re Sportsman's Rendezvous Retail Firearms Dealer's License, 374 N.J.
Super. 565 (App. Div. 2005). In that case, the applicant had operated as a
licensed firearms dealer for over ten years. Id. at 568. An investigation revealed
that the applicant was unable to account for three firearms out of the 4300 sales
it completed during that lengthy period. Id. at 574. The trial judge concluded
that even one recordkeeping mistake of this nature was unacceptable given the
highly regulated nature of the retail firearms industry, and denied the applicant's
request for a license renewal. Id. at 574-75.
We affirmed the trial judge's decision. Id. at 567-68. In her oft-cited, and
well-reasoned opinion on behalf of the court, our former colleague, Judge
Francine Axelrad, explained that the focus under N.J.S.A. 2C:58-2(a) must be
on whether the applicant could engage in the retail firearms business "without
any danger to the public safety, health or welfare." Id. at 578. In this regard,
the judge made crystal clear that
the Legislature chose to use the adjective "any" in the
. . . requirement for issuance of a license, i.e., if the
A-4042-17T3
8
judge finds the applicant can be permitted to engage in
business as a retail dealer of firearms "without any
danger to the public safety, health or welfare." N.J.S.A.
2C:58-2(a) (emphasis added). Considering the
common-usage of "any" as "one or some, regardless of
sort, quantity, or number," Webster's II New College
Dictionary, 51 (1995), in the context of our State policy
construing the licensing requirements to limit the
availability of weapons, clearly suggests an intent by
the Legislature to give this provision broad application.
[Ibid.]
Thus, Judge Axelrad held:
It is not acceptable for the applicant to
demonstrate it can engage in the business of retailing
firearms with little danger, some danger, or even minor
danger; the standard is that it must operate without any
danger. We find completely unavailing Sportsman's
argument that because the three missing firearms have
not turned up stolen, been linked to a crime, or
recovered under dubious circumstances, they do not
pose a danger to the public. "Any" danger includes
potential danger.
[Ibid.]
Applying these same principles, Judge McGovern found that Cayuse and
Stabile, as its owner, had not demonstrated that they could operate a retail
firearms business without any danger to the public safety, health, or welfare in
light of Stabile's utter lack of responsibility in the operation of the theme park
on the same property. As Judge McGovern stated:
A-4042-17T3
9
The message . . . from Sportsman's . . . is if you're
a holder of a retail firearms dealer license, you better
run a tight ship, you're expected to run a tight ship, and
if you don't run a tight ship, you're potentially going to
have your license revoked, or if you're filing for
renewal, you're not going to get the license. And in this
case, sad to say, back in 2006 at least, Mr. Stabile was
not running a tight ship. . . . The policies and guidelines
and safety procedures that were supposed to be in place
were not being adhered to, and among other things, one
or more individuals were using firearms at that time
without having a permit to carry [them].
Judge McGovern further found that Western's conviction for violating the
State's firearms laws was properly attributable to Cayuse as well because that
new entity was the "substitute, alter[]ego" for Western, and stood "in the same
shoes [as Western] at the same location, the same business, the same place, the
same operation." In this regard, N.J.S.A. 2C:58-2(a) provides that
No license shall be granted to any retail dealer under
the age of 21 years or to any employee of a retail dealer
under the age of 18 or to any person who could not
qualify to obtain a permit to purchase a handgun or a
firearms purchaser identification card, or to any
corporation, partnership or other business organization
in which the actual or equitable controlling interest is
held or possessed by such an ineligible person.
A-4042-17T3
10
"[A]ny person [13] who has been convicted of any crime" cannot obtain a
handgun purchase permit or firearms purchaser identification card (FPIC).
N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(1). Put differently, a criminal conviction of any crime will
result in ineligibility for licensure as a retail firearms dealer under N.J.S.A.
2C:58-2.
