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[DO NOT PUBLISH]
IN THE UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS
FOR THE ELEVENTH CIRCUIT
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No. 17-14802
Non-Argument Calendar
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D.C. Docket No. 2:16-cv-00085-JES-MRM
MICAH L. LAWSON,
Petitioner-Appellant,
versus
SECRETARY, DEPARTMENT OF CORRECTIONS,
Respondent-Appellee.
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Appeal from the United States District Court
for the Middle District of Florida
________________________
(August 28, 2019)
Before WILLIAM PRYOR, GRANT and FAY, Circuit Judges.
PER CURIAM:
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Micah L. Lawson, a Florida prisoner, appeals the denial of his petition for a
writ of habeas corpus. 28 U.S.C. § 2254. Lawson succeeded in having two
convictions vacated on direct appeal as barred by the statute of limitation in a
decision of first impression, but he was denied state postconviction relief on his
claim that counsel was ineffective for failing to make a similar timeliness argument
before trial, see Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850. We issued a certificate of appealability to
address “[w]hether trial counsel’s failure to move for a dismissal of the charge of
lewd or lascivious battery upon an elderly person and the charge of abuse of an
elderly person resulted in Lawson receiving a longer sentence for his conviction of
burglary of a dwelling with assault or battery.” Because the Florida courts
reasonably concluded that Lawson suffered no prejudice from counsel’s
performance, we affirm.
I. BACKGROUND
In January 2003, a burglar sexually assaulted a 76-year-old female in her
home in Lee County, Florida. Detectives collected biological evidence from the
victim, but her assailant remained unknown for several years. In November 2008,
the Florida Department of Law Enforcement matched a specimen collected from
Lawson with the biological evidence collected during the investigation.
In 2004 and 2006, the Florida Legislature amended the statute imposing time
limitations in criminal cases to allow the state to prosecute specific sex crimes after
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identifying the offender using biological evidence. The 2004 amendment provided
that “a prosecution for . . . [a]n offense of sexual battery under chapter 794 [and
for] [a] lewd or lascivious offense . . . may be commenced within 1 year after the
date on which the identity of the accused is established . . . through the analysis of
deoxyribonucleic acid (DNA) evidence . . . .” Fla. Stat. § 775.15(8)(a). That
“subsection applie[d] to any offense that [was] not otherwise barred from
prosecution on or after July 1, 2004.” Id. § 775.15(8)(b). The 2006 amendment
retained the one-year extension so long as the offense was “not otherwise barred
from prosecution between July 1, 2004, and June 30, 2006.” Id. § 775.15(15)(b).
The 2006 amendment also provided that the prosecution of eight specific offenses,
including the two identified in the earlier amendment, could “be commenced at any
time after” the offender was identified using biological evidence, id.
§ 775.15(16)(a), so long as the offense was “not otherwise barred from prosecution
on or after July 1, 2006,” id. § 775.15(16)(b).
On November 20, 2008, the State Attorney filed a three-count information
charging Lawson for burglary of a dwelling with assault or battery, a first-degree
felony punishable by a sentence of up to life imprisonment, id. § 810.02(2); lewd
or lascivious battery of an elderly person, a second-degree felony, id.
§ 825.1025(2), and abuse of an elderly person, a third-degree felony id.
§ 825.102(1). After a Florida jury found Lawson guilty of the three crimes, the
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trial court sentenced him to concurrent terms of 65 years of imprisonment for
burglary, 15 years of imprisonment for lewd or lascivious battery, and 5 years of
imprisonment for elder abuse.
On direct appeal, Lawson succeeded in having his convictions for the two
lesser offenses vacated. Lawson v. State, 51 So. 3d 1287 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2011).
The appellate court found that the three-year statute of limitation applicable to
Lawson’s offenses of lewd or lascivious battery and of elder abuse, Fla. Stat.
§ 775.15(2)(b) (2002), expired on January 25, 2006. Lawson, 51 So. 3d at 1288.
