DCPP VS. A.M.P., K.S. AND M.T.J., IN THE MATTER OF THE GUARDIANSHIP OF A.S.P., J.M.J. AND J.D.J. (FG-05-0020-16, CAPE MAY COUNTY AND STATEWIDE) (RECORD IMPOUNDED)
RECORD IMPOUNDED
NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3485-17T4
NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF
CHILD PROTECTION AND
PERMANENCY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
A.M.P. and K.S.,
Defendants,
and
M.T.J.,
Defendant-Appellant.
_________________________
IN THE MATTER OF THE
GUARDIANSHIP OF A.S.P.,
J.M.J. and J.D.J., minors.
______________________________
Submitted November 1, 2018 – Decided December 5, 2018
Before Judges O'Connor and DeAlmeida.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Cape May County,
Docket No. FG-05-0020-16.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Sarah Chambers, Designated Counsel, on
the brief).
Gurbir S. Grewal, Attorney General, attorney for
respondent (Melissa H. Raksa, Assistant Attorney
General, of counsel; Jennifer Russo-Belles, Deputy
Attorney General, on the brief).
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law Guardian,
attorney for minors A.S.P., J.M.J. and J.D.J. (Meredith
Alexis Pollock, Assistant Deputy Public Defender, of
counsel; Todd Wilson, Designated Counsel, on the
brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant M.T.J. 1 (father or defendant) appeals from a March 20, 2018
judgment terminating his parental rights to his twin sons, J.M.J. and J.D.J.
(twins), presently four years of age. The twins’ mother, A.P., also lost her
parental rights to the twins, as well as to another child, A.S.P., in this
judgment, but she did not appeal from it. 2
1
We use initials to protect the parties’ and their family members’ identities.
2
M.T.J. is not the biological father of A.S.P.
2
A-3485-17T4
On appeal, the father contends the Division of Child Protection and
Permanency (Division) failed to prove by clear and convincing evidence the
four-prong standard set forth in N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a).3 After reviewing the
record and applicable legal principles, we reject the father’s contentions and
affirm substantially for the reasons expressed by the trial court in its written
opinion. In lieu of reciting at length the evidence adduced during the trial, we
3
These four prongs are:
(1) The child's safety, health, or development has been or
will continue to be endangered by the parental
relationship;
(2) The parent is unwilling or unable to eliminate the
harm facing the child or is unable or unwilling to provide
a safe and stable home for the child and the delay of
permanent placement will add to the harm. Such harm
may include evidence that separating the child from his
resource family parents would cause serious and enduring
emotional or psychological harm to the child;
(3) The division has made reasonable efforts to provide
services to help the parent correct the circumstances
which led to the child's placement outside the home and
the court has considered alternatives to termination of
parental rights; and
(4) Termination of parental rights will not do more harm
than good.
[N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a).]
3
A-3485-17T4
incorporate by reference the trial court’s findings on the material facts because
they are supported by competent evidence. See N.J. Div. of Youth & Family
Servs. v. F.M., 211 N.J. 420, 448-49 (2012). Nonetheless, we note some of the
key evidence.
At the time of trial, the father was thirty years of age. During a
psychological evaluation, he admitted to having previously engaged in various
criminal activities and was arrested numerous times. By the time of trial, he
had been incarcerated for five of the twelve years he had been an adult. In
2008, he was convicted of second-degree possession/distribution of CDS
within five hundred feet of a public housing facility, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-7.1, for
which he was sentenced to a seven-year term of imprisonment.
It is not clear when the father was released from prison, but in April
2013, he was arrested and ultimately pled guilty to third-degree distribution of
CDS, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1); third-degree distribution of cocaine, N.J.S.A.
2C:35-5(b)(3); third-degree hindering prosecution, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3(a)(5); and
third-degree theft by unlawful taking, N.J.S.A. 2C:20-3. For these
convictions, he was sentenced to a concurrent four-year term of imprisonment.
While in prison, he was charged with and pled guilty to third-degree hindering
prosecution, N.J.S.A. 2C:29-3(b)(1), for which he was sentenced to a three-
4
A-3485-17T4
year term of imprisonment. The father was released on all of the latter
convictions in August 2016.
