RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPBRIANNATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court ." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4076-16T4
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
EDGAR A. MEJIA,
Defendant-Appellant.
___________________________
Submitted September 26, 2018 – Decided March 27, 2019
Before Judges Koblitz and Ostrer.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Monmouth County, Indictment No. 15-03-
0525.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Stephen W. Kirsch, Assistant Deputy Public
Defender, of counsel and on the brief).
Christopher J. Gramiccioni, Monmouth County
Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Mary R. Juliano,
Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Edgar A. Mejia appeals from his conviction, after a jury trial,
of first-degree aggravated sexual assault, N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2(a), and third-degree
endangering the welfare of a child, N.J.S.A. 2C:24-4(a). After merger, the court
sentenced defendant to a thirty-year prison term, subject to the No Early Release
Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2. As plain error, defendant contends the jury instruction
on aggravated sexual assault was not properly tailored, and the prosecutor made
improper comments in her summation. Having reviewed defendant's arguments
in light of the record and applicable principles of law, we affirm. However, we
remand for the court to provide the required reasons for a financial penalty it
imposed.
The indictment charged defendant with a non-specific "act of sexual
penetration with A.H." (Anna),1 who was seven years old. The State's theory at
trial was that defendant digitally penetrated Anna's vagina and touched her
buttocks, although there was evidence that defendant also penetrated the anus.
I.
Anna testified at the trial, but the State's case centered on the testimony
of the sexual assault nurse examiner (SANE nurse) who examined Anna the day
1
We utilize pseudonyms to protect the victim's privacy.
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of the assault, and Anna's video-recorded statement to a detective three days
later.
The assault occurred in the bedroom of a family friend and babysitter,
B.R. (Brianna). Brianna had asked Anna to go to the bedroom so she would not
hear the adults' conversation in the living room. Anna took with her defendant's
tablet computer, which he had earlier permitted her to use. Soon afterwards,
Brianna retreated to the bedroom's walk-in closet, to take a private phone call.
Defendant entered the bedroom a few minutes after that. Not feeling well, he
obtained Brianna's permission to rest on the bed.
Brianna was on the phone for almost a half hour. During the call,
according to Anna, defendant put his hand down her pants and underneath her
underwear. He first touched her buttocks and then her vagina. In her interview
with the detective, Anna seemed to indicate that defendant inserted his finger in
the anus and touched the vagina, but her statements were not crystal clear, even
though she used diagrams and an anatomical doll to help. Referring to the
"butt," she said defendant's hand went "like almost to the hole," "on the hole,
but a little bit through the hole," and his finger "felt like it went in." Asked if
defendant's finger went inside her vagina ("private"), Anna said, "it just felt like
A-4076-16T4
3
he was touching it." Anna said it hurt because of defendant's long fingernails.
She asked him to stop and he did.
Later that evening, Anna reported the assault to her mother, B.M. (Beth).
Beth testified that Anna said defendant touched her in her "hole" while pointing
toward her vaginal area. Anna complained that it hurt when she urinated. Beth
took Anna to the hospital.
The SANE nurse said she was told Anna had complained only of vaginal
pain. The nurse observed redness and swelling on Anna's hymenal area, around
the clitoral head, and part of the external vagina. The areas looked "brighter and
more inflamed" than normal. Anna cried out in pain when the nurse attempted
to swab the hymenal ring area, so the nurse stopped. The nurse said that an
infection or any form of irritation could cause such inflammation, but she did
not opine what caused it in Anna's case. Nonetheless, the State in summation
referred to the inflammation as circumstantial evidence of the assault.
The State also elicited testimony that defendant kept his fingernails long.
Even a character witness for the defense – defendant's landlord and occasional
employer for handyman jobs – recalled that he observed that defendant kept one
fingernail long and used it as a tool. The State also elicited that a couple days
A-4076-16T4
4
after the assault, defendant asked Brianna to say that she was in the bedroom
with him and Anna, and Brianna said that she would not lie for defendant.
Testifying in his own defense, defendant denied that he touched Anna.
The defense highlighted the differences between Anna's recorded statement to
the detective, which was relatively detailed, and her trial testimony, in which
she stated only that defendant touched her butt.