The appellate court concluded that the amendments to section 775.15 did not
extend the time within which to prosecute Lawson’s battery offense because the
statute of limitation expired “between July 1, 2004, and July 30, 2006,” under
subsection 15 and before “subsection (16) took effect on July 1, 2006.” Id. The
appellate court also concluded that the amendments did “not apply to the offense of
abuse of an elderly person” and could not extend the limitation period to prosecute
Lawson for that offense. Lawson, 51 So. 3d at 1289.
Lawson moved pro se for state postconviction relief and argued that trial
counsel was ineffective for failing to move to dismiss his charges for lewd or
lascivious battery and for elder abuse. See Fla. R. Crim. P. 3.850. Lawson alleged
that he told his two attorneys that the statute of limitation barred his prosecution
for the two offenses, but they disagreed. Lawson also alleged that, “[h]ad [he] only
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been facing count one [for burglary] he would not [have gone] to trial and counsel
could ha[ve] pursued a more favorable plea bargain than the 25 years initially
offered the day of trial.”
The trial court held an evidentiary hearing on Lawson’s motion. Lawson
testified that attorney Christopher Whitney “never really responded” to his
concerns about the statute of limitation and that attorney Tiffany Chewing told him
that the biological evidence extended the limitations period to prosecute his
offenses. Attorney Whitney testified that the state offered for Lawson to plead
guilty to his three charges in exchange for a sentence of 25 years of imprisonment,
but Lawson was disinterested in the plea offer. Trial counsel also testified that his
“research of the statute led [him] to believe that because of the DNA . . . there was
no time bar” to Lawson’s prosecution.
The trial court denied Lawson’s postconviction motion. Fla. R. Crim. P.
3.850. The trial court ruled that trial counsel’s representation was neither deficient
nor prejudicial under the two-part standard of Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S.
668 (1984). The trial court found that trial counsel did not act deficiently by failing
to move to dismiss the charges because the amendments to 775.15 could be
interpreted as giving “the State . . . one year from the date that [Lawson’s] identity
. . . had been established, . . . until November 4, 2009, in which to prosecute” him.
The trial court also found that, even if Lawson’s two lesser charges had been
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dismissed, it could have “imposed a life sentence for the conviction of burglary
with assault or battery” and “would have imposed the same sentence of 65 years
for [the] conviction . . . .” Lawson appealed, and the state appellate court affirmed
summarily. Lawson v. State, 182 So. 3d 649 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015).
Lawson filed a federal petition for a writ of habeas corpus and repeated his
claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. See 28 U.S.C. § 2254. The district
court denied the writ. The district court ruled that Lawson’s claim “clearly fails to
satisfy Strickland’s prejudice prong” because the trial court “has already told us
what would have happened if Counsel had successfully moved to remove counts
two and three from the information—Lawson would have still received a sixty-five
sentence on count one.”
II. STANDARD OF REVIEW
We review de novo the denial of a petition for a writ of habeas corpus
involving a claim of ineffective assistance of counsel. Gissendaner v. Seaboldt,
735 F.3d 1311, 1316 (11th Cir. 2013). A state prisoner is entitled to a writ of
habeas corpus only if the state court reached a decision that was “contrary to, or
involved an unreasonable application of, clearly established Federal law” or
“resulted in a decision that was based on an unreasonable determination of the
facts in light of the evidence presented in the state court proceeding.” 28 U.S.C.
§ 2254(d). The “determination of a factual issue . . . by a State court [is] presumed
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to be correct” unless the state prisoner can rebut the presumption with “clear and
convincing evidence.” Id. § 2254(e)(1). “A state court’s determination that a claim
lacks merit precludes federal habeas relief so long as ‘fairminded jurists could
disagree’ on the correctness of the state court’s decision.” Woods v. Etherton, 136
S. Ct. 1149, 1151 (2016) (quoting Harrington v. Richter, 562 U.S. 86, 101 (2011)).
III. DISCUSSION
Lawson argues that the state court unreasonably applied Strickland in
denying his claim of ineffective assistance of trial counsel. Lawson contends that
trial counsel’s performance was deficient because he would have succeeded in
having Lawson’s charges for lewd or lascivious battery and for elder abuse
dismissed, as evidenced by Lawson’s success in having the convictions vacated on
direct appeal. Lawson also contends that he was prejudiced because he would have
received an offer from the state to plead guilty to the remaining charge of burglary
of a dwelling with assault or battery, Fla. Stat. § 810.02(2), in exchange for a
sentence less than 25 years of imprisonment. We need not address whether
counsel’s conduct was deficient because the ruling of the state court that Lawson
failed to prove prejudice did not constitute an unreasonable application of
Strickland or an unreasonable determination of fact.