After the twins were born in June 2014, defendant was unable to visit
with the children while incarcerated, due to the prison facility’s policy on
visitation. But while in prison, he completed two parenting classes, earned his
GED, and took a college course in business management. However, a Division
worker told the father the Division wanted him to submit to psychological and
substance abuse evaluations, as well as random urine screens, and warned non-
compliance would prevent reunification. After his release from prison, the
father did submit to a psychological evaluation, but refused to submit to any
drug testing and spurned five of the Division’s referrals for a substance abuse
evaluation.
In March 2016, the twins were placed in the home of their great aunt and
uncle, where they have lived since. These relatives want to adopt the twins.
After his release from prison in August 2016, defendant was able to
secure work. On appeal he argues the Division did not help him obtain
suitable housing, but during his psychological evaluation, conducted in
January 2017, defendant stated he did not need any services to provide a good
5
A-3485-17T4
home for his children. Further, there is evidence the Division wanted to
evaluate his home, but he declined to give the Division staff his address.
Psychologist James Loving, Psy.D., conducted the psychological
evaluation. He testified defendant does not have any significant mental health
problems. However, based upon defendant’s criminal history, Loving opined
defendant was “at extremely high risk” for recidivism. Because of this risk,
defendant may be incarcerated in the future, which implicates his ability to
parent the twins, not to mention provide them with a safe and stable home.
During his psychological evaluation, the father asserted he had not used illicit
drugs for a decade, but that claim could not be confirmed or at least
investigated because, as stated, defendant evaded submitting to drug screens
and a substance abuse evaluation.
Loving also conducted a bonding evaluation of the twins with defendant,
as well as of the twins with their great aunt and uncle. During these
evaluations, Loving noted the twins interacted with defendant in positive ways,
but he found the twins’ interaction with their resource parents to be much
stronger. Loving determined the twins did not see defendant as their father or
even as a primary person in their life. However, the twins “clearly show[ed]
that they have close, familiar, comfortable, positive relationships with their
6
A-3485-17T4
caregivers. And I would describe these attachments [to their caregivers] as
being strong and positive . . . . [T]he best plan for the kids moving forward
would be adoption by these caregivers.”
The court found Loving’s testimony credible. The father offered no
contrary expert opinion to Loving’s; in fact, he did not introduce any evidence
at all. Following trial, the trial court issued a written opinion in which it
addressed the four factors in N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a). The father raises various
arguments, claiming there was insufficient evidence to support the court’s
conclusion the Division met all four prongs in this statute by clear and
convincing evidence.
We recognize parents have a constitutionally protected right to enjoy a
relationship with their children and to raise them without State interference.
N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. E.P., 196 N.J. 88, 102 (2008).
However, this right is not absolute, as it is limited by the "State's parens
patriae responsibility to protect children whose vulnerable lives or
psychological well-being may have been harmed or may be seriously
endangered by a neglectful or abusive parent." F.M., 211 N.J. at 447. The
State has a strong public policy that favors placing children in a permanent and
stable home. See In re Guardianship of K.H.O., 161 N.J. 337, 357-58 (1999).
7
A-3485-17T4
A reviewing court should not disturb the factual findings of the trial
court if they are supported by "'adequate, substantial and credible evidence' on
the record." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.M., 189 N.J. 261, 279
(2007) (quoting In re Guardianship of J.T., 269 N.J. Super. 172, 188 (App.
Div. 1993)). We defer to the trial court's credibility findings, unless the trial
court's findings are "so wide of the mark that the judge was clearly mistaken."
N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. G.L., 191 N.J. 596, 605 (2007) (citing
J.T., 269 N.J. Super. at 188-89).
We have examined the father’s arguments the Division failed to satisfy
the four prongs of N.J.S.A. 30:4C-15.1(a). After perusing the record, we
conclude these arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant discussion in
a written opinion. See Rule 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). The court analyzed these prongs,
and its findings are amply supported by substantial and credible evidence,
mandating our deference. F.M., 211 N.J. at 448-49.
Affirmed.
8
A-3485-17T4