NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION
This opinion shall not "constitute precedent or be binding upon any court."
Although it is posted on the internet, this opinion is binding only on the
parties in the case and its use in other cases is limited. R. 1:36-3.
SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-4074-16T2
STATE OF NEW JERSEY,
Plaintiff-Respondent,
v.
JOSEPH M. DOYLE,
Defendant-Appellant.
____________________________
Submitted May 17, 2018 – Decided June 26, 2018
Before Judges Haas and Gooden Brown.
On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Law Division, Burlington County, Indictment
No. 16-05-0556.
Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney
for appellant (Michele E. Friedman, Assistant
Deputy Public Defender, of counsel and the
brief).
Scott A. Coffina, Burlington County
Prosecutor, attorney for respondent (Nicole
Handy, Assistant Prosecutor, of counsel and
on the brief).
PER CURIAM
Defendant Joseph Doyle appeals from an April 6, 2017 judgment
of conviction for third-degree possession of cocaine with intent
to distribute, N.J.S.A. 2C:35-5(a)(1) and (b)(2). Defendant moved
to suppress evidence seized without a warrant, which formed the
evidential basis for the charge. After his motion was denied,
defendant entered a negotiated guilty plea and was sentenced to a
five-year term of special probation in drug court, with an
alternative sentence of four years' imprisonment, with a one-year
period of parole ineligibility, if defendant violated probation.
On appeal, as permitted under Rule 3:5-7(d), defendant
challenges the denial of his suppression motion, raising the
following single point for our consideration:
THE STATE FAILED TO PRESENT
COMPETENT EVIDENCE TO CORROBORATE
ITS CLAIM THAT THE WIRETAP TEXT
MESSAGES AND PHONE CALLS ON WHICH
POLICE RELIED WERE OBJECTIVELY
EMBEDDED WITH "DRUG CODE." WITHOUT
THIS MISSING LINK, THE COURT
COMMITTED REVERSIBLE ERROR IN
FINDING THAT POLICE HAD REASONABLE
SUSPICION TO STOP [DEFENDANT] IN
CONNECTION WITH A NARCOTICS
INVESTIGATION.
Having considered the argument and applicable law, we affirm.
After defendant filed his suppression motion, the parties
agreed that no testimonial hearing was required pursuant to Rule
3:5-7(c); stipulated to the facts in their written submissions;
and requested that the motion judge, Judge Philip E. Haines, review
the police motor vehicle recording of the stop provided in
2 A-4074-16T2
discovery. Accordingly, in his written decision rendered on
January 17, 2017, Judge Haines made factual findings from the
undisputed facts, which we incorporate by reference and summarize
to lend context to the judge's decision.
Briefly, the Burlington County Guns, Gangs, and Narcotics
Task Force (GGNTF) and the Drug Enforcement Agency (DEA) conducted
an undercover investigation of Dante Fox, which led to an arranged
drug transaction with Fox and a confidential source in September
2015; the issuance of a communications data warrant (CDW) for
Fox's phone in October 2015; and the issuance of a wiretap order
to intercept Fox' telephone communications for twenty days from
December 14, 2015. As a result, police intercepted a number of
telephone conversations and text messages they believed referred
to drug vernacular for cocaine and drug transactions.
Two of the intercepted conversations, which occurred on
December 15 and 16, 2015, involved a request between Fox and an
individual later identified as defendant for "4 vizzles," which
police believed was coded language for a drug transaction. In
subsequent conversations on December 29 and 30, 2015, defendant
arranged a time to meet Fox at Fox's house.
On the morning of December 30, 2015, police observed a man
later identified as defendant enter Fox's home carrying a black
backpack, exit ten minutes later, and drive off in a white Ford
3 A-4074-16T2
Crown Victoria. One of the GGNTF officers conducted a motor
vehicle stop and advised defendant he was being stopped for having
tinted windows.1 Thereafter, the officers removed defendant from
the vehicle, handcuffed him, conducted a pat down, and placed him
in the back seat of a police car. During the pat down, the
officers removed $585 in currency from defendant's pockets.
Approximately one minute after the stop, a K-9 unit arrived
at the scene to perform an exterior sniff of defendant's vehicle.
The K-9 officer gave a positive hit, indicating the presence of
narcotics at the trunk and passenger side of the Crown Victoria.
Thereafter, the officers transported defendant and his vehicle to
police headquarters, after which a search warrant was obtained for
the vehicle. The resulting search of the trunk of the vehicle
uncovered a black backpack containing one ounce of cocaine.
In upholding the stop of defendant's vehicle, Judge Haines
initially recognized that defendant "was stopped as a part of a
GGNTF investigation, . . . a specialized unit with particularized
knowledge about the drug trade." After acknowledging "the training
and experience of the officers involved," and the propriety of the
officers "consider[ing] the conversation that took place between
1
Before the motion judge and on appeal, the State abandoned any
argument that the stop was justified based on a violation of the
tinted-windows statute, N.J.S.A. 39:3-74.
4 A-4074-16T2
. . . [d]efendant and . . . Fox several weeks prior to the
challenged car stop," Judge Haines concluded that "the police had
a 'particularized suspicion' that [defendant] was 'engaged in
wrongdoing' which justified the stop of his motor vehicle." To
support his decision, the judge relied "on the information obtained
from the wiretap, from the [CDW], the surveillance of [defendant]
arriving at and departing from the home of . . . Fox, and the
specialized knowledge of the [GGNTF]."2 The judge entered a
memorializing order and this appeal followed.3
On appeal, defendant "exclusively" challenges the judge's
ruling that the officers possessed the requisite suspicion to stop
the car, arguing "the record is devoid of proof corroborating
[the] claim" that "the intercepted text messages and phone calls
contained language which the officers reasonably and objectively
believed to contain 'drug code.'" We disagree.