The evidence also varied regarding the extent to which the doors to the
bedroom and the walk-in closet were open. According to Anna and one of the
other adults in the apartment who testified at trial, the bedroom door was almost
closed or closed and locked. Defendant asserted it was open. The defense
preemptively elicited that defendant had a prior federal conviction for which he
received time served and twelve months probation.
II.
Defendant presents the following points for our consideration:
POINT I
IN A CASE WHERE THE EVIDENCE REGARDING
SEXUAL PENETRATION WAS EXTREMELY
LIMITED AND CONTRADICTORY, AND, IN FACT,
MOST OF THE RECITATIONS OF THE INCIDENT
BY THE ALLEGED VICTIM REFERRED TO
TOUCHING RATHER THAN PENETRATION, THE
JURY INSTRUCTION WAS NOT PROPERLY
TAILORED TO DISTINGUISH BETWEEN FIRST-
A-4076-16T4
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DEGREE AGGRAVATED SEXUAL ASSAULT --
WHICH CARRIES A DRACONIAN MANDATORY
MINIMUM OF 25 YEARS IN PRISON WITHOUT
PAROLE -- AND SECOND-DEGREE SEXUAL
ASSAULT, WHICH CAN BE PUNISHED BY NO
MORE THAN A TEN-YEAR/85% ORDINARY
PRISON TERM. (NOT RAISED BELOW).
POINT II
THE ASSISTANT PROSECUTOR'S SUMMATION
IMPROPERLY ACCUSED THE DEFENDANT OF
USING A SPANISH-LANGUAGE INTERPRETER
TO BUY TIME TO ANSWER UNTRUTHFULLY -- A
NOXIOUS ARGUMENT THAT SHOULD NOT BE
PERMITTED TO TIP THE BALANCE IN A
CRIMINAL TRIAL WHERE CREDIBILITY IS AT
STAKE. (NOT RAISED BELOW).
POINT III
A REMAND IS REQUIRED FOR A STATEMENT OF
REASONS REGARDING ONE OF THE IMPOSED
PENALTIES.
III.
A.
We first consider defendant's challenge to the court's instruction on the
aggravated sexual assault charge. Defendant notes that the judge informed the
jury that vaginal intercourse required "penetration of the . . . space between the
labia majora or outer lips of the vulva." Defendant contends the judge should
have been similarly detailed in his description of anal penetration, to avoid the
A-4076-16T4
6
possibility that the jury would conclude that merely touching the buttocks
constituted anal penetration.
We are unpersuaded. In its instruction on aggravated sexual assault, the
court instructed the jury as follows:
In order to convict the defendant of this charge
the State must prove the following elements beyond a
reasonable doubt: First, that defendant committed an
act of sexual penetration with another person; two, that
defendant acted knowingly; and, three, that at the time
of the penetration the victim was less than 13 years old.
The first element that the State must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt is that defendant committed
an act of sexual penetration with [Anna]. According to
the law, vaginal intercourse between persons or
insertion of the hand, finger, or object into the anus or
vagina by the defendant constitutes sexual penetration.
The definition of vaginal intercourse is
penetration of the vagina or of the space between the
labia majora or outer lips of the vulva. Any amount of
insertion, however slight, constitutes penetration; that
is, the depth of insertion is not relevant.
Defendant raised no objection to the charge when the judge proposed it
during the charging conference, or after he delivered it to the jury. See R. 1:7-
2 (stating that "[e]xcept as otherwise provided by R. 1:7-5 and R. 2:10-2 (plain
error), no party may urge as error any portion of the charge to the jury or
omissions therefrom unless objections are made thereto before the jury retires
A-4076-16T4
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to consider its verdict"). Therefore, we shall not reverse unless the court
committed an error "of such a nature as to have been clearly capable of
producing an unjust result." R. 2:10-2.
In the context of jury instructions, plain error is a "legal impropriety . . .
prejudicially affecting the substantial rights of the defendant and sufficiently
grievous to . . . convince the court that of itself the error possessed a clear
capacity to bring about an unjust result." State v. Hock, 54 N.J. 526, 538 (1969);
accord State v. Montalvo, 229 N.J. 300, 320-21 (2017). Not any possibility of
an unjust result will suffice as plain error, only one "sufficient to raise a
reasonable doubt as to whether the error led the jury to a result it otherwise might
not have reached." State v. Macon, 57 N.J. 325, 336 (1971).
