DCPP VS. A.D, D.H. AND D.C. IN THE MATTER OF N.D., DI.C., DIA.C, L.C. AND A.C. (FN-07-0365-15, ESSEX COUNTY AND STATEWIDE)(RECORD IMPOUNDED)

RECORD IMPOUNDED

NOT FOR PUBLICATION WITHOUT THE
APPROVAL OF THE APPELLATE DIVISION

SUPERIOR COURT OF NEW JERSEY
APPELLATE DIVISION
DOCKET NO. A-3127-15T3

NEW JERSEY DIVISION OF CHILD
PROTECTION AND PERMANENCY,

Plaintiff-Respondent,

v. APPROVED FOR PUBLICATION

June 11, 2018
A.D. and D.H.,
APPELLATE DIVISION
Defendants,

and

D.C.,

Defendant-Appellant.
______________________________________

IN THE MATTER OF N.D., DI.C., DIA.C.,
L.C. and A.C., Minors.
______________________________________

Submitted December 18, 2017 – Decided June 11, 2018

Before Judges Messano, Accurso and Vernoia.

On appeal from Superior Court of New Jersey,
Chancery Division, Family Part, Essex
County, Docket No. FN-07-0365-15.

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, attorney
for appellant (Thomas G. Hand, Designated
Counsel, on the briefs).

Christopher S. Porrino, Attorney General,
attorney for respondent (Andrea M.
Silkowitz, Assistant Attorney General, of
counsel; Sheena M. Rinkle, Deputy Attorney
General, on the brief).
 Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law
Guardian, attorney for minor N.D. (Margo
E.K. Hirsch, Designated Counsel, on the
brief).

Joseph E. Krakora, Public Defender, Law
Guardian, attorney for the minors, DI.C.,
DIA.C., L.C. and A.C. (Melissa R. Vance,
Assistant Deputy Public Defender, on the
brief).

The opinion of the court was delivered by

VERNOIA, J.A.D.

Defendant, D.C., appeals from a Family Part order finding

he abused or neglected his fifteen-year-old stepdaughter, N.D.

(Nancy),1 by "comitt[ing] acts of sexual abuse against" her.

Because we conclude there was sufficient credible evidence in

the record supporting the court's factual findings and abuse or

neglect determination, we affirm.

I.

On February 12, 2015, the Division of Child Protection and

Permanency (Division) responded to a Newark Police Department

referral that defendant was arrested for sexually abusing Nancy.

Defendant is Nancy's stepfather, and father to DiA.C., born in

2002, Di.C., born in 2005, L.C., born in 2008, and A.C., born in

2011.

1
We employ initials and pseudonyms to protect the children's
privacy.

2 A-3127-15T3
 Nancy reported to Newark police officers and the Division

that during the evening of February 7, 2015, defendant asked her

to check on him by text message because he was going out

drinking. She explained defendant left their home and she spoke

with him at approximately 4:00 a.m. the following morning when

he called her and asked if she was awake. Defendant then asked

Nancy to come downstairs so they could leave to get food. Nancy

agreed, got in defendant's vehicle when he arrived home, and

defendant then drove to a dark street. According to Nancy,

defendant parked the vehicle, kissed her on the lips and neck,

and forcibly inserted his finger into her vagina. Defendant

stopped when Nancy's mother, A.D., called him on the phone

asking where they were. Defendant then took Nancy to a fast

food restaurant, where he bought food for them.

Nancy further reported that on their way home, defendant

asked if she was angry with him, and that he felt "stupid" for

what he had done. Nancy said defendant had sexually abused her

since she was twelve years old. A.D. told the Division

caseworker that defendant confirmed he took Nancy with him to

purchase food on the night of the alleged sexual assault, but

denied ever sexually assaulting Nancy.

Nancy also reported prior instances of inappropriate sexual

contact with defendant. She stated defendant once "tested" her

3 A-3127-15T3
to see if she would do anything sexual with boys by touching her

on her thigh area close to her vagina and buttocks. She told

defendant to stop, and he told her she passed his "test." Nancy

reported that when she was a young child, defendant took her

clothes off while she was sleeping, but was interrupted when her

mother walked into the room. Nancy also reported that defendant

tried to hump her buttocks area when she was twelve while he was

intoxicated.