Thus, because Western could not obtain a handgun purchase permit or an
FPIC due to its conviction for allowing unpermitted individuals to illegally carry
handguns, and Cayuse was the undisputed successor in interest to Western, the
judge ruled that this disqualification was another reason to deny Cayuse's
application. This appeal followed.
On appeal, Cayuse raises the following contentions:
POINT I
THE TRIAL COURT'S FACTUAL FINDINGS WERE
ERRONEOUS AND WERE NOT BASED UPON
SUFFICIENT, SUBSTANTIAL AND CREDIBLE
EVIDENCE.
a. THE TRIAL COURT'S FACTUAL FINDINGS
WERE BASED UPON UNRELIABLE
HEARSAY WHICH WAS NOT SUPPORTED
13
A "person," as defined by N.J.S.A. 1:1-2, "includes corporations, companies,
associations, societies, firms, partnerships and joint stock companies, as well as
individuals, unless restricted by the context to an individual as distinguished
from a corporate entity."
A-4042-17T3
11
BY A RESIDUUM OF LEGALLY
COMPETENT EVIDENCE.
b. THE TRIAL COURT'S FACTUAL FINDINGS
THAT MICHAEL STABILE WAS A DANGER
TO THE PUBLIC HEALTH, SAFETY AND
WELFARE WAS CLEARLY ERRONEOUS
AND WAS NOT BASED UPON SUFFICIENT,
SUBSTANTIAL OR CREDIBLE EVIDENCE.
c. THE TRIAL COURT'S FACTUAL FINDINGS
WERE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND WERE
NOT BASED UPON SUFFICIENT,
SUBSTANTIAL AND CREDIBLE EVIDENCE
WHEN IT DETERMINED THAT CAYUSE
AND CHEYENNE/WESTERN WORLD WERE
ONE AND THE SAME AND THAT STABILE
WAS THE CHIEF, COOK AND BOTTLE
WASHER.
d. THE TRIAL COURT'S FACTUAL FINDINGS
WERE CLEARLY ERRONEOUS AND WERE
NOT BASED UPON SUFFICIENT,
SUBSTANTIAL AND CREDIBLE EVIDENCE
WHEN IT DETERMINED THAT FILM AND
MOVIE STANDARDS ARE DIFFERENT
FROM WILD WEST CITY.
POINT II
THE TRIAL COURT'S INTERPRETATION AND
APPLICATION OF THE LAW TO THE FACTS OF
THIS CASE REQUIRE DE NOVO REVIEW.
a. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED WHEN IT
DETERMINED THAT THE CIVIL
RESERVATION DID NOT APPLY TO THIS
CASE.
A-4042-17T3
12
b. THE TRIAL COURT COMMI[T]TED
REVERSIBLE ERROR WHEN IT
DETERMINED THAT THE CARRY PERMIT
LAW APPLIES TO WILD WEST CITY.
c. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ITS
APPLICATION OF N.J.S.A. 2C:58-2(A)
BECAUSE THE REQUIREMENTS OF THE
STATUTE APPLY TO NATURAL PERSONS
(RAISED BELOW BUT NEVER ADDRESSED
BY THE COURT).
d. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN
DETERMINING THAT IT DID NOT MATTER
WHETHER [THE] SHOOTER WAS
NEGLIGENT OR PURPOSEFUL.
POINT III
THE TRIAL COURT'S EVIDENTIARY RULINGS
WERE INCONSISTENT WITH APPLICABLE LAW.
a. THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN ALLOWING
EVIDENCE AND TESTIMONY REGARDING
THE JUDGMENT OF CONVICTION OF
WESTERN WORLD IN LIGHT OF THE CIVIL
RESERVATION.
b. THE COURT ERRED IN NOT CONSIDERING
THE FACTS UNDERLYING THE GUILTY
PLEA.
c. THE TRIAL COURT ABUSED ITS
DISCRETION WHEN IT ADMITTED AND
RELIED UPON EVIDENCE PREVIOUSLY
RULED INADMISSIBLE.