Here, we discern no error, let alone plain error. We consider whether a
jury charge as a whole was accurate and provides "a comprehensible explanation
of the questions that the jury must determine . . . ." State v. Singleton, 211 N.J.
157, 181-82 (2012) (quoting State v. Green, 86 N.J. 281, 287-88 (1981)). "No
party is entitled to have the jury charged in his or her own words . . . ." State v.
Jordan, 147 N.J. 409, 422 (1997). A court should tailor its instruction if "the
statement to relevant law, when divorced from the facts, [would be] potentially
A-4076-16T4
8
confusing or misleading to the jury." State v. Robinson, 165 N.J. 32, 42 (2000).
We discern no possibility of confusion here.
The judge explained to the jury that both vaginal and anal penetration
required "insertion, however slight" and "the depth of insertion is not relevant."
The plain language of the instruction referred to "insertion of the hand, finger
or object into the anus or vagina." The instruction did not refer to the buttocks,
nor cause the jury to be confused that inserting a finger between the buttocks is
equivalent to inserting a finger into the anus. Notably, Anna did not use the
word "buttocks" or "anus." She referred generally to the buttocks region as a
"butt" and referred to the anus as a "hole," as she did the vagina. Furthermore,
the court's subsequent instruction of the lesser-included offense of sexual
assault, which did not require penetration, highlighted for the jury the difference
between touching the buttocks, and penetrating the anus.
We recognize that the court's instruction could have been improved. First,
there was no point in mentioning vaginal intercourse or its explanation,
inasmuch as it was not charged. Secondly, the court, without explanation,
modified the model charge by moving the sentence about the nature of required
insertion, so it followed the explanation of vaginal intercourse, instead of the
A-4076-16T4
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phrase in which the concept of insertion as penetration is first introduced. 2 Yet,
reversal is not warranted where "instructions were not so much incorrect as they
were capable of being improved." State v. Delibero, 149 N.J. 90, 106 (1997).
Also significant in our plain error analysis is that the State did not seek
conviction of aggravated sexual assault based on anal penetration.
Notwithstanding Anna's statements in her recorded interview, the prosecutor
contended in summation that defendant committed lesser-included sexual
assault by non-penetration touching of the buttocks, and aggravated sexual
assault by penetration of the vagina. She argued:
The defendant was 52 years old when he did this to
[Anna], when he chose to reach under her leggings,
under her underwear, and touch her butt with his hand,
and she felt it and his hand was moving.
Well, that, ladies and gentlemen, in and of itself
is sexual assault, but he did more. Because not only did
he touch her butt, he reached his fingers under and
around, he touched her vagina and he penetrated her.
And you know that because [Anna] said that's what
happened. [Anna] demonstrated that's what happened.
And [Anna] is corroborated by the SANE exam and all
2
"According to the law, [choose appropriate] vaginal intercourse, cunnilingus,
fellatio or anal intercourse between persons or insertion of the hand, finger or
object into the anus or vagina, either by defendant or by another person upon
defendant's instruction, constitut[es] 'sexual penetration.' Any amount of
insertion, however slight, constitutes penetration, that is, the depth of insertion
is not relevant." Model Jury Charge (Criminal), "Aggravated Sexual Assault-
Victim Less Than 13 (N.J.S.A. 2C:14-2a(1))" (rev. Jan. 24, 2005).
A-4076-16T4
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the other evidence. And that, ladies and gentlemen, that
is aggravated sexual assault.
The judge reaffirmed the State's position in the course of his charge on
endangering the welfare of a child, specifically, his reference to the nature of
the sexual conduct alleged. The judge stated:
The second element that the State must prove
beyond a reasonable doubt is that defendant knowingly
engaged in sexual conduct. Here the State alleges that
the sexual conduct committed by defendant consisted
of touching [Anna]'s buttocks and/or putting his finger
or fingers in her vagina.
In sum, we do not believe the failure to tailor the jury charge led the jury
to a result it otherwise might not have reached.
B.
We turn to defendant's claim of prosecutorial misconduct in summation.
Defendant was born in Guatemala and spoke Spanish as his "primary language."