In his February 12, 2015 statements to Newark police and

the Division, defendant said he exchanged text messages with

Nancy on February 7, 2015, because "she would always check on

him if he [went] out to drink." Defendant admitted asking Nancy

to come downstairs and get into his car, and getting food with

her during the early hours of February 8, 2015. Defendant

confirmed he received a phone call from A.D. while they were

getting food, asking where they were. Defendant stated he told

A.D. that they were getting food, and returned home with Nancy

soon thereafter. Defendant denied ever touching Nancy

inappropriately.

Defendant admitted to taking Nancy "through a test about

boys." Defendant stated he only "talked her through

everything," and "never physically touched her." Defendant also

admitted he took Nancy's clothes off while she was sleeping when

4 A-3127-15T3
she was a young child, but did so because she fell asleep in

dirty clothes. Defendant denied humping Nancy's buttocks when

she was twelve.

In an interview conducted that same day, A.D. stated that

on February 8, 2015, at approximately 4:00 a.m., she noticed

defendant and Nancy were not home. She then called defendant at

approximately 4:30 a.m., and he said he called Nancy to come

downstairs and took her to get food. A.D. indicated that Nancy

and defendant then returned home.

Following her report on February 12, 2015, Nancy went to

the Newark Beth Israel Medical Center for a physical

examination, which revealed her hymen was not intact and she

suffered from pain and tenderness in her vaginal area. The

examining physician, Dr. Kereese Gayle, wrote in her notes that

her "clinical impression" was that Nancy had been sexually

assaulted and listed "sexual abuse of adolescent" as her

diagnosis.

On February 25, 2015, the Division filed a verified

complaint and order to show cause in the Law Division, seeking

the care and supervision of Nancy as well as defendant's four

biological children. The court granted the Division's request,

and ordered that defendant "remain out of the home," and "shall

5 A-3127-15T3
not have any contact with [the children] until further order of

the court."

On March 11, 2015, Nancy was admitted to the Newark Beth

Israel Medical Center's Children's Crisis Intervention Services

Unit (Crisis Unit) for a psychological evaluation. The

discharge summary described Dr. Lindsay Liotta's findings and

showed Nancy expressed feelings of suicide, anxiety and

depression. The discharge summary stated that Nancy had a

"history of being assaulted by [defendant]," the most recent

incident being two months prior to her admission in the Crisis

Unit. The discharge summary listed post-traumatic stress

disorder (PTSD) as a "diagnosis at discharge."

The court held a fact-finding hearing, but Dr. Gayle and

Dr. Liotta were not called to testify. Over defense counsel's

objection, the court admitted in evidence portions of Dr.

Gayle's report, including her diagnosis Nancy was sexually

assaulted, and Nancy's psychological records as "notes or

observations of the doctors," and rejected defendant's assertion

they included inadmissible complex diagnoses. After hearing

testimony from Division caseworker Wilmer Mendez and reviewing

Nancy's medical and psychological records, the court found the

Division established by a preponderance of the evidence that

defendant abused or neglected Nancy by "comitt[ing] acts of

6 A-3127-15T3
sexual abuse," and placed his four biological children at

significant risk of harm under N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.21(c).

In an oral decision, the court concluded Nancy's

allegations regarding the February 8, 2015 sexual assault were

corroborated, because defendant "corroborated . . . all of the

facts provided in [Nancy's] account of what occurred on the

subject night with the exception of the actual sexual assault."

The court also found Nancy "made consistent disclosures"

regarding the sexual assault, and determined it was "certainly

satisfied that [Nancy's] statement was corroborated, [and] . . .

credible."

The court placed particular emphasis on Dr. Gayle's

clinical finding that Nancy had been sexually assaulted, and

determined the Crisis Unit's discharge summary suggested that

Nancy "had not had" PTSD or become anxious and suicidal "prior

to these allegations of sexual abuse."