A-4042-17T3
13
The scope of our review of Judge McGovern's determination on Cayuse's
retail firearms dealer's application is limited. In general, "[f]inal determinations
made by the trial court sitting in a non-jury case are subject to a limited and
well-established scope of review[.]" Seidman v. Clifton Sav. Bank, S.L.A., 205
N.J. 150, 169 (2011). "[W]e do not disturb the factual findings and legal
conclusions of the trial judge unless we are convinced that they are so manifestly
unsupported by or inconsistent with the competent, relevant and reasonably
credible evidence as to offend the interests of justice[.]" In re Trust Created By
Agreement Dated December 20, 1961, 194 N.J. 276, 284 (2008) (internal
quotation marks omitted) (quoting Rova Farms Resort, Inc. v. Investors Ins. Co.
of Am., 65 N.J. 474, 484 (1974)); see also Cayuse, 445 N.J. Super. at 89. The
court's findings of fact are "binding on appeal when supported by adequate,
substantial, credible evidence." Cesare v. Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 411-12 (1998);
see also Brunson v. Affinity Fed. Credit Union, 199 N.J. 381, 397 (2009).
That said, we review rulings on pure questions of law de novo. Manalapan
Realty, L.P. v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan, 140 N.J. 366, 378 (1993);
Sportsman's, 374 N.J. Super. at 575. However, findings that "may be regarded
as mixed resolutions of law and fact" generally receive deference on appeal,
with review "limited to determining whether there is sufficient credible evidence
A-4042-17T3
14
in the record to support these findings." P.T. & L. Constr. Co. v. State, Dep't of
Transp., 108 N.J. 539, 560 (1987).
Applying these well-established principles, we conclude that Judge
McGovern's determinations are based upon findings that are adequately
supported by the record, and Cayuse's arguments on appeal are without
sufficient merit to warrant extended discussion in a formal opinion. R. 2:11-
3(e)(1)(A) and (E). Therefore, we affirm the denial of Cayuse's application for
a retail firearms dealer license essentially for the reasons set forth by Judge
McGovern in his thoughtful oral opinion. We add the following comments.
Contrary to Cayuse's contentions, the record fully supports the judge's
determination that Cayuse, under Stabile's supervision, was unable to establish
that it could operate "as a retail dealer of firearms . . . without any danger to the
public safety, health and welfare" as required by N.J.S.A. 2C:58-2(a). Indeed,
there was no evidence pointing to a contrary conclusion.
Regardless of the specific corporate structure he operated under at any
given time, Stabile was responsible for the day-to-day operations of the theme
park and the retail firearms business. 14 In that position, Stabile handed out
14
In this regard, the testimony revealed that Stabile was a shareholder and
president of Western; a shareholder in Cheyenne, which owned the property on
A-4042-17T3
15
handguns to employees who were not legally permitted to carry them. He also
permitted employees to illegally carry their own firearms onto the premises.
Although Stabile claimed that he had safety protocols in place, they obviously
failed to prevent an employee from using a real firearm to shoot another
employee with live ammunition in the theme park.
Stabile's inattention to firearm safety concerns was clearly more egregious
than that exhibited by the unsuccessful applicant in Sportsman's. That dealer
lost three handguns, but no evidence was presented that anyone was hurt as the
result of this negligence. Sportsman's, 374 N.J. Super. 578. Nevertheless, Judge
Axelrad found that the dealer's actions plainly placed the public in danger, and
required the denial of the license application. Id. at 576. Here, Stabile's actions
have already resulted in a near-fatal shooting at the theme park where the retail
business is located. Under these circumstances, Judge McGovern's denial of the
application was clearly appropriate.
This conclusion is further bolstered by Stabile's troubling failure to tak e
responsibility for allowing unpermitted employees to illegally carry handguns
on the property. He took the position at the hearing that there was little he could
which the businesses were located; and the sole managing member of Cayuse.
