LINDA B. JONAS VS. EDWIN R. JONAS, III (FM-04-0259-89, CAMDEN COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3696-16T2
LINDA B. JONAS,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v.

EDWIN R. JONAS, III,

Defendant-Appellant.
_______________________________

Submitted May 16, 2018 – Decided August 17, 2018

Before Judges Nugent and Geiger.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Camden County,
Docket No. FM-04-0259-89.

Edwin R. Jonas, III, appellant pro se.

Linda B. Jonas, respondent pro se.

PER CURIAM

Defendant Edwin R. Jonas, III, was once a prominent

Haddonfield attorney. His undoing has been his inexplicable,

obstinate, unlawful, and decades-old refusal to pay child support

and alimony obligations that have accumulated since his 1990

divorce. The extreme measures he has taken over the years to
avoid his obligations include removing the parties' children from

the country, attempting to dissipate assets, making false

statements to the court, and fleeing the jurisdiction.

There have been ten post-judgment appeals involving this

action.1 This is the eleventh. Here, defendant appeals from an

April 7, 2017 order denying the following relief: modification of

a May 4, 2006 order; vacation of October 22, 1996, May 19, 1999,

and May 23, 2006 orders; and costs and counsel fees. Defendant

also appeals the grant of plaintiff Linda B. Jonas' cross-motion

to enforce litigant's rights by compelling compliance with May 4,

2006, January 30, 2008, and December 29, 2011 orders. Lastly,

defendant appeals from an April 11, 2017 order denying his motion

to transfer venue.

On appeal, defendant argues the following points: (1) the

trial court erred in applying the fugitive disentitlement

doctrine; (2) all judges of the Camden County Superior Court should

recuse themselves due to the appearance of impropriety; (3) the

judge who decided these motions ethically erred by ruling on the

underlying motions before determining defendant's motion for a

1
The previous appeals, which detail this action's lengthy
procedural history, are: Nos. A-3104-90, A-4322-90, A-1309-91, A-
1431-93, A-1342-95; consolidated appeal Nos. A-3734-95 and A-1950-
96 (App. Div. Dec. 19, 1997); No. A-5857-98; No. A-5241-05 (App.
Div. Jan. 30, 2008); and No. A-1118-10 (App. Div. Dec. 29, 2011).

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change in venue; (4) defendant was denied due process because of

the lack of notice of the motion hearing and lack of an impartial

tribunal; and (5) the motion judge erred by barring defendant from

filing any further applications and by refusing to hear the merits

of defendant's motions.

Defendant's arguments are without sufficient merit to warrant

extended discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-3(e)(1)(E). We

add only the following brief comments.

In one of the relatively early post-judgment proceedings,

defendant misrepresented to the court that he did not intend to

either leave the State with the parties' three children or

liquidate assets. He then left the country with the children,

bought a home in the Cayman Islands, and attempted to sell a

convenience store he owned. Jonas v. Jonas, Nos. A-3734-95 and

A-1950-96 (App. Div. Dec. 19, 1997) (slip op. at 4-6).

In consequence, on January 12, 1996, a Family Part judge

entered an order directing title to defendant's property in

Medford, his condominium in Florida, and his convenience store be

transferred to plaintiff. The order authorized plaintiff to "hold,

sell, liquidate or otherwise dispose of same for creation of a

constructive trust to ensure payment of spousal and child support."

Id. at 10-11. The order further provided the net proceeds of the

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sales should be held in trust by plaintiff's counsel and used to

pay outstanding support orders. Id. at 11.

We affirmed these orders. Id. at 26-27. In doing so, we

noted if defendant returned to the jurisdiction and complied with

the orders, the order of January 12, 1996, which required plaintiff

to maintain records of the trust, gave defendant "the means to

hold the plaintiff accountable" for any diversion. Id. at 27.

In a subsequent appeal, we recounted that in 2006 a Family

Part judge, considering a motion by plaintiff to enforce litigant's

rights and a cross-motion by defendant to compel an accounting of

the constructive trust, invoked the fugitive disentitlement

doctrine and dismissed defendant's cross-motion without prejudice.

Jonas v. Jonas, No. A-1118-10 (Dec. 29, 2011) (slip op. at 3). We

noted we had previously affirmed the Family Part judge's invocation

of the doctrine, as well as the judge's dismissal of defendant's

cross-motion. The judge dismissed defendant's cross-motion

without prejudice to future consideration provided defendant

personally appeared and posted a surety bond to cover all

outstanding judgments. Ibid. We continued:

Despite the clarity of this court's 1997
decision, which conditions defendant's right
to seek an accounting and appointment of an
independent trustee on compliance with court
orders, and the 2008 decision approving
application of the fugitive disentitlement
doctrine, defendant has not posted bond in the

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 judgment amount, personally appeared in court
or even filed a certification signed by him.
Instead, he filed identical, consecutive
motions to vacate orders entered prior to 2008
and compel an accounting and appointment of
an independent trustee. Defendant's only
argument respecting his entitlement to be
heard on the motions was his attorney's
representation that he could not locate an
arrest warrant.

[Ibid.]

In the case before us, without posting a bond, defendant

moved for an accounting. He is now apparently willing to appear

in court. He makes numerous allegations of impropriety against

his former wife and her attorney, and he repeatedly refers to the

value of the property that the court ordered sold to enforce his

support obligations. Conspicuously absent from his pleadings is

any mention of the current sum of money he owes for twenty-eight

years of accumulated alimony and child support, including medical

and educational expenses for his children. Also missing is any

mention of any attempt he ever made to voluntarily pay so much as

one month of alimony or child support.

In view of defendant's continuing refusal to comply with

court orders and post a bond for either past judgments or current

support arrearages, we find no error in the trial court's dismissal

of his motion.

Affirmed.

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