In its subsequent written decision, the court found

defendant abused or neglected Nancy by sexually assaulting her

on February 8, 2015, and sexually abusing her on prior

occasions. The court found defendant gave Nancy a "test" where

he rubbed her thigh close to her vagina. The court further

found defendant humped Nancy on a previous occasion, and took

her clothes off while she was sleeping. The court found

7 A-3127-15T3
defendant's admissions "sufficiently corroborate[d] [Nancy's]

statements."

The court concluded defendant's history of inappropriate

sexual conduct with Nancy placed all of the children "at

substantial risk of injury," as defendant "ha[d] not addressed

any sexual [deviance]." In its fact-finding order, the court

noted that defendant had "not admitted that this abuse occurred

or taken any steps to address the sexual abuse and mitigate the

risk of harm he poses to the other children which places the

children at significant risk of harm." The court ordered that

the children remain in the care and supervision of the Division,

and ordered defendant's placement on the Child Abuse Registry.

On February 22, 2016, after a series of compliance

hearings, the court entered an order terminating the abuse or

neglect proceedings by the consent of all parties, ordering that

defendant have no contact with Nancy, and that a prior order

requiring that defendant have no contact with his biological

children outside of Division supervision remain in effect. 2 This

appeal followed.

Defendant presents the following arguments for our

consideration:

2
Defendant was no longer living with A.D., Nancy, and his
biological children at the time the court entered its order
terminating the litigation.

8 A-3127-15T3
 LEGAL ARGUMENT

THE TRIAL COURT ERRED IN FINDING THAT
[DEFENDANT] COMMITTED AN ACT OF ABUSE OR
NEGLECT AGAINST NANCY BECAUSE NO CREDIBLE
EVIDENCE WAS PROVIDED TO CORROBORATE NANCY'S
ALLEGATIONS UPON WHICH THE TRIAL COURT MADE
ITS FINDINGS.

A. The Trial Court Erred in Finding That
Nancy's Allegations Were Corroborated By
Multiple Re-Tellings To Different People And
By [Defendant's] Statements.

B. The Trial Court Erred . . . When It
Relied On Inadmissible Evidence In Making
Its Findings Of Fact.

II.

Defendant argues the court erred by finding abuse or

neglect based solely on Nancy's statements, which he contends

were not corroborated as required by N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.46(a)(4).

Defendant challenges the court's finding that Nancy's allegation

of sexual abuse was corroborated by her repetition of the

allegation, by his own statements to police and Division

caseworkers, and by medical and psychological reports introduced

into evidence at the fact-finding hearing.

We are guided by the well-established principle that "[w]e

accord substantial deference and defer to the factual findings

of the Family Part if they are sustained by 'adequate,

substantial, and credible evidence' in the record." N.J. Div.

of Child Prot. & Permanency v. N.B., 452 N.J. Super. 513, 521

9 A-3127-15T3
(App. Div. 2017) (quoting N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v.

R.G., 217 N.J. 527, 552 (2014)). This is "[b]ecause of the

family courts' special jurisdiction and expertise in family

matters." N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.C. III, 201

N.J. 328, 343 (2010) (alteration in original) (quoting Cesare v.

Cesare, 154 N.J. 394, 413 (1998)).

"The Division bears the burden of proof at a fact-finding

hearing and must prove . . . harm . . . by a preponderance of

the evidence." N.J. Dep't of Children & Families, Div. of Youth

& Family Servs. v. A.L., 213 N.J. 1, 22 (2013). In satisfying

their burden, the Division's proofs must be "competent, material

and relevant." N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.46(b). A Family Court's

determination of whether the Division's proofs are admissible is

"left to the . . . court's discretion, and its decision is

reviewed under an abuse of discretion standard." N.J. Div. of

Youth & Family Servs. v. I.H.C., 415 N.J. Super. 551, 571 (App.

Div. 2010).

We do not, however, accord the "same degree of deference"

to Family Court findings that are based on a "misunderstanding

of the applicable legal principles . . . ." N.J. Div. of Youth &

Family Servs. v. Z.P.R., 351 N.J. Super. 427, 434 (App. Div.

