STATE OF NEW JERSEY VS. JAMIE CENTENO (09-06-2092, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court." Although it is posted on the
internet, this opinion is binding only on the parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4631-16T1

STATE OF NEW JERSEY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

JAMIE CENTENO,

Defendant-Appellant.

Submitted September 5, 2018 – Decided September 13, 2018

Before Judges Alvarez and Gooden Brown.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey, Law
Division, Camden County, Indictment No. 09-06-2092.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney for
appellant (Richard Sparaco, Designated Counsel, on the
brief).

Mary Eva Colalillo, Camden County Prosecutor,
attorney for respondent (Linda A. Shashoua, Assistant
Prosecutor, of counsel and on the brief).

Appellant filed a pro se supplemental brief.

PER CURIAM
 Defendant Jamie Centeno appeals from an April 27, 2017 Law Division

order denying his second petition for post-conviction relief (PCR) without an

evidentiary hearing. For the reasons stated by Judge Gwendolyn Blue, we

affirm.

Defendant unsuccessfully appealed his conviction for first-degree murder,

N.J.S.A. 2C:11-3(a)(1)-(2), and related offenses. State v. Centeno, No. A-1523-

10 (App. Div. May 2, 2012) (slip op). Defendant was sentenced to life on the

murder charge, subject to the No Early Release Act, N.J.S.A. 2C:43-7.2(a). The

Supreme Court denied certification on defendant's further appeal of his

conviction and sentence. State v. Centeno, 212 N.J. 456 (2012). Thereafter, on

October 1, 2015, we denied defendant's first PCR petition, also by way of

unpublished decision. State v. Centeno, No. A-1989-13 (App. Div. Oct. 1, 2015)

(slip op. at 1). The Supreme Court denied certification on defendant's appeal.

State v. Centeno, 224 N.J. 527 (2016). Now on appeal, defendant raises the

following points in his counseled brief:

POINT I – DEFENDANT'S CLAIMS WERE NOT
PROCEDURALLY BARRED FROM BEING RAISED
IN HIS SECOND PETITION FOR POST
CONVICTION RELIEF.

A. DEFENDANT'S CLAIMS WERE NOT
BARRED BY R. 3:22-5.

2 A-4631-16T1
 B. DEFENDANT'S CLAIMS WERE NOT
BARRED BY R. 3:22-12(a)(2).

POINT II – DEFENDANT WAS ENTITLED TO AN
EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON HIS SECOND PCR
PETITION AND CLAIM OF INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF COUNSEL BECAUSE THE
FACTS LAY OUTSIDE THE RECORD AND
DEFENDANT ESTABLISHED A PRIMA FACIE
CASE OF INEFFECTIVENESS OF FIRST PCR
COUNSEL.

A. DEFENDANT WAS DENIED
EFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF PCR
COUNSEL DUE TO FIRST PCR COUNSEL'S
FAILURE TO RAISE INEFFECTIVE
ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL COUNSEL FOR NOT
EXPLAINING TO DEFENDANT HIS RIGHT
TO TESTIFY AT TRIAL.

B. INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF FIRST
PCR COUNSEL FOR FAILING TO RAISE
INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF TRIAL
COUNSEL'S FAILURE TO REQUEST
CURATIVE INSTRUCTION DUE TO
PROSECUTOR'S PREJUDICIAL COMMENTS
DURING CLOSING ARGUMENT.

C. FIRST PCR COUNSEL WAS
INEFFECTIVE FOR FAILING TO PROVIDE
MORE THAN BARE ALLEGATIONS TO
SUPPORT DEFENDANT'S ARGUMENT
THAT TRIAL COUNSEL FAILED TO
CONDUCT PRETRIAL INVESTIGATION
AND PREPARATION.

POINT III – POST-CONVICTION RELIEF IS
REQUIRED BECAUSE OF THE CUMULATIVE

3 A-4631-16T1
 EFFECT OF THE ERRORS AND THE
INEFFECTIVENESS SET FORTH ABOVE.

In his pro se brief, defendant raises the following points:

POINT I: DEFENDANT HAS SUBMITTED PRIMA
FACIE EVIDENCE REQUIRING HE BE GRANTED
AN EVIDENTIARY HEARING ON POST
CONVICTION RELIEF.

POINT II: THE POST-CONVICTION RELIEF
JUDGE ERRED BY FAILING TO GRANT
APPELLANT AN EVIDENT[IA]RY HEARING ON
THE ISSUE OF INEFFECTIVE ASSISTANCE OF
TRIAL, APPELLATE AND PCR COUNSEL.

A. Appellant was Denied Effective Assistance of
PCR Counsel Due to First PCR Counsel's Failure
to Raise Ineffective Assistance of Trial Counsel
for Not Explaining to Defendant His Right to
Testify at Trial.

B. Ineffective Assistance of First PCR Counsel
for Failing to Raise Ineffective Assistance of
Trial Counsel's Failure to Request Curative
Instruction Due to Prosecutor's Prejudicial
Comments during Closing Argument.

C. First PCR Counsel was Ineffective for Failing
to Provide More Th[a]n Bare Allegations to
Support Defendant's Argument that Trial
Counsel Failed to Investigate Alibi Witnesses
and Failed to Properly Prepare to Cross-Examine
the State's Key Witness, Rose Nelson.

Rule 3:22-12(a)(2) states that second or subsequent petitions for PCR

asserting ineffective assistance of counsel must be filed within a year of the

4 A-4631-16T1
denial of the first or subsequent application for PCR. In this case, the first PCR

petition was decided on October 3, 2013. The second pro se petition was filed

August 17, 2016, considerably more than a year after the first was denied.

Presumably to avoid the impact of the rule, defendant now claims that the

ineffective assistance of counsel occurred on the part of first PCR counsel. The

argument does not nullify the limits found in Rule 3:22-12(a)(2), which "cannot

be relaxed by invoking Rule 1:1-2 or Rule 3:22-12(a)(1) . . ." State v. Jackson,

454 N.J. Super. 284 (App. Div. 2018). In this case, counsel did not even attempt

to explain the reason for the delay.

Furthermore, the issues defendant raises had been previously addressed

by the PCR court with the exception of a purported alibi witness. As Judge Blue

observed, on the direct appeal defendant contended the court's failure to sua

sponte instruct the jury as to passion/provocation was reversible error. This

instruction and the claim of error regarding the instruction would logically be

premised on defendant's presence at the scene. This undercuts any credibility

on the part of a purported alibi witness.

Defendant again raises the issue of his trial attorney's failure to object to

alleged prosecutorial misconduct and asserts PCR counsel was ineffective for

failing to raise it. The issue could have been adjudicated on the direct appeal.

See R. 3:22-5.

5 A-4631-16T1
 In this second PCR petition, defendant reargues the ineffectiveness of his

trial counsel and makes points that are out of time, under the guise of placing

them at the feet of first PCR counsel. Defendant does not explain the reason the

identity of his purported alibi witness would not have been previously known to

him.

Therefore, Judge Blue's denial was appropriate not only because of the

untimeliness of the second PCR petition, but its lack of substantive merit.

Defendant's contentions of error are so lacking in merit as to not warrant further

discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).

Defendant's pro se submission is also lacking in merit. The points are

attempts to raise issues out of time by claiming they should have been addressed

by the first PCR counsel, and to at least some extent, mirror those raised in the

counseled brief. No further discussion is necessary. R. 2:11-3(e)(2).

Affirmed.

6 A-4631-16T1