All three of these businesses, as well as the Wild West City theme park, were
registered at the same address, and Stabile lived on the property.
A-4042-17T3
16
have done to prevent the July 7, 2006 incident. However, the shooting could
have easily been prevented had he not provided firearms to unpermitted
individuals in the first instance.
Stabile's claim that he was unaware that his employees could not legally
carry and use handguns on his property is also unavailing. "In the context of
gun-control laws[,] courts have held that ignorance of the law is no defense to
even a statute requiring that the defendant have 'knowingly' violated the law."
In re Two Seized Firearms, 127 N.J. 84, 88 (1992).
The judge also correctly determined that Cayuse, as the alter ego of
Western, was barred by the latter's conviction from obtaining a permit to
purchase a handgun or a FPIC. N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c). This ruling was
particularly appropriate in view of the fact that the sentencing judge in Western's
criminal case required Cayuse to abide by all of the conditions of probation
placed upon its predecessor as part of the sentence. Because Cayuse could not
obtain a handgun purchase permit or a FPIC, the judge properly barred it from
becoming a licensed retail firearms dealer under N.J.S.A. 2C:58-2(a).
We reject Cayuse's contention that the judge improperly based his
decision on "uncorroborated hearsay" contained in Lieutenant Ross's report.
First, it is well established that at a licensure hearing, "the judge may admit
A-4042-17T3
17
hearsay, but 'a residuum of legal and competent evidence in the record' must
support the court's decision." Cayuse, 445 N.J. Super. at 91 (quoting Weston v.
State, 60 N.J. 36, 51 (1972)). As discussed above, there was ample testimony
at the hearing from Stabile conceding that he was responsible for Western's
failure to abide by this State's gun possession laws in connection with that
company's conviction for violating N.J.S.A. 2C:39-5(b). In addition, the judge
properly relied upon Stabile's plea allocation testimony and Western's judgment
of conviction (JOC) itself which, under N.J.R.E. 803(c)(22), was plainly
admissible in this hearing.
On this score, Cayuse asserts that the JOC should not have been entered
in evidence because Western received a "civil reservation" under Rule 3:9-2 at
the time it pled guilty to the illegal carrying charge. We disagree.
As a general rule, a guilty plea arising from a criminal proceeding is
admissible as a statement of a party opponent under N.J.R.E. 803(b)(1). State
v. McIntyre-Caufield, 455 N.J. Super. 1, 8 (App. Div. 2018) (citing Maida v.
Kuskin, 221 N.J. 112, 125 (2015)). However, "[f]or good cause shown the court
may, in accepting a plea of guilty, order that such plea not be evidential in any
civil proceeding." R. 3:9-2.
A-4042-17T3
18
The burden of establishing good cause is on the defendant. Maida, 221
N.J. at 123. New Jersey courts "have defined two examples of what constitutes
good cause under Rule 3:9-2." McIntyre-Caufield, 455 N.J. Super. at 8. Good
cause exists if a "no-civil-use agreement . . . is necessary to remove an obstacle
to a defendant's pleading guilty to a criminal change" or if "the civil
consequences of a plea may wreck devastating financial havoc on a defendant."
Id. at 8-9 (first quoting State v. Haulaway, Inc., 257 N.J. Super. 506, 508 (App.
Div. 1992); then quoting State v. Tsilimidos, 364 N.J. Super. 454, 459 (App.
Div. 2003)).
In this case, Cayuse contends that the trial court erred when it allowed the
State to introduce the JOC since a civil reservation had been granted to Western
at sentencing. As a preliminary note, the civil reservation order does not appear
in the record. Under the letter of the rule, the trial court grants a civil reservation
by order. R. 3:9-2; see also Gallo Asphalt Co. v. Sagner, 71 N.J. 405, 408 (1976)
("Pursuant to R. 3:9-2, and with the consent of the prosecuting attorney, [the
trial court] issued two orders prohibiting the use of the guilty pleas of the two
companies as evidence . . . . ").