2002) (citing Manalapan Realty, LP v. Twp. Comm. of Manalapan,

140 N.J. 366, 378 (1995)). We therefore review a trial court's

10 A-3127-15T3
legal conclusions de novo. State v. Smith, 212 N.J. 365, 387

(2012).

The trial court based its abuse or neglect finding in part

on Nancy's statement that defendant sexually assaulted her on

February 8, 2015. The court considered Dr. Gayle's medical

report, the Crisis Unit's discharge summary and defendant's own

statements as corroborative evidence of Nancy's statement

describing the sexual assault.

Because the trial court's rulings "essentially involved the

application of legal principles and did not turn upon contested

issues of witness credibility," we review the court's

corroboration determination de novo. See N.B., 452 N.J. Super.

at 521 (reviewing de novo the trial court's determination that a

child's statements were corroborated as required by N.J.S.A.

9:6-8.46(a)(4)).

Under N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.46(a)(4), "previous statements made by

the child relating to any allegations of abuse or neglect shall

be admissible in evidence; provided, however that no such

statement, if uncorroborated, shall be sufficient to make a fact

finding of abuse or neglect." See N.J. Div. of Youth & Family

Servs. v. P.W.R., 205 N.J. 17, 32-33 (2011).

A child's statement need only be corroborated by "[s]ome

direct or circumstantial evidence beyond the child's statement

11 A-3127-15T3
itself." N.B., 452 N.J. Super. at 522. "The most effective

types of corroborative evidence may be eyewitness testimony, a

confession, an admission or medical or scientific evidence."

N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. L.A., 357 N.J. Super. at

155, 166 (App. Div. 2003). However, corroboration of child

sexual abuse does not have to be "offender-specific," because

"[i]t would be a rare case where evidence could be produced that

would directly corroborate the specific allegation of abuse

between the child and the perpetrator . . . ." Z.P.R., 351 N.J.

Super. at 435. Rather, corroborative evidence "need only

provide support" for the child's statements and may be

circumstantial. N.B., 452 N.J. Super. at 521. The evidence

must be independently admissible for a court to deem it

corroborative of a child's statement. See id. at 524-26

(finding evidence was insufficient to corroborate the child's

statement because it constituted inadmissible hearsay).

In N.B., we cautioned that "courts must protect against

conflating a statement's reliability with corroboration," id. at

522, and determined "consistency alone does not constitute

corroboration," id. at 523. We further noted that "in

assessing the trustworthiness of a child's hearsay statement

under N.J.R.E. 803(c)(27) . . . a court may consider . . .

12 A-3127-15T3
'consistency of repetition,'" but that determination is

"distinct from corroboration of the statement". Id. at 523 n4.

It is unclear whether the court relied on Nancy's

repetition and consistency of her account of the February 8,

2015 incident to find corroboration, or simply to assess her

credibility. In any event, the mere repetition and consistency

of Nancy's statements are insufficient to support a finding of

corroboration under N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.46(a)(4). Id. at 523. We

therefore consider whether defendant's statement, Dr. Gayle's

medical report and the Crisis Unit's discharge summary provide

the corroboration required under N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.46(a)(4).

Defendant argues the conclusions in the medical report and

the Crisis Unit's discharge summary could not have corroborated

Nancy's statement because they were inadmissible. Defendant

asserts Dr. Gayle's conclusion that Nancy was sexually assaulted

and Dr. Liotta's conclusion that Nancy suffered from PTSD as a

result of the assault constituted inadmissible statements of

complex diagnoses. We agree.

Medical reports created by Division consultants for

purposes of investigating allegations of abuse or neglect are

generally admissible in fact-finding hearings as business

records. N.J. Div. of Child Prot. & Permanency v. N.T., 445

N.J. Super. 478, 487 (App. Div. 2016); N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.46(a)(3).

13 A-3127-15T3
However, expert conclusions or diagnoses within such reports are

subject to a further admissibility determination under N.J.R.E.