Lawson must “[s]urmount[] [a particularly] high bar” to obtain a writ of
habeas corpus based on ineffective assistance of counsel. Padilla v. Kentucky, 559
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U.S. 356, 371 (2010). He must prove that his attorney’s performance was deficient
and that the deficiency prejudiced his defense. Strickland, 446 U.S. at 687. To
prove prejudice, Lawson has to establish that the outcome of the plea process
would have been different but for counsel’s deficient performance. Lafler v.
Cooper, 566 U.S. 156, 163 (2012). Lawson must prove “there is a reasonable
probability that [a] plea offer would have been presented to the court . . ., that the
court would have accepted its terms, and that the conviction or sentence, or both,
under the offer’s terms would have been less severe than under the judgment and
sentence that in fact were imposed.” Id. at 164.
Lawson cannot satisfy the first and last elements of the Lafler test. Lawson’s
argument that he would have received an offer to plead guilty to his charge of
burglary of a dwelling with assault or battery, Fla. Stat. § 810.02(2), is wholly
speculative. “[A] defendant has no right to be offered a plea . . . .” Missouri v.
Frye, 566 U.S. 134, 148 (2012). Lawson also assumes that the state would have
offered a sentence less than what it offered in exchange for his pleas of guilty to
burglary and two other offenses. Not only is it impossible to predict what sentence
the prosecutor might have offered, it is quite possible that the state would have
recommended a sentence equal to or longer than 25 years of imprisonment.
Lawson’s burglary crime was a first-degree felony for which he faced a sentence of
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up to imprisonment for life. See Fla. Stat. § 810.02(2). Prejudice cannot be based
on speculation and conjecture.
Lawson also cannot establish that the trial court would have accepted an
agreement recommending that he receive a sentence of 25 years of imprisonment
or less. See Lafler, 566 U.S. at 164; see also Frye, 566 U.S. at 148 (“a defendant
has no . . . federal right that the judge accept” a plea agreement). The trial court
stated, when it denied Lawson’s motion for state postconviction relief, that it
would have “imposed the same sentence of 65 years” for his burglary crime even if
his lesser offenses had been dismissed. And the nature of Lawson’s crime and his
background would have supported a harsh sentence. See Imbert v. State, 154 So. 3d
1174, 1176 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2015) (holding a trial court can consider uncharged
conduct in selecting a sentence); Fla. Stat. § 921.231(1)(c) (providing that a
presentence investigation report “shall include . . . [t]he offender’s prior record of
arrests and convictions”). The victim, a 76-year-old woman, called 911 and
reported that she had been raped, and the semen collected from her identified
Lawson as her assailant. In addition to that, trial counsel stated during the state
postconviction hearing that Lawson had made a statement to law enforcement
about the crime “[t]hat would not have been favorable to his case at all” and that
Lawson had a “prior criminal history that would be used to impeach his
credibility.”
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The district court correctly denied Lawson federal habeas relief. The Florida
courts reasonably determined that Lawson failed to establish prejudice. Lawson
failed to prove that there was a reasonable probability that the outcome of the plea
process would have been different had counsel succeeded in having his charges for
lewd and lascivious battery and for elder abuse dismissed. See Lafler, 566 U.S. at
164. Lawson offered no evidence that he would have received what he deemed an
acceptable offer to plead guilty that the trial court would have accepted.
IV. CONCLUSION
We AFFIRM the denial of Lawson’s petition for a writ of habeas corpus.
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Micah L. Lawson v. Secretary, Department of Corrections
Combined Opinion