However, even assuming a civil reservation was granted, Judge McGovern
did not abuse his discretion by admitting the JOC because a hearing to determine
A-4042-17T3
19
whether a retail firearms dealer license should be granted is simply not the type
of "civil proceeding" envisioned by the rule. See McIntyre-Caufield, 455 N.J.
Super. at 8 (stating that "[t]he purpose of [Rule 3:9-2] is to avoid an unnecessary
criminal trial of a defendant who fears that a civil claimant will later use [its]
plea of guilty as a devastating admission of civil liability." (second alteration in
original) (quoting Stone v. Police Dep't of Keyport, 191 N.J. Super. 554, 558
(App. Div. 1983))). This licensure case does not involve the imposition of civil
liability, in contrast to a lawsuit by the employee who was shot in the 2006
incident.
Furthermore, N.J.S.A. 2C:58-2 and 2C:58-3 bar anyone with a criminal
conviction from obtaining a retail firearms dealer license. Allowing Cayuse to
rely on a civil reservation in this case would circumvent and undermine the
comprehensive statutory scheme our State has established for firearms
possession and licensing. See Application of Hart, 265 N.J. Super. 285, 288
(Law Div. 1993) ("Ownership of firearms and a criminal conviction do not mix."
(citing N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3(c)(1))).
Cayuse's remaining arguments involve its attempts to collaterally attack
Western's conviction for allowing unlicensed employees to illegally carry
handguns on the property. Cayuse argues that Western reserved its right to
A-4042-17T3
20
appeal its conviction by arguing that its employees were not required to possess
carry permits because they were engaged in a "theatrical performance" or
exhibition when they took part in the simulated gunfights in the theme park. See
Rule 3:9-3(f) (stating that a defendant can "enter a conditional plea of guilty
reserving on the record the right to appeal from the adverse determination of any
specified pretrial motion").
This argument lacks merit. Although Western filed an appeal from its
conviction, it later withdrew it. Thus, the JOC stands and was properly
considered in this civil proceeding. See State v. Gonzalez, 142 N.J. 618, 633
(1995) (holding that "a judgment of conviction may not be collaterally attacked
in an employee license revocation proceeding" because it undercut the Casino
Control Act's 15 strong policy of maintaining the integrity of the casino industry).
Cayuse also alleges that the judge erred by barring it from introducing
facts to attack Western's straightforward guilty plea, such as Stabile's claim in
his appellate brief that the employee who shot the other worker did so
deliberately after bringing ammunition to the theme park without his knowledge.
However, it is well established that a "defendant cannot attack the sufficiency
of the factual basis for his plea in the absence of an indication that he seeks to
15
N.J.S.A. 5:12-1 to -233.
A-4042-17T3
21
withdraw that negotiated plea and stand trial on all of the original charges
against him." State v. Mitchell, 374 N.J. Super. 172, 175 (App. Div. 2005).
Therefore, Judge McGovern did not err in limiting the scope of this licensing
hearing to Cayuse's eligibility for a retail firearms dealer license pursuant to
N.J.S.A. 2C:58-2 and N.J.S.A. 2C:58-3. See State v. McInerney, 450 N.J.
Super. 509, 512 (App. Div. 2017) (recognizing that evidentiary rulings should
be upheld on appeal unless "there has been a clear error of judgment" (quoting
State v. J.A.C., 210 N.J. 281, 295 (2012))).
In sum, we discern no basis for disturbing Judge McGovern's well-
supported determination that based upon Stabile's past actions and Western's
conviction, Cayuse, as Stabile's new corporate identity, should not be licensed
as a retail firearms dealer. 16
Affirmed.
16
All other arguments raised in this appeal, to the extent we have not addressed
them, are likewise without sufficient merit to be discussed. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E).
A-4042-17T3
22