808. N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. M.G., 427 N.J.

Super. 154, 173 (App. Div. 2012); accord N.B., 452 N.J. Super.

at 525-26; see also N.T., 445 N.J. Super. at 487 (holding that

a non-testifying expert's "diagnoses and opinions in a Division

report are inadmissible hearsay, unless the trial court

specifically finds they are trustworthy under the criteria in

N.J.R.E. 808").

Under N.J.R.E. 808, a court may admit a non-testifying

expert's diagnosis and opinion if it finds "that the

circumstances involved in rendering the opinion, including the

motive, duty, and interest of the declarant, whether litigation

was contemplated by the declarant, the complexity of the subject

matter, and the likelihood of accuracy of the opinion, tend to

establish its trustworthiness." N.T., 445 N.J. Super. at 501.

"An expert medical opinion contained in a report is

generally inadmissible under [this] test because of the

complexity of the analysis involved in arriving at the opinion

and the consequent need for the other party to have an

opportunity to cross-examine the expert." Ibid. (citation

omitted); see also Konop v. Rosen, 425 N.J. Super. 391, 405

(App. Div. 2012) (citations omitted) (noting that "medical

14 A-3127-15T3
opinions in hospital records should not be admitted under the

business records exception where the opponent will be deprived

of an opportunity to cross-examine the declarant on a critical

issue such as the basis for the diagnosis or cause of the

condition in question").

In N.T., 445 N.J. Super. at 490, we applied the above

principles in determining whether the trial court erred by

admitting a non-testifying psychologist's evaluation diagnosing

the child with PTSD. We determined that although the

psychologist's factual observations were admissible, the

opinions and diagnoses contained in the evaluation were not.

Id. at 500. We concluded that psychological evaluations, like

medical opinions, "generally 'entail[] the exercise of

subjective judgment rather than a straightforward, simple

diagnosis based upon objective criteria or one upon which

reasonable professionals could not differ.'" Id. at 501

(alteration in original) (quoting M.G., 427 N.J. Super. at 174).

We further noted that an "evaluation of a mental state . . . is

among the most 'complex diagnoses.'" Ibid. (citation omitted).

In James v. Ruiz, 440 N.J. Super. 45, 72 (App. Div. 2015),

we determined the trial court erred in admitting a non-

testifying doctor's disputed conclusion that a CT-scan revealed

a "disc bulge." We noted that even though we had "no reason to

15 A-3127-15T3
believe that the 'motives, duties and interest[s]' of [the

doctor] were anything other than benign," id. at 72, his

conclusions were "sufficiently complex and controversial to

require them to be excluded" under N.J.R.E. 808, id. at 73.

Dr. Gayle's statement in the medical report that Nancy was

sexually assaulted was inadmissible because it is "sufficiently

complex and controversial," ibid., constitutes an opinion on "a

critical issue such as the . . . cause of the condition in

question," Rosen, 425 N.J. Super. at 405, and is based on Dr.

Gayle's "subjective judgment," N.T., 445 N.J. Super. at 500.

We find no basis to conclude that Dr. Gayle's conclusion was

based solely on objective criteria, or upon criteria "which

reasonable professionals could not differ." Id. at 501. It was

error for the trial court to admit and rely upon that portion of

Dr. Gayle's report containing her conclusion and diagnosis that

Nancy was sexually assaulted.

For the same reasons, the Crisis Unit's discharge summary

stating Nancy suffered from PTSD as a result of alleged sexual

abuse was inadmissible under N.J.R.E. 808. As we noted in N.T.,

"evaluation of a mental state . . . is among the most 'complex

diagnoses.'" Id. at 501; see also N.B., 452 N.J. Super. at 526

(holding that the trial court erred in admitting the

psychologist's PTSD diagnosis because PTSD "is a complex

16 A-3127-15T3
diagnosis given the disorder's definitions, which notably

include a wide variety of symptoms, and is not a monolithic

disease with a uniform structure that does not permit individual

variation").