2
The wiretap application, which was not challenged by defendant,
detailed the affiant's extensive knowledge and experience "in all
facets of narcotics investigations" while assigned to the GGNTF,
as well as the suspected involvement in drug trafficking of
defendant and his two brothers, described as associates of Fox,
whose "Cadillac [was] registered to [defendant]."
3
Because the judge found "nothing in the dash camera video nor
in the recited facts that could lead the officers to believe that
[defendant] was armed and dangerous," he determined that "the
frisk of his outer clothing" and "entry into [his] pockets" were
unlawful and suppressed the seizure of $585 in currency from
defendant's person. That ruling is not challenged on appeal.
5 A-4074-16T2
Our review of a motion judge's decision on a motion to
suppress is limited. State v. Robinson, 200 N.J. 1, 15 (2009).
We review the judge's factual findings in a suppression hearing
with great deference, State v. Gonzales, 227 N.J. 77, 101 (2016),
and "must uphold the factual findings underlying the trial court's
decision, provided that those findings are 'supported by
sufficient credible evidence in the record.'" State v. Boone, 232
N.J. 417, 425-26 (2017) (quoting State v. Scriven, 226 N.J. 20,
40 (2016)). We "disregard those findings only when a trial court's
findings of fact are clearly mistaken." State v. Hubbard, 222
N.J. 249, 262 (2015). We owe no deference, however, to the trial
court's legal conclusions or interpretation of the legal
consequences that flow from established facts. Id. at 263. Our
review in that regard is de novo. State v. Watts, 223 N.J. 503,
516 (2015).
It is well settled that the police may lawfully stop a motor
vehicle and detain the occupants on less than probable cause in
order to investigate suspicious conduct. State v. Stovall, 170
N.J. 346, 356 (2002). Such an "investigatory stop," also known
as a Terry4 stop, is characterized by a detention in which the
person approached by a police officer would not reasonably feel
4
Terry v. Ohio, 392 U.S. 1 (1968).
6 A-4074-16T2
free to leave, even though the encounter falls short of a formal
arrest. Id. at 355-56. During a Terry motor vehicle stop, a
police officer may detain an individual for a brief period, if the
stop was "based on reasonable and articulable suspicion that an
offense . . . has been or is being committed." State v. Carty,
170 N.J. 632, 639-40 (2002). Once a lawful stop is made, the
subsequent reasonable detention of the occupant of the motor
vehicle constitutes a permissible seizure. State v. Dickey, 152
N.J. 468, 475 (1998). The burden is on the State to show by a
preponderance of the evidence that it possessed sufficient
information to give rise to the required level of suspicion. State
v. Pineiro, 181 N.J. 13, 19-20 (2004).
"The principal components of a determination of reasonable
suspicion . . . [are] the events which occurred leading up to the
stop . . . , and then the decision whether these historical facts,
viewed from the standpoint of an objectively reasonable police
officer, amount to a reasonable suspicion . . . ." Stovall, 170
N.J. at 357 (alteration in original) (quoting Ornelas v. United
States, 517 U.S. 690, 696 (1996)). Determining whether a
reasonable and articulable suspicion exists depends upon the
totality of the circumstances. Pineiro, 181 N.J. at 22. In
evaluating the totality of the circumstances surrounding the Terry
stop, a reviewing court must balance "the State's interest in
7 A-4074-16T2
effective law enforcement against the individual's right to be
protected from unwarranted and/or overbearing police intrusions."
State v. Davis, 104 N.J. 490, 504 (1986).
As our Supreme Court observed in Davis,
such encounters are justified only if the
evidence, when interpreted in an objectively
reasonable manner, shows that the encounter
was preceded by activity that would lead a
reasonable police officer to have an
articulable suspicion that criminal activity
had occurred or would shortly occur. No
mathematical formula exists for deciding
whether the totality of circumstances provided
the officer with an articulable or
particularized suspicion that the individual
in question was involved in criminal activity.
Such a determination can be made only through
a sensitive appraisal of the circumstances in
each case.
[Id. at 505.]
In reviewing the totality of the circumstances, we are also
required to "give weight to 'the officer's knowledge and
experience' as well as 'rational inferences that could be drawn
from the facts objectively and reasonably viewed in light of the
officer's expertise.'" State v. Citarella, 154 N.J. 272, 279
(1998) (quoting State v. Arthur, 149 N.J. 1, 10-11 (1997)). "The
fact that purely innocent connotations can be ascribed to a
person's actions does not mean that an officer cannot base a
finding of reasonable suspicion on those actions as long as 'a
8 A-4074-16T2
reasonable person would find the actions are consistent with
guilt.'" Id. at 279-80 (quoting Arthur, 149 N.J. at 11).
Applying these principles, we discern no basis to disturb
Judge Haines' reasoned decision upholding the motor vehicle stop
that led to the seizure of a large quantity of cocaine found in
the black backpack in the trunk of defendant's vehicle. Contrary
to defendant's contention, the totality of all of the circumstances
viewed through the prism of the specialized knowledge and
experience of the members of the GGNTF in conducting narcotics
investigations clearly provided a constitutionally permissible
reasonable suspicion that defendant was engaging in criminal
activity with Fox to justify the motor vehicle stop. We are
satisfied, as was Judge Haines, that the full mosaic of the
circumstances provided the "reasonable and articulable suspicion
that an offense . . . has been or is being committed" necessary
to effectuate a motor vehicle Terry stop. Carty, 170 N.J. at 639-
40.
Affirmed.
9 A-4074-16T2