United States Court of Appeals
Fifth Circuit
F I L E D
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE FIFTH CIRCUIT June 16, 2006
______________________
Charles R. Fulbruge III
No. 05-41492 Clerk
Summary Calendar
______________________
ELIZABETH TEAGUE, a/n/f of C.R.T.
Plaintiff - Appellant,
v.
THE TEXAS CITY INDEPENDENT SCHOOL DISTRICT,
Defendant - Appellee.
______________________
Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Southern District of Texas
C.A. No. G-04-558
______________________
Before HIGGINBOTHAM, BENAVIDES, and DENNIS, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:*
Appellant sued the Texas City Independent School District
(“TCISD”) as next friend of her daughter, C.R.T. She claimed that
TCISD violated C.R.T.’s constitutional rights. The district court
granted summary judgment in favor of TCISD. We affirm in light of
the general rule that the state’s failure to protect an individual
from private harm does not state a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983.
This case arises out of an unfortunate incident. Appellant
alleges that C.R.T., then an eighteen-year-old special education
*
Pursuant to 5th Cir. R. 47.5, this Court has determined
that this opinion should not be published and is not precedent
except under the limited circumstances set forth in 5th Cir. R.
47.5.4.
student attending Texas City High School, was sexually assaulted by
another special education student on TCISD’s watch. TCISD disputes
Appellant’s version of the facts, and the district court
characterized TCISD’s role in the incident as “benign.” As this
appeal arises from summary judgment, we view the record in the
light most favorable to Appellant. Appellant argues that TCISD
should be held liable for the incident, which occurred on school
grounds, under section 1983.
Ordinarily, governmental entities have no constitutional duty
to protect individuals from private violence. See DeShaney v.
Winnebago County Dep’t of Soc. Servs., 489 U.S. 189, 196–97 (1989).
To secure liability against the state for private harm under
section 1983, plaintiffs must show that their claims fit within the
narrow class of exceptions to the Deshaney rule. Deshaney itself
recognized one exception: the state may be liable for private harm
where it has a “special relationship” with the plaintiff. Id. at
197–200. Additionally, out-of-Circuit cases have adopted a “state-
created danger” exception to Deshaney. See generally McClendon v.
City of Columbia, 305 F.3d 314, 324–26 (5th Cir. 2002) (en banc).
Neither the special relationship exception nor the state-
created danger exception applies here. No special relationship
existed because C.R.T.—an eighteen-year-old not subject to
compulsory attendance laws—was not “involuntarily confined against
h[er] will through the affirmative exercise of state power.”
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Walton v. Alexander, 44 F.3d 1297, 1299–1306 (5th Cir. 1995) (en
banc). As to the state-created danger theory, we assume without
deciding that it would be viable in this Circuit. That exception
would be inapposite here because the evidence does not create a
genuine issue of fact that TCISD had “actual knowledge” of, and
disregarded, an “excessive risk” to C.R.T. See McClendon, 305 F.3d
at 326 & n.8. For these reasons, the district court correctly
granted summary judgment against Appellant’s private-harm claim.
Not every one of Appellant’s claims derive from the alleged
private harm. She also alleges that school employees used
excessive force in searching C.R.T. after the incident. The
district court correctly found that Appellant did not raise a
genuine issue of material fact as to this claim. Appellant did not
produce evidence that the alleged excessive force resulted from an
official policy of TCISD, a precondition of it being liable for the
acts of its employees under section 1983. See Beattie v. Madison
County Sch. Dist., 254 F.3d 595, 600 n.2 (5th Cir. 2001).
For these reasons, the district court’s judgment is AFFIRMED.
3