We find no basis to depart from these principles, and

conclude the court erred in admitting the PTSD diagnosis without

testimony from Dr. Liotta regarding how she reached that

diagnosis. N.B., 452 N.J. Super. at 526. Thus, neither the

Crisis Unit's PTSD diagnosis nor Dr. Gayle's conclusion that

Nancy was sexually assaulted constituted admissible

corroborative evidence of Nancy's statement under N.J.S.A. 9:6-

8.46(a)(4). Ibid.

Because we conduct a de novo review of the court's

determination of whether there was sufficient corroboration to

permit reliance on Nancy's statements, we next consider whether

there was other admissible evidence supporting a finding of

corroboration under N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.46(a)(4). See id. at 521.

Based on our review of the record, we are convinced that

although the court erred by admitting Dr. Gayle's diagnosis that

Nancy was sexually assaulted, Dr. Gayle's factual and objective

findings that Nancy suffered from tenderness in her vaginal area

and her hymen was not intact provided "some" admissible

17 A-3127-15T3
circumstantial evidence corroborating Nancy's statements. Id.

at 522.

In N.B., the trial court relied upon a non-testifying

psychologist's report that the child suffered from PTSD "as a

result of exposure to domestic violence" to support its finding

of sufficient corroboration under N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.46(a)(4). Id.

at 523. On appeal, we determined that although the conclusion

was an inadmissible complex diagnosis, the psychologist's

objective "factual observations" were admissible. Id. at 526;

see also N.T., 445 N.J. Super. at 490 (determining factual

observations are admissible).

Dr. Gayle's factual observations, made four days after the

alleged sexual assault, that Nancy had tenderness in her vaginal

area and that her hymen was not intact constituted "some"

circumstantial evidence corroborating Nancy's statement that

defendant "forcibly" digitally penetrated her vagina. See N.B.,

452 N.J. Super. at 522 (requiring "[s]ome direct or

circumstantial evidence beyond the child's statement"). We do

not determine that Dr. Gayle's factual observations

independently establish that Nancy was sexually assaulted. That

issue is not before us. Rather, we determine only that Dr.

Gayle's objective findings of injuries to Nancy's vaginal area

provide some circumstantial evidence corroborating Nancy's

18 A-3127-15T3
statement that defendant sexually assaulted her in the manner

she described in her statements. Id. at 521-22.

Moreover, the court did not err in finding defendant's

statements provided additional corroboration of Nancy's

statements. Defendant argues that he "only admitted to being

with Nancy at the time of [the] allegations," and "[p]resence,

alone cannot satisfy the corroboration requirement." This

argument ignores, however, that defendant did not simply state

he was with Nancy at the time of the alleged assault, but rather

he corroborated many of the details concerning the circumstances

Nancy described surrounding the alleged sexual assault, with the

exception of the sexual assault itself. We are convinced that

his admission of those details, when coupled with Dr. Gayle's

objective findings of injuries to Nancy's vaginal area, provide

more than sufficient corroboration of Nancy statements

describing the sexual assault to satisfy the requirements of

N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.46(a)(4).

In Z.P.R., there was no direct evidence corroborating the

child's sexual assault allegation. 351 N.J. Super. at 432.

Rather, the Division presented evidence that the child possessed

"precocious sexual knowledge." Id. at 436. The trial court

determined this did not sufficiently corroborate the child's

statements regarding a parent's alleged sexual abuse. Ibid. We

19 A-3127-15T3
reversed, holding that "we have no doubt that evidence of age-

inappropriate sexual behavior could provide the necessary

corroboration required by N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.46(a)(4)." Ibid.

In N.J. Div. of Youth & Family Servs. v. H.B., 375 N.J.

Super. 148, 154-55 (App. Div. 2005) the Division3 alleged that

the defendant exposed her daughter, Cathy, to "the risk of

emotional and physical harm by permitting her husband . . . ,

Cathy's stepfather, to reside in the home after learning" that

Cathy had accused him of sexually molesting her. On appeal, the

Division argued that the trial court erred in determining the

stepfather's Megan's Law status was inadmissible to corroborate

Cathy's allegations he sexually assaulted her. Id. at 156. We

reversed, holding that "the details of [the stepfather's prior

conviction for a sex offense was] directly relevant to

establishing whether he in fact molested Cathy . . . [because

they] may . . . reveal similarities in the 'plan' or

'preparation' utilized by [the defendant] . . . ." Id. at 181.