Nevertheless, he chose to testify in English, with a stand-by interpreter. At the
outset of his testimony, defense counsel advised him that the interpreter would
assist him if he did not understand a question.
During direct examination, defendant asked counsel to repeat some
questions, but did not ask the interpreter to help. During cross-examination,
defendant asked for repetition of some questions, and interpretation of others –
A-4076-16T4
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some on topics peripheral to the key issues in the case, some not. 3 In summation,
the prosecutor attacked defendant's credibility by arguing that defendant availed
himself of the interpreter to "buy time" in answering certain questions. She
stated,
Now, listen, I know my voice was off on Thursday but
he didn't say he couldn't hear me. He needed my words
interpreted. Did he? Or was he just buying time to
think of what to say? Was he stalling? What about his
demeanor told you that was what he was doing?
Defendant contends these remarks were objectionable, as they invited the
jury to punish defendant for availing himself of an interpreter, which he had
every right to do. We agree the remarks were inappropriate on that basis.
A prosecutor may generally argue in summation that a defendant, as a
witness, did not testify credibly. State v. Bauman, 298 N.J. Super. 176, 208
(App. Div. 1999). However, a prosecutor must exercise caution in challenging
a defendant's credibility based on his exercise of a fundamental procedural right.
For example, a prosecutor may not generically accuse a defendant of tailoring
3
For example, he asked for an interpretation of the question about his
immigration to the United States, "And you lived [in Guatemala] until what
year?" He also asked for the interpreter's assistance when the prosecutor asked,
"And [Anna's] focus, when you came in [to the bedroom] was on the tablet,
correct?" Defendant also apparently had difficulty understanding the word
"ports" as used to refer to medical devices, and the word "sideburns."
A-4076-16T4
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his testimony, by pointing to the defendant's presence and ability to listen at
trial, because defendant has a fundamental right to be present. State v. Daniels,
182 N.J. 80, 97, 101 (2004). However, a prosecutor may assert specific tailoring
if based on evidence other than defendant's presence. Id. at 99.
A defendant who cannot speak or understand English has a constitutional
right to the assistance of an interpreter at trial. State v. Guzman, 313 N.J. Super.
363, 377-78 (App. Div. 1998). That right pertains not only to the ability to
understand what others are saying, but also to vindicate the right to testify on
one's own behalf. As with the right to be present, a prosecutor may not "invert"
that right by "permitting that prosecutor to punish the defendant for exercising
that which the Constitution guarantees." Daniels, 182 N.J. at 98. The prosecutor
did not point to specific evidence demonstrating that the defendant's resort to
the interpreter was calculated to buy time, or was based on any reason other than
a lack of understanding English.
As defendant did not object and prompt the court to provide a curative
instruction, he must establish plain error, the standard for which we have already
described. "[N]ot every prosecutorial misstatement warrants a new trial." State
v. Feal, 194 N.J. 293, 312 (2008). A prosecutor's improper comments must be
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"so egregious that [they] deprived the defendant of a fair trial." State v. Frost,
158 N.J. 76, 83 (1999).
They were not so here. In Feal, 194 N.J. at 313, the Supreme Court
concluded that the prosecutor's "fleeting references to defendant's presence in
the courtroom" did not lead "the jury to a result it otherwise would not have
reached," because the defendant's credibility was largely challenged on other
grounds. We reach the same conclusion in this case. The prosecutor's comment
was fleeting. Furthermore, defendant's credibility was mainly challenged on
other grounds. He lied about his fingernails. He asked Brianna to say she was
in the bedroom when she was not. Defendant had a criminal conviction. And,
his testimony was at odds with Anna's, whose allegation of vaginal touching was
apparently corroborated by the SANE nurse's physical findings.
In sum, we reject defendant's contention that he is entitled to a new trial
based on the prosecutor's comments in summation.
C.
The State concedes that the trial court omitted its reasons for imposing the
Sex Crime Victim Treatment Fund penalty. See State v. Bolvito, 217 N.J. 221,
235 (2014). We remand for the court to reconsider and provide reasons for the
penalty imposed.
A-4076-16T4
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Affirmed as to the conviction and sentence, except remanded as to the Sex
Crime Victim Treatment Fund penalty.
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