Although "eyewitness testimony, a confession, [or] an

admission," would be most effective in establishing

corroboration, L.A., 357 N.J. Super. at 166, only "[s]ome direct

or circumstantial evidence . . . is required," N.B., 452 N.J.

3
Pursuant to L. 2012, c. 16, effective June 29, 2012, the
Division of Youth and Family Services was renamed the Division
of Child Protection and Permanency.

20 A-3127-15T3
Super. at 522. Defendant's admissions corroborated almost every

detail of Nancy's statements concerning the alleged sexual

assault, including the text message exchange between them

earlier in the night, when he picked her up, where they went,

and when they returned. The court did not err in finding that

defendant's statements sufficiently corroborated Nancy's

account, because they "provid[ed] support for" her statement,

N.B., 452 N.J. Super. at 521, and "relate[d] directly to"

defendant, L.A., 357 N.J. Super. at 166. In addition, Dr.

Gayle's objective findings provided some evidence corroborating

the only detail defendant denied – that he forcibly digitally

penetrated Nancy's vagina.

We are therefore satisfied Nancy's statement was

sufficiently corroborated and the Division provided sufficient

credible evidence supporting the court's finding that defendant

abused or neglected Nancy by sexually assaulting her on February

8, 2015, and placed his biological children at substantial risk

of harm as a result. N.B., 452 N.J. Super. at 513, 521.

We also observe that defendant does not contend the court

erred in its findings concerning his four biological children,

or argue that Nancy's remaining sexual assault allegations

supporting that finding were uncorroborated. Generally, an

issue not briefed on appeal is deemed waived. Jefferson Loan

21 A-3127-15T3
Co. v. Session, 397 N.J. Super. 520, 525 n.4 (App. Div. 2008);

Zavodnick v. Leven, 340 N.J. Super. 94, 103 (App. Div. 2001).

We nevertheless consider whether Nancy's remaining allegations

of prior instances of sexual abuse were sufficiently

corroborated to support the court's finding of abuse or neglect.

As noted, the court's abuse or neglect finding was not

limited to the February 8, 2015 sexual assault. The court also

based its abuse or neglect finding on Nancy's reports that

defendant sexually touched her on three prior occasions. With

regard to her statement regarding the "test," defendant admitted

he "took [Nancy] through a test about boys," but denied having

physical contact. He stated he did so to teach Nancy "what boys

can do to get slick and get their feel off on young girls." As

with the February 8, 2015 assault, the only fact defendant

failed to corroborate was the inappropriate sexual touching

itself. Although defendant makes no arguments otherwise, we

find that his admission concerning the administration of the

"test" provide some evidence supporting Nancy's version of the

event and therefore provides sufficient corroboration of Nancy's

account under N.J.S.A. 9:6-8.46(a)(4). N.B., 452 N.J. Super. at

522.

Nancy also reported that defendant took her clothes off

while she was sleeping. Defendant admitted he did so, but

22 A-3127-15T3
denied any sexual intentions. We again find defendant's

admission provided sufficient corroboration of Nancy's statement

to permit the court's reliance on Nancy's version of the event.

Ibid.

Lastly, Nancy described that defendant humped her from

behind when she was twelve. Our review of the record, however,

reveals no admissible evidence corroborating Nancy's statement

concerning that event. Nancy's mere repetition of her account

was insufficient. Id. at 523.

Although the Division did not provide sufficient

corroboration to warrant the court's consideration of Nancy's

statement concerning that event, we are satisfied the totality

of the admissible evidence corroborates Nancy's statements

concerning the other events and supports the court's findings of

abuse or neglect of the five children.

Defendant's remaining arguments are without merit

sufficient to warrant discussion in a written opinion. R. 2:11-

3(e)(1)(E).

Affirmed.

23 A-